Because of the overly large paragraph adaptation by Apte, reading the translation is breathless and not as easily connected to the Devanāgari as I would have wished. So this here is a temporary format of the translation.(Upaniṣad Śānti Mantras) Adhyāyas (Chapters): Ch. 1
I will be reformatting to include the Devanāgari sentences interspersed with their English translations. This also matches how this Sūtra Bhāṣyam is studied and discussed sentence-by-sentence, instead of read like a novel or text book. Until then – which will take more than a month or two – I am offering this intermediary format.
by A.K. Aruna
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/, or click the following logo:
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
(The Sūtra-kāra) therefore, now in the first place states the opposition (to the Vedānta view) based on Smṛti, and refutes it, thus: —Smṛti: the Sāṅkhya philosophy; An-avakāśa: no room; Doṣa: defect; Prasaṅgaḥ: Result, chance; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Na: not; Anya-smṛti: other Smṛtis; An-avakāśa-doṣa-prasaṅgāt: because there would result the defect of want of room for other Smṛtis.🔗 If it be said (that Brahman is not the cause of the world) because there would be the predicament of the fault of want of scope for a certain Smṛti, (we reply), no, because, thus, there would be the predicament of a fault of the want of scope for another Smṛti. — 2.1.1. (Says the opponent) — What you have said, viz. that the Omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world, is not logical. How so? Because thereby occurs the predicament of the fault of the want of scope of a (certain) Smṛti. Because, in that case the Smṛti known as (Sāṅkhya) Tantra, promulgated by the great sage (Kapila) and accepted by learned people, and the other Smṛtis which follow this (Tantra) Smṛti would be without any scope. In those Smṛtis the non-sentient Pradhāna is spoken of as the independent cause of the world. On the other hand, the Smṛtis of Manu and others, which purport to mention all matters of religious duties such as Agni-hotra etc. as having the characteristic of an injunction, would be having due scope; as for instance — that (a man of) such and such caste should receive initiation by the investiture of a sacred thread at such and such time and by such and such rite, it has such and such rule of conduct, its study of Vedas should be in such and such a way, a pupil’s return home after finishing his course of holy study should be in such and such a way, and in such and such a way should he enter wedlock (i.e., lit., should be joined with a coadjutor in religious duties). They give injunctions about the proper aims of life, and the various religious duties of the castes (Varṇas) and the various types of the orders of life (Āśramas). The Smṛtis of Kapila etc. have no such scope with regard to the subject of the performance of rites, as they have been written with special reference to the correct knowledge as a means of bringing about Final Release, and if they don’t have scope even for that, then they would be rendered meaningless. Therefore, Vedāntas ought to be explained by avoiding any conflict with them. But when the meaning of Scriptures is determined thus, viz. that the Omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world, on the grounds of “thinking etc.”, how ever can it be objected to on the ground of any such predicament as that of a fault of want of scope for a certain Smṛti? May be, no such objection can arise in the case of those whose intellect is independent, but in the case of ordinary men who depend upon others for knowledge, and are unable to understand the meaning of the Scriptures independently, and who may well depend upon Smṛtis written by well-known authors (such as Kapila), and who would understand the meaning of Scriptures on the strength of these Smṛtis, and, as naturally, they would have great respect for the writers (of such Smṛtis), they would not believe in our (i.e. of the Vedāntin’s) explanation. Smṛtis speak of the knowledge of Kapila and others, as being Ṛṣi-like and unobstructed. A Scriptural passage moreover says thus — “He, who in the beginning produced out of himself the aureate-complexioned one i.e. Hiraṇya-garbha (Kapila) and sustained him by wisdom.” (SvetU.5.2). Therefore, it is not possible to consider the opinion of such as these, as improper. They determine the meaning by having recourse to reasoning. Therefore, the objection again is, that Vedānta texts should be explained on the strength of Smṛtis. The refutation of this (objection, is by the latter part of the Sūtra) thus: — “(In that case) there would result the predicament of the fault of there being no scope for (these) other Smṛtis”. If the doctrine of the Lord being the cause, were to be objected to, on the ground of the predicament of a fault of want of scope for some Smṛtis, then, other Smṛtis which lay down that the Lord is the cause, would have no scope left for them. We will cite them by way of illustration: — (The Smṛti) after saying with reference to the Highest Brahman “That this which is subtle and unknowable”, says, “it is said that he is the Universal Self of all beings, and the knower of the Kṣetra (i.e. the body)”. It further says — “Oh, the best of the twice-born, from that (i.e. Brahman) was born the undeveloped i.e. unevolved (Avyakta), having the three qualities (Guṇas)”. In another place also, it says — “Oh great Brāhmaṇa, the unevolved is absorbed in the Puruṣa (Brahman) which has no qualities.” The Purāṇa also says — “Hence, listen to this conclusion, that the ancient Nārāyaṇa is all this. He creates everything at the time of creation, and at the time of destruction consumes all this”. The Bhagavad-gīta says — “I am both the source (Prabhava), as also the great flood (Pralaya) of the whole world.” (BhG.7.6). Āpastamba with reference to the same Highest Self says — “All bodies are born from it, it is the root cause and is everlasting and unchanging” (Dha. Su. 1.8.23.2). In this manner, even in the Smṛtis, often, the Lord is explained as being the material and the accidental cause. This Sūtra, which mentions the fault of the want of scope for some other Smṛtis (in the latter half), is so stated, because it is desired to refute him — who raises an objection on the strength of (the fault about) the want of scope for some Smṛti — by raising a similar objection with regard to some other Smṛtis. That the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world is the substance of the Scriptures, has been shown already. When Smṛtis differ, and when one has necessarily to be accepted and the others rejected, those which follow the Scriptures are an authority and the others are irrelevant. This is mentioned in the Pramāṇa Lakṣaṇa (Jai. Su. 1.3.3) — “When a Smṛti conflicts with the Scriptures, it is to be neglected, and where it does not, the inference is (that it follows some original Scriptural text)”. It is not possible to understand, that a person can perceive supersensuous things without (the help of) the Scriptures, as there is no valid reason for that. If it be said, that it is possible because gifted persons such as Kapila and others have unobstructed knowledge, (we reply) — no, because super-natural faculty itself is dependent upon the performance of religious duty, of which injunction is the characteristic. Hence the meaning of an injunction which is in existence already, cannot be doubted by reliance on the word of a person who has become so gifted, afterwards. Even if we were to accept the idea of resorting to a person who has attained such supernatural faculty, such persons being many, in the case of a conflict of Smṛtis in the manner indicated (above), there is no other means of arriving at a decision except by a resort to the Scriptures. Even in the case of one who is dependent on others for knowledge, his sudden partiality i.e. predilection for a particular Smṛti. is not logically justifiable, because, if any one has such partiality or predilection, then there would be the predicament of truth remaining unsettled, as men’s intellects are of the nature of the variety of the universe. So, even in his case, his intellect deserves to be focussed or fixed on the right path, by explaining to him the disparity between Smṛtis, and by way of explaining the point as to how some Smṛtis are in accordance with the Scriptures, and that some others are not. It is not possible to believe in the doctrine of Kapila (the Sāṅkhya sage) contrary as it is to the Scriptures, merely on the authority of a Scriptural passage which has been cited as showing superabundance of his knowledge, in as much as, it merely mentions the name Kapila, because one Smṛti also refers to another Kapila, called Vāsu-deva, the tormentor of the sons of Sagara. If any thing is stated casually in connection with a passage which purports to indicate an altogether different thing, then that thing stated so casually, is not established by the passage in which it is mentioned so casually (Anyārthadarśanasya prāptirahitasya asādhakatvāt). There is besides another Scriptural passage establishing the greatness of Manu, thus: — “Verily, whatever Manu has said, is medicine” (Tait. Sam. 2.2.10.2). Manu, who extols looking upon everything as the Self, thus — “One who sees the Self in everything, and everything in the Self, and is a sacrificer to the Self, verily attains Final Release — Svā-rājya” (12.91), seems thereby to censure i.e. to disapprove of the doctrine of Kapila, who does not agree with the doctrine of seeing the Self in everything, in as much as he holds that there is difference between Selfs (and that they are many). In the Mahā-bhārata also, when the question is whether there are many Puruṣas or there is only one, after laying down first the view of the opponent thus — The follower of Sāṅkhya and Yoga doctrines, consider the Selfs to be many — , it refutes it, and establishes the doctrine of the Universal Self, by stating in the beginning — “I shall explain to you that Universal Self which transcends the Guṇas, and also as to how it is said to be the one and the only one origin of all Puruṣas”, and afterwards by stating — “It is the witness of all, the Self of mine and yours too, and the Self of all embodied beings, and is not comprehensible by anybody. He is the Universal head-arms-legs-eyes-and-nose, and alone moves as it pleases Him amongst the things.” There is a Scriptural passage also, about the Self of all, thus — “When a person sees that all beings are but the Self only, then, to him who sees such unity, what infatuation, what grief, can possibly affect?” (IsU.7). Hence it is established that because of his doctrine of the plurality of Selfs also, the system of Kapila is against the Scriptures (Vedas), and against the statement of Manu who follows the Vedas, and not merely because of his imagining the doctrine of Prakṛti (i.e. the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas) in an independent manner. The authority of the Vedas is direct and independent, with respect to matters which come in their own province, just as that of the Sun in the province of form (Rūpa-viṣaye). The authority of the statements of mere men (i.e. of Smṛti-kāras) depends upon another thing (i.e. the Scriptures) and is further away from directness (of authority) because of (their having to rely on) the memory of the speaker, and the necessity of their having to have some other source (viz. the Scriptures). Hence, the predicament of a fault of want of scope for a Smṛti, when it occurs in a subject which is opposed to the Vedas, is no fault. — 1.
[Go top]
This is how, again, the predicament of want of scope for (a certain) Smṛti, is no fault.Itareṣām: of others; Ca: and; An-upalabdheḥ: there being no mention.🔗 Because some others (i.e. things other than the Pradhāna) are not perceived (in the Vedas). — 2.1.2. Mahat etc. which are different from the Pradhāna, but are conceived by the Smṛti to be the modifications of Pradhāna, are not to be met with, either in the ordinary world or in the Vedas. As for things, such as elements and sense-organs, well-known as they are in the ordinary world and the Vedas, they may well be mentioned in the Smṛti, but it could not be possible for Smṛtis to refer to Mahat etc. — as they are not to be met with, either in the ordinary world or in the Vedas — any more than they can possibly refer to a sixth sense-organ and a sixth sense-object. Even though the Scriptures may occasionally appear to refer to such things (as Mahat etc.), it has been already explained in Brahma-Sūtra (I.iv.l) — “The inferred one (i.e. the Pradhāna) etc.” — that they could not possibly refer to such things (as the Pradhāna and the Mahat). What is meant by this is, that as Smṛtis which refer to modifications (of the Pradhāna) such as Mahat etc., are not authoritative, even so, the Smṛtis which refer to their cause (i.e. the Pradhāna) are properly not authoritative. That is why, want of scope for a certain Smṛti (which refers to the Pradhāna) is no fault. The objection (to Brahman as the cause) based on reasoning (Tarka) will be refuted (by the Sūtra-kāra) hereafter, beginning with the Sūtra — “No, because of dissimilarity” (Bra. Su. II. i. 4). — 2.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Etena: by this viz., by the refutation of the Sāṅkhya Smṛti; Yogaḥ: the Yoga philosophy; Pratyuktaḥ: is (also) refuted.🔗 By this (refutation of Sāṅkhya Smṛti) the Yoga Smṛti also is refuted. — 2.1.3. The Sūtra-kāra extends the application (of these i.e. the first two Sūtras in refutation of the Sāṅkhya Smṛti) to Yoga Smṛti, by saying, that the Yoga (Smṛti) also should be looked upon as refuted similarly. The Yoga Smṛti also, contrary to the Scriptures, imagines the Pradhāna to be the independent cause and Mahat etc. to be its modifications, though they are not so known both in the ordinary world and in the Vedas. (Says the opponent) — If it be so, as this ground is covered already by what has gone before, why is it then indicated again by the Atideśa (i.e. extended application)? The answer is — well, there is this further doubt. The Scriptural passage “(The Self) should be heard, cogitated upon and meditated upon” (BrhU.2.4.5). prescribes Yoga as the means of realizing correct knowledge. It is seen that in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad the practice of Yoga, preceded by the taking up of certain postures (i.e. Āsanas) etc., has been enjoined at great length, thus: — “Keeping the body in perfect poise with the three parts held erect” (SvetU.2.8) etc. There are thousands of Scriptural indicatory marks about Yoga, such as — “A steady abstraction of sense-organs, is considered to be Yoga” (KathU.2.6.11) and “(Having obtained) this knowledge (of Brahman) and the whole technique of Yoga” (KathU.2.6.18). In the Yoga Śāstra itself, Yoga has been accepted as the means of realizing correct knowledge thus — “Now (is begun) Yoga, the means of realizing the principle of Truth”. Hence (it may be maintained) that because of the agreement (of both disputants i.e. the Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntin) with regard to the meaning of a part of the Yoga-Smṛti being in conformity with the Scriptures, the Yoga-Smṛti — like the Aṣṭakā Smṛti etc. — may well be rendered unobjectionable. Even this further doubt also is removed here by this ‘Atideśa’ (extended application), because even though one part of the Yoga-Smṛti is in conformity with the Scriptures, still, as has already been indicated above, another part of the Yoga-Smṛti is in conflict with the Scriptures. Even though there are many Smṛtis on the subject of Adhyātma (the relation between the Supreme Self and the Jīva-Self i.e. the individual soul) an attempt is made here to refute the Sāṅkhya and Yoga Smṛtis only, because, they, as having the reputation of being the means of attaining the highest aim of life, have been accepted by the wise, and have been supported by i.e. bolstered up with indicatory marks in the Scriptures, such as: — “He who has understood that cause (of the world) which can be known from the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, is relieved from all nooses or fetters” (SvetU.6.13). The refutation (of the above) is, that final beatitude is not attained by the mere knowledge of Sāṅkhya Smṛti or the path of Yoga, without reference to the Veda. The Scriptures obviate the possibility of any other means of attaining Final Beatitude, except the knowledge of the unity of the Selfs referred to in the Vedas, thus — “It is by knowing that (Ātmā i.e. Brahman) alone, that a person transcends death, and there is no other path to final emancipation” (SvetU.3.8). The followers of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga doctrines are dualists (i.e. they recognize duality of Ātmās) and do not countenance the unity of the Self. As to the instance quoted — viz. “That cause which is known from the Sāṅkhya and Yoga” — , it should be understood that by the words “Sāṅkhya and Yoga”, only knowledge and meditation as understood by the Scriptures is meant, because of their proximity (to the subject). So far as that portion of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga Smṛtis which does not conflict (with the Scriptures) is concerned, we welcome that portion of Sāṅkhya and Yoga as having due scope, as for instance, when the Sāṅkhyas understand by their definition of quality-less Puruṣa, the purity of the Puruṣas well-known in the Scriptures, thus — “That this Puruṣa is unattached” (BrhU.4.3.16). Similarly, when the followers of Yoga, by its injunction with regard to the order of religious mendicants, understand it to be the same, as belief in actionlessness, by instruction about renunciation of the world, well-known in the Scriptures, thus: — “Then the Parivrājaka (i.e. a Sannyāsin who has renounced the world) who wears colourless dress, is shaven, and is without a wife or other possessions or attendants (attains Final Release).” (Jābāla 5). By this (refutation), all Smṛtis based on reasoning should be refuted. If it be said, that they also are helpful for the attainment of knowledge, by means of inferences by reasoning, well may they indeed be so helpful, but the knowledge of truth can only be attained by Scriptural passages, such as — “No one who does not know the Vedas, knows the great one” (Tait. Bra. 3.12.9.7) and “I am asking you about the Puruṣa of the Upaniṣads”. (BrhU.3.9.26). — 3.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Na: not (i.e. Brahman is not the cause of the world); Vi-lakṣaṇatvāt: because of difference in nature; Asya: its (i.e. of this world); Tathātvam: its being so; Ca: and; Śabdāt: from the word, from the Śruti.🔗 No (i.e. Brahman is not the cause of the world), because of this (the world) being dissimilar (to Brahman). That it is so (i.e. it is dissimilar) is known from the Scriptures. — 2.1.4. The objection to the view — that Brahman is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world — , based on Smṛti, has been refuted. Now the objection based on reasoning is being refuted. (Says the Vedāntin) — But whence can there be any scope for a doubt based on reasoning, with regard to the meaning of Scriptures which has already been determined? Just as Scriptures are independent of any other thing with regard to matters pertaining to religious duty, even so should they be understood to be independent in the case of Brahman also. (The opponent replies) — Well, such determination would be there, provided, like matters of religious duty which have to be performed, and which are to be understood from the Scriptures only, Brahman also were liable to be determined with the help of the Scriptures alone, and were not to be understandable by other means-of-proof. But Brahman is of the nature of an actually established entity and with regard to such an established thing, like the earth etc., there is scope for other means-of-proof. Just as, when there is a conflict between Scriptural passages, all the rest have necessarily to be coordinated with only one of them, similarly when there is a conflict of the other means-of-proof with the Scriptures, they i.e. the Scriptures, ought to be coordinated with the other means-of-proof. Reasoning, which establishes invisible entities, on the ground of their similarity with a thing which is visible, is nearer to experience, than the Scriptures which convey their meaning in a traditional dogmatic manner (like an Ipse dixit) and they are further removed from experience. Knowledge of Brahman however culminates in experience, and by removing Nescience becomes the means of Final Beatitude, and only if it is so understood, can it be said to have a fruit which is visible or tangible. The Scriptures by enjoining thus — “(The Ātmā) should be seen and cogitated upon” i.e. by enjoining cogitation in addition to hearing, show that here, reasoning also should be welcomed with respect (as a means). That is why an objection based on reasoning is here taken, thus — “No, because of this (the world) being dissimilar”. It is not reasonably sustainable to say — as is said — that sentient Brahman is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world. Why so? Because of this alleged modification or effect of Brahman (i.e. this world) being dissimilar to the material cause (Brahman). This world which is alleged to be a modification of Brahman appears to be non-sentient and impure and therefore dissimilar to Brahman, while the Scriptures declare Brahman to be sentient and pure i.e. dissimilar to the world. No relationship such as that of a cause to its effect is ever seen where there is dissimilarity (between two things). Modifications such as ornaments etc. cannot have clay as their material cause, nor can earthen pots etc. have gold as their material cause. Modifications having the nature of earth are effected from earth alone, and those having the nature of gold from gold alone. Similarly, this world, non-sentient and of the nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, as it is, deserves to be the modification of a cause which similarly is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, and not (a modification) of Brahman which is dissimilar. Dissimilarity of this world from Brahman should be understood from the world’s impurity and from its being non-sentient. The world after all is impure, because, on account of its nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, it is the cause of happiness, grief and dejection, and because of the diversity of the world with its high and low abodes, such as heaven and hell etc. This world is non-sentient, again, as it is understood that it constitutes itself as the subservient instrument of the intelligent Self by means of a body and sense-organs. When there is similarity (between two things), there never is a relationship between them, by way of the one helping and the other receiving such help. For instance, two lamps do not help each other. But (says the Vedāntin) even a sentient instrument may subserve the enjoying Self, on the analogy of the maxim of a master and a servant? To the foregoing argument, the opponent replies: — No. In the master and servant illustration also, it is only the non-sentient part (of the servant) that serves the sentient (master). It is the non-sentient property of Buddhi (which is considered to be a sense-organ) of one sentient thing that helps the other sentient thing, and not that one sentient thing itself either helps or causes impediment to another sentient thing. The Sāṅkhyas hold that sentient things (such as Selfs) are sans-qualities and inert. Therefore, the modifications such as a body and sense-organs are non-sentient. There is no authority to hold that things such as wood or clay are sentient. The division of things into sentient and non-sentient is popularly well-known. Therefore, since this world is dissimilar to Brahman, it cannot have Brahman as its material cause. If somebody were to argue in this connection, thus — As the Scriptures declare that the world has a sentient entity (Brahman) as its material cause, I would on the strength of that very statement hold that the whole world is sentient, because the nature of the cause is invariably seen to inhere in the modification or effect, and that the non-manifestation of sentiency (in the modification) may well be due to a peculiarity of the modification. And just as, even though the sentiency of Selfs is patent, yet it is not manifest during the condition of sleep or swoon, even so, the sentiency of a piece of wood or a clod of earth may not be manifest. And it may well be, that, because this peculiarity of the existence of form (Rūpa) etc. or its absence, is due to the manifestation or non-manifestation of sentiency, that, it is, that even though the quality of sentiency is common both to effects and their causes, i.e. the Selfs, there is no conflict between them, by way of one amongst them being subordinate and the other superior. And just as, even though meat, soup, and rice have the common quality of being earthy, they become mutually helpful on account of the peculiarity of each of them in themselves, so may it well be, in the present case, and thus there would be no conflict with respect to the well-known division (of things being sentient and nonsentient). But (says the opponent), that may at the most be able to refute the dissimilarity of the nature of things being sentient and non-sentient, but all the same it won’t be able to refute the dissimilarity of the natures of purity or impurity (as between Brahman and the world). Nor can even dissimilarity of the sort referred to above (i.e. sentient and non-sentient) happen to be really refuted thus, because (as the Sūtra says) — “The Scriptures declare it to be so”. Even if the sentient nature of all things (i.e. effects), though non-discernible in the ordinary world, were to be so predicated of them, and even if all those things were to be so understood, because the Scriptures declare them to have a cause of a sentient nature (i.e. Brahman), by merely considering the Scriptures as the sheet-anchor of authority, even then, it is contradicted by the Scriptures themselves, because, that they are so dissimilar, is understood even on the authority of the Scriptures themselves. Because, ‘Tathātvam’ here means, being dissimilar to the material cause (i.e. Brahman). The Scriptures themselves speak about this non-sentiency of a part, thus — “It became that which is endowed with knowledge (Vijñāna) and that which is devoid of knowledge (Avijñāna)” (TaitU.2.6), and they also declare the non-sentient and inert world to be dissimilar to the sentient Brahman. — 4.
[Go top]
But — says some other opponent — the Scriptures themselves speak of the sentient nature of the elements and sense-organs which have been understood to be non-sentient, thus — “The Earth spake, the waters spake” (Sha. Bra. 6. 1.3.2. 4). With regard to the sense-organs the Scriptures say — “Now these Prāṇas (sense-organs) disputing amongst themselves as to which of them was pre-eminent amongst them, approached Brahman” (BrhU.6.1.7), “They said to Speech (Vāk), do thou recite (Sāman) for us” (BrhU.1.3.2) etc. To this objection the Sūtra-kāra replies: —Abhimāni: the presiding deity (of the organs and the elements); Vyapadeśaḥ: an expression, an indication, pointing out of, denotation of; Tu: but; Viśeṣa: specific adjunct, on account of distinction, because of so being qualified; Anugatibhyām: the act of pervading; (Viśeṣa-anugatibhyām: from the specific adjunct as well as from the fact of pervading, on account of their entering).🔗 But, because of special characterization (Viśeṣa) and relation (Sambandha), this reference is to those presiding (deities). — 2.1.5. The word ‘But’ removes the doubt. Scriptural passages such as “The Earth spake, the waters spake” etc. should not be suspected of referring to the sentient nature of elements and sense-organs, because this reference is to the presiding entities (deities). When with reference to elements and sense-organs, activities such as speaking and discussing — proper only to sentient entities — are attributed to them, it is really the sentient entities (deities) which preside over speech (Vāk) and Earth etc., that are meant, and not the elements and sense-organs themselves. Whence is it so? “Because of the special characterization and connection”. The difference between the enjoying Selfs on the one hand, and the elements and sense-organs on the other, as characterized by a division between those that are sentient and those that are non-sentient, has already been referred to before. Were all to be sentient, reference to such a difference (between them) would not be reasonably sustainable. Besides, those who follow the Kauṣītaki branch, distinguish between them by the use of the word ‘deities’ in the dialogue of the Prāṇas, thus: — “Those deities, each disputatiously claiming to be preeminent (went to Brahma-deva) etc.” and also thus — “All these deities knowing Prāṇa (the Chief Vital Air) to be pre-eminent” (Kaush. 2.14), in order to remove the suspicion about the sense-organs (being understood to be meant), and to enable the presiding deities (of the sense-organs) to be understood. These sentient presiding deities are also understood to have a relation (with the elements and sense-organs) as seen from Mantras, Artha-Vādas, Iti-hāsas and Purāṇas. The Scriptural passage beginning with “Agni transforming itself into speech (Vāk) entered the mouth” (Ait. Ara. 2.4.2.4) shows that the deity which vouchsafes its favour on the sense-organs is meant. In the concluding portion of the dialogue of the Prāṇas also, by the Scriptural passage, “Those Prāṇas approached the original parent, Prajā-pati, and said” (ChanU.5.1.7), which speaks of their approaching Prajā-pati for the determination, as to which amongst them was the highest, there is the ultimate realization by the Prāṇas, by each in turn going out (of the body) as instructed by him, and by positive and negative instances (i.e. Anvaya and Vyatireka) of the pre-eminence of the Prāṇa (the Chief Vital Air). And such ordinary activities of the sense-organs, which resemble those of human beings such as ourselves, in the passage “The making of offerings to him (by all the sense-organs)” (BrhU.6.1.13), strengthens the view that the reference is to the presiding deities. In the passage “The Tejas thought” also, it should be understood that this ‘thinking’ is indicated to have been done, only by the presiding deity (viz. the Highest Brahman) which inheres in its own modification. Therefore, this world is dissimilar to Brahman, and being so, Brahman is not its material cause. This objection (of the opponent) is now being answered. — 5.
[Go top]
Dṛśyate: is seen; Tu: but.🔗 But it is seen (to be like that). — 2.1.6. The word ‘But’ refutes the opponent’s view. The objection taken — viz. that this world being dissimilar (to Brahman), Brahman is not its material cause — is not conclusive. We find in the ordinary world that from men etc., who are known to be sentient, hair, nails etc. which are dissimilar to them are produced, and scorpions etc. are produced from cowdung etc. which are known to be non-sentient. But (says the opponent) we have said already, that it is the non-sentient bodies of men etc. which are the cause of the non-sentient hair, nails, etc., and the non-sentient bodies of the scorpions etc. that are the effects of the nonsentient cow-dung etc. (We reply) — But even then, dissimilarity does still persist, in as much as some non-sentient things only, constitute the basis for sentient things, while some do not. Great indeed is this disparity of nature, due to modification (of cause into effect), between men etc., and hair and nails etc., because of dissimilarity of form etc. between them, and similarly also between cowdung and scorpions etc. Were there to be complete identity of form (between two things) the very relationship between them as cause and effect would be dissolved. If it were to be said (by the opponent), that a certain quality of ‘earthiness etc.’ in men etc., continues to inhere at least in the hair and nails, etc., and a similar quality of ‘earthiness etc.' in cowdung etc., at least continues to inhere in scorpions etc., (the Vedāntin would retort) that Brahman’s nature of having the characteristic of existence as such (Sattā-lakṣaṇaḥ sva-bhāvaḥ) at least appears to continue to inhere in Ākāśa etc. Now you, who wish to vitiate the doctrine of the world having Brahman as to its material cause, on the ground of dissimilarity, have to say, whether by dissimilarity, you mean the non-appearance of the total comprehensive nature of Brahman (in the effect i.e. the world), or the non-appearance of any particular nature, or the nonappearance of the nature of sentiency. In the case of the first alternative, there would be the predicament of the complete destruction of the relationship of cause and effect as between them, because, in the absence of there being something extra (in an effect), there would be no such thing as cause and effect. As regards the second alternative, it cannot be substantiated, because it has already been said that the nature of ‘existence as such’ (Sattā) inherent in Brahman (the cause) is seen to reappear in Ākāśa etc. (the effects). So far as the third alternative is concerned, there is absence of any illustration (to prove it). To what entity — which is at once non-sentient but which is not seen to have Brahman as its cause — can you possibly refer to (as actually existing), as an illustration (of your alternative), in answer to the doctrine of a follower of Vedānta (i.e. Brahmavādin) who holds that all things have Brahman as their cause? The opposition of the Scriptures (to the view of the opponent) is well-known, because it has already been established, that the conclusion of the Vedas is, that sentient Brahman is both the accidental and the material cause of the world. As regards the objection (of the opponent), viz. that as Brahman is an already established entity, other means-of-proof can come into operation (for establishing Brahman), (we reply) — that it is mere wishful thinking. This entity (Brahman) devoid of any form as it is, is neither perceptible by any direct (occular) means-of-proof, nor is it perceptible by inference etc., as there is absence of any indicatory mark about it (i.e. Brahman). Like religious duty, it (i.e. Brahman) is understandable from the Scriptures alone. So say the Scriptures also — “This knowledge cannot be acquired by reasoning. Oh dear one, it becomes properly understood only when it is taught by another (competent person).” (KathU.1.2.9), “Who indeed knows whence came this creation”, and “From what did it originate” (Ṛg-Veda 1.30.6). These Vedic Ṛks show how difficult it is even for Gods who have acquired super-human powers, to understand this cause of the world. The Smṛti also says — “These entities are inscrutable, and one should not try to understand them by reasoning.” Smṛtis also are of the same type, thus: — “He is said to be unmanifest or unevolved, inscrutable and unchangeable” (BhG.2.25). “Not even these hosts of Gods know my origin, as I myself am the comprehensive origin of the Gods and Ṛṣis” (BhG.10.2). With regard to the objection, viz. that it has been said that as the Scriptures enjoin cogitation in addition to the hearing of it, it shows that they welcome reasoning also with due respect, (our reply is) — mere empty reasoning cannot justify its own help (to the understanding of Brahman) on some such pretext. It is only such reasoning as is in consonance with the Scriptures that can be resorted to as a subordinate auxiliary to experience. For instance, — that (1) as the conditions of dreams and wakefulness mutually differ from each other, the Self is not connected with either of these conditions and (2) in as much as in the condition of deep sleep, the Jīva-Self gives up its phenomenal existence and becomes one with the Highest Self, its nature is purely that of ‘Sat’ Self (i.e. Being) and has no phenomenal existence, and (3) as all phenomenal existence originates from Brahman, in accordance with the maxim of the cause and effect not being different from each other, it is not different from Brahman. The Sūtra-kāra will hereafter illustrate the fallaciousness of mere reasoning, by the Sūtra — “Because of the inconclusiveness of reasoning” (Bra. Su. II. i. 11). He, who, on the strength of the Scriptures that speak of a sentient cause, conjectures that the whole world is sentient, may be able to explain the division into sentient and non-sentient as referred to by the Scriptures in “He becomes knowledge (Vijñāna), and becomes that which is not-knowledge (Avijñāna)” as being due to the manifestation or the absence of manifestation of sentiency. But this division referred to by Scriptures would not be of any help to the other (i.e. our opponent). How is that? Because the Scriptures by the passage “(He became) knowledge (Vijñāna) and (became) that which is not-knowledge (Avijñāna)” speak about the Highest cause (i.e. Brahman) as constituting itself as the entire world. So, as according to him, by reason of dissimilarity, it is not reasonably possible to consider, that a sentient cause can become a non-sentient effect, similarly, a non-sentient cause (such as Pradhāna) also, cannot modify itself into a sentient effect. Therefore, as the objection based on dissimilarity thus stands refuted, (the view) that the cause (of the world) is sentient as spoken of by Scriptures, has necessarily to be accepted. — 6.
[Go top]
A-sat: non-existence; Iti cet: if it be said; Na: no; Pratiṣedha-mātratvāt: because of denial, as it simply denies.🔗 (If the opponent were to say) (that before creation) it (i.e. the effect) was nonexistent (Asat), (we reply) No. (To say so) would be but only a mere negation. — 2.1.7. (If the opponent were to say) — If you (the Vedāntin) were to have it, that the sentient, pure, and soundless etc. Brahman is the material cause of quite a dissimilar effect, i.e. an effect which is non-sentient, impure, and is endowed with the quality of sound etc., then it would necessarily be, that before creation, the. effect was non-existent, which of course would not be acceptable to you, an adherent of ‘the view of the pre-existence of an effect before its origination’ (Sat-kārya-Vāda). (We would reply) — This is no fault, because it (i.e. what you the opponent have said) would but amount to a mere negation only, having nothing substantial at all of which it can be a negation. This sort of mere negation cannot possibly be able to deny the pre-existence of the effect prior to its creation. How can it be so? It is understood, that just as even at the present moment the effect having its self as its cause does exist, even so does the effect exist before its creation (in the form of the Self, which is its cause). Even at the present moment, the effect does not have existence, independently of the Self of its cause, because the Scriptures say thus: — “Everything ousts (i.e. abandons or outlaws) him who looks upon everything as (existing) apart from its Self” (BrhU.2.4.6). The existence of the effect before its creation, however, as the Self of its cause, is not different (from the existence of the effect, as an effect having that cause as its Self). Oh, but (says the opponent) Brahman which is soundless etc., is the cause of the world (isn’t it what you hold?). (The Vedāntin replies) — Certainly, but an effect which is equipped with the quality of sound etc. is never without its cause ‘the Self’ inhering in it, before its creation, nor is it so now (after the effect is created). Hence, it cannot be maintained that an effect is non-existent before its creation. We will speak at greater length about this, when we discuss the subject of the doctrine of the cause and effect not being different from each other. — 7.
[Go top]
Apitau: at the time of Pralaya or the great dissolution; Tadvat: like that, like the effect; Prasaṅgāt: on account of the consequences; A-samanjasam: inconsistent, absurd.🔗 (The doctrine of the Vedāntin) is absurd i.e. incongruous because, during the resorption of the world there would be the predicament (of the cause i.e. Brahman) becoming like the effect (i.e. the world). — 2.1.8. (Says the opponent here) — If you (the Vedāntin) were to understand that this effect (i.e. this world) which has the qualities of grossness, of having parts, of having no sentiency, of being circumscribed i.e. limited, and impure, has Brahman as its cause, then during resorption, i.e. during the great flood when the effect is being reabsorbed and is becoming one with its cause, it will contaminate the cause with its own qualities, and so during resorption there would result the predicament of the cause (i.e. Brahman) acquiring the nature of the qualities of impurity etc.; and thus the Upanishadic doctrine, that the Omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, would appear to be absurd i.e. incongruous. It would also appear to be absurd, i.e. incongruous, because, after all the effects have once become one with the cause, in the absence of any rule to guide the recreation (of the effects), there would not be any recreation of the experiencing Selfs and the things to be experienced etc., separately. Besides if one were to understand, that after the experiencing Selfs have once become one with Brahman and when Karma (as the cause of recreation) has been destroyed, they are all liable to be recreated, then, there would result the predicament that those who have obtained their Final Release, would also be liable for a rebirth, and thus again, the doctrine would appear to be absurd, i.e. incongruous. If it were to be maintained again that even after resorption the world would continue to retain its distinctive condition separate from the Highest Brahman, then in that case resorption itself as such, would not be possible, because no effect (according to your doctrine) can possibly exist without its cause being inherent in it. Thus again the doctrine would appear to be absurd. — 8.
[Go top]
Na: not; Tu: but; Dṛṣṭānta-bhāvāt: on account of illustrations.🔗 (To this objection of the opponent) the Vedāntin says — It is not so, however, because there are illustrations. — 2.1.9. There is not the least absurdity or incongruity in our doctrine. What you (the opponent) have said, viz. that the effect as it becomes one with its cause, would contaminate the cause with its own qualities, is no such fault at all. How is it so? Because, there are illustrations which show, how, when an effect merges into its cause, it does not contaminate the cause with its qualities. For instance, earthen troughs etc. which are effects, having earth as their material cause, and which while they exist as effects are individually separate entities having big, small and intermediate dimensions, do not contaminate their cause, when they merge back into it (i.e. the earth); nor do ornaments etc. which are the effects of gold, contaminate gold with their own qualities when they merge into it. Similarly also, all these beings of the four categories, which are the effects of earth, do not, during resorption, infect the earth with their qualities. The followers of your (i.e. the opponent’s) view on the other hand have no such illustration to cite. Resorption itself would not take place, were the effect to (try to) retain its distinctive quality while merging with its cause. We will speak hereafter in the Sūtra (Bra. Su. II. i. 14) how, even though cause and effect are not different from each other, it is the effect alone which has the cause as its Self, and it is not as though the cause has the effect as its Self. It would be a very jejune statement that during resorption the effect would contaminate the cause with its own qualities, because, the same predicament would occur while the effect exists as an effect, because it is well understood that there is non-difference between a cause and its effect. Scriptural passages, such as “All this is the Self” (BrhU.2.4.6), “The Self is all this” (ChanU.7.25.2), “Immortal Brahman is this, which is here right in front” (MunU.2.2.11), “Verily all this is Brahman” (ChanU.3.14.1), purport to say, that without exception during all the three times (i.e. past, present and future), the effect is never different from the cause. The refutation in such cases — viz. that as both the effect and its qualities are the result of superimposition through Nescience, the cause is not affected by them — is common to resorption also. There is this other illustration also. Just as an illusionist is never affected during all the three times, by the illusion projected by himself, in as much as it (i.e. the illusion) is insubstantial, even so, the Highest Self is never affected by the illusion of transmigratory existence. Also, just as a person who experiences a dream is never affected by the illusory nature of the dream vision, in as much as it does not persist during the conditions of deep sleep and wakefulness, even so, this one unchanging, constant and immediate witness of all the three conditions (viz. the Highest Self i.e. Brahman) is not affected by the three changing transmigratory conditions (of creation, preservation, and resorption). This manifestation of the Highest Self, by its existing as the Self of these three conditions, is — like the appearance of a snake etc. in a rope — but a mere illusion. With regard to this the Ācārya who is fully conversant with the traditional meaning of Vedānta has said — “When the Jīva-Self that is in deep sleep brought about by the beginningless Māyā, wakes up, it realizes the unborn, sleepless, dreamless, non-duality (Brahman)” (Gaudapada Ka. 1.16). Hence, when it is said that during resorption there would result the predicament of the cause being affected by the fault of grossness etc. quite as much as the effect, it would not at all be proper. Again, when it is said, that when all this differentiated world has become one (with Brahman) there is no regular cause for its being recreated in its usual differentiated form, it would, again, not be a fault, precisely because an illustration is available. Just as during sleep and meditative trance, even though there naturally is a complete oneness (of the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self), false-knowledge not yet having been eradicated, differentiation (as it was before sleep and the mystic trance) is re-established on the Waking up (of the Jīva-Self), even so would it be, in this condition (of resorption). There is this supporting Scriptural passage — “All these beings having become one with the ‘Sat’ (Brahman) still do not realize that they have attained this unity with the ‘Sat’, and they again become what they were here before, viz. whether (they were) a tiger or a lion, a wolf or a boar, a worm or a midge, or a gnat or a mosquito” (ChanU.6.9.23). Just as, even though there is no differentiation in the Highest Self, still, under the binding influence of false-knowledge, such differentiated condition persists continuously, without let or hindrance, as in a dream, even so, the existence of a potential power of differentiation, due to the binding influence of false-knowledge, may be inferred as still surviving during the condition of resorption also. This would effectively answer the objection about the predicament of the likelihood of those who have already obtained Final Release having to be born again, because true knowledge will have by then supplanted false-knowledge. The last alternative (of the opponent) referred to towards the end, viz. that the world would continue to remain differentiated from Brahman even during resorption, cannot be countenanced, as it never is so understood (by the Vedāntin). Hence the Upanishadic doctrine, therefore, is perfectly cogent. — 9.
[Go top]
Sva-pakṣa-doṣāt: because of the objections, to his own view; Ca: and.🔗 Also because the faults (pointed out by the Sāṅkhya opponent, against the doctrine of the Vedāntin) will apply to this own doctrine. — 2.1.10. The same faults (which are alleged against the doctrine of the Vedāntin) would be commonly applicable to the doctrine of our opponent also. The same allegation, viz. that on account of dissimilarity this world could not have Brahman as its material cause, is equally applicable to the doctrine (of the Sāṅkhyas), as they understand that this world has the Pradhāna as its material cause, in as much as, in that case also, the world which possesses the quality of sound etc. would have the soundless Pradhāna as its cause. And therefore, in as much as it is understood (by the Sāṅkhyas) that effects dissimilar to the cause come into existence, there is the same predicament of the view of the non-existence of the effect (such as the world), prior to creation, being equally applicable (to the Sāṅkhyas). Similarly, (as understood by the Sāṅkhyas) when the effects have become one with their cause during resorption there would result the same predicament (as in the case of the Vedāntin). Similarly, when once during resorption all the special characteristics of the effects have been effaced by their becoming one with their cause, it would not be possible at the time of the recreation (of the world) to regulate the identical reproduction of the distinctive special characteristics of every person before resorption, such as that this particular thing is the material cause of this man, and this particular thing, of the other, because of the absence of any such regulating cause. Were we to imagine gratuitously the existence of such a regulating cause, (when there is none), the absence in fact of the existence of such regulating cause being common, there would result the predicament, in the case of those who have already obtained Final Release, of being again subjected to the bondage (of transmigratory existence). If (it be said), that during resorption, only some distinctive characteristics become one (with the cause) and others do not, then those that do not attain such oneness, would not be the effects of the Pradhāna, and thus, all these faults being common to both the doctrines, they could not be properly directed (by the Sāṅkhya opponent) against his opponent (the Vedāntin), and hence our view that these faults are no faults at all would be strengthened, as it would necessarily have to be accepted. — 10.
[Go top]
Tarka: reasoning, argument; A-pratiṣṭhānāt: because of not having any fixity or finality; Api: also; Anyathā: otherwise; Anumeyam: to be inferred, to be ascertained, by arguing; Iti cet: if it be said; Evam api: even thus in this way; A-nirmokṣa: want of release, absence of the way out; Prasaṅgaḥ: consequence.🔗 If it be said (by the opponent) that reasoning being without any sure basis, (i.e. it being inconclusive), an inference otherwise may be drawn, even then the predicament of the non-attainment of Final Release would occur just the same. — 2.1.11. This is just why, in the case of entities which are understood through the traditional teaching of the Scriptures alone, no objection on the strength of mere reasoning should be made, because, reasonings, which are not derived from Scriptural traditions and which depend solely on the conjectures of man, happen to be inconclusive, in as much as such conjectures are unfettered. Reasonings or deductions made by some highly competent persons with great effort, are seen to be demonstrated as fallacious by more competent persons, and those made by these latter ones, are also in their turn demonstrated to be equally fallacious by some other persons, and hence as men’s understanding differs, it is not possible to accept that reasonings have sure basis and that they are conclusive. Even if one were to rely on reasoning, acceptable to men of well-known intellectual eminence such as Kapila and others, as having a sure basis and as being conclusive, even so, inconclusiveness would be there all the same, because it is seen that Tīrtha-karas (i.e. founders of religions or philosophical schools) such as Kapila and Kaṇāda whose intellectual eminence is well-known are seen mutually to differ from each other. (If the opponent were to say) — we would infer in such other way as would not cause the fault of inconclusiveness, because it cannot possibly be said that there never can be any reasoning which is conclusive, we say, that you cannot say so because even this inconclusiveness of reasoning is itself established by reasoning alone, viz. by conjecturing, that because some reasonings are seen to be inconclusive, other reasonings of a similar nature also are inconclusive. Besides, if all reasoning were to be inconclusive, there would result the predicament of the destruction of all worldly transactions. It is seen, that people in general are impelled towards activity in their future course, either for acquiring happiness or avoiding pain, by its similarity to the past or the present course. When there is contradiction in Scriptural passages, it is only by means of reasoning, which explains the general force or import of sentences, and by refuting their wrong and apparent meaning, that the correct ascertainment of their meaning is accomplished. Manu also thinks similarly when he says thus: — “Those who desire the purity of Dharma (i.e. the desire to be able to distinguish Dharma — law of religious duties — from Adharma i.e. wrong notions about it), have to know well the triad of direct perception, inference and Śāstra based on different traditional knowledges of various sorts”, and “He alone and none other really knows Dharma, who combines the instructions about religious duties by sages, with reasoning which is not opposed to the Vedic Śāstra” (Manu-Smṛti 12. 105, 106). That reasoning is by nature inconclusive, is indeed in itself something which constitutes its glory or ornament (Alaṅ-kāra). It is exactly because it is so, that faulty reasoning is rejected and faultless reasoning has to be arrived at (just as by refuting the really faulty view of an opponent, the Siddhānta (i.e. final conclusion) is arrived at). There is no justification for a person to be an ignoramus because his ancestor happened to be so. Hence, if it be said that, that reasoning is without a firm basis and is inconclusive, is no fault, (we reply) — that way also in the case of reasoning there would still be the predicament of the absence of escape from fault just the same. Even though with regard to some particular subject, reasoning is seen to have a firm basis i.e. it is conclusive, still so far as the present subject is concerned, the objection that reasoning cannot escape the fault of having no firm basis and being inconclusive, does apply all the same. Barring traditional instruction of the Vedas, it is not possible even to indulge in any conjecture about the very deep nature and positive existence of an entity (Brahman) as such, on which Final Release depends. Because we have said already, that due to its being formless etc., it is not perceptible directly, and due to its being without any indicatory mark etc., it is not amenable to inference etc. Besides all those who believe in Final Release, understand, that perfect knowledge (of Brahman) results in Final Release. That perfect knowledge, which is dependent on the thing-in-itself (for its validity), is of a uniform nature. That entity which exists uniformly is the highest entity. In the ordinary world, knowledge about it is understood to be perfect knowledge, as for instance the knowledge that ‘fire is hot’. It being so, it would not be reasonably sustainable to understand that men can have differences about perfect knowledge. Mutual differences amongst men, about knowledges as a result of reasoning, are notorious. That, whatever is expounded by cne logician as perfect knowledge, is upset by another, and that established by him, is upset by yet a third, is well-known in the ordinary world. How ever, then, can knowledge arrived at by reasoning, which is not of one settled aspect, be correct knowledge? It is not as if a follower of the doctrine of the Pradhāna is accepted by all logicians as the best amongst the professors of logic, so that we can understand that, that which is understood by him to be correct knowledge, is in fact so. It is not possible to get together all the past, present and future logicians at one time and in one place, so that the uniform nature of their knowledge about an entity, could be correct knowledge. The Scriptures on the other hand being eternal and being the cause of the attainment of knowledge, it would be reasonably sustainable to understand them to have the ability to possess well-established knowledge of an entity, so that, it is not possible for the whole lot of past and future logicians to deny the correctness of the knowledge arising from them (i.e. the Scriptures). Hence, the correctness of the Upanishadic knowledge alone is firmly established. In as much as correct knowledge anywhere outside this, is not reasonably sustainable, the predicament of non-release from transmigratory existence would necessarily result. Hence, on the strength of the traditional instructions of the Scriptures, and with the help of reasoning conformable to such traditional instructions of the Scriptures, it is thus firmly established that the sentient Brahman is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world. — 11.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Etena: by this (by the above reasoning, by what has been said against Sāṅkhya); Śiṣṭa-aparigrahāḥ: not accepted by the wise or competent persons; Api: also; Vyākhyātāḥ: are explained or refuted.🔗 By this (refutation of the Sāṅkhya doctrine) others (i.e. other views) also which competent persons have categorically rejected, and also answered. — 2.1.12. So far objection to the Vedānta passages based on reasoning, by the adherents of the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the cause of the world, is thus refuted, as it (i.e. Pradhāna doctrine) is nearest to the Vedānta doctrine, and as it is further reinforced by weighty reasoning, and as it has been to a certain extent accepted by learned persons who are followers of the Vedas. Now, some slow-witted persons taking their stand on the Atomic doctrine have raised doubts based on reasoning about the Vedānta passages, so (the Sūtra-kāra) extends the application of the foregoing refutation (of the Sāṅkhya doctrine) to the doctrine of the atom, following the maxim of ‘the knocking out of the best (lit., chief) athlete.’ (Here the Bhāṣya-kāra explains the word ‘Śiṣṭāparigrahaḥ’ thus: — what is accepted is ‘Parigraha’, what is not accepted is ‘Aparigraha’, what is not accepted by the learned is ‘Śiṣṭāparigrahaḥ’). By reason of this refutation of the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the cause of the world, the Atomic and other doctrines of the cause (of the world) which are not accepted in the least (i.e. are categorically rejected) by learned persons such as Manu and Vyāsa, should also he understood as having been explained as rejected, i.e. refuted, because the reasons of refutation are the same, and there is no room for any thing further to be doubted. The reasons which constitute the refutation, viz. the ineligibility of understanding the very deep i.e. abstruse cause of the world (viz. Brahman) by reasoning, the inconclusiveness of reasoning which has no firm basis, and the non-attainment of Final Release even if an inference in another way is drawn, and conflict with the traditional instructions of the Scriptures, being the same in this case, as they were in the earlier one. — 12.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Bhoktṛ: one who enjoys and suffers; Āpatteḥ: from the objections, if it be objected; A-vibhāgaḥ: non-distinction; Cet: if it be said; Syāt: may exist; Lokavat: as is experienced in the world.🔗 If it be said, that (if the thing to be experienced) becomes merged into the experiencer or vice versa, non-separation (between the two) would result, the reply is — that such separate existence may well continue as it is met with in the ordinary world. — 2.1.13. The doctrine of Brahman being the cause, is again objected to in another way on the same ground viz. that of reasoning. Even though the Scriptures are authoritative with regard to their own subject, still, when that which is their province is taken out of their own scope by another means-of-proof, they deserve to be construed in a secondary sense, as for instance in the case of the Mantras (Vedic Ṛks) and Artha-Vādas. Even reasoning (applied) beyond Its own particular province, would be inconclusive, as (for instance) in the case of Dharma and Adharma (meritorious and unmeritorious actions). Supposing it is so — (says the Vedāntin — so what?) — (the opponent says) it would be improper if the Scriptures were to deny (the truth of) what has been established by another means-of-proof. In what way (it is asked) do the Scriptures purport to deny what has been established by another means-of-proof? The reply (of the opponent) is — this distinctive division of the experiencer and the things to be experienced, is well-known in the ordinary world, as for instance that the sentient Jīva-Self is the experiencer, and the objects-of-sense such as Sound etc., are the things to be experienced — to wit — that Deva-datta is the experiencer and the boiled rice is the thing to be experienced. If the experiencer were to attain the condition of the thing to be experienced, non-existence of the distinction between them would take place. It would be so, also if the thing to be experienced were to attain the condition of the experiencer. So these (i.e. the experiencer and the thing to be experienced) being nondifferent from the Highest cause Brahman (as the Vedāntins claim), attainment by them of each other’s condition would thus result. But it is not proper that the well-known distinctive division between them should get obliterated. We have necessarily to assume that this distinctive division between the experiencer and the things to be experienced, which obtains, and is seen to exist to-day, must have been so in the past, and will continue to be so in the future. Hence if one were to say, that to understand that Brahman is the cause (of the world) is not proper, as that would lead to the predicament of the absence of any distinctive division between the experiencer and the thing to be experienced, which is well-known, we would reply — Well may such distinctive division exist, just as it is seen to exist in the ordinary world. It is reasonably sustainable, that even in our view of the matter (i.e. of the Vedāntin, that effect is non-different from the cause) such distinctive division is seen to exist because it is so observed to exist in the ordinary world. As for instance, even though the sea is not different from water which constitutes its self, the foam, waves, and bubbles (of the sea) etc., which are modifications of the sea, and are not different from it, are sometimes seen to display a behaviour characterized by being distinctively different from each other, and at another time being in conjunction with each other. These modifications of the sea, viz. the foam, waves etc., even though they are non-different from their cause, i.e. the sea, which has water as its self, still they (i.e. the modifications) do not attain each other’s condition, and just as even when they do not attain each other’s condition, they are not different from the nature of the sea which is their self, similarly in the present case also, the experiencers and the things to be experienced do not attain each other’s condition, nor do they (because of that) become different from the Highest Brahman. Even though the experiencer (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is not (in fact) a modification of Brahman, and as according to the Scriptural passage “Having created it, he entered into it” (TaitU.2.6), the unevolved Brahman is declared by the Scriptures to be itself the experiencer, as a result of its entering into its own creation, still by reason of its having so entered, there does come about a distinctive difference, as a result of limiting adjuncts, even as the Ākāśa (has distinctive difference) due to the limiting adjunct in the shape of an earthen pot etc. Hence, it is said (by the Sūtra-kāra) that distinctive difference between the experiencer and the thing to be experienced — nondifferent though they are from their cause viz. the Highest Self i.e. Brahman — is reasonably sustainable on the analogy of the maxim of the sea and the waves etc. — 13.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tat: (its, of the universe): An-anyatvam: non-difference; Ārambhaṇa-śabda-ādibhyaḥ: from words like ‘origin’, etc.🔗 That cause and its effects are non-different from each other, follows from the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ (making current) etc. (occurring in the Scriptures). — 2.1.14. Having provisionally accepted this practical distinctive difference between the experiencer and the things to be experienced, the Sūtra-kāra has (in the previous Sūtra) rendered the refutation (of that objection on the ground of reasoning) by saying — ‘it may well be so, as observed in the ordinary world’ (the latter part of the previous Sūtra). This distinctive difference, however, does not exist in the real sense, because it is understood that the cause and its effects are non-different from each other. The effects comprise of this diverse world, such as the Ākāśa etc. and the cause is the Highest Self i.e. Brahman. It is understood that in a real sense the effect is non-different from the cause i.e. the Highest Self, i.e. it has no existence as apart from its cause, the Highest Self. Whence is it so? Because of the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ and others. As for this word ‘Ārambhaṇa’, the Scriptures, after declaring that by knowing the one (i.e. Brahman) everything else becomes known, and with a desire to cite an illustration, say — “Oh mild one, just as by knowing one clod of earth, everything that is made of earth becomes known. The effect (viz. a pot etc.) is merely a name made current by speech, while that it is earth merely, is the truth” (ChanU.6.1.1). By this is meant that when a clod of earth is understood to be in essence but mere earth only, all things made of earth such as a jar, a trough and a water-pot, automatically become known, because, having the earth as their Self is common (to them all), and hence it is (that it is said) that an effect is merely a name made current by speech, and its existence as an effect is because of speech only. The effect viz. a jar or a trough or a water-pot is not in existence substantially as an effect as such, but is merely a name, and is false or untrue, and that it merely is but earth only, is the truth. This is stated as an illustration of Brahman. Therefore, because of the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ occurring in the Scriptures, it is understood that, in the case of the thing illustrated also, all creation as a class as such, has no existence as apart from Brahman. Again, the Scriptures after speaking of Tejas, Water and the Earth as being the effects of Brahman, proceed to speak about the absence of the existence of the effects of Tejas, Water and the Earth also as apart from them, thus: — “(In this way) Agni has lost its property of being Agni as such, and the effect Agni) as such is merely a name made current by speech, and that it is but the three colours (Rūpas, by which the three elements Tejas, Water and Earth are expressed individually by Lakṣaṇa) only, that constitute the real substance”. (ChanU.6.4.1). By the word ‘etc.’ in the passage “because of the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ etc.”, the following several Scriptural passages — viz. “In that all, this has its self, it is the Truth, this is the Self, that thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7); “All this, is that which is the Self” (BrhU.2.4.6); “All this is Brahman” (MunU.2.2.11); “The Self is all this” (ChanU.7.25.2); “There is no diversity here about anything” (BrhU.4.4.19) — which have the purpose of expounding the unity of the Selfs, should also be understood to have been cited (in illustration). Otherwise, it would not be possible to uphold in any other way, that by the knowledge of one, the knowledge of everything else is attained. Therefore it should be seen, that just as Ākāśas circumscribed by jars and water-pots are nondifferent from the great Ākāśa, or just as mirages etc., whose nature is that they seem and then again seem not, and whose nature is thus inexplicable, are non-different from the sandy plain etc., even so, this aggregate of transmigratory existences consisting of experiencers and the things to be experienced, have, as apart from Brahman, no real existence. But (says the opponent) Brahman is of more than one form and just as a tree has many branches, even so Brahman is equipped with various powers and propensities (for creating effects), so that, (its) oneness and manifoldness are both necessarily equally true, just as, for instance, a tree as a tree is one, but considered in its aspect as one consisting of branches it is manifold, or just as the sea as sea is one, yet considered in its aspect as foam, waves etc. it is manifold, or just as the earth is one only, but considered in its aspect as a jar or a trough, it is manifold. The circumstances being such, Brahman, considered in its aspect of being one only, may well accomplish the process of Final Release, and considered in its manifold aspect, may help the accomplishment of worldly transactions and Vedic observances appertaining to the “Karma-kāṇḍa”. It is only in this way that the illustrations of the earth etc. can be appropriate. (To this, we reply) — No, it could not be like that. By the passage “That it is but earth merely, is the truth” it is understood that in the illustration it is the material cause alone that is considered to be true, and by the words ‘made current by speech’ the whole aggregate of effects is spoken of as being unreal. In the case of that which is illustrated, also, by the passage “In all that, this has its Self, that is the truth”, that one, the highest cause alone, is understood to be true, because in the passage “He is the Self, that thou art, Oh Śveta-ketu” the instruction is, that the embodied Jīva-Self is, in essence, Brahman. It is only about this Jīva-Self’s having Brahman, which is an already well-established thing, as its Self, that instruction is here given, and also that it (Brahman) is something which cannot be attained with any extraneous effort. Hence it is this Brahma-hood of the Jīva-Self, which is understood to be based on the Śāstra, that serves to obliterate the natural notion of a man, about the Jīva-Self being of the nature of the body, even as the appreciation of the rope etc., as a rope, obliterates the notion of a snake (which is, till then, entertained about the rope). All this notion of phenomenal worldly transactions depending upon the Jīva-Self, for substantiating which you (the opponent) would want to hold that Brahman has a manifold aspect also, would itself become obliterated, when once the notion that the Jīva-Self is of the nature of a body, is itself obliterated. The Scriptures, by the passage “When all this becomes but the Self to him, by what can he see and whom” (BrhU.4.5.15) etc., would discover to a person who understands Brahman as the Self of all, the non-existence of all phenomenal transactions such as actions, agents and the fruit of actions. It would not be proper to say, that this non-existence of all phenomenal transactions is spoken of as confined to any special condition (such as that of Final Release), because the Scriptural words “That thou art” show that the realization (of the fact) that Brahman is the Self of all, as mentioned in these very words, is not confined to any particular specific condition. The Scriptures also show by the ‘illustration of the thief’, that one who banks on falsehood convicts himself i.e. becomes tied down (to phenomenal existence), and one who depends on truth, secures an acquittal i.e. attains Final Release, and they also show further, that the oneness of Brahman is the only one and the highest truth (ChanU.6.16) and that its (so-called) manifoldness is merely the display of false-knowledge. For, if both could be true, how could a person observed to be involved in phenomenal worldly existence be said (by the Scriptures) to bank on a falsehood? The Scriptures indicate this very thing, by finding fault with the viewing of things as different, by the passage — “He who sees differences in things meets with death after death” (Bri. 4.4.19). The doctrine (of our opponent) does not recognize Final Release as resulting from knowledge to be reasonably sustainable, because it does not hold (like the Vedānta doctrine) that false-knowledge which is capable of being removed by true knowledge, is the cause of all transmigratory existence. If both the unitary and the manifold aspects of Brahman were to be true, how ever would the knowledge that Brahman is one and one only, be able to obliterate the knowledge of its manifoldness? But (argues some other opponent here), if one were to understand the pure absolute oneness (of Brahman), then (in that case) its manifoldness being necessarily nonexistent, all those worldly means-of-proof, such as direct perception etc., would cease to operate as such means-of-proof, because of the absence of any scope for their operation, just as they would cease to operate as means-of-proof, for instance, when in the case of a pillar etc., there is a realization that it is a pillar and not a man. Similarly, a Śāstra which enjoins the doing of something, or inhibits some other thing, would — as it depends on the manifoldness of things — be rendered hors de combat in the absence of such manifoldness, and equally so would be the Śāstra of Final Release also, which depends (for its validity) on the distinctive difference between the teacher and the taught, in the absence of any such distinction between them. How could this truth about the absolute one-ness (of Brahman) as propounded by this (palpably) untrue Śāstra of Final Release, be reasonably sustainable? To this the reply (of the Vedāntin) is — This is no fault. It would be reasonably sustainable to understand that prior to the realization of Brahman as the Self of all, all transactions (of the phenomenal world) for the time being are real enough, even as the transactions in dreams are real enough (for the time being) until waking consciousness returns. As long as the truth of the one-ness of the Self is not realized, the knowledge, that all these effects, i.e. modifications, as characterized by the means-of-proof, the thing to be known, and the fruit, are unreal, does not arise in any one, and on the other hand, people in general under the influence of Nescience, consider these effects or modifications as being their own Selfs, viz., that this body is myself. or that this is mine, by ignoring their own Brahmic nature. Therefore, prior to the realization of Brahman as the Self of all, all worldly and religious transactions based on the Scriptures, are reasonably sustainable i.e. valid, even as an ordinary man, while he is asleep and dreaming, sees all the high and low entities, and definitely considers his experiences quite as real as they are when they are directly perceived, and has no notion, then, of their having only an unreal appearance (of direct perception). But (says the opponent) how ever can the realization of the unity of Brahman as the Self of all, in fact, arise, through such palpably untrue Vedānta passages? A man who thinks he is bitten, by what in the place of a rope he considers to be a snake, does not die thereby, nor can anybody make use of the water as seen in a mirage, for drinking or bathing etc. (The reply is) — This is no fault, because we do observe an effect such as death, supervening by reason of even the suspicion of being poisoned (by a snake-bite). And it is also seen that a man experiencing a dream sees actions such as that of his being bitten by a snake or of his having a bath. If the opponent were to say, that like the dream itself, even that action in a dream (of a snake-bite or of bathing) is untrue, we reply that though the action of being bitten by a snake or having a bath, experienced by a person dreaming, is no doubt untrue, the fruit of that action, viz. his experience of that action, is indeed true enough, because that experience is not effaced or removed even after such person awakens. No man, who after waking up from a dream considers the action of such a snakebite or his own bath as experienced by him in his dream as unreal, ever considers his knowledge of the experience of that action also, as unreal. This non-effacement of the knowledge of the dream experience of a person, should be understood to invalidate the doctrine (of the Lokāyatikas), that the body as such alone is the Self. Similarly, a Scriptural passage — “When a man who engages himself in some religious ritual with a desire to gain some end, sees a woman in a dream, he should infer from his dream experience, the certain fulfilment of his desire” (ChanU.5.2.9) — which shows that even by his experience of the unreal dream, there is a very real fulfilment (of his desire). Similarly Scriptures in another place, after saying that “When some ill omens are seen one should know that he would not live long”, indicate further that by the very experiencing of that dream, which (of course) is of an unreal nature, death, which indeed is too real, is suggested, by the passage — “Now about dreams — if one sees a dark man with black teeth, he kills him”. It is well-known, that experts in the interpretation of dreams, by positive and negative instances, interpret how a dream of one sort indicates a good result and a dream of another sort indicates a bad result. It is similarly seen, how, by mere letters of the nature of lines which are unreal in themselves (in as much as they are mere conventional symbols), the Akāra (i.e. the letter ‘अ A’) etc., which are very real, are indicated. Now what is more is, that this is the final conclusive means-of-proof which declares the oneness of Self, and there is nothing further which is desired to be known. Just as in the ordinary world, when an injunction to perform a sacrifice is given, it is necessary to know with what (material) and how one should perform the sacrifice, but when it is said “That thou art” or “I am Brahman” and one understands how the Ātmā i.e. Brahman is the Self of all, there is nothing which need be known beyond that, for it is only when there still remains something which ought to be known, that there can be any further desire to know, and as apart from one’s unity with the Self nothing still remains which one would further want to know. It is not possible to say that such realization cannot arise, for a Scriptural passage says — “He (i.e. Śveta-ketu) understood that (viz. the oneness of Self) from him (i.e. his father)” (ChanU.6.16.3), and there is besides instruction (in Scriptures) about listening to the Scriptures and reciting them, as the means of such realization. Nor is it possible to say that such realization is meaningless or is a delusion, because it is seen, that it has the result of removing ignorance, and there is absence of any other knowledge, which would invalidate it. We have already said before, that prior to the realization of one’s identity with the Self, the course of all these falsely-true worldly and religious transactions, runs uninterrupted. In this way, therefore, when one’s identity with the Self is duly propounded with the help of this ultimate means-of-proof, there is no scope for imagining Brahman to be of diverse types, because all the earlier consciousness of distinctive differences happens then to be eliminated. But (says the opponent), by adducing the illustration of clay etc., the Śāstra seems to accept Brahman to be capable of undergoing modification. In the ordinary world also things like clay etc. are understood as undergoing modification. To this we reply — No. The Scriptures by the following passages such as “Indeed the great unborn Self i.e. Brahman is undecaying, undying, immortal and fearless” (BrhU.4.4.25), “This Self (which can be only expressed negatively as) ‘not this’, ‘not this’” (BrhU.3.9.26), “(The Self) is neither gross nor atomic” (BrhU.3.8.8), which deny every kind of modification of Brahman, understand Brahman as absolutely unchangeable. The same one and only one Brahman cannot at one and th,e same time be understood, both to possess the quality of modification and yet be unchangeable i.e. without that quality of modification also. (If the opponent were to suggest) — It may well be (like something which is both) stationary and at the same time have movement, we reply — no, because it has been particularized as being absolutely unchangeable. It is not possible, that one and the same unchangeable Brahman can at one and the same time be the substratum of many (opposite) qualities, such as being fixed and yet capable of movement. We have already said that Brahman is unchangeable and eternal because of the denial (by the Scriptures) of its undergoing any modification. Nor is it, that just as the realization of the doctrine of Brahman being the only one Self leads to the fruit of Final Release, the knowledge that it is capable of modification in the form of this world also leads to some other independent fruit, because there is no authority for it. It is by the realization of the unchangeable Brahman alone that the Śāstras show that there is a fruit, because the Scriptures after first stating that — “This Self (which can only be expressed negatively as) ‘not this’, ‘not this’” indicate by the passage “Oh Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness” (BrhU.4.2.4), that there is a fruit of that type (viz. Final Release). So this much is established, that in the chapter dealing with Brahman, when it is stated that the desired result is obtained only by realizing that Brahman is devoid of any special attributes, and some other thing having no such fruit is also mentioned along with it — such as, that Brahman has the quality of modification in the form of the world — , it should be employed only as a means of realizing Brahman, in accordance with the maxim of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā — viz. “Whenever something which is fruitless is mentioned in proximity with something which has some fruit, the former should be understood as being subordinate to the latter, and also that it has no independent fruit of its own.” As Final Release is unchangeable and eternal, it would not be proper to say that the knowledge, that Brahman undergoes modification, is itself the fruit which the Jīva-self acquires by such knowledge. (If it be said by the opponent) that if according to the adherent of the doctrine of the unchangeable Brahman, this eternal oneness (of Brahman) is the only view, it would mean the absence of the relationship of a ruler and the ruled, and it would contradict the declaration that the Lord is the cause, (we reply) — No, the omniscience (of Brahman as the Lord) depends upon the evolving of the seed of the nature of names and forms which are the result of Nescience, and on the Scriptural passage — “The Ākāśa was born of this very Self” (TaitU.2.1), and that the origin, preservation and resorption of the world proceed from the Lord who is of an eternally pure, wise, and free nature, and neither from the non-sentient Pradhāna nor from any other things, is what is declared (by the Sūtra-kāra) by the Sūtra — “From whom is the origin etc. of this world” (Bra. Su. I. i. 4). That declaration still holds the ground as before, and nothing contrary to that is here suggested. (The opponent says) — How can you say that you do not say so (i.e. you do not contradict the declaration) when you talk of the Self’s eternal one-ness and non-duality? (We reply) — Listen, how we do not say so. It is declared by both the Scriptures and the Smṛtis, that names and forms which are imagined through Nescience and which are as it were the Self of the Omniscient Lord, and about which it is impossible to say, either that they are one with Brahman or that they are different from it, and which are the seeds of this entire expanse of transmigratory existence, are the illusion-causing power and the nature (Prakṛti) of the Lord. That the omniscient Lord is different from them is indicated by the Scriptural passage “The Ākāśa is the revealer of the names and forms, and that in which they are contained, is Brahman” (ChanU.8.14.1), and also according to the Scriptural passages — “May I evolve names and forms” (ChanU.6.3.2); “Having created all beings and given them names, the Lord keeps on voicing them” (SvetU.6.12). It is in this way that the Lord (as the Īśvara) conforms to the limiting adjuncts of names and forms produced by Nescience, just as the Ākāśa conforms to the limiting adjuncts of the jars and pots. During the condition of phenomenal existence, the Lord rules over the so-called Jīva-Selfs i.e. the cognitional Selfs, which are but only his own alter egos and which conform to the multitude of effects and causes brought about by names and forms, which in their turn are brought about by Nescience, and stands in the same relation to these Jīva-Selfs i.e. cognitional Selfs, as the great Ākāśa stands to the Ākāśa of the jars and pots. So the Lord’s over-lordship, omniscience and omnipotence, depend upon the determinate distinctions caused by the limiting adjuncts of Nescience, while in the truest sense, in the case of the Self whose limiting adjuncts have been swept off by knowledge, all such behaviour as that of being the ruler and the ruled or of being an omniscient entity etc., cannot be reasonably sustainable. The Scriptures also say so, thus — “Where one does not see, hear or know anything, other than its Self, that is the great one” (ChanU.7.24.1); “But when the Self alone has become all this, by what can one see, and whom (can one see)?” (BrhU.4.5.15). And in this manner, all Vedānta texts declare, that in the condition of the Highest Truth, there is absence of all phenomenal transactions. In the Īśvara-Gīta also, in the passage “The Lord does not create in any one, the capacity to act, nor any actions, nor their connection to the fruit, but they tend towards activity by reason of their own nature. He neither receives the sins nor the merits of any person. Knowledge is enveloped in Nescience and hence creatures become infatuated i.e. confused” (BhG.5.14–5), it is indicated that there is absence of all behaviour as that of a ruler or the ruled in the condition of perfect knowledge, while in the condition of phenomenal existence, even the Scriptures do speak of the Selfs behaviour as the Lord, thus — “He is the Lord of all, the King and the protector of all beings, and he is the bund which upholds the worlds so that they may not be confounded (by promiscuity)” (BrhU.4.4.22). Similarly it is said in the Īśvara-Gīta again — “Oh Arjuna, the Lord is immanent in the region of the heart of all beings, and by this power of Māyā makes them go round and round as in a whirligig” (BhG.18.61). The Sūtra-kāra also speaks of the non-difference of cause and effects, in the real sense only, and so far as the phenomenal transactions are concerned, he has likened Brahman to the ocean, in the preceding Sūtra thus — “It may well be so, as observed in the ordinary world”. He (the Sūtra-kāra) accepts and does not refute the view about Brahman being liable to modification, in so far as it can be made use of in meditations on Brahman in its qualified (Sa-guṇa) aspect. — 14.
[Go top]
Bhāve: on the existence; Ca: and; Upalabdheḥ: is experienced effect (world) is in separable from its material cause, Brahman, is continued.🔗 (Cause and effect are non-different) because it is only when the cause exists, that the effect exists. — 2.1.15. Again why the effect is non-different from its cause, is, because it is only when the cause exists, that the effect is seen to exist, and not when it does not. For instance, it is in the presence of clay only that a pot is seen to exist, and in the presence of yarns only that cloth is seen to exist. It is not, that when one thing exists, that, as a rule, another thing is to be seen to exist. It is not, that a horse, different as it is from a cow, exists, only when a cow exists. Nor is it, that a pot is seen to exist only when a potter exists, even when there subsists a relation of an effect and an accidental cause between them, because the one thing is different from the other (and hence there is no non-difference between them). (The opponent says) — But it is seen that when a particular thing exists, as a rule another particular thing is seen to exist, as for instance, smoke necessarily is seen to exist, when fire exists. (To this) we reply — no, because smoke held up in a cowherd’s pot is seen (to exist), even after the fire is put out. If the opponent were to say — if smoke is particularized by a certain condition (such as, smoke which has ascended high up into the sky from something on the ground), then such and such particular smoke does not exist, if fire does not exist — , even then (we reply), there is no fault whatever even if it were to be so (understood), because we say, that the reason for holding, that there is non-difference between cause and effect, is (not only that an effect is to be seen to exist only when the cause exists) but that intelligence (Buddhi) coloured by (i.e. impressed with) the consciousness, of the cause being always jointly discernible with the effect, also is such a cause, and such consciousness does not exist in the case of fire and smoke, (because there never is a consciousness that the smoke which is perceived is Agni). There may also be another reading of this Sūtra, thus — “Bhāvāt ca upalabdheḥ”. It means, that it is not only because of the Scriptures (that we say) that there is nondifference between cause and effect, but also because it is directly seen to be so. Such non-difference between cause and effect does happen to be directly perceived. It is this way: — In the case of a cloth which is a construction of threads, we do not of course perceive merely an effect, viz., the cloth as such, as apart from the threads themselves, but what we actually and directly see are merely the threads only in their condition as warps and woofs, and similarly, we perceive fibres only, in the condition of threads, and minute parts of the fibres only, in the condition of fibres. And thus by this same process of direct observation, it ought to be inferred that the minute parts of the fibres are but the three colours viz. the red, white and black (representing the fire, water and earth), and thereafter, that the three colours are but the Vāyu, and that Vāyu is but merely the Ākāśa (ChanU.6.4), and thereafter that the Ākāśa is but the transcendent Brahman, which is one only without a second, and in which, as we have already said, all means-of-proof have their ultimate culmination. — 15.
[Go top]
Sattvāt: Because of the existence; Ca: and; Avarasya: of the posterior, i.e., of the effect as it comes after the cause, i.e., of the world.🔗 Because an effect (Avara) (i.e. one which comes into existence later on) already exists (as the cause). — 2.1.16. This again why the effect is non-different from the cause, viz. because the Scriptures say, that the Avara i.e. the one which comes into existence later on as the effect is, before its creation, already in existence in the cause, as the cause itself, because in the Scriptural passages “Oh mild one, this was mere existence ‘Sat’ only, in the beginning” (ChanU.6.2.1), “This in the beginning was only the Self (Ātmā)” (Ait. Ara. 2.4.1. 1), the word ‘this’ (Idam) by which the effect (i.e. this world) is understood, and the cause the Ātmā (the Self), have the same case-endings (showing their oneness). That (viz. the effect) which does not happen to exist in that form in any thing which is its cause, can never come into existence from it, as for instance, oil (which does not exist in the form of the sand as the cause of itself, can never be produced) from sand. Therefore being in fact non-different (from the cause) before creation, it is understood, that the effect even when it is created, is non-different from its cause. Just as Brahman during all the three times (i.e. past, present and future) never deviates from existence (Sattva), even so, the effect viz. this world also during all the three times never deviates from existence (Sattva). And again as existence itself as such (i.e. Sat) is but one only, it follows that the effect is non-different from the cause. — 16.
[Go top]
A-sad-vyapadeśāt: on account of its being described as non-existent; Na: not; Iti cet: if it be said; Na: no: Dharma-antareṇa: by another attribute or characteristic; Vākya-śeṣāt: from the latter part of the text or passage, because of the complementary passage.🔗 If it be said, that as an effect (Kārya) is said to be non-existent i.e. ‘Asat’ (before its creation, and that, therefore, the doctrine of the Vedāntin is) not (correct), (we reply) — No (i.e. it is not that an effect is not ‘Sat’ i.e. Existent), because from the complementary part of the passage, it is seen (that it is called non-existent i.e. Asat) because of its having a different attribute (Dharma). — 2.1.17. But (says the opponent) the Scriptures do also occasionally refer to the effect before its creation as non-existent (Asat), thus: — This merely was non-existent in the beginning” (ChanU.3.19.1), and also “In the beginning this indeed was non-existent” (TaitU.2.7.1). Therefore, if it be said, that by reason of an effect being non-existent (Asat) before creation, effect does not exist (before its creation, we reply) — no. This reference to an effect before its creation, as non-existent (Asat) is not meant to convey its absolute or total non-existence. What then is meant? What is meant is that the condition (of an entity) in which its name and form have become evolved, is a condition different from its condition, in which such name and form have not yet been evolved, and this reference to an entity as being non-existent (Asat) (in the Scriptures) is with respect to this latter condition, nondifferent though the effect is from its nature as the cause. How is it understood to be so? Because of the complementary passage. The meaning of the sentence, which, in the introductory portion, is ambiguous in meaning, is made definite from the complementary passage. As for the sentence here (under consideration), viz. “This was but merely non-existent (Asat) in the beginning”, what (Yat) in the introductory portion was indicated by the word ‘non-existent’ (Asat), and is again referred to by the word ‘that’ (Tat), is (afterwards) particularized as ‘existent’ (Sat) by the sentence — “That was Sat i.e. existent”. The use of the word ‘Āsīt’ (in the sentence ‘it was existent’) cannot be reasonably sustainable because, ‘Asat’ (non-existent) has no connection either with the past or the future time. In the sentence “This of course was non-existent in the beginning” also, absolute i.e. total non-existence could not be meant, because it is particularized (as ‘it’) in the complementary passage — “It made itself manifest”. Hence this reference to an entity before its creation, as ‘non-existent’, is with reference to this other condition of it. It is well-known in the ordinary world, that it is only a thing which is evolved with name and form that deserves to have the word ‘existent’ (Sat) applied to it. Hence, prior to its evolution by name and form, a thing is figuratively referred to as ‘was non-existent as it were’. — 17.
[Go top]
Yukteḥ: from reasoning; Śabda-antarāt: from another Śruti text; Ca: and.🔗 Because of reasoning, and because of another Scriptural word also (non-difference between cause and effect and the identity between them is understood). — 2.1.18. The existence of the effect (prior to its creation) and its non-difference with the cause is understood by reasoning (Yukti) and by another Scriptural word also. Now, for the present, reasoning will be described. It is seen in the ordinary world that those who desire to have curds or pots or ornaments, as a rule invariably make use of milk, clay and gold respectively, which are their definitely well-established causes. Those who desire to have curds do not make use of clay, and those who desire to have pots do not make use of milk, which would not be reasonably sustainable, so far as the doctrine of the non-existence of an effect prior to its creation (i.e. Asat-kārya-Vāda) is concerned. Non-existence of everything everywhere prior to its creation, being general i.e. common, why is it that curds is produced from milk only, and not from clay, and why are pots produced from clay only, and not from milk? (If the opponent were to say) — even though the non-existence of effects prior to their creation is common i.e. general (to all effects), there is a special property i.6. idiosyncrasy (Atiśaya) of curds, that subsists in milk only, and a special property or idiosyncrasy of pots, that subsist in clay only, then (the assumption of) such property or idiosyncrasy of their prior state (of effects), would necessarily mean the abandonment of the doctrine of the non-existence of effect prior to its creation (i.e. Asat-kārya-Vāda), and the establishment of the doctrine of the prior existence of the effect as the cause, prior to its creation (i.e. Sat-kārya-Vāda). If such potentiality capable of regulating the effect were to be imagined to exist (in a cause), then, if it is either different (from the cause and the effect) or nonexistent, it would not regulate the effect, because if it is either non-existent or different (from the cause and the effect) it will not be able to regulate the creation of a particular effect, because of common non-existence (Asattva) and common difference (Anyatva), (in as much as, on the one hand it is as non-existent as the non-existent effect, and on the other hand it is quite as different from the cause and the effect, as the cause is different from the effect). Therefore, this potentiality (Śakti) is the essential nature of the cause, and the essential nature of such potentiality, is the effect (which ultimately means that the cause, the potentiality and the effect are both one and the same thing). Besides in the absence of the existence of any notion of difference — such as there is as between a horse and a buffalo — between cause and effect, and also as between substance and quality etc., their identity i.e. unity must necessarily be understood. Even in the assumption of a Samavāya relation (invariable concommitance) if it is understood that there is a relation as between the Samavāya on the one hand, and the two entities between which such Samavāya exists (viz. the Samavāyins) on the other, then such another Samavāya relation of that, and then still such another Samavāya relation of that, ad infinitum, will have to be imagined, and hence the predicament of a regressus ad infinitum would result; and if it is not assumed that there is a relation between a Samavāya and the Samavāyins, then the predicament of the destruction of any such notion of a Samavāya relation between two entities (such as cause and effect) would result. Now (if the opponent were to say) that a Samavāya itself being of the nature of a relation, establishes such relation (between two entities) without requiring any other relation (of another Samavāya), then (we would reply) that contact or conjunction (Saṃyoga), also, being of the nature of a relation, it would establish such Saṃyoga relation, without necessarily requiring a Samavāya (which according to you is necessary). Moreover, as an identity between substance and quality etc. (by etc. a material cause and an effect should be understood) is actually experienced, the notion of such a Samavāya is meaningless. Moreover in which manner (according to you, the opponent) does the material (i.e. Dravya) of an Avayavī (effect) subsist or abide in the material (Dravya) of the Avayava (the cause)? Does it subsist in all the parts i.e. Avayavas (of the cause) together, or in each individual part (i.e. Avayava)? Supposing it subsists in all parts (i.e. Avayavas) together, there would be no perception of the Avayavī (i.e. the effect) because the (necessary) connection (Sannikarṣa) between the sense-organ and the objects of sense i.e. all the Avayavas together, would be impossible, because, plurality or manyness (Bahutva) which subsists in all the substrata together, would not be perceivable by perceiving any one substratum only. Now (if the opponent were to say) that the Avayavī material subsists Avayava by Avayava, on all the substrata of the cause (i.e. the Avayava material), then it would be necessary to imagine that the Avayavī (i.e. effect), has Avayavas, different from those which started the bringing about of the Avayavī i.e. effect by which the Avayavī could subsist Avayava by Avayava on the Avayavas which started the bringing about of the Avayavī. A sword (for instance) occupies its scabbard by Avayavas different from the Avayavas of the scabbard. And as it would be necessary to imagine other and still other Avayavas so that they may subsist in those Avayavas (which come in the series, earlier) ad infinitum, it would lead to a regressus ad infinitum. Now, supposing the Avayavī material, together, subsists in every Avayava of the material (Dravya) of the cause, one by one in a series, then it would be that while it operates in one place it could have no operation in another place. Deva-datta while he is living in Srughna cannot on the same day be living in Pāṭali-putra also. Being present in two places simultaneously would mean the predicament of there having to be more than one person, as for instance, when Deva-datta and Yajña-datta simultaneously reside in Srughna and Pāṭali-putra respectively. (If the opponent were to say) that like the cowness (of a cow) the Avayavī-material may subsist in every Avayava, and hence there would be no such fault, (we would reply) — No, because it is not so actually perceived. If like the cowness which abides in every cow, the Avayavī were to abide fully in every Avayava, then just as the ‘cowness’ (of a cow) is directly perceived to be abiding in every individual cow, even so, would the Avayavī be directly perceivable in every individual Avayava, but it is not perceived to be so invariably. Besides if the Avayavī were to abide fully in every Avayava, then as it is but one only, and is competent to function, it may accomplish the function of the udders with a horn, and the function of the back with the chest. But it is not so experienced. Again if an effect were to be non-existent (Asat) prior to its creation, then creative action would be without an agent, and it would not have a Self. Creation, indeed, is an action, and, like motion etc., action deserves to have an agent. It would be a contradiction in terms to speak of there being action and such action (taking place) without an agent. (If the opponents’ doctrine of the non-existence of effect prior to creation were to be accepted) when the creation of a pot is spoken of, it would have to be imagined that it is not caused by the pot (as it is not in existence before its creation), but by some other agent. Similarly when the creation of the two halves of a pot is spoken of, it also would have to be imagined that it is caused (not by the two halves but) by some other agent. If it were to be so, then, when it is said that a pot is being created, it would be tantamount to saying, that its causes, such as the potter etc., are being created (because as a pot cannot be its own maker, when it is said that a pot is being created, it would mean by implication, that the causes of a pot are being created), but in the ordinary world when the creation of a pot is spoken of, it is not experienced, that its causes such as the potter etc., are also being created simultaneously, but on the other hand it is experienced that they have already been in existence. Now, (if the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) that the creation of an effect, merely means the establishment of its relation with its cause, and the obtainment by the effect of its own existence (Sattā), then the opponent has to explain, as to how, anything which has not as yet acquired its own existence, can ever establish its relation (with something else). It is when two entities are in existence that a relation between them is possible, and not when one exists and the other does not, nor when neither of them are in existence. Besides non-existence by itself being of the nature of falsity or unreality (Nirupākhyatva), it would not be reasonably sustainable to set a time limit to it, such as, non-existence prior to the creation (of an effect). In the ordinary world, it is when there are already existing things such as a field or a house that it is seen that a limit is set to them, and never to mere non-existence. By setting a limit of this sort for instance, viz. that the ‘son of a barren woman’ became a king before the coronation of Purṇa-varman, it can never be that an absolute non-entity (Tuccha-Vastu) such as the ‘son of a barren woman’, ever was, is, or will be, a king. If even ‘the son of a barren woman’ could come into existence, after the operation of a casual agent, then it may also be that an effect which is non-existent prior to its creation, may also come into existence after the operation of a casual agent. What we see, however, is that non-existence being common both to the (non-existence of the) ‘son of a barren woman’ and (the non-existence of) an effect prior to its creation, just as the ‘son of a barren woman’ does not ever come into existence by and after the operation of a casual agent, even so, the non-existent effect (which is non-existent prior to its creation), cannot ever come into existence by and after the operation of a casual agent. But (says the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin) in that case the operation of a casual agent would be rendered purposeless. Just as no one endeavours to bring about a cause which already exists, even so, no one would bother to bring about an effect which exists already, and is non-different from the cause (as you the Sat-kārya-vādin hold), but we do see that people always do so endeavour (to bring about effects). So, in order that the operation of a casual agent may not be rendered purposeless, we believe in the nonexistence of an effect prior to its creation. (To this, we reply) — This is not proper, because it would be reasonably sustainable to say, that operation by a casual agent, which modifies the cause into the form of an effect, could have a purpose. We have said already, that the form of an effect-as-such, is but the form of the cause itself, and nothing that has no form in itself can ever be set on (to establish an effect in a similar form). A thing as such does not become another different thing altogether, by merely appearing in a different aspect. Deva-datta, whose hands and legs are (at one time) in a flexed position, and Deva-datta whose hands and legs are (at some other time) in an extended position, and who is thus to be seen in such different attitudes (at different times), does not merely on that account, become different persons, because he is still recognizable as the same one person (Deva-datta). Similarly, a father etc. who every day happen to be in different capacities do not become different individuals because they are recognized as being — ‘my father’, ‘my brother’ and ‘my son’ etc. (If the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) — In that case it may well be so, because of their having (during such capacities) no connection with birth and death, but it is not so, in other cases, (we reply) — no, because milk etc. also are directly seen to materialize as curds etc. (without undergoing destruction). When seeds of the Vaṭa (Banyan) tree etc., which are not visible, become visible as sprouts, as a result of their cells multiplying themselves into many such cells, and ultimately developing into a sprout, it is termed (their) ‘birth’, and when as a result of the diminution of these very cells, they again become invisible, it is termed (their) ‘death’. Now (if the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say), that what is nonexistent (Asat) becomes existent (Sat) because of its having no connection with birth and death, (we reply) that in that case there would result this predicament, viz., that the unborn embryo, and a new-born child lying face upwards on its back, would become different entities. Similarly there would also be the predicament, of the same man in his childhood, youth and old age, being different entities, and there would also be the predicament of the destruction of the use of such conventional terms as father etc. By all this (preceding argument) the doctrine of all existence being momentary (Buddhistic doctrine) should also be understood to be refuted. In the case of the adherents of the doctrine of the non-existence of the effect prior to its creation, the operation of a causal agent would not have any object (such as a cause) on which it can operate, and again non-existence not being an object, it cannot also be the object of any operation by a causal agent, even as the Ākāśa cannot be the object, for the purpose of mowing it down by striking it with a sword etc. (Now if the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) that the operation of a causal agent may have the material cause (of an effect) — such as earth etc. — as the object of its operation, (we reply) — No, because it would in that case lead to a strange result (Atiprasaṅga) viz. that by the operation of a causal agent on one object (i.e. earth), another different object (i.e. a pot) would be produced. (If the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) that an effect is but an idiosyncrasy of the Self of the material cause, (we reply) — No, as it would lead to the establishment of Sat-kārya-Vāda i.e. the doctrine of the existence of the effect prior to creation, (which would be awkward for the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin). Therefore, in as much as substances such as milk etc., only when they attain the form of curds etc., acquire the name of an effect, it is not possible even after (wrangling about it for) a hundred years, to establish, that an effect is different from its cause. Similarly, it is only the fundamental cause, which, like an actor, assumes different forms as effects right down to the last effect, and becomes amenable to all worldly transactions. In this way it is understood through ‘reasoning’ that the effect does exist prior to its creation, and that it is non-different from the cause. The same proposition is proved by other Scriptural passages. In the preceding Sūtra a passage which indicated the Scriptural word ‘Asat’ (i.e. non-existent) was cited and now the word ‘Sat’ (i.e. existent) i.e. a Scriptural word different from it (Śabdāntara), is cited, in the passage — “Oh mild one, the ‘Sat’ alone was existing in the beginning, the only one without a second” etc., after challenging the view of the non-existence of the effect (before creation) thus — “Some said, this was not in existence in the beginning”, and then by saying thus — “How can existence spring from non-existence?”, it is finally concluded by the Scriptures, thus — “Sat alone was existing in the beginning” (ChanU.6.2.1). Now in as much as it is understood from the Scriptures that the effect which is indicated by the word ‘Idam’ has the same case-ending as the cause indicated by the word ‘Sat’ (existing) i.e. there is oneness between them, the existence of (the effect) prior to its creation and its non-difference with the cause, becomes established. If on the other hand, an effect prior to its creation were to be non-existent and were it to establish a relation with the material cause after its creation then it would be an entity different from the cause, and in that case the original declaration, viz., “By which that which is unheard becomes heard” (ChanU.6.1.3), would be contradicted, and it is only by understanding that the effect exists prior to its creation and that it is non-different from the cause, that the original declaration can be upheld. — 18.
[Go top]
Paṭavat: like a piece of cloth; Ca: and.🔗 Also, similarly to a piece of cloth (the effect is non-different from the cause). — 2.1.19. Just as when a piece of cloth happens to be folded, it is not definitely understood whether it is a piece of cloth or some other material, but when it is unfolded it becomes clearly understood to be a piece of cloth, or, it is understood to be a piece of cloth even when it is yet folded, but it is not understood as to how long and broad it is, but when it is unfolded it is known to be of a particular dimension in length and breadth and that it is not a piece of cloth different from the one which happened to be in a folded condition, similarly, an effect such as a piece of cloth etc., unrecognizable as it is, while it is in the condition of its cause viz. as threads etc., becomes clearly recognizable when it is made manifest by the operations of the causal agents, such as the shuttle, the loom and the weaver. Hence the meaning is, that it is precisely in accordance with ‘the maxim of the folded and unfolded piece of cloth’ that an effect is non-different from its cause. — 19.
[Go top]
Yathā: as; Ca: and; Prāṇa-ādi: in the case of Prāṇas or vital airs.🔗 Also like the (minor) Prāṇas (Vital Airs, the effect is non-different from the cause). — 2.1.20. Just as in the ordinary world, when the different kinds of minor Prāṇas such as the Prāṇa, Apāna (ascending and descending Prāṇa) etc. are controlled, (and put out of action) by Prāṇāyāma (breathing exercises) and they then subsist merely in the form of a cause, only the life (of a man) is sustained and no other function such as the flexion or stretching (of the limbs) takes place, and when these different Prāṇas start functioning again, flexion and stretching (of the limbs) in addition to mere living also is restored. Now just as during all this time, the different minor Prāṇas, though they appear to be different, are not essentially different from the chief vital Prāṇa, because of the chief vital Prāṇa and the other minor Prāṇas being all of the same nature of air, even so, the effects are nondifferent from their causes. Hence, as the whole world is an effect of Brahman (as its cause), and is non-different from it, the Scriptural declaration — “By (the knowledge of) which, what is not heard becomes heard, what is not perceived becomes perceived, what is not known becomes known” (ChanU.6.1.1) — is thus established. — 20.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Itara-vyapadeśāt: on account of the other being stated (as non-different from Brahman); Hita-akaraṇa-ādi-doṣa-prasaktiḥ: defects of not doing what is beneficial and the like would arise. (Itara: other than being Brahman, i.e. the individual soul; Vyapadeśāt: from the designation, from the expression; Hita: good, beneficial; A-karaṇa-ādi: not creating, etc.; Doṣa: imperfection, defect, faults; Prasaktiḥ: result, consequence.)🔗 Because of the reference to the other (i.e. the Jīva-Self is of the nature of Brahman), a fault — viz. that which is beneficial is eschewed etc. (by the Self) — attaches. — 2.1.21. Again, the doctrine of a sentient thing being the cause (of the world) is objected to. If it is accepted that the creation of the world is due to a sentient cause (such as Brahman), faults such as the eschewing (by it) of what is beneficial etc. do attach themselves (to Brahman). Whence is it so? Because of the reference to other (i.e. the Jīva-Self). The Scriptures indicate that the other, i.e. the Jīva-Self, has Brahman as its Self (i.e. both are one and the same), by enlightening (Śveta-ketu), thus — “That is the Self, that thou art, Oh Śevta-keto” (ChanU.6.8.7). Or else (it may be construed) that the Scriptures declare, that the other (i.e. Brahman) is the Self of the embodied Jīva-Self, thus — “Having created that (world) it entered into it” (TaitU.2.6), by stating the Creator (Brahman) which never undergoes any modification, as entering into that which it has created (viz. the body etc.). The Scriptural passage “May I, by myself entering (into my own creation) as the Jīva-Self, evolve names and forms”, by indicating that the transcendent deity (i.e. Brahman) refers to the Jīva-Self as its own Self, shows, how the Jīva-Self is not different from Brahman. Hence the creative activity of Brahman is but the creative activity of the Jīva-Self only. Hence being thus an independent creator in itself, it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) would rather create what is beneficial to itself and conducive to its own satisfaction, and avoid creating that which is not so beneficial, such as this snare of all the evils of birth, death, old age, and disease. No one who is not dependent ever voluntarily creates a prison for himself and enters into it. No one who himself is extremely pure and stainless, would ever accept this extremely unclean body as his own (tabernacle). Even if anything is done by him which causes pain, he would voluntarily give it up and would undertake only that which gives happiness. Further he would also remember that he himself has created this wonderful sphere of the universe. All persons who have done any definite thing, necessarily remember it as their own handiwork. Just as an illusionist, at will and without any effort withdraws an illusion spread by him, even so would the embodied Jīva-Self, at will, demolish his own creation. The Jīva-Self, however, is not easily able even to do away with its own body. Hence, as it is not seen that a thing which is beneficial is done (by the embodied Jīva-Self), it is understood that the acceptance of the theory that the world is created by a sentient being, is not reasonable. — 21.
[Go top]
Adhikam: something more, greater than the Jīva; Tu: but; Bheda-nirdeśāt: because of the pointing out of differences on account of the statement of difference. (Bheda: difference; Nirdeśāt: because of the pointing out).🔗 But (Brahman is) greater (and therefore, other than the Jīva-Self) because of the mention of a distinction (between Brahman and the Jīva-Self). — 2.1.22. The word ‘But’ rebuts the (opponent’s) view. We maintain that Brahman, which is omniscient, and omnipotent, and which possesses a nature which is eternally pure and enlightened, and which is free and is greater than the Jīva-Self, and is different (from it), is the creator of the world. The faults of not doing what is beneficial etc. do not attach themselves to it. Possessing as it does the nature of being eternally free, it has no duties either to perform anything beneficial or not to perform anything unbeneficial (to itself). Because of being omniscient and omnipotent there is also not the least let or hindrance either to its knowledge or power. The Jīva-Self on the other hand is unlike that and the faults of not doing what is beneficial etc. do of course attach to it, but, we do not maintain that the Jīva-Self is the creator of the world. How is that? Because of the mention of a distinction (between it and Brahman). Scriptural passages such as “The Self (Oh Maitreyī) is to be seen, heard, cogitated upon and constantly meditated upon” (BrhU.2.4.5), “He should be sought for and desired to be known” (ChanU.8.7.1), “He in that condition (of deep sleep) becomes one with the Sat” (ChanU.6.8.1), “The embodied Jīva-Self being mounted upon by the intelligential Self (Prājña)” (BrhU.4.3.35), which speak of a distinction as between an agent (Kartā) and an object (Karma) etc., show that Brahman is greater i.e. other than the Jīva-Self. But (says the opponent) there is a mention also of the non-distinction between the two, such as — “That thou art”. How can distinction and non-distinction which are contrary to each other be both possible? (We reply) — this is no fault, because we have already established in several proper places, that according to the maxim of “The Ākāśa and the Ākāśa of the pot”, both are possible. Besides when the non-distinction (between the two) comes to be realized, by means of such reference to non-distinction, as “That thou art”, then the nature of the transmigratory existence of the Jīva-Self, and the creative activity of Brahman, both vanish, on account of the removal of the entire set of transactions, depending upon the notion of distinction which is but only a display of false-knowledge, by true knowledge. Whence could then there be any creation (of the world) at all or any such faults of not doing that which is beneficial? We have said more than once, that this transmigratory existence characterized by the avoidance of what is beneficial etc., is nothing but a delusion, caused by the failure to realize the limiting adjuncts, such as the aggregates of bodies and organs of sense, and names and forms brought about by Nescience, and it is not as if it exists in the truest sense, and that it (i.e. this delusion) is of a piece with the supposed notions, of birth or death or of being hurt or wounded. As long as the notion of distinction (between the Jīva-Self and Brahman) continues unobliterated, the notion of Brahman being different from (and more than) the Jīva-Self, as understood from the Scriptural passage “He should be searched for and understood”, precludes the possibility of the attachment to Brahman, of any such faults as the not doing of things beneficial etc. (to itself). — 22.
[Go top]
Aśma-ādivat: like stone, etc.; Ca: and; Tat anupapattiḥ: its untenability, unreasonableness, impossibility; (Tat: of that; Tasya: its, of the objection raised in Sūtra 21).🔗 And (this) being similar to the case of stones etc., that (i.e. the objection of the opponent of the Vedānta view) is not reasonably sustainable. — 2.1.23. Just as in the ordinary world, though stones in general are the effects of earth, we find that there is quite a variety in them, as for instance, some are highly precious such as diamonds and lapis lazuli, some are of an intermediate quality such as crystals and sun-stones, and some are of the lowest type, fit only to be thrown at dogs and crows, or just as in the case of seeds which are all planted in earth, we find a great variety of leaves, flowers, fruits, smells and tastes, as in sandlewood and Kim-pāka (Giant Palm fruit) or just as from one and the same food chyle, a variety of effects such blood etc. and hair and down etc. result, in the same way in the case of Brahman, one only though it is, such distinction as by way of the Jīva-Self and the intelligent Self is possible, and also a variety of its effects, is reasonably sustainable, and hence the objection raised by the opponents of the Vedānta view, is not reasonably sustainable. The meaning is that the fault imagined by the opponent is not reasonably sustainable. Also other reasons, such as that the Scriptures are the ultimate authority, that effects (Vikāras) are such as are merely made current in speech, and that there is a variety of dream experiences (though the person who experiences dreams is but one only), can be cumulatively mentioned. — 23.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Upasaṃhāra-darśanāt: because collection of materials is seen; Na: not; Iti cet: if it be said; Na: no; Kṣīravat: like milk; Hi: because, as. (Darśanāt: because of the seeing; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Vat: like, has the force of an instrumental case here. (See Sūtra of Pāṇini, Tena tulyaṃ kriyā etc.)🔗 (If it be said that the Vedānta view) is not correct because it is seen (in the ordinary world) that (for producing an effect) there is preparation or an assemblage (of means, we reply) — No, because it (Brahman) is like milk. — 2.1.24. What is said by the opponent — viz., the statement (by the Vedāntin) that sentient Brahman, which is alone without a second, is the cause of the world — is not reasonably sustainable. Whence is it so? Because it is seen that there is preparation or assemblage (of means). In the ordinary world, it is observed that potters (and weavers) etc., the manufacturers of pots and cloth etc., accomplish those different things, after furnishing themselves with the necessary means or implements, by assembling together clay, staff, wheel and threads, etc., and many such causal agents, while you maintain that Brahman is without any such help. Hence how can it be reasonably sustainable, that Brahman, which you understand to have no such helpful means, can have the ability to create in the absence of any such assemblage of means? Ergo, Brahman could not be the cause of the world. (To this, we reply) — This is no fault. It is reasonably so sustainable, because Brahman, like milk, is a special peculiar material (Dravya). Just as in the ordinary world, milk and water, by themselves undergo modifications into curds and snow respectively without expecting any extraneous means, even so, it might be the case here (i.e. in the case of Brahman). If the opponent says) How do you say that the case is analogous to milk, when even milk etc. do require such outside help as heat etc.? (We reply) — this is no fault, because whatever modification milk undergoes in turning into curds is by itself only, and whatever potentiality or the limit of potentiality which milk has in itself for the modificatory process of conversion into curds is but merely accelerated by heat etc., that is all. Because, were milk not to possess in itself this potentiality of modifying itself into curds, it would never undergo such modification per force alone, by means of heat etc. Ākāśa and Vāyu, for instance, do not modify themselves per force into curds, by heat etc., and (in the case of milk) its capacity (for modification) is merely perfected by the assemblage of means. Brahman on the other hand is fully powerful by itself, and nothing else is necessary to make its capacity perfect. For the Scriptures say — “There is nothing that it has to create, nor has it any extraneous instrument or means, (it may also mean — it i.e. Brahman has neither a body nor any sense-organ), nothing equal to or greater than it, is to be seen, and its powers are (seen to be) manifold and transcendental, and it has the natural power to know all things and to regulate and overcome everything by its mere presence” (SvetU.6.2). Therefore, only one, as Brahman is, that it has diverse powers inherent in itself, and that it can, like milk, modify itself in diverse ways, is reasonably sustainable. — 24.
[Go top]
Deva-ādivat: like gods and others (saints); Api: even, also; Loke: in the world.🔗 (The case of Brahman) may he, as it is in the ordinary world, like that of Gods etc. (it may also become active). — 2.1.25. May be (says the opponent), it may be reasonably sustainable, that non-sentient milk and such things may modify themselves into curds etc. without expecting any extraneous means (to aid them), because it actually is so seen. But potters etc., who are sentient, are seen to proceed to do their various different works only by depending on extraneous means (to help them). How then can Brahman, which is sentient, proceed to work unaided? We reply, that, it may be so, as in the case of Gods, etc. Just as in the ordinary world it is understood on the authority of Veda, Mantras, History and Purāṇas, that Gods, the manes and sages etc., very powerful and sentient as they are, and unaided by extraneous means as they are, are seen to create bodies of different sorts, and chariots and palaces etc. merely by themselves by means of their special power and by mere meditation, and by mere volition, or just as a spider produces its own threads itself, or just as a crane conceives without insemination, or just as an assemblage of lotuses proceeds from one lake to another without any extraneous means of movement, even so, Brahman, sentient as it is, may, well by itself, create the world unaided by any extraneous means. (If the opponent were to say) — But these Gods etc., which are cited (by the Vedāntin) as illustrations for Brahman, bear no similarity to Brahman, which is sought to be illustrated by them. It is the non-sentient body of the Gods, and not their sentient selfs, that furnishes the material for producing other bodies, and it is the saliva of a spider which becomes coagulated by feeding on inferior insects, that modifies itself into threads, and the crane conceives on hearing the sound of thunder, and an assemblage of lotuses, impelled by an indwelling sentient being, moves with its non-sentient body from one lake to another, just as a creeper climbs up a tree, and not that the non-sentient assemblage of lotuses, by itself endeavours to move towards another lake. Therefore these cannot be illustrations with regard to Brahman. We would reply — This is no fault, because, what we wish to stress, is only the dissimilarity of the illustrations such as that of the potter etc. (which you, the opponent referred to). Just as, though sentiency is common both to the potter and the Gods, it is only the potter etc. that need extraneous means (to help them) in doing their work, but not so the Gods, even so, all that we wish to say by the illustration of the Gods, is that sentient Brahman, also need not require any extraneous means (to help it in creating the world). What we therefore mean, is, that it is not an invariable rule, that just as a particular power is observed to exist in one thing, similarly all other things also must necessarily have the same power. — 25.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Kṛtsna-prasaktiḥ: possibility of the entire (Brahman being modified); Nir-avayavatva-śabda-kopaḥ: contradiction of the scriptural statement that Brahman is without parts; Va: or, otherwise. (Kṛtsna: entire, full, total; complete; Prasaktiḥ: exigency, employment; activity; Nir-avayavatva: without parts, without form, without members, indivisible; Śabda: word, text, expressions in Śruti; Kopaḥ: contradiction, violation, incongruity, stultification; Va: or.)🔗 (If Brahman be the cause of the world, the conclusion would be), that the entire Brahman undergoes modification, or else the Scriptural declaration that Brahman has no parts would be vitiated. — 2.1.26. It is established, that Brahman, which is the only one without a second, and which undergoes modification without expecting any extraneous means (to help it) — like milk or like the Gods — , is the cause of the world. Objection however is taken to this (by the Sūtra-kāra himself), for securing the purification of the meaning of the Śāstra, thus — A conclusion, that there would be modification of the entire Brahman, into its effects, would result, as Brahman is without any parts. Were Brahman to have parts like the earth for instance, it may be that while one part of it would undergo modification the other part may remain as it is. But it is understood from the Scriptures which deny any special attribute in Brahman, that Brahman has no parts, thus — “(Brahman is) without parts, without action, tranquil, faultless and untainted” (SvetU.6.19), “That celestial and incorporeal Puruṣa is both inside and outside and. is unborn” (MunU.2.1.2), “This great being, is infinite, endless and fully knowledge-incarnate” (BrhU.2.4.12), “(Whatever is predicated to be Brahman) — it is not that, not that, it is the Self” (BrhU.3.9.26), “Neither gross nor atomic” (BrhU.3.8.8). Hence, as there is the impossibility of only a part of Brahman undergoing modification, and the conclusion about its modification in its entirety being therefore inevitable, the destruction of the very basis itself (i.e. Brahman) would thus result. Now, as effects as such (of Brahman) are recognizable without any effort, the Scriptural instruction that “it (Brahman) should be seen” would be rendered purposeless, and the existence of Brahman as apart from its modification would not be possible, (as Brahman will have undergone modification in its entirety). Besides, it would militate against the Scriptural declaration of its not being subject to origination (Ajatva) etc. If, in order to remove this fault, it is understood, that Brahman has parts, then the Scriptural statements cited in illustration of its being without any parts would be contradicted. Besides, if it is understood to have parts, the predicament of its not being eternal would arise. Hence (the opponent avers) it is not possible to reconcile this (Vedānta) view. — 26.
[Go top]
Śruteḥ: from Śruti, as it is stated in Śruti, on account of scriptural texts; Tu: but; Śabda-mūlatvāt: on account of being based on the scripture, as Śruti is the foundation.🔗 But (the objection of the opponent is not correct) because of Scriptural passages, and also because it (Brahman) has the Scriptures as its basis (lit. root). — 2.1.27. By the word ‘But’ (the Sūtra-kāra) refutes the objection (of the opponent). Really there is no fault of any kind in our view (i.e. the view of the Vedāntin). In the first place there is no modification of Brahman in its entirety. Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptures. Just as the Scriptures speak of the creation of the world from Brahman, they also speak of the existence of Brahman, as apart from its modifications, inasmuch as they speak of the cause (i.e. Prakṛti, Brahman) and its modification (Vikāra) as being different from each other, by passages of the type of “This deity thought, I will now enter into these three divinities (i.e. into the Pṛthivī, Āpaḥ and Tejas) as the Jīva-Self and evolve names and forms” (ChanU.6.3.2) and “So much is its greatness, and the Puruṣa is even greater than that. His one foot (i.e. quarter) represents all the beings, and the other three feet (quarters) represent that which is immortal in heaven” (ChanU.3.12.6). Also, as the Scriptures speak of the Hṛdaya as its (Brahman’s) abode, and that in deep sleep, it, i.e. the Jīva-Self, becomes one with the ‘Sat’ (Brahman). Were entire Brahman to be used up in modifying itself into effects, then the special mention, in the Scriptural passage “Oh mild one, in deep sleep the Jīva-Self becomes one with the ‘Sat’ (Brahman)” (ChanU.6.8.1), about this peculiarity pertaining to deep sleep, would not be reasonably sustainable, because (in such a case) it (i.e. the Sat i.e. Brahman) would always be as one with the modified Brahman, (because according to the opponent, the entire Brahman would have modified itself) and because there would be no unmodified Brahman as such. And also because it is denied (by the Scriptures) that Brahman is perceptible to sense-organs, and it is reasonably sustainable that the effects (i.e. the world etc.) are perceptible to sense-organs. Therefore, unevolved Brahman does necessarily exist. There can be no contradiction of the Scriptural statement about Brahman being without any parts, as it is understood from Scriptures themselves that Brahman has no parts. As Brahman has the Scriptures as its basis, and Scriptures alone and not the sense-organs are authoritative about it, it should necessarily be understood to be just as it is spoken of in the Scriptures. And the Scriptures speak of Brahman as being both without parts and at the same time as not modifying itself wholly. Even ordinary things of the world such as gems, Mantras and herbs are observed to possess powers to exhibit properties producing incompatible effects depending upon the varieties of environment, time, and occasion, and in the absence of any instruction about them, it cannot be known merely by reasoning, that they possess such and such powers, which require such and such help and which produce such and such effects and are effective for such and such purposes. Need it be mentioned, therefore, that it is not possible to explain the inscrutable nature of Brahman, without (the help of) the Scriptures? The Purāṇikas also say, similarly — “Do not employ reasoning to entities which are unthinkable. To be beyond the material effects (Prakṛti) is the criterion of that which is unfathomable”. Therefore, the realization of the supersensuous Brahman, as it is in fact, depends upon the Scriptures as its source. But (says the opponent) things which are contradictory — as for instance, that Brahman which is without parts, modifies itself but not entirely — cannot be realized even on the authority of the Scriptures. If, Brahman is (in fact) without parts, it will either not modify itself at all, or modify itself entirely. If it were to be supposed that it has different aspects, so that it modifies itself in some of its aspects and remains unmodified in some other of its aspects, it would mean necessarily that it has parts. In the case of matters connected with actions (Karma), when a conflict is discernible, such as “He uses the Ṣo-ḍaśi cup in Atirātra sacrifice”, and “He does not use the Ṣo-ḍaśi cup in Atirātra sacrifice”, as action depends upon a man, a resort to an option constitutes the means of removing the contradiction, but in the present case, even a resort to option would be unable to remove a contradiction, because, an entity (Vastu) as such is independent of man, and therefore, it is difficult to reconcile this (contradiction). (To this we reply) This is no fault, because here it is understood that these different aspects of Brahman are imagined through Nescience. A thing is not rendered as being a thing having parts, merely by imagining through Nescience (Avidyā) that it has different aspects. The moon, for instance, does not in fact become more than one, merely because she appears to be more than one, to an eye affected by double vision (Timira i.e. Diplopia). Brahman appears to become susceptible of (i.e. appears to be the basis of) all phenomenal behaviour by way of modifications etc., by reason of the distinctions of aspects or forms characterized by names and forms imagined through Nescience, which are at once both evolved and unevolved, and about whom it is not possible to predicate that they either are or are not Brahman, while in its truest nature Brahman subsists only in its unmodified aspect, and is beyond all phenomenal behaviour, and, as names and forms imagined through Nescience are but merely made current by speech, the fact that Brahman has no parts is not thereby vitiated. Besides, on the one hand this Scriptural statement about the modification (of Brahman) is not meant to propound the fact of modification itself, as such realization is not understood to have any fruit as such, while on the other hand it is intended to establish how Brahman which is the Self of all is devoid of any real phenomenal behaviour, as it is understood that a fruit results by such realization. The Scriptures, after declaring in the beginning that “(whatever is predicated to be Brahman) is not that, not that”, proceed to say later on — “Oh Janaka, verily hast thou attained fearlessness” (BrhU.4.2.4). Therefore there could never be a predicament of any kind of fault attaching to our view (i.e. that of the Vedāntins). — 27.
[Go top]
Ātmani: in the individual soul; Ca: also, and; Evam: thus; Vicitrāḥ: diverse, manifold, variegated; Ca: and, also; Hi: because.🔗 It is similar in (the case of) the Ātmā (Jīva-Self) also, (during dream experiences), and such different (creations exist in the case of Gods, illusionists etc.). — 2.1.28. It is similar in (the case of) the Ātmā (Jīva-Self) also, (during dream experiences), and such different (creations exist in the case of Gods, illusionists etc.). — 28. It should not be disputed in this matter (of Brahman), as to how creations of different sorts, originating out of Brahman which is but one only, can be possible without the destruction of its own nature, since the Scriptures speak of similar creations of different sorts in the case of the dreaming Jīva-Self also without any destruction of its own nature thus — “(In the dream condition) there are no chariots, nor steeds, nor roads, but he creates chariots, steeds and roads etc.” (BrhU.4.3.10) It is seen in the ordinary world also, that Gods, illusionists etc. cause such creations as elephants and horses, without their own forms undergoing destruction, and hence, even in the case of Brahman, one and only one as it is, there may well be creation of different sorts without involving destruction of its own nature. — 28.
[Go top]
Svapakṣa: in one’s own view; Doṣāt: because of the defects; Ca: also, and.🔗 Also because the faults (attributed to the Vedānta doctrine by the opponents) are common to their own (i.e. of the opponent’s) view. — 2.1.29. The same faults are common to their own view (i.e. to the view of the opponents of Vedānta). Their own view also is, that the Pradhāna which is without parts, undelimited, and devoid of attributes such as sound etc., is the cause of effects which have parts, which are delimited and which have the attributes of sound (such as the world etc.). In that case also, the Pradhāna being without parts, there would also be the same conclusion, viz., that the Pradhāna as a whole undergoes modification, or that the assumption that Pradhāna has no parts would be contradicted. (The opponent may suggest) — they (i.e. the opponents) do not understand that the Pradhāna is without parts, because its three qualities (Guṇas) of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas are eternal and Pradhāna means their condition of balanced equipoise, and that it is because of these three qualities (Guṇas) that their Pradhāna has parts. (We say to this) — they would not be able to remove the present fault by any such supposition about the Pradhāna being endowed with parts, because (according to them) each of their Guṇas viz. Sattva, Rajas or Tamas is by itself equally partless, and each one of these three helped by the other two, is the material cause of diverse creations, homogeneous to themselves (i.e. having all these qualities in every creation), and therefore, there would be the same common predicament of a similar fault occurring in their own view also. (If the opponent says) — As this reasoning (viz. that each of these three qualities i.e. Guṇas of Pradhāna has no parts) has no basis, we understand that the Pradhāna has parts, even then (we reply) there still would occur the predicament of its being non-eternal etc. (because a thing which has parts is not everlasting i.e. is Anitya). (Again if the opponent says) We assume that the diverse potential powers of the Pradhāna, as suggested by the variety of created effects themselves, constitute the parts of the Pradhāna, then (we reply) that the assumption of such potential powers is equally common to the Vedānta view. Now, in the case of the Atomists (Vaiseṣikas) also, when one atom combines with another, it would combine entirely because atoms are without parts, and then as no dimensions i.e. extensions would emerge (from such combination of partless atoms) there would occur the predicament of the resulting combination (of one atom with another) also being atomic. If it then be said, that an atom combines with only one part (of it) with one part (of another), it would contradict their own assumption of atoms being without parts, and the fault would then be common to the Atomist’s view also. Such a fault therefore being in such a case common to both the views (of the Vedāntin’s and the Atomist’s) it would not be proper (for any one) to urge it only against one’s opponent’s view only. The possibility of any fault attaching to the Vedānta view has already been refuted by the adherent of the Vedānta view. — 29.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Sarva-upetā: endowed with all powers, all-powerful; Ca: also, and; Tad-darśanāt: because it is seen (from the scriptures). (Sarva: all; Upetā: endowed with, possessed with; Tat: that, the possession of such powers.)🔗 (Brahman, parā devatā) is equipped with all powers, because it is so seen (from the Scriptures). — 2.1.30. It has already been said that though Brahman is one only, its modification in the form of this diverse world appearance, is reasonably sustainable, because of its being equipped with all powers. Again (it may be asked), how is it known that the Highest Brahman is equipped with diverse powers? (We reply) — Because it is seen that it is so equipped (with diverse powers). It has necessarily to be understood that this Highest deity is equipped with all powers. Whence is it so? Because it is seen (from Scriptures) that it has all such powers, thus — “He, to whom all actions, all desires, all smells, all tastes belong, who is immanent in i.e. occupies all this (world appearance), who has no speech and who is indifferent and calm” (ChanU.3.14.4); “His desires are true, his resolutions are true” (ChanU.8.7.1); “Who is omniscient and who cognizes everything” (MunU.1.1.9); “Oh Gārgi, it is at the behest of him who is unperishable that the sun and the moon hold themselves suspended in position (in space) (BrhU.3.8.9). — 30.
[Go top]
Vikaraṇatvāt: because of want of organs of action and perception; Na: not; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Tat: that, that objection; Uktam: has been explained or answered.🔗 (If it be said) — not being endowed with sense-organs, (Brahman) (cannot effect modifications) (we reply) it has been answered already. — 2.1.31. The Scriptures have stated that the transcendent deity (Brahman) is not endowed with organs, thus — “(Brahman is) sans-eyes, sans-ears, sans-speech and sans-mind” (BrhU.3.8.8). How then, can such transcendent deity be able to effect modifications, even though it be equipped with all powers? Intelligent and equipped with all powers as Gods etc. are, they are understood to be able to effect all such several modifications, only when they are possessed of physical organs as the means (of effecting modifications). (If it be said) — how is it possible, that a deity which can be referred to only negatively as “not that, not that” (BrhU.3.9.26) and about which all specific attributes are thus denied, can still have a connection with all such powers? (We would reply) — All that can be said in reply to this has already been stated before. This extremely solemn Brahman is capable of being understood only through the Scriptures and never through reasoning. There is no such rule that because one entity is observed to possess certain powers, any other entity must necessarily possess all these powers. That it is possible, that Brahman, with regard to which all special attributes are denied, may yet possibly possess all powers when it is borne in mind that it has already been stated that even though all specific attributes are denied in the case of Brahman, still when it is assumed that it has different forms or natures imagined through Nescience (Avidyā), it becomes possible that it can have a connection with all powers. Even so teaches the Śāstra (Scriptures), viz., that unequipped with physical organs though Brahman is, it still is possessed of all powers, by the passage — “Though he has neither hands nor feet, he grasps and is capable of swift movement, he sees even though he has no eyes and hears even though he has no ears to hear” (SvetU.3.19). — 31.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Na: not (i.e. Brahman cannot be the creator); Prayojana-vattvāt: on account of having motive.🔗 (Brahman) is not the cause of the world, because (all endeavours by sentient entities are) with some object. — 2.1.32. Again in another way an objection is raised (by the opponent) to (the doctrine of) this transitory world being the handiwork of a sentient entity (i.e. Brahman). Verily this sentient Highest Self (i.e. Brahman) does not deserve to create (i.e. be the creator of) this world-sphere. Why so? Because all endeavours presuppose an objective (behind such endeavour). (For instance) in the ordinary world a sentient man whose every endeavour is invariably preceded by previous thought, is never seen to engage himself in any the least endeavour which is useless for his own objective. How then about this stupendous undertaking? There is a passage in the Scriptures which agrees with ordinary well-known worldly experience, thus — “All this does not become dear for the sake of all, but it all is so dear, because it is desired by one’s own self (Ātmā)” (BrhU.2.4.5). It is a stupendous undertaking this, viz. the creation of this worldly sphere, which is comprised of all such high and low worldly phenomena. Now, if it were to be conceived that this endeavour of the Highest Self is useful to itself because of its own desire, then such supposition would contradict the Scriptural statement about the Highest Self being always quite contented. If, on the other hand, one were to conceive no such purpose (behind such endeavour), one would have to concede that (in such a case) there would not be any such endeavour, (if one were to say) that it is seen that if a person even though sentient, happens to be unsound in mind, such person, through the fault of his intellect, is seen to be engaged in activity quite useless to his purpose, by reason of his inability to discriminate properly, and even so, may the Highest Self also endeavour, then (in such a case) the Scriptural statement about the Highest Self being omniscient, would be contradicted. For these reasons, therefore, (the doctrine) that the creation (of this world) is by a sentient being, is not tenable. — 32.
[Go top]
Lokavat: as in the world, as in ordinary life; Tu: but; Līlā-kaivalyam: mere pastime. (Līlā: sport, play; Kaivalyam: merely; Līlā-mātram: mere pastime.)🔗 But (the act of creation) is a mere sport (of the Lord) even as is seen in the ordinary world. — 2.1.33. The word “But” refutes the objection. Just as in the ordinary world, in the case of a king who has attained all his desires or of his minister, their activities in sports and pastimes are merely of the nature of a sport and are indulged in without any particular aim in mind, or just as the inspiration or expiration etc. (of a man) takes place naturally, without any extraneous purpose, even so may the Lord also engage in such sportful activity without any purpose, and merely as the result of his nature. It is not possible to explain on the ground of reasoning or the Scriptures that there is any other purpose on the part of the Lord. It is not possible to question the nature (of the Lord). Though the creation of this world-sphere appears to us as a stupendous undertaking, yet to the Lord, it is but a mere pastime, because of his measureless power. May be, that in the case of the ordinary world, we may imagine perhaps some minute purpose even for sports, but here in the case of the Lord, it is not possible to imagine any such purpose, because of the Scriptural statement about His being one who has obtained all his desires. Nor can we say that the Lord has no such activity or that such activity is that of a person who is possessed of an evil spirit or of one who is insane, because of the Scriptural statement about creation and about his being Omniscient. Nor should it ever be forgotten, that even this Scriptural statement about creation (by the Lord) is not so in the truest sense, but with reference to the perception of the transactions of names and forms being merely imagined through Nescience, and also because it purports to propound how Brahman is the Self (of everything). — 33.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Vaiṣamya: inequality, partiality; Nairghṛṇye: cruelty, unkindness; Na: not (cannot be ascribed to Brahman); Sa-apekṣatvāt: because of dependence upon, as it is dependent on something else, i.e., upon the Karma of the souls; Tathā: so; Hi: because; Darśayati: the scripture declares.🔗 (Faults of) discrimination and cruelty do not (attach themselves to the Lord) because of (the Lord’s) having regard (for the merit or demerit of a person). The Scriptures themselves bear it out. — 2.1.34. Objection is again taken (by the Sūtra-kāra himself) to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the creation etc. of the world, in order to confirm the declaration of that doctrine, in accordance with the ‘maxim of driving a pile deeper (in order to make it firm) (Sthūṇā-nikhanana Nyāya)’, thus — It is not reasonably sustainable that the Lord is the cause of the world, because (supposing it is so) there would result the predicament of (the fault of) discrimination and cruelty (attaching themselves to the Lord). It would be reasonably sustainable to hold, that the Lord in bringing about such unequal creation — such as Gods etc. who enjoy great happiness, animals etc. who suffer great misery, and men etc. who enjoy happiness or suffer misery in moderation — is like an ordinary man subject to passion and hatred. It would thus bring about the effacement of the Lord’s nature of extreme purity as understood from the Scriptures and the Smṛtis. Similarly by his inflicting misery and by destroying all his creation, faults of such pitilessness and cruelty, as would be abhorred even by a villain, would attach themselves to the Lord. Therefore, because of the predicament of (the faults of) discrimination and cruelty resulting, the Lord could not be the cause of the world. To this (we reply) — (The faults of) discrimination and cruelty do not affect the Lord. How is this so? Because of the regard (which the Lord has for the merit or demerit of a person). Were the Lord to bring about such unequal creation without any such regard (for a person’s merit or demerit), then surely (the faults of) discrimination and cruelty would attach themselves to Him, but no one who has no such regard, has any such creativity i.e. an impulse to create. It is because the Lord just has such regard (for a person’s merit or demerit) that he brings about such unequal creation. What then, is his regard about? We say that he has a regard for the merit or demerit of persons. Surely it is no fault of the Lord, that his bringing about of such unequal creation is due to the regard he has for the merit and demerit of the beings about to be created. The Lord should rather be looked upon to be like ‘rain’. Just as rain is the general cause which makes rice and barley grow, while the different potentialities inherent in their seeds, are the cause of the disparity between such rice and barley, even so in the creation of Gods and men etc. the Lord is but the general common cause only, while for the inequality between Gods and men etc., they have their own different individual actions as the cause, and in this way, the Lord, because of this regard (for men’s merits and demerits) is not vitiated by (such faults as of) discrimination and cruelty. But, how again is it understood that the Lord brings about such low, middling and high transmigratory existences because of such regard on his part (for a person’s merits and demerits)? The Scriptures themselves state so, thus — “The Lord when he wishes to raise a person higher than this world, he causes such person to do good deeds, and when he wishes to lead him down to the nether regions, he causes him to do bad deeds” (Kaush. Bra. 3.8); also, “A man becomes meritorious by meritorious actions and sinful by sinful actions” (BrhU.3.2.13). Smṛti also shows how the vouchsafing of grace by the Lord (to a person) or his condemnation (of him) depends upon the particular actions of these beings, thus — “I respond to men in the same measure in which they serve me” — (BhG.4.11). — 34.
[Go top]
Na: not; Karma-avibhagāt: because of the non-distinction of work (before creation); Iti cet: if it be said, if it be objected in this way; Na: no, the objection cannot stand; An-āditvāt: because of beginninglessness.🔗 (If the Lord’s having regard (for merit or demerit) is objected to as being impossible, on the ground that, prior to creation, because of the absence of distinction (between merit and demerit), there is no Karma (action), — (we reply) No, because (transmigratory existence) is beginningless. — 2.1.35. If the objection (by the opponent) is thus: Because as it has already been understood from the Scriptural passage “Oh mild one, in the beginning, ‘Sat’ alone, one without a second, existed” (ChanU.6.2.1) there could be no action (Karma), having regard to which there would be this disparity in the creation, inasmuch as it is understood that prior to creation, differences did not exist. Action would take place only after creation, depending upon differences such as physical bodies etc., and differences such as physical bodies etc. would depend upon action taking place, and thus there would occur (the fault of) mutual interdependence (Itaretarāśrayatva). Hence, well may the Lord function, having regard to action, after such differences (of bodies etc.) have taken place, but because of the absence of action which is the cause of the variety (of creation) prior to such differences, it would come to this, that creation would be homogeneous. (We reply) — This is no fault, because of transmigratory existence being beginningless. The fault (as referred to by the opponent) may well occur provided transmigratory existence were to have a beginning. But transmigratory existence being beginningless, there need not be any objection for action and the variety of creation, to act alternately as cause and effect of each other, like the seed and the sprout, and to have a tendency for creation having such disparity. — 35.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent) how is it understood that this transmigratory existence is beginningless?Upapadyate: is proved by reasoning, is reasonable that it should be so; Ca: and; Api: and, also, assuredly; Upalabhyate: is seen, is found in Śruti or Scriptures; Ca: also, and.🔗 (The Sūtra-kāra) replies (that transmigratory existence is beginningless) is reasonably sustainable and is understood (from the Scriptures) also. — 2.1.36. That transmigratory existence is beginningless is reasonably sustainable. If it were to have a beginning, then it having come into existence capriciously without any cause, the predicament of persons who have attained Final Release being again involved in transmigratory existence, would take place, as also the predicament of ‘fruit’ arising without any action having taken place, because (under such supposition) there would be no cause for the disparity between pleasure and misery (to come into existence). It has already been said that the Lord cannot be the cause for such disparity, nor can mere Nescience also be the cause of such disparity, because it is of a uniform nature. Nescience at best could produce such disparity, if it were to depend on action produced by subconscious impressions of misery resulting from passion etc. (Assuming that a physical body is the cause of variety) Without action, a physical body would not result, nor would action result in the absence of a physical body, and hence it would all result in the fault of mutual interdependence. If on the other hand, transmigratory existence is understood to be beginningless, then it would all be reasonably sustainable in accordance with the maxim of “the seed and the sprout” and hence there would not be any fault. That, transmigratory existence is beginningless, is understood both from the Scriptures and Smṛtis. So far as the Scriptures are concerned, they in the beginning of creation by referring to the embodied Self by the word Jīva, which comes into use by reason of the action of sustaining life (Prāṇa-dhāraṇa), by the Scriptural passage — “By this Jīva-Self” (ChanU.6.3.2), show, that transmigratory existence is beginningless. If it were to have a beginning, then lifeless as the Self (Ātmā) would necessarily be, how could the embodied Self be ever referred to, in the beginning of creation, by the term Jīva-Self, which becomes applicable because of the sustaining of life? It cannot be said, that it would be so referred to in anticipation, because a relationship Which is already in existence has greater force than a relationship which is yet to supervene, because it (the first relationship) is an already established thing. The Scriptural Mantra passage — “The Creator created the sun and the moon as before” (Ṛg-Veda 10.109.3), shows the existence of a prior Kalpa. That transmigratory existence is beginningless, we find mentioned in the Smṛti thus — “Neither is its (i.e. Brahman’s) form known here (like for instance the form of an earthen pot), nor its beginning, existence and end” (BhG.15.3). In the Purāṇas also it has been well established, that there is no measure of the past and future Kalpas. — 36.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Sarva: all; Dharma: attributes, qualities; Upapatteḥ: because of the reasonableness, because of being proved; Ca: and, also.🔗 (The Vedānta doctrine is valid) because all qualities (attributed to Brahman) are reasonably sustainable. — 2.1.37. The Ācārya (Sūtra-kāra) has thus refuted the faults attributed by the opponent of Vedānta to the doctrine of Brahman being the material and accidental cause of this world, by the Sūtra “On account of dissimilarity (between cause and effect) etc.”. Now with a view to begin the subject chiefly dealing with the refutation of the opponent’s doctrines, the Ācārya proposes to conclude the chief subject of the establishment of his own (Vedānta) doctrine, in as much as, when once this Brahman is accepted as the cause of this world, all qualities attributable to the cause, become reasonably sustainable in the manner indicated, viz. — that Brahman is omniscient, omnipotent and possesses the great power of Maya, and that therefore one should not doubt the Upaniṣad doctrine over much. — 37.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
Racanā: construction, the design in creation; An-upapatteh: on account of the impossibility; Ca: and; Na: not; Anumānam: that which is inferred, what is arrived at by inference, i.e., the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas.🔗 That the inferred one (of the Sāṅkhyas, i.e., the Pradhāna, is the cause of the world) is not (correct), also because (on that assumption) the proper arrangement (of this world) is not reasonably sustainable. — 2.2.1. Although this Śāstra has been commenced with a view to propound that the Vedānta passages mean thus and thus, and not with a view — like the Śāstra of reasoning — either to establish or vitiate a particular conclusion by mere reasonings, still it is but proper that learned scholars critically explaining the Vedānta passages should refute the doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas and others, who have ranged themselves in opposition to the doctrine of correct knowledge (Saṃyag-darśana), and it is with this view that the following chapter is commenced. As the ascertainment of the correct meaning of Vedānta is meant for the purpose of the determination of the doctrine of correct knowledge, we have first established our own doctrine by ascertaining the correct meaning, because that was more desirable than the refutation of the opponent’s doctrine. But (it may be said by the opponent), — it is proper, only to establish one’s own view for the purpose of explaining the doctrine of correct knowledge as the means for the attainment of Final Release for those who desire to be so liberated, so why trouble yourself then, about the refutation of the opponent’s doctrine which is calculated only to engender their hatred? Well, it is as you say, but some slow-witted persons, when they know, that these great doctrines of the Sāṅkhyas and others, which, albeit they proceed under the semblance of a true doctrine, are accepted by great people, may expect that the same should be accepted by them also, for the purpose of (attaining) correct knowledge. It may also be, that because they are the result of acute reasoning and are propounded by omniscient sages, such people may pin their faith on them i.e. such other doctrines, and hence an attempt is therefore made to expound their meaninglessness. But (it may again be urged by the opponent) that the Sāṅkhya and other doctrines have already been refuted by Sūtras, such as Brahma-sūtra I.i.5, I.i.18, I.iv.28. So what is the point, then, in doing it all over again? To that we say The Sāṅkhyas and others, with a view to establish their own doctrine, even cite Vedānta passages as illustrations, and interpret them in such a way as to make them applicable i.e. conformable to their own doctrines, and what has been done so far before, is, that it has been shown that their interpretation (of the Vedānta passages) is fallacious and not a correct explanation at all. Now, however, the special feature here is, that without reference to the Vedic passage, an independent refutation of their reasoning is made. Now, with regard to the present subject, the Sāṅkhyas hold, thus — Just as in the ordinary world it is seen that such things as earthen pots and jars etc., which have but clay as their common substance, have but clay as their general material cause, similarly, all these Bāhya (external) and Ādhyātmika (having a relation with bodies) effects (Bhedas), which have pleasure, misery, and ignorance as their general common nature, deserve to have something which has the same pleasure, misery and ignorance as their general common nature, as their material cause, and what this general common substance (viz. pleasure, misery and ignorance taken collectively) is, is but the Pradhāna, comprising of the triple qualities (of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas), which, like the earth, is non-sentient, and which, by virtue of its own nature, undergoes various modifications (as effects) with a view to fulfil the chief purpose of the sentient Puruṣa. They also infer this same Pradhāna (as the cause) because of such indicatory marks as the property of dimension i.e. extension etc. (viz. dimension or extension, the power to be active, proper sequence, origination of effect from a cause, and the merging of the effect into the cause). To this, we reply — If it is sought to explain this, only on the strength of illustrations, (we may point out that) in the ordinary world no non-sentient thing, independently and without being guided by some sentient entity, is seen to be able to bring about any modifications or effects, which are able to fulfil any particular purpose of man. It is seen that in the ordinary world things like a house, a palace, a bed-stead, a seat or a pleasure-ground, calculated to make for pleasure or for the avoidance of discomfort or pain, are created by sentient artisans at the required proper time. How could non-sentient Pradhāna, then, be able to create this entire external i.e. visible world, comprising of this earth etc. which is fit for the experiencing of the fruit of various actions, and this Ādhyātmika world of physical bodies of different classes, each having its own particular regular i.e. set arrangement of organs, affording basis for the experience of the fruits of various actions, which is not possible even to be mentally imagined by the most respected and highly intelligent architects? Because, it is not seen, that lumps of earth or stones ever accomplish such things. Even in the case of clay etc. it is only when they are directed or presided over (and taken up and manipulated) by potters etc. that they assume particular forms, so (even if one were to concede that Pradhāna is the cause) there would result the predicament of this Pradhāna also, having to be directed by some other sentient entity. There is no such restrictive rule that the root cause (of any thing) should be determined by having recourse to the qualities having a substratum of the nature of a material thing only (such as earth etc.) and not by having recourse to the qualities of any external (efficient) causes such as potters etc. This being so, not only nothing is contradicted thereby, but on the other hand the Scriptures would thus be supporting us (because of this agreement of views) by reason (of the fact) that the Scriptures culminate in indicating a sentient entity as the cause (of the world etc.). Hence it is precisely because of this very reason (stated by the opponent), viz. “That proper arrangement is not reasonably sustainable”, that it cannot be feasible to infer, that a non-sentient entity must be the cause of the world. The world ‘Also’ (i.e. ‘Ca’ in the Sūtra) cumulatively shows that the other reasons such as Anvaya (logical continuance) etc. (stated by the Sāṅkhyas as arguments in addition to the argument about Racanā i.e. arrangement or design) are not reasonably sustainable. Again Anvaya (i.e. logical continuance) is not reasonably sustainable in the case of external (Bāhya) effects or Kāryas (such as sound i.e. Śabda etc.) and internal (Ādhyātmika) effects or Kāryas (such as a body and sense-organs etc.) of which we have experience, as they have no relation to pleasure, pain, and infatuation i.e. ignorance (Moha), in as much as pleasure etc. are internally apprehended and sound (Śabda) etc. are externally apprehended, and also because sound etc. are apprehended as being the cause of pleasure etc., and also because, though words etc. are the same (in every case) they create a particular pleasurable or painful sensation depending upon the particular impression or fancy (of the hearer). Again, noticing that objects such as roots and sprouts which have definite dimensions (i.e. extension) spring up as a result of an antecedent contact (of materials), if you were to infer, that external and internal Ādhyātmika differences (Bhedas) i.e. effects also having dimensions, are similarly the result of an antecedent contact (of materials), you will land yourself into the predicament that the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (of which the Pradhāna is made up) also have dimensions (i.e. extension) in common with the above and are the result of an antecedent contact (of materials). But because a relation of cause and effect is seen to exist in the case of beds and seats etc. which are created at will, it is not possible to infer that because a relation of cause and effect exists in the case of external and Ādhyātmika differences (Bhedas) i.e. effects, they also are the result of a nonsentient cause. — 1.
[Go top]
Pravṛtteḥ: because of the activity, of a tendency; Ca: and (it has the force of ‘only’ here).🔗 Also (on account of the impossibility of) a tendency (in Pradhāna). — 2.2.2. Let this (discussion about a) proper design or arrangement wait (for the time being). It is not reasonably sustainable that the non-sentient Pradhāna could independently by itself ever at all secure the necessary disturbance in its perfectly balanced condition of equipoise of Sattva, Rajas, Tamas (the three constituents of Pradhāna) i.e. by their converting themselves into a condition of reciprocal superiority or inferiority with regard to each other, and its acquiring the necessary tendency towards accomplishing any particular effect, because it is not to be seen, either in the case of (such non-sentient things as) clay etc. or a chariot etc. It is not observed, that clay etc. or a chariot etc., which themselves are non-sentient, when not guided by intelligent entities such as potters etc. or horses etc., ever acquire a tendency towards a particular effect, and we have to determine about what cannot be seen, from what is actually observed. Therefore also, because of the reason of the acquisition of such a tendency not being reasonably sustainable, it is not inferable that the non-sentient one (Pradhāna) could be the cause of the world. But (the opponent may urge), neither is such tendency observable in the case of a mere sentient entity. (We reply) It is no doubt true, but the non-sentient chariot etc. are seen to have such tendency only when they are in conjunction with a sentient entity. (Says some third person here) What then, under such circumstances, is logical? Does such tendency, in fact, belong to that (non-sentient entity) in which it is observed, or to that (sentient entity) with which it (i.e. such non-sentient entity) is in conjunction? (The opponent says) It is reasonable that such tendency should belong to that in which it is actually observed, because both these (i.e. the tendency and that in which it occurs) are actually perceived, while a merely sentient entity is not actually perceived to be the basis (Āśraya) i.e. the source of such a tendency, just as chariots etc. (for instance) are actually perceived to be the basis of such a tendency. That a living body is actually seen to be different from a non-sentient entity such as a chariot etc., is the reason for merely inferring the certain existence only of a sentient entity being in conjunction with a non-sentient body etc. which furnish themselves as the basis of such a tendency. It is precisely for this very reason, viz. that sentiency is observed when a body is actually perceived and not observed when such a body is not perceived, that the materialists (Lokāyatikas) also understand that ‘sentiency’ belongs only to such a body. Therefore (the conclusion of the opponent is that) it is the non-sentient entity to which such tendency belongs. With regard to this we say — We do not say that such tendency does not belong to that non-sentient entity in which it is observed. Well may it so belong to it. Only, we maintain, that it results from a sentient entity, because, it exists when that sentient entity exists (in conjunction with the non-sentient thing) and it does not exist when such sentient entity does not exist (in conjunction with such non-sentient thing). Just as, the properties of burning and emitting light, which, even though they subsist in fuel etc., are not perceivable in mere fire as such (as without fuel, mere fire does not exist), but they are in fact caused by it (i.e. fire only), because they are seen, when it (fire) is in conjunction (with fuel) and are not seen, when it is not in such conjunction. Even the materialists hold that as it is seen that it is the sentient body that imparts the tendency to non-sentient chariots etc., therefore, that the power to impart such tendency belongs to the sentient body, is incontrovertible. (Even if it be said by the opponent) — In your case even, in as much as, even though the Self is in conjunction with a body etc., it is not reasonably sustainable that the Self has such tendency as apart from its nature of mere knowledge, therefore, that the Self could have such power to impart such a tendency, is not reasonably sustainable. (We reply) — no, like the magnet or like form (Rūpa) etc., it is reasonably sustainable that an entity which is devoid of any such tendency in itself, may however possess a power to impart such a tendency. Just as a magnet having no such tendency in itself, still has the capacity to impart such tendency to iron, or just as sense-objects such as form (Rūpa) etc. which do not possess such tendency, are still able to induce activity in the organ of sight etc., similarly it is reasonably sustainable that the Lord, being all-pervading, the Self of all, omniscient, and omnipotent, may, even though He Himself is without any such tendency, still induce such activity in everything. If it be said — the Lord being but one only (without a second) and there being nothing else (in existence) in which he could induce such tendency, that he could still possess such a capacity to impart a tendency, is not reasonably sustainable, (we reply) — No, because that has already been refuted more than once, on the ground of the influence of Māyā (illusory power) in the form of names and forms which are brought about by Nescience. Therefore the existence of such a tendency is possible in the case of the omniscient (Brahman) which is the cause (of the world), and it is not so possible in the case of a non-sentient entity (like the Pradhāna) which is supposed to be such a cause (of the world. — 2.
[Go top]
Payo'mbuvat: like milk and water; Cet: if; Tatra: there, in those cases; Api: even, also. (Payaḥ: milk; Ambuvat: like water.)🔗 If it be said (by the opponent) that (the Pradhāna may show such tendency) even as milk or water do, (we reply) — even there also (such tendency results from a sentient entity). — 2.2.3. May be (says the opponent), just as milk, non-sentient as it is, because of its own nature, flows for promoting the growth of a young one, or just as water naturally flows in order to oblige men, even so may the Pradhāna, non-sentient though it is, act by virtue of its own nature for securing the highest aim of man. (To this we reply) — This can’t be said to be well spoken, because even in those cases (i.e. of milk or water) we would infer that such tendency either in milk or water is because of its being controlled by a sentient entity, inasmuch as, such tendency is not observed in merely non-sentient entities, such as chariots etc. which are well-known to both of us disputants. The Śāstra speaks of all kinds of movements of things as seen in the world to be due to being presided over by the Lord, thus: — “Who, dwelling in water, governs it from within” (BrhU.3.7.4); “It is at the behest of this Akṣara (the imperishable), Oh Gārgi, that one set of rivers flows eastward” (BrhU.3.8.9). Therefore, because the instances given by you, viz. “like milk and water”, are of a piece with that very much disputed view which you want to establish (viz. that the Pradhāna is the cause of the world), they do not furnish a ground for consideration (Anupanyāsaḥ i.e. Na Vicāra-Bhumiḥ), because it is reasonably sustainable, that it is the sentient cow that at her will stimulates the flow of her milk, through instinctive affection (for the calf), and also because the sucking by the calf causes the milk to be drawn out (from the udders). Nor is it, that water also does not need any other help in its tendency to flow, because, it does need a sloping ground-level etc. so that it may flow. That in all cases, a sentient entity is needed, has however been shown. In Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya II.i.24, so far as ordinary worldly experience is concerned, it has been indicated, that a cause depending only on itself, may bring about an effect without needing any outside means; but from the point of view of the Śāstra, the conclusion that is inevitably arrived at in this Sūtra is that in all cases, effects have to depend upon the Lord, and it does not contradict (what is stated in the previous Sūtra). — 3.
[Go top]
Vyatireka-anavasthiteḥ: There being no external agency besides it; Ca: and also; An-apekṣatvāt: because it is not dependent. (Vyatireka: an external agent; An-avasthiteḥ: from non-existence, as it does not exist.)🔗 (The Pradhāna is not the cause) also because nothing else (other than the (Pradhāna) exists, on which it can count for help. — 2.2.4. According to the Sāṅkhyas, their three Guṇas existing in perfectly balanced equipoise, mean the Pradhāna. But barring that, there is nothing which is expected as existing outside or apart from it, which has a capacity to induce a tendency or to prevent any tendency arising, in the Pradhāna. The Puruṣa is passive i.e. apathetic (and according to the Sāṅkhyas takes no part in creation) and as such, has neither the capacity to induce, or to prevent any such tendency (in Pradhāna) and hence, Pradhāna having nothing else on which it can depend, it is not reasonable (to say) that it sometimes does, and at other times does not, modify itself into the form of ‘Mahat’ (greatness) etc. In the case of the Lord, however, because of his being omniscient, omnipotent, and being always in association with the great Māyā (illusory power) his either having such a tendency and or not having such a tendency in Himself (just as it pleases Him), is not incompatible (with reason). — 4.
[Go top]
Anyatra: elsewhere, in the other case, elsewhere than in cows; A-bhāvāt: because of the absence; Ca: and, also; Na: not; Trṇa-ādivat: like the grass etc.🔗 (The Pradhāna) could also not have — like grass — a tendency to modify itself (as is supposed by the Sāṅkhyas), because grass etc. do not show such tendency for modification in other cases. — 2.2.5. May be (says the Sāṅkhya opponent), just as grass, leaves, water etc. by virtue of their own nature modify themselves in the form of milk etc., without needing any other means, even so, may the Pradhāna modify itself in the form of Mahat etc. (If we i.e. the Sāṅkhyas — are asked), how do you know that grass etc. do not need any other means (to help them), (we reply) because, no such other means are observed. Were we to find any such other means we could then have, at will, manufactured milk from grass etc. (with the help of such other means), but we are not able to do so (i.e. manufacture milk from grass, with the help of any other means). Therefore, modification of grass etc. (into milk) takes place because of its own nature, and even so, there may similarly be a modification of the Pradhāna also (because of its own nature). To this we (Vedāntins) reply — If we were to hold that such modification of grass, comes about by virtue of its own nature, then it may well happen that modification of Pradhāna also may take place by virtue of its nature, but not only we do not understand it to be so, but we do (on the other hand) know, that there is such other cause (because of which grass is turned into milk). (Says the opponent) How do you know that there is such other cause? Because it (i.e. the turning of grass into milk) is absent in any other cases. It is grass etc. which is consumed by the cow only, that modifies itself into milk, and not that which is either rejected (by the cow) or is consumed by a bull etc. Were grass to require no other means (such as a cow, for modifying itself into milk), grass would have modified itself into milk elsewhere also, and not when in conjunction with the body of a cow only. That men are unable to manufacture milk at will, is no reason for holding that there is no means at all, because some effects are fit to be accomplished by men and some others through Divine pleasure. Besides, even men are able to produce more milk by using proper means, as for instance by using grass etc. Those who desire plentiful milk, feed the cow with plentiful grass and that way get plentiful milk. Therefore, it cannot be, (as the opponent claims) that, like grass, the Pradhāna modifies itself by virtue of its own nature. — 5.
[Go top]
Abhyupagame: accepting, admitting, taking for granted; Api: even; Artha: purpose; A-bhāvāt: because of the absence.🔗 Even if it (i.e. the Sāṅkhya doctrine that the Pradhāna has such tendency) is assumed (to be correct), (the Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world) because of the absence of any purpose. — 2.2.6. That there is no such natural i.e. spontaneous tendency in the Pradhāna, has been established. Even though falling in in line with your (i.e. opponent’s) belief, however, we were to understand that there is such natural i.e. spontaneous tendency in the Pradhāna, still the same fault attaches itself just as well (to the Sāṅkhya doctrine). Whence is it so? Because of the absence of any purpose (to be fulfilled). If it be said that such tendency of the Pradhāna is natural i.e. spontaneous and nothing else is here needed, then, just as no auxiliary is needed (by the Pradhāna), even so, no purpose also can be expected (to be fulfilled), and hence the declaration (of the Sāṅkhyas) that the Pradhāna acts in order to fulfil the aim of the Puruṣa, would be contradicted. If he (the Sāṅkhya) were to say, that it is not, that there is no purpose, but merely, there is no need of an auxiliary (for the Pradhāna), still if some purpose for such tendency has to be ascertained, it can either be experience (Bhoga i.e. experience of pleasure or pain by the Self) or Final Release, or both. Now, if experience is supposed to be such a purpose, what particular kind of experience could be imagined in the case of a Puruṣa, in whom there is no such scope for any addition (Atiśaya) of the nature of the experience of pleasure or pain? Besides in such a supposition there would be the predicament of non-release. If such purpose on the other hand is supposed to be Final Release (of the Self), then, that being an already established thing, prior to such activity of the Pradhāna, such activity would be meaningless or superfluous. There would also be the predicament of the non-perception of sound etc. (which are the means of experience). If, both experience and Final Release, are understood to be such a purpose, the effects i.e. modifications of Pradhāna which are fit for experience being infinite, there would still be the predicament of the impossibility of Final Release. Such tendency could not also be due to the reversal of the desire for activity (in the Pradhāna), nor could such ardent desire be possible in the case of the pure and partless Puruṣa. If it be said, that such tendency (on the part of the Pradhāna) may be due to apprehension i.e. fear, that the power to witness (Dṛkśakti in the Puruṣa, as the witness of everything), and the power to create (on the part of the Pradhāna), would be rendered unfructuous, still as there can never be the destruction of the power to create even as there can never be the destruction of the power of (the Puruṣa) to be the witness, there would never be the destruction of the power (of the Pradhāna) to create, and, as there would never be the destruction of transmigratory existence, it (in its turn) would cause the predicament of there being no Final Release just the same. Hence it is not reasonable to say, that the tendency of the Pradhāna is for securing the aim of the Puruṣa. — 6.
[Go top]
Puruṣa: a person; Aśma: a lodestone, a magnet; Vat: like; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Tathā api: even then, still.🔗 (If it be said that the Puruṣa would stimulate the Pradhāna to act) as in the case of a man or a magnetic stone (we reply) even then it would mean just the same (i.e. the same fault would attach). — 2.2.7. May be, it may be this way (says the Sāṅkhya), by ranging himself in opposition (to the Vedāntin) and trying to justify his position by illustrations, thus — Just as some lame person possessing the power of sight but not the power of movement, riding pick-a-back on another who is sightless but possesses the power of movement, makes the latter move, or just as a magnet which while it itself does not move, makes iron move (i.e. attracts it), even so, would the Puruṣa cause the Pradhāna to act. To this we reply — Even so, there is no escaping the fault. In the first place, the fault viz. the discarding of the position assumed as hypothesis (by the Sāṅkhya) would arise, because you (the Sāṅkhya opponent) hold that the Pradhāna possesses such tendency, and you do not hold that the Puruṣa (Self) can cause activity (in Pradhāna). How can the apathetic Puruṣa ever stimulate the Pradhāna to act? The lame man also, directs the blind one to move by words etc., but no such influence for causing movement is possible in the case of the Puruṣa who is apathetic i.e. inactive, nor can it, like a magnet, cause movement by mere proximity, because (were we to suppose so) there would thus be the predicament of perpetual activity induced by the constant proximity (between the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa). To say (as the Sāṅkhya opponent avers) that it may be, as in the case of a man or a magnet, is no proper illustration, because, as the proximity of a magnet (to iron) is not constant, it may have such influence due to such proximity, and besides there still is the necessity of cleansing it (i.e. the magnet) etc. Again, that there could be any relation between the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, is not reasonably sustainable, because the former is non-sentient and the latter is apathetic, and there is absence of any third entity which could bring about any such relation between these two. If it be said that there would be the relation of capacity i.e. Yogyatā (between the Puruṣa and the Pradhāna to see and be seen), then, on account of the indestructibility of such a relation between them, there would, all the same, be the predicament of the absence of Final Release. Further, as in the previous Sūtra, the alternatives about the purpose (i.e. whether it is experience, Final Release, or both) should be considered (to show that the Pradhāna can have no such' purpose). In the case of the Highest Self, however, its tendency towards creation depends upon its association with its power of Māyā, and apathy of its own nature (as realized by the Jīva-Self on the attainment of knowledge), and that is where there is this peculiarity (Atiśaya) in the case of the Highest Self. — 7.
[Go top]
Aṅgitva-anupapatteḥ: on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and subordinate); Ca: and, also. (Aṅgitva: the relation of being the principal, being preponderant; An-upapatteḥ: on account of the impossibility and unreasonableness).🔗 (The Pradhāna cannot have a tendency) Because a relation of being subsidiary (to a principal, as between Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) is not reasonably sustainable. — 2.2.8. This is again why the Pradhāna cannot have any tendency. When Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, give up their condition of being reciprocally principal and subsidiary to each other, and they subsist merely in the condition of balanced equipoise of their own individual natures, that, constitutes the condition of Pradhāna. While in that condition and when their nature is such, that they do not need each other’s help, it is not reasonably sustainable that they would convert themselves into having a reciprocal relation as that of being principal and subsidiary to each other, because of the apprehension of the destruction of their own nature. Again, in the absence of any extraneous entity to excite them (into activity), the creation of Mahat (the great principle) etc. which results from such disturbance of their balanced equipoise would not take place. — 8.
[Go top]
Anyathā: otherwise, in other ways; Anumitau: if it be inferred, in case of inference; Ca: even, and; Jña-śakti: power of intelligence; Vi-yogāt: because of being destitute of, because of dissociation.🔗 Also, even if an inference is drawn in another way, because of the absence (in the Pradhāna) of the power of being a sentient entity, (the same fault would attach). — 2.2.9. May be, I will draw an inference in such other way that the fault referred to above would not occur (says the Sāṅkhya opponent). I do not hold that the Guṇas (of the Pradhāna viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) are either unchangeable by nature or such as need no mutual help, because there is no authority or means-of-proof (for that). The nature of the Guṇas is understood from the effects (resulting from them). I understand that they are just of that nature as the nature of the effects they bring into existence. It is understood (by us) that the Guṇas are of an unsteady nature, therefore they may, even during the condition of equipoise, subsist in a condition, fit for attaining disparity i.e. the relation of being principal and subsidiary (to each other). (To this we reply) Even if (it is understood) this way, because of the absence in the Pradhāna of the power of being sentient, the faults referred to above, viz. that the proper design or arrangement (of his world) is not reasonably sustainable etc., stand as they are (i.e. unrefuted). If our opponent were to infer that the Pradhāna has such power of being sentient, the result would be that he would cease to be our opponent, because it would mean, that there would be the predicament for him of (having to accept) the doctrine of Brahman viz. that the only one sentient entity (Brahman) is the material cause of this manifold world appearance. Even though the Guṇas may have a fitness in them for attaining inequality (i.e. of attaining a principal and subsidiary relationship as between themselves, by a disturbance of the condition of balanced equipoise) still, when once they are in the condition of equipoise, they would either never again attain inequality, because of the absence in that condition of equipoise of any cause (for a change), or assuming they do so attain inequality, the absence of a cause (for a change) being common (to both the alternatives), the predicament would be, that the fault, viz. that they will always continue in that condition of disturbed equipoise, would necessarily occur all the same. — 9.
[Go top]
Vipratiṣedhāt: because of contradiction; Ca: also, and; A-samañjasam: inconsistent, objectionable, not harmonious, untenable.🔗 (The Sāṅkhya doctrine is) also incongruous because of the contradictions. — 2.2.10. The Sāṅkhya doctrines are moreover mutually contradictory. In one place, they enumerate the sense-organs to be seven, and then again eleven in another place. Similarly in one place the instruction is that the subtle sense-organs (Tan-mātras) have their origin from Mahat (the great one) and elsewhere that they have their origin from Ego (Ahaṅ-kāra). In one place, they describe the internal-organs to be three (viz. Ego, intelligence and mind), and then again, as only one, in another place. Besides their opposition to the Scriptures, which declare the Lord to be the cause, (of the world), and to the Smṛtis, which follow the Scriptures, is well-known. Therefore also, the doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas is incongruous. To this the Sāṅkhya replies — Oh, but the doctrine of the Upaniṣads also is equally incongruous, in as much as they do not recognize the ‘tormented’ (Tapya) and the ‘tormentor’ (Tāpaka) as being two different categories, because those who understand the one and only one Brahman, the Self of all, alone, to be the cause of all this world-appearance have necessarily to understand, that the ‘tormented’ (Tapya) and the ‘tormentor’ (Tāpaka) are but two different aspects of the same one Self (Brahman) and that they do not belong to different categories. Now, if the ‘tormented’ and the ‘tormentor’ are but only two special aspects of one and the same Self (Ātmā) then as the Self can never be freed from being both these viz. the ‘tormented’ and the ‘tormentor’, the Śāstra which gives instruction that the truth should be known in order that torment may be assuaged, would be meaningless. It would not be reasonably sustainable that the lamp which possesses the properties of heat and light, can, as long as it is in that particular condition (of being a lamp) be ever free from these properties. With regard also to the statement about water on the one hand, and ripples, waves, and foam of water on the other, (we the opponents say) that, even these special forms (of water), viz. the waves etc., essentially one and the same as they are, as water, are, even though they alternately appear and disappear, eternal, and for water itself also (as much as for a lamp) there is a similar want of freedom from having the nature of waves etc. Besides, in the ordinary world, that the ‘tormented’ and the ‘tormentor’ are different categories (or entities) is well-known. Similarly also, a person desiring to possess a particular thing (Arthī) and the thing so desired (Artha) are actually seen to be mutually different from each other. Were the thing desired not to be an entity different from the person desiring such thing, and if the thing desired were to be eternally available to the person desiring such a thing, then such person would never in fact be a person desirous of such things, just as a lamp, which by itself has the form of light, and would have such light ever available in itself, could never be an entity that could itself ever have a desire for light, because, it is only with respect to a thing which has yet to be acquired, that a person can be said to be desirous of acquiring (it). Similarly a thing desired cannot have the characteristic of being a thing desired (unless the person desiring such a thing, and the thing so desired are different) and, if ever such a thing, is a desired thing (Artha), it can have such desire only in and for itself. But this is never so. ‘A person desiring’ and the ‘thing desired’ (by him), are in fact two things having a mutual relation between them, and a relation can subsist only when there are two things having a mutual relation between them, and not when there is but one thing alone, and therefore, ‘a person desiring’ and the ‘thing desired’ are in fact different (from each other), and similarly, ‘a person who has an undesired thing thrust on him’ and such ‘undesired thing’ (also are different). That which is favourable to a person desiring, is a desirable thing, and that which is unfavourable to him, is a thing not desired by him (but still it has itself thrust upon him), and a person alternately comes into contact with these two (i.e. the desired and the undesired thing). Now, as (comparatively) what is desired by a person is so little, and what he does not desire, (but which he finds willy-nilly thrust upon him), is so much, that both these (desired and undesired things) together, in effect, practically mean a thing not desired, and it is called the ‘tormentor’ and the person who thus alternately comes into contact with it is the person ‘tormented’, and hence, if (according to you — the Vedāntin) the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’ were to be but one entity, then (the possibility of) Final Release is not reasonably sustainable. But if they were supposed to belong to different categories, and if the cause of their coming into contact (viz. false-knowledge) is removed, then perhaps Final Release (Mokṣa) may perchance be so reasonably sustainable. To this the reply is — No. It is precisely because of (the Self) being one only, that it is not reasonably sustainable that there could be any such relation as between the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’. This fault might perhaps occur, if, even though the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’ are but one and the same single entity, such entity were to be able to attain a relation with itself, as between the object (Viṣaya) and the subject (Viṣayī) (i.e. as between the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’). But precisely because it (i.e. the Self) is essentially one only, it cannot be so. Though in the case of fire Agni), one as it is, even though there is a distinction in its attributes viz. ‘light’ and ‘heat’, and it is liable to undergo modification, it is precisely because fire is but one entity only, that fire can neither burn or illuminate itself. Need it be said then, that the one, unchangeable Brahman cannot possibly have in itself a relation as between the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’? (The opponent may here ask) — where again then is this relation as between the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’? The reply is — why, can’t you see, that the living body, which is the object of the action (of being scorched), is the one that is tormented, and that the sun is the tormentor? (The opponent says) This torment indeed is pain, and pain can affect only a sentient entity, and never an inert body. Were torment to be of the body only, it itself would be destroyed, when the destruction of the body takes place and it would not be necessary to wish for some means to bring about its destruction. To this the reply is — It is not observed, that a mere sentient entity, in the absence of a body, is ever affected by torment. Nor do you (the opponent) desire or hold, that a merely sentient entity is subject to an affection (Vikṛti) viz. torment, nor can it be, that a body and a sentient entity get mixed up together, as that would lead to the predicament of the fault of impurity, etc. (in the Self), nor again of course would you understand that ‘torment’ itself could be tormented. How then would you also assume the existence of a condition, in which one entity) is the ‘tormentor’ and another (entity) the ‘tormented’? If you were to say that the Guṇa ‘Sattva’ is the ‘tormented’ and the Guṇa ‘Rajas’ is the ‘tormentor’, (we reply) — no; it cannot be reasonably sustainable that these (Guṇas) can ever be in conjunction with i.e. can ever get mixed up with a sentient entity. If you were to argue, that the sentient entity while conforming with the Guṇa ‘Sattva’, is tormented ‘as it were’, then it would come to this, that in the truest sense, it is in fact not tormented at all, precisely because of your using the expression ‘as it were’. If in fact it is not tormented then it would not be a fault to use the expression ‘as it were’. If it is said (by any body) that an amphisbaena (Ḍuṇḍubha, a carnivorous worm) is ‘as it were’ a snake, it would not, simply because it is so said, become a poisonous snake, nor would a snake become non-poisonous, simply because it is said, that, it is, ‘as it were’ an amphisbaena. Therefore it should be understood, that this condition of one being the tormentor and the other being the tormented, is caused by Nescience and has no ultimate reality. And our withers are unwrung, even if it were to be so. If however, you understand that a sentient entity (the Self) is in the truest sense tormented, then as you of course understand the tormentor (the Pradhāna) to be eternal, there would be so much the greater reason why there would be no Final Release. If it be said (by the opponent) that even though the capacities of being the tormentor and being the tormented respectively are everlasting, yet as torment (Tapti) is in need of the conjunction of the cause i.e. ignorance, and these two (i.e. the tormented and the tormentor), when the cause (viz. ignorance, of the fact that the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa are different) for such conjunction is not to be seen, there is a total cessation of conjunction, as a result of which, absolute Final Release is reasonably sustainable, we reply — no, because this, ‘not to be seen’ (Adarśana), depends upon Tamas (i.e. ignorance) which (as you hold) also is equally everlasting. Also, as the manifestation or the obliteration of Guṇas is uncontrolled or irregular, the cessation of the cause of conjunction, also, is uncontrolled and irregular, and hence their disunion also being necessarily uncontrolled or irregular, non-release in the case of the Sāṅkhyas, is unavoidable. So far as the Upanishadic teaching goes, however, as it understands the Self to be but one only, and that inasmuch as one entity can at once be both the subject and object (of the torment) is not reasonably sustainable, and as the Scriptural instruction is, that all the different effects are merely made current by speech (while in fact in the truest sense they do not exist), no doubt about non-release can ever arise, even in a dream (in the mind of a Vedāntin). So far as the phenomenal world of experience is concerned, however, the well-known condition of one being the tormentor and the other being the tormented, is as valid as it is seen to be for the time being, and so it does not become necessary (in such a case) either to raise an objection or to have to refute it. — 10.
[Go top]
[Go top]
The doctrine that the Pradhāna is the cause (of the world) is (already) refuted. The doctrine that the Atom is the cause (of the world) has now to be refuted. In this connection, firstly, the fault which the Atomist (Aṇu-vādi Vaiśeṣika) has levelled against the upholder of Brahman as the cause (Brahma-vādi), is refuted. This is how the Vaiśeṣikas understand (their doctrine) — (It is inferred that) qualities which inhere in the material constituting the cause, produce other similar qualities in the material constituting the effect, because it is seen that from white threads, a white piece of cloth is produced, and we don’t see any contrary result (occurring). Therefore, if sentient Brahman is understood to be the cause of the world, then in the effect (i.e. the world) also, sentiency ought to inhere. But as it is not seen to be so, Brahman does not deserve to be the cause of the world. The Sūtra-kāra now vitiates this conclusion (of the Vaiśeṣika opponent) with his (i.e. Vaiśeṣika’s own system (“The engineer is hoist with his own petard”).Mahat-dīrghavat: like the great and the long; Vā: or; Hrasva-parimaṇḍalābhyām: from the short and the atomic.🔗 Or just as the ‘Great and long’ (dimensions) can be the effect of the ‘short and spherical’ (dimension of the atom) (even so the world may be the effect of Brahman). — 2.2.11. Their system amounts to this — The various kinds of infinitesimal Atoms (Paramāṇus) which possess their respective qualities proper to them and are spherical in dimension or form of extension, merely stand by for the nonce (i.e. during periodical resorption i.e. Pralaya) and refrain from starting on producing effects. Then afterwards, led by the unseen principle (Adṛṣṭa i.e. the meritorious and unmeritorious action of the Jīva-Self, taken collectively) and aided by conjunction (Saṃyoga), they start producing the entire aggregate of effects, in a regular order, of the binary atomic compound (Dvy-aṇuka) etc., and the qualities of the cause, reproduce other similar qualities in the effects. When the two Paramāṇus (infinitesimal Atoms) begin producing a binary atomic compound, particular qualities such as ‘whiteness etc.’ belonging to the Paramāṇus, begin producing other such similar qualities etc., in the effect (i.e. the binary atomic compound), but that special quality of the Paramāṇus viz. its sphericity, does not begin to produce a similar other quality of sphericity in the effects, the tenet (of the Vaiśeṣikas) being, that a binary atomic compound has another Parimāṇa (form of extension or dimension). They describe ‘minuteness’ (Aṇutva) and ‘shortness’ (Hrasvatva) to be the Parimānas that inhere in the binary atomic compound. When two such binary atomic compounds start producing a quaternary atomic compound (Catur-aṇuka), there is a similar reproduction of the whiteness and other qualities inherent in themselves, in the quaternary atomic compound, but they refrain from reproducing in such quaternary atomic compounds, the form of extension or dimension of ‘minuteness’ and ‘shortness’ inherent in themselves, because the Vaiśeṣikas hold that quaternary atomic compounds have their own different form of extension or dimension, viz. ‘Bigness’ (Mahat) and ‘Length’ (Dīrgha). The same arrangement takes place when many Paramāṇus, or many binary atomic compounds, or a Paramāṇu or a binary atomic compound, begin producing ‘effects’. This being so, just as a binary atomic compound which has the ‘minute and short’ dimension or form of extension or a tertiary atomic compound which has ‘greatness and length’ as its dimension or form of extension, (but not sphericity), result from a Paramāṇu which is spherical, or just as from a binary atomic compound, ‘minute’ and ‘short’ as it is, a tertiary atomic compound having a dimension or the form of extension of ‘greatness’ and ‘length’ and not ‘minuteness and shortness’, results, similarly, if it is understood (by us the Vedāntins) that the non-sentient world may well result from the sentient Brahman, how does it harm you (i.e. why should you, a Vaiśeṣika, have an objection)? Now, if you (the Vaiśeṣika) were to consider thus — (I understand) that the material constituting such effects as a binary atomic compound, is encompassed with a dimension or form of extension having a nature contrary to the nature of its cause, and that is why ‘Sphericity’, the dimension or the form of extension of the cause, which starts the effect, does not encompass the effect with itself, while it is not that the world — an effect — is encompassed with any such quality as is contrary to sentiency, so that the sentiency inherent in the cause may not reproduce similar sentiency in the effect. Non-sentiency is not some quality which is contrary to sentiency, because it is a mere negation of it, and therefore, as sentiency is a quality dissimilar to the quality of sphericity etc., it comes to this that sentiency (of the cause) will necessarily reproduce itself (in the effect viz. the world). — (We, the Vedāntins would say) — Do not consider it to be so. The two cases are only to this extent common, viz., just as the qualities of sphericity etc. inherent in the cause, do not begin to reproduce similar qualities in the effect, similarly sentiency (which is inherent in the cause) does not begin to reproduce itself in the effect (i.e. the world). (It should not be said) — That the effect has a different dimension encompassing it, is not a reason why the sphericity (of the cause) does not begin to reproduce sphericity in the effect, because it is reasonably sustainable to hold that prior to the beginning of the production of a different dimension or form of extension in the effect, the sphericity (of the cause) can start reproducing a similar dimension in the effect, because you understand, that an effect which has been started to be produced, exists for a moment without any quality, before qualities begin to be produced (in the effect). It is not either, that because the spherical dimensions are engrossed in producing other dimensions, that they do not reproduce dimensions of their own kind (in the effect), for you understand that there is an entirely different cause for the dimension or form of extension (in the effect) being of a different kind. The Aphorisms of Kaṇa-bhuk (i.e. Kaṇāda the propounder of Vaiśeṣika school) are as follows: — “Mahat (the great) results from the plurality of the cause, from the bigness of the cause, and an accumulation by a special loose contact” (Vai. Su. 7.1.9); “The Aṇu dimension is the contrary of that” (Vai. Su. 7.1.10) and “Thus, are length and shortness explained” (Vai. Su. 7.1.17). It should not be argued, that because of some special kind of proximity (Sannidhāna), ‘plurality’ (Bahutva) of causes etc. alone produce qualities in effects, but not sphericity, etc. (as they have no such special kind of proximity), because when a new material or a new quality starts on being produced, all the qualities of the causes inhere in the same common substratum viz. such new material or new quality. Therefore, it should be understood, that just as dimensions such as sphericity etc. do not reproduce themselves (in the effect) because of their own peculiar nature, even so it is, in the case of sentiency also. It is because it is seen that dissimilar substances etc. are produced as a result of ‘conjunction’ (Saṃyoga), that there is a departure from the uniform reproduction of similar species. If it is said (by the Vaiśeṣika opponent), that when the relevant subject (under discussion) is a substance, it is not logical to adduce an illustration about quality, (we reply) — no, because by the illustration, we merely wish to point out (the fact of) the starting of the production of dissimilar effects. Besides there is no reason for (there being) a rule, that an illustration about a substance only, should be adduced in the case of a substance, and an illustration about a quality only, in the case of a quality. Even your own Sūtra-kāra has adduced an illustration about a quality for a substance, in the Sūtra: — “Because the relation of conjunction (Saṃyoga) between the perceptible and non-perceptible, is not perceptible, a body cannot consist of the five (elements, viz. Earth, Tejas and Water which are perceptible, and Air and Ākāśa which are not)” (Vai. Su. 4.2.2). For instance, just as a conjunction, which inheres between the Earth and Ākāśa which are perceptible and non-perceptible respectively, is not perceptible, similarly a body in which perceptible and non-perceptible elements inhere, should properly be not-perceptible. But it actually is so perceptible, therefore, it is not the result of the (conjunction of the) five elements. For it has been said — conjunction is a quality, while a body is a substance. In the Sūtra “But it is so seen” (Bra. Su. II.i.6), creation of a dissimilar thing is discussed. (The opponent says) If that is so then the matter is really finished there. (We reply) no, that was in reply to the Sāṅkhyas, while this, is in reply to the Vaiśeṣikas. But (says the opponent) you have also extended the application of that Sūtra about the refutation of the Sāṅkhyas, to other systems, on the ground of parity of reasoning, by the Sūtra — “By this, these systems also which are not accepted by the learned, are also explained” (Bra. Su. II.i.12). (We reply) no doubt it is so. The same thing, however, is further elaborated here, where we begin discussion about the Vaiśeṣika system, by adducing instances adaptable to their own system. — 11.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Ubhayathā: in either case, in both ways, on both assumptions or hypotheses; Api: also; Na: not; Karma: action, activity, motion; Ataḥ: therefore; Tad-abhāvaḥ: absence of that, negation of that, i.e., negation of the creation of the world by union of atoms.🔗 Considered either way (i.e. that the Paramāṇus are led by the unseen principle i.e. Adṛṣṭa or aided by conjunction i.e. Saṃyoga) no action is possible, hence the absence of that (i.e. Creation and Pralaya). — 2.2.12. (The Sūtra-kāra) now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause (of the world). This is how the doctrine is presented. In the ordinary world it is seen that materials like a piece of cloth etc. consist of parts, and are begun (to be produced) by the very threads etc. which are inherent in them, and which are aided by the relation of conjunction. In common with that, it is understood that all things which consist of parts are produced out of similar materials inherent in them, which are aided by the relation of conjunction. A Paramāṇu is that entity, where during the process of division this distinction between a thing consisting of parts and its parts disappears, and when such thing consisting of parts is reduced to that utmost limit of subdivision into parts, beyond which no further division is possible. This entire world, consisting of mountains and seas etc. which consists of parts, is, for that very reason, something which has a beginning and an end. An effect cannot be without a cause, thinks Kaṇa-bhuk (i.e. Kaṇāda), and hence he holds that the Paramāṇus are the cause of this world. Now knowing that the four elements viz. the Earth, Water, Tejas (fire) and Vāyu (Air) are understood to consist of parts, it is assumed, that there are four kinds of Paramāṇus, and in as much as they have reached the utmost limit of subdivision, and, in as much as no further division of them is possible, after they are thus reduced to their utmost limit (of subdivision), the destruction of the Earth etc., when they are in the process of destruction, goes right down to the stage of Paramāṇus, and that is the stage of Pralaya (Final Dissolution). Thereafter, at the time of creation, activity is generated amongst the Paramāṇus of Vāyu, due to the unseen principle (Adṛṣṭa) as the cause, and this activity combines the atoms (Aṇus) in which such activity takes place, with other similar atoms (Aṇus) and thus, in the order of the binary atomic compound etc., Vāyu results, and the same is the case with Agni (fire), Water and Earth, and the physical body along with the organs-of-sense. And (the followers of Kaṇāda understand), that in this manner the whole world is created from atoms (Aṇus), and as in the case of threads and a piece of cloth, the qualities etc. of the atom(Aṇu) are reproduced in the binary atomic compounds etc. To this, we have to say thus — It has to be understood, that such conjunction between atoms (Aṇus) in the state of such separate division, depends upon activity, because it is seen that it is due to activity in threads etc., that conjunction between them takes place. Activity again being an effect, a cause for it has necessarily to be presumed. If no such cause is presumed, then, in the absence of any cause, there could be no initial activity in the atoms (Aṇus). Even if such a cause is presumed, and if any causes such as endeavour or impact etc. as they are seen, are understood, still that being impossible, initial activity amongst the atoms (Aṇus) would not be possible. In that condition (of Pralaya), endeavour, as an attribute of the Self (Ātmā), is not possible, because of the absence of a physical body, for it is only after there is a conjunction of the Self with the mind which has its seat in a physical body, that any endeavour as an attribute of the Self, can at all arise. It is because of this same reason, that any cause as is ordinarily observed (in the world) such as impact etc. has also to be discounted. All that, is (possible) after creation (takes place), but it cannot possibly be the cause of initial activity. Again, if it is said that the unseen principle (Adṛṣṭa) is the cause of the initial activity, then it can either be inherent in the Self or inherent in the atom (Aṇu). In neither case can it be imagined, that activity in the atom (Aṇu), is due to the unseen principle, because of its being non-sentient. It has already been remarked during the refutation of the Sāṅkhya theory, that no non-sentient entity which is not guided by a sentient entity, can either act independently or cause any activity (in any other entity), because during that condition (of Pralaya) the Jīva-Self, in which sentiency has not till then become manifest, is non-sentient. Besides even if the unseen principle is understood to be inherent in the Jīva-Self, then in the absence of the necessary relation of conjunction between the unseen principle and the atoms, the unseen principle cannot be the cause of activity in an atom (Aṇu). If it be said, that there is conjunction between the atoms (Aṇus) and the Jīva-Self which has the unseen principle inherent in it, then, such conjunction being constant, there would be the predicament of the tendency for action being constant, in the absence of any other controlling principle. This being so, in the absence of any definite cause for (starting) activity, no initial activity would take place, and in the absence of activity, conjunction which depends upon such activity, would not take place, and in the absence of such conjunction (Saṃyoga), the whole gamut of effects such as a binary atomic compound, etc., which depend upon such conjunction, would not result. Besides, this conjunction of one atom (Aṇu) with another can either be total or in only a part of it. If the conjunction is total, then, as any increase in the form of extension or dimension would not be reasonably probable, there would be the predicament, of there being but one atom (Aṇu) only (as a result of the total conjunction of two Aṇus), and also a predicament of its being contrary to what is ordinarily observed (viz. that when two things merge into each other there is an increase in the form of extension or dimension) would result, because conjunction is observed to be only between two things, each of which has a dimension. Now, (if it be said) that the conjunction (of the two Aṇus) is only between a part of each Aṇu, the predicament would be that it would mean that an atom (Aṇu) has parts (which is against the Vaiśeṣika assumption). Again, if it be said, that Paramāṇus have imaginary surfaces, then as an imagined entity is unreal (i.e. there can never be an entity existing in fact), the conjunction (of such Paramāṇus) would necessarily be unreal, and it could not be the efficient (i.e. Asamavāyi) cause of a real thing or effect, and in the absence of an efficient (i.e. Asamavāyi) cause, any material constituting an effect, such as a binary atomic compound, would not come into existence. Just as at the initial creation, in the absence of a cause, activity in the atoms (Aṇus) for effecting conjunction would not be possible, similarly, even in the great absorption (Pralaya), activity in the atoms (Aṇus) for effecting separation (of the Aṇus) would not be possible, as in that case also, no definite cause for it can be observed. Again, the unseen principle (Adṛṣṭa) is for the purpose of effecting experience, and not for the purpose of effecting Pralaya, and hence, in the absence of a cause, no activity either for bringing about conjunction or separation between atoms (Aṇus), can be possible. Therefore, in the absence of conjunction or separation, neither creation nor Pralaya which depend upon them, would take place. Therefore, the doctrine of atoms being the cause (of the world), is not reasonably sustainable. — 12.
[Go top]
Samavāya-abhyupagamāt: Samavāya being admitted; Ca: and, also; Sāmyāt: because of equality of reasoning; An-avasthiteḥ: regressus ad infinitum would result.🔗 And as a Samavāya relation (invariable concomitance) is understood to exist (by a Vaiśeṣika), because of parity (of reasoning) a regressus ad infinitum would result (if the Vaiśeṣika doctrine is accepted). — 2.2.13. (The clause) — “Because of the assumption (by the opponent) of a Samavāya relation”, there is absence of it (i.e. there is absence of creation or Pralaya), in the Sūtra, connects with the present subject of discussion, viz. the refutation of the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world). You (the Vaiśeṣika) understand, that a binary atomic compound which results from two atoms (Aṇus) and is quite dissimilar to the atoms (Aṇus), is in a relation of Samavāya (invariable concomitance) with the atoms (Aṇus), and because you understand it that way, you would not be able to substantiate the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world). How is it so? Because of parity (of reasoning), a regressus ad infinitum would result. Just as (according to a Vaiśeṣika) a binary atomic compound, quite dissimilar as it is to the atoms (Aṇus), is related to the atoms (Aṇus) by a Samavāya relation, similarly, Samavāya relation itself, quite dissimilar as it is to the two entities having such a Samavāya relation between them (i.e. the Samavāyins), will necessarily have to be understood to be related to them (i.e. the Samavāyins) by an altogether separate relation, again of the nature of a Samavāya, because, the circumstance of ‘being absolutely dissimilar’ is common (to both these cases). Hence, thus, another and yet another such unending series of Samavāyas will have to be presumed (to exist), and so a regressus ad infinitum would result. (But if it be said by the Vaiśeṣika opponent) — that here, a Samavāya relation which is actually perceivable, is perceived as being eternally related with the Samavāyins (viz. the Dvy-aṇuka and the two atoms), and it is not that it is not so related or that it needs another such (Adṛṣṭa) relation (for being so related), and hence any other separate relation of it, which would inevitably lead to a regressus ad infinitum, need not be imagined, we reply — No, because if it be so (understood) then the relation of contact (Saṃyoga) between two entities which are in such contact (Saṃyoga) also, would be similarly eternal, and like Samavāya, would not need any other separate relation (to establish the contact i.e. Saṃyoga relation). (If it is said) that ‘contact’ being an altogether different thing (from the two things which are in such contact i.e. Saṃyoga) it must needs require another relation, then Samavāya also being a thing altogether different from the Samavāyins must needs require another such relation. It would not be proper to say, that ‘contact’ (Saṃyoga) being a quality (Guṇa) does need another relation, while Samavāya not being a quality does not require it, because, the reason for the need for such a relation (viz. that both Saṃyoga and Samavāya being things different from the two things between which such Saṃyoga or Samavāya exists) is common to both these cases, and the terminology (of the Sāṅkhyas) which represents contact as a quality (Guṇa) has no bearing on the need or otherwise (of such another relation). Therefore, in the case of those who (like you, the opponent) understand Samavāya to be a thing different (from the Samavāyins), regressus ad infinitum must necessarily result. And when such regressus ad infinitum results, (as no particular Samavāya relation can be proved to be the last Samavāya relation in all the Samavāyas of the series, all the other preceding relations of Samavāyas in the infinite series also cannot possibly be proved), and when one Samavāya fails to be established, all Samavāyas (of the series) equally fail to be established, and hence a binary atomic compound will by no means result from two atoms (Aṇus). Therefore also, the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world) is not reasonably sustainable. — 13.
[Go top]
Nityam: eternal; Eva: certainly, even; Ca: and, also; Bhāvāt: because of the existence, from the possibility.🔗 Also, because of (a tendency for activity or inactivity) being constant (the atomic theory is unsustainable). — 2.2.14. Besides, atoms (Aṇus) have necessarily to be understood to have the nature, either of a tendency for activity or inactivity, or of both or neither, as no other alternative is possible. But none of these four kinds (of possibilities) is reasonably sustainable. If their nature is that of a tendency for activity, such activity would continue eternally, and there would be the predicament of the absence of final dissolution. If their nature is of inactivity, as such inactivity also would continue eternally, there would be the predicament of the absence of any creation. Their having both these natures at one and the same time, would be, because of the contradiction (involved), incongruous. If it be supposed, that they have neither of these natures, and that a tendency for activity or inactivity depends upon a cause, a cause such as the unseen principle (assumed by the Vaiśeṣikas to be such a cause, albeit wrongly, as shown before), being constantly available i.e. near at hand, such a tendency for activity would be eternal, leading to the predicament of constant activity (making final dissolution impossible). Now, supposing the unseen principle is not accepted (by the Vaiśeṣikas as a part of their theory) the predicament of constant inactivity would result. For these reasons also, the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world) is not reasonably sustainable. — 14.
[Go top]
Rūpa-ādimatvāt: because of possessing colour, etc.; Ca: and, also; Viparyayaḥ: the reverse, the opposite; Darśanāt: because it is seen or observed, from common experience.🔗 Also because of (the Atoms) being possessed of colour etc. (i.e. Rūpa etc.), (a result) contrary (to Vaiśeṣika assumption) would result, because it is (actually) observed (to be so). — 2.2.15. The accepted tenets of the Vaiśeṣikas, viz. that these Paramāṇus (infinitesimal atoms) are of four kinds, that they result when materials which consist of parts undergo division upto that stage beyond which no further subdivision is possible, that they possess the four qualities of Rūpa etc., that they are the initial starting cause of the four kinds of elements, and things resulting from the elements, which possess the four kinds of qualities, and that they are eternal, would be without any support, because there would result the predicament of the loss and reversal of their atomicity and eternal nature, as the result of their possessing such qualities. The meaning is, that contrary to their assumption, in comparison with the Highest Cause (Brahman), they (i.e. the four kinds of Paramāṇus) would happen to be gross and non-eternal. Whence is it so? Because in the ordinary world, it is observed to be so. In the ordinary world, anything which possesses colour etc., is seen to be gross and non-eternal, in comparison with its cause. For instance, a piece of cloth is relatively gross and non-eternal as compared with the threads (the cause of the piece of cloth), and the threads (in their turn) are relatively gross and non-eternal as compared with their minute subdivisions (which are the cause of the threads), and similarly, as these Paramāṇus are understood by them to possess colour etc., therefore, they also, as being necessarily effects from their cause would be rendered relatively gross and non-eternal as compared with their cause. What they (Vaiśeṣikas) mention as the cause for a thing being eternal, viz. “Whatever exists and is not the effect of some cause, is eternal” (Sad-akāraṇavan-nityam) (Vai. Su. 4.1.1), would not hold good in the case of atoms (Aṇus), because in the manner referred to above, it would be reasonably sustainable to understand, that the atoms (Aṇus) do have a cause. The second reason for being eternal mentioned (by them) is: — “The absence of any specific denial (of being eternal) such as that a particular thing is non-eternal” (Anityamiti ca viśeṣataḥ pratiṣedhābhāvaḥ) (Vai. Su. 4.1.4). That also does not necessarily establish that the Paramāṇus are eternal. If some eternal entity does not exist i.e. unless some eternal entity exists, a ‘Naña’ (नञ् a prefix of negation) cannot possibly enter into a compound with ‘Nitya’ thus: Na nityaḥ — Anityaḥ. (One cannot deny anything as being eternal, unless we know of an entity which is eternal.) Again it is not as if the Paramāṇus (infinitesimal atoms) must, therefore, be necessarily understood to be eternal, because (according to the Vedāntins) Brahman, the eternal, and the Highest Cause, is there, already available. It is not that the existence of an entity (Artha) is established, merely because a word signifying that entity is actually in common use, because it is only when its existence is proved by other means-of-proof that words and their meaning are received into common use. Now with respect to the third reason for assuming the atoms (Aṇus) to be eternal, viz. the Sūtra “Also Nescience” (Avidyā ca) (Vai. Su. 4.1.5), if it is explained like this, viz. that Nescience is the failure to perceive the causes of effects which actually exist and are perceivable, then (according to that reason) even the binary atomic compound (Dvy-aṇuka) would be eternal. If the additional proviso, viz. ‘not having any causal material for producing them’, is read into the definition of Nescience to qualify it, then it would amount to this, that the circumstance of there being no cause for an effect, would itself be a reason for its being eternal, and that having been already mentioned (Vai. Su. 4.1.1 above), ‘Also Nescience’ would be a repetition. Now if it be explained thus, viz. that Nescience means the impossibility of the existence of any third cause for the destruction of a thing, over and above two such causes, viz. ‘the division of a cause’ or ‘the destruction of a cause’, and that this ‘Nescience’ would establish the eternal nature of Paramāṇus, (then we would reply) — there is no such rule, that a thing which is in the process of destruction, must perish by either of these two reasons only. It would be so, if it is understood that more than one causal material, aided by the ‘contact’ (Saṃyoga) relation, start the productive process, of another material effect. When, however, it is understood, that a cause which is devoid of any special attribute of any kind, and which has only a general characteristic (such as being earthy), initiates the process of bringing an effect into existence, merely by the cause itself attaining another special condition, then in that case destruction will be achieved merely by the disintegration of the solidity (of the effect), similar, for instance, to the melting of the solidity or hardness of ghee. Thus in the case of Paramāṇus a result contrary to that which is assumed (by the Vaiśeṣikas viz. that the infinitesimal atoms are minute and eternal) would take place, because of the fact, that Paramāṇus possess colour etc. Therefore also, the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world) is not reasonably sustainable. — 15.
[Go top]
Ubhayathā: in both ways, on either side, in either case; Ca: also, and; Doṣāt: because of defects (or difficulties).🔗 Also, because (considered) either way, a fault is inevitable. — 2.2.16. The Earth has qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch and it is gross; water has the qualities of taste, colour and touch and it is fine, Tejas has the qualities of colour and touch and it is finer, and Vāyu has only the quality of touch and it is superfine, and in this way in the ordinary world it is seen that these four elements have an increasing and decreasing number of qualities and they are gross, fine, finer and superfine comparatively, and (the question is) whether the Paramāṇus also have to be imagined to possess similar increasing and decreasing number of qualities respectively. (Considered) either way, its being open to fault is inevitable. If it be assumed that the qualities increase or decrease in number, then such increasing qualities will produce grossness in them (i.e. the Paramāṇus) and they will cease to be Paramāṇus (as conceived by the Vaiśeṣikas), and it is contended that such increase in qualities without a corresponding increase in grossness is not possible, because in the ordinary world (it is seen) that as qualities of effects (i.e. created things) increase, they tend to augment their grossness. Now, if the assumption of an increase or decrease of qualities in the Paramāṇus is rejected and it is understood for the purpose of ensuring their similarity that all Paramāṇus have only a single quality each, then in the Tejas there would be no perception of touch, in Water of colour and touch, and in the Earth of taste, colour and touch respectively, because the quality of an effect is understood to be reproduced from the quality of its cause. Again, if all these (different Paramāṇus) are assumed to have all these four qualities, then Water will evince the quality of smell, Tejas of smell and taste, and Vāyu of smell, colour and taste respectively. But it is never observed to be so. Therefore also, the theory of atoms being the cause is not reasonably sustainable. — 16.
[Go top]
A-parigrahāt: because it is not accepted; Ca: and; Atyantam: altogether, totally, completely; An-apekṣā: to be rejected.🔗 (The theory of atoms being the cause of the world) cannot be accepted, also because, the learned have not accepted it. — 2.2.17. The theory about the Pradhāna being the cause (of the world) has been accepted to a small extent at least, by Manu and others learned in the Vedas on the ground of its being helpful by reason of its supporting the Sat-kārya-Vāda (viz. the theory that an effect always pre-exists as a cause, before it is created etc.). But the theory of atoms being the cause, has not been accepted by the learned, even to the least little extent and should not therefore be countenanced at all by those who accept the Vedas (as authoritative i.e. Pramāṇa). Besides the Vaiśeṣikas hold that there are six categories, propounded in their Śāstra, called — ‘substance’ (Dravya), ‘quality’ (Guṇa), ‘action’ (Karma), ‘generality’ (Sāmānya), ‘particularity’ (Viśeṣa) and ‘inherence’ (Samavāya), which are absolutely different from each other and have absolutely different characteristics, like a man, a horse, or a hare (which are different from each other and have different characteristics), and while holding thus, they also hold, in a way quite contrary to it, that all the other five categories are completely dependent on the category ‘substance’ (because, substance is a sine qua non for their existence). This of course is not reasonably sustainable. How is that? Just as in the ordinary world, a hare, grass or a tree which are absolutely different from each other are not mutually interdependent, even so, the categories such as ‘substance’ etc. being absolutely different from each other, categories such as ‘quality’ etc. do not deserve to be dependent on the category ‘substance’, inasmuch as they would then exist only when a ‘substance’ exists, and would not exist when a substance does not exist, and it would then come to this, that it is the ‘substance’ only that comes to have these several terms applied to it, and becomes the object of knowledge, according to the different forms and conditions in which it happens to be. Just as, Deva-datta, one only as he is, becomes the object of different terms and perceptions according to the particular different conditions in which he happens to be, even so it is, in this case. But, if it is understood to be so, there would occur the predicament (for the Vaiśeṣika), of (the acceptance of) the Sāṅkhya doctrine (similar also to Vedānta), and of his going counter to his own theory. But (says the Vaiśeṣika), even though ‘fire’ is a different entity (than smoke), ‘smoke’ is seen to be dependent upon ‘fire’. (We reply) yes, it certainly is seen to be so, but it is precisely because of the perception of their being different, that it is concluded that fire and smoke are different (entities). Here, however, in the case of a substance such as a white blanket or a dun cow, or a blue lotus, it is the substance itself, which, because of a particular qualification, is perceived to have its own particular quality, and not that a substance and its quality are perceived to be entities different from each other, like fire and smoke. Therefore, quality has substance as its self. It thus happens to be explained (i.e. by what is said about quality), that, the remaining five other categories viz. action (Karma) etc., have substance as their selfs (because they are not perceived to be different from substances). If it be said (by the Vaiśeṣika) that this dependence of ‘quality’ etc. on ‘substance’ is, because substances and qualities have a relation of inherence between them (i.e. they are Ayuta-siddha), then (we say that) their having such a relation of inherence (i.e. Ayuta-siddhatva) can happen to be because of their being non-separate (from each other) with reference either to space or time or nature, but none of these alternatives would be reasonably sustainable. So far as their being non-separate in space is concerned, it would be contradictory to their own assumption. Why would it be so? (Because the Vaiśeṣikas hold that) a piece of cloth which is produced from threads exists in the space occupied by its threads, and not in any separate space of its own, but the qualities of the piece of cloth, i.e. its whiteness etc., occupy the space of the piece of cloth and not the space occupied by the threads. Their Sūtra also lays down that — “Substances reproduce other substances, and qualities reproduce other qualities” (Vai. Su. 1.1.10). Threads which are the causal material produce a piece of cloth, viz. the substance of the effect, and the qualities of the threads such as whiteness etc. produce similar qualities in the effect i.e. the piece of cloth. This assumption (of the Vaiśeṣikas) would be vitiated, if a substance and its qualities were to be understood to be nonseparate in space. Now, if it is said that their being Ayuta-siddha is because of their not existing in different times, then it would come to mean that the right horn and the left horn of a cow (having been created at one and the same time) are Ayuta-siddha (i.e. have a relation of inherence between them). Similarly, if by Ayuta-siddhatva. (i.e. having a relation of inherence), non-separateness in nature is understood, then there would be no difference in the Selfs of substances and qualities, as they would be perceived to be identical. Their (i.e. of the Vaiśeṣikas) tenet, that the relation of Yuta-siddha entities is the relation of ‘contact’, and that of the Ayuta-siddha entities is the relation of ‘inherence’, is fallacious and futile, because, to say, that the cause which already exists prior to an effect, and the effect, are Ayuta-siddha, is not reasonably sustainable. Now, (if the Vaiśeṣikas say) that they understand by an Ayuta-siddha relation, the relation of only one of the two Ayuta-siddha entities with the other (and that it is not reciprocal), i.e. the Ayuta-siddha relation of the effect only, with the cause, is ‘inherence’ (Samavāya), even then, any relation of an effect with its cause, prior to its creation, when it has not yet attained its existence and has not yet attained its own Self is not reasonably sustainable, because relation depends upon (the existence of) two entities. Again if it is said, that it (i.e. an effect) may establish a relation (with its cause) after it comes into being, and if it is also understood that an effect comes into being prior to its establishing any relation with the cause, then, in the absence of an Ayuta-siddha relation (which the Vaiśeṣika holds as existing), to say that, as between an effect and a cause there is neither contact nor disjunction, would be an unhappy utterance (on the part of a Vaiśeṣika). Just as the relation of an effect-material (Kārya-Dravya) which has come into being but is yet inactive, with another material, viz. the all-pervading Ākāśa, is that of ‘contact’ only and not ‘inherence’ (Samavāya), even so the relation between an entity and its cause would be that of ‘contact’ (Saṃyoga) only and not ‘inherence’ (Samavāya). Besides, there is no authority i.e. means-of-proof as to the existence of a relation (Sambandha), either of ‘contact’ or ‘inherence’, between two entities, as apart from the two entities themselves which are supposed to have any such relation between them. Now, if it be said (by the Vaiśeṣika) that the existence of such terms (Śabda) as ‘Saṃyoga’ and ‘Samavāya’ is to be seen, because of the perception of the existence of the two terms ‘Saṃyoga’ (contact) and ‘Samavāya’ (inherence) as apart from the existence of the terms i.e. the names of the entities which themselves are so related, (we reply) — no, because it is seen that even though there is but one entity only, it is seen to be expressed by different terms, and there is a different perception of it, depending upon its own nature and its external aspect. For instance, just as Deva-datta, only a single entity though he is, is with reference to his own nature or his external nature (as caused by other things), known by different terms such as, a man, a Brāhmaṇa, one well-versed in the Vedas (Śrotriya), generous (Vadānya), a child, a youth, an old man, a father, a son, a brother, a son-in-law; or, just as for instance, a mere line, one as it is, when placed in another position is (because of its relative position), understood differently, viz. either as one (Eka), a ten (Daśa), a hundred (Śata) and a thousand (Sahasra) etc., similarly, entities which have a relation between them, apart from having their own names, and being known as such entities, become the objects of such terms as ‘Saṃyoga’ (contact) and ‘Samavāya’ (inherence) and their experience as such, and it is not that they establish the existence of such contact (Saṃyoga) or inherence (Samavāya) as entities different in themselves, and hence, there is non-existence of any such other entity that has attained the criterion of its own actual experience. Nor is it, that because the perception of the names which express relationship, belongs to the province of the entities which are so related, there would be the predicament of the perception of their existence eternally, as that has already been answered, by our stating, that it is with reference to the nature of such things and their external aspect, that they acquire several names and there are several perceptions of them. Again, as the Aṇu, the Self (Ātmā), and the internal organ (Manas) have no tangible surfaces (i.e. parts) as such, contact with them is not possible, because, it is only an entity which possesses a tangible surface i.e. a part, that is observed to have a contact (Saṃyoga) relation with another such entity. If it be said (by the Vaiśeṣika) that the Aṇu or the Self, or the internal organ, may be imagined to have such tangible surfaces i.e. parts, (we reply) — no, because, if a non-existing entity were to be imagined to exist, it would lead to the predicament of the establishment of the existence of any and every thing at pleasure (Sarvārtha-siddhi-prasaṅga), because, there is no raison d’etre for any such restrictive rule, that only such and such particular non-existing entity, whether contradictory to reason or otherwise, may be imagined to exist, and no other, and also because imagination being solely dependent upon itself, it is limitless or prolific. There is no restrictive reason why more categories than the six categories imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas, say a hundred or a thousand for instance, may not be imagined, and hence anything which anybody may wish for, would result. Some kind-hearted soul may wish that this preponderatingly painful transmigratory existence itself, may not be there at all, while another, a vicious person may wish that even those who have already secured Final Release should revert to the transmigratory existence, and who can prevent them? Besides this, it is not reasonably sustainable to expect cohesion, i.e. intimate contact, between two atoms which have no surfaces i.e. parts, and a binary atomic compound having such parts, just’ as it is not possible for a binary atomic compound (Dvy-aṇuka) to have cohesion or intimate contact with the Ākāśa. The Ākāśa has no such cohesion or intimate contact with the Earth etc., as there can be, for instance, between lac and wood. If it be said (by the Vaiśeṣika) that it is absolutely necessary to assume a relation of inherence, as otherwise it would not be reasonably sustainable to understand, that as between a cause and an effect, the condition of one being the abode (Āśraya) and the other being the abider (Āśrita) exists, we reply — no, because (by such assumption) the fault of mutual interdependence would result. Because, it would be only after a distinction between a cause and an effect is established, that a condition, in which one is an abode and the other is the abider, would be established, and it would be only after a condition in which one is the abode and the other is the abider is established, that a distinction between a cause and its effect can be established, and thus according to ‘the maxim of the bowl and the berry tree (‘Kuṇḍa-Badara-Nyāya’) the fault of mutual interdependence would occur (because to say that the bowl is near the berry tree and vice versa, fails to locate either definitely). The Vedāntins do not hold that there is any distinction between the effect and its cause, or that as between the cause and the effect there is a condition of one (i.e. the cause) being the abode and the other (i.e. the effect) being the abider, because they hold that an effect is but only a particular special condition of the cause. Moreover, as Paramāṇus have a definite extension, they must have, therefore, as many parts as there are directions, be they six or eight or ten, and because they have parts they necessarily are non-eternal, and thus, the assumption (of the Vaiśeṣikas) that the Paramāṇus are eternal and without parts would be vitiated. If they were to say, that the very parts, which, you say, would be there because of such directions, are exactly what we mean by our Paramāṇus, we reply — No, because it would be reasonably sustainable to understand, that they get destroyed in a way in which they happen to become smaller and smaller, i.e. from gross to fine and from fine to finer, right down upto the Highest Cause. Just as the Earth which is the most gross, in comparison with the binary atomic compound, which (according to you), even though it substantially exists, ultimately, gets destroyed, even so, things, comparatively fine and finer than the Earth, but which belong to the same category as the Earth, get destroyed, and after them, the binary atomic compound and the Paramāṇus also, which belong to the same category as the Earth, do therefore get destroyed. If it is said that, even when they thus get destroyed, it is only by way of a process of being divided into their parts, we reply, this is no fault, because it has already been said by us, that it would be reasonably sustainable to understand their destruction, to be of the same type, as that of the melting of the hardness or solidity of ghee (Ghṛta-kāṭhinya-vilayanavat). Just as ghee and gold etc. without destruction of their parts, become liquefied by contact with fire and thus lose their hardness, even so, in the case of the Paramāṇus, the destruction of their solidity is attained, by their merely merging into the Highest Cause. Similarly, it is not that the creation of the effects starts merely by the conjunction of parts, because it is seen that milk and water, without undergoing any other different contact (of their parts) begin to turn themselves into effects, such as curds and snow. Therefore, inasmuch as the Vaiśeṣika theory of Paramāṇus being the cause (of the world) is thus bolstered up by the most vapid reasoning and is contrary to the Scriptures, which declare the Lord to be the cause (of the world), and is not accepted by respected persons such as Manu and others, it should be totally rejected. And a passage such as “those who desire to secure their spiritual well-being” should be understood to be a complementary portion of the sentence (of the above Sūtra). — 17.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Samudāye: both aggregates; Ubhaya-hetuke: having two causes; Api: also, even; Tad-aprāptiḥ: it will not take place, it cannot be established.🔗 Aggregates, assumed to result from both the kinds of causes, would not take place. — 2.2.18. It has already been stated that inasmuch as the vicious doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas is bolstered up by faulty reasoning, and is opposed to the Vedas, and is not accepted by respectable people, it should not be accepted. We will now propound, how — it (i.e. the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas) being semi-Nihilists in nature (because they consider only a few entities, such as Paramāṇus etc., as eternal and the rest as non-eternal), and by reason of its similarity with Nihilism — the vicious doctrine of total Nihilism (of the Buddhists) has to be still more overlooked. This doctrine (of the Buddhists) consists of a variety of forms, both because it propounds different views, and because of the different mental calibre of the disciples (of Buddha). There are in this, three kinds (of disciples) holding three different views. Some are those who hold that all things really exist (Sarvāstitva-vādins i.e. Realists), some are those who hold that thought-forms or ideas (Vijñāna) alone (and not actual entities) really exist (Vijñāna-vādins i.e. Idealists), and others again are those who hold that nothing really exists (Śūnya-vādins i.e. Nihilists). We now would refute the Sarvāstitva-vādins who hold that external (i.e. Bāhya) and internal (i.e. Āntara) things do in fact exist, viz. elements i.e. Bhūta and things resulting from elements i.e. Bhautika (are external i.e. Bāhya), and mind i.e. Citta and things resulting from the mind i.e. Caitta (are internal i.e. Āntara). The elements are the earth etc., and the things resulting from the elements are colour (Rūpa) etc., and the organ of sight (Cakṣus) etc. The Buddhists hold that the quartette of Paramāṇus viz. those of the Earth, Water, Tejas, and Vāyu, having a hard, viscid, hot and mobile nature respectively, come together to form the Earth etc. They also hold that five groups i.e. Skandhas (of internal things) such as Rūpa (sensation), Vijñāna (thought-form or idea), Vedanā (feeling), Sañjnā (verbal knowledge), Saṃskāra (impressions) come together and constitute the basis of all Ādhyātmika transactions. In connection with this it is said, thus — with regard to the two kinds of aggregates, viz. the aggregates of the nature of the coming together of the elements, and entities resulting from such elements as caused by the Aṇus, on the one hand, and the aggregates of the five groups (Skandhas) as caused by the coming together of these five groups (Skandhas) on the other, assumed by others (i.e. the opponents of the Vedānta), we say that even supposing they are assumed to be so, they would not materialize i.e. such aggregates would not result. Whence is it so? Because the components of such aggregates are non-sentient. Besides, the flashing of intelligence in the mind, again, is dependent upon such an aggregate materializing. Besides, in the absence of the assumption of any other sentient, experiencing Self, or steady ruler, who can bring about such an aggregate, supposing such a tendency (for aggregation) is understood to be independent of anything, then there would be the predicament of such tendency never ceasing to be active. Also the Āśaya (i.e. the constant stream of the cognitions of the ego) cannot be such a cause, as it is incapable of being described as being either the same (as knowledge) or otherwise. Also because, if the Āśaya is supposed to be momentary, then as it cannot have any activity, the assumption of any such tendency in the Āśaya is not reasonably sustainable. And if this coming about of the aggregate (assumed by the Buddhists) is not reasonably sustainable, then in the absence of such an aggregate this stream of mundane existence (Lokayātrā) which depends upon it, would necessarily dry up. — 18.
[Go top]
Itara-itara: mutual, one another; Pratyayatvāt: because of being the cause, one being the cause of the other; Iti: thus; Cet: if; (Iti cet: if it be said); Na: no; Utpatti-mātra-nimittatvāt: because they are merely the efficient cause of the origin.🔗 (If it be said that aggregates may well result, because Nescience etc. are mutually the cause (Pratyayatva) of each other, (we say) — no, because they merely are the efficient cause of each other. — 2.2.19. (The Buddhists say) — Even though a sentient, experiencing Self or a steady ruler is not understood to be the one who brings about an aggregate of the Paramāṇus and the Skandhas, still, as Nescience etc. are mutually the cause of each other, the fact of such a stream of mundane existence, is reasonably sustainable, and being so reasonably sustainable, nothing else is necessary. These Nescience etc., viz. Nescience, impression, knowledge, name, form, the tabernacle of the six (i.e. five sense-organs and intelligence) i.e. the body, touch, feeling, desire, activity (of speech, body and mind), birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction and things ejusdem generis with these, which, in the Buddhist doctrine, are understood to be the mutual cause of each other, are sometimes indicated briefly and at other times treated in detail. Besides, this group of Nescience etc. is not denied by the followers of other systems. If it be said — This group of Nescience etc. therefore, recurring constantly like (the pots of) a water-wheel, and being mutually the cause and the effect of each other, and being actually in existence, the existence of an aggregate has necessarily to be understood by implication, to be reasonably sustainable — we reply: it is not so. Why is it not so? Because these entities are mutually the cause of each other’s creation only. If any cause as such for such an aggregate is actually known, then only, such an aggregate is reasonably sustainable. Because, assuming Nescience etc. to be mutually the cause of the creation of each other, if each preceding one (in the series) would be the cause merely of the coming into existence of the one that comes after it, it may well be so, but even so, no cause for the coming into existence of an aggregate is possible (merely because of that). But (says the Buddhist), it has been stated that an aggregate has to be presumed to exist by a necessary implication. To this we reply — If it is meant to say, that as Nescience etc., cannot come into existence without an aggregate and hence the existence of an aggregate is to be understood by implication, then some cause for such aggregate has to be stated. It has already been stated during the examination of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, that even if the Atoms (Aṇus, which are understood to be eternal) and the experiencing-Selfs (the abode of the unseen principle which is the abider) are in existence, no cause for an aggregate is possible. How very much less possible, therefore, must it be, when (as the Buddhists hold) the Atoms (Aṇus) have only a momentary existence and when they are devoid of any such relation, in which one is the abode and the other the abider, and when there are no experiencing-Selfs? Again, if it is meant that Nescience etc. are themselves the cause of the aggregate, then how ever can Nescience etc., which themselves depend upon an aggregate for coming into existence, be themselves the cause of such aggregates? Now if you (the Buddhist) think that aggregates by themselves recur constantly in this beginningless transmigratory existence, and Nescience etc. abide in them, even then, an aggregate which comes into being from another aggregate, will either as a rule be similar to it, or in the absence of any rule, be either similar or dissimilar to it. If it is understood that it will come into being as a rule, it will imply the impossibility of a human body ever attaining the body, either of a God, or of an animal (Tiryag-yoni), or of that of a denizen of Hell (Nāraka), and if no such rule is assumed then it may amount to this, that it (i.e. the human body) may at one moment become an elephant or a God, and may again revert, and be a man. Both these (consequences) would be contrary to their own doctrine (viz. that a body suffers death every moment). Besides your (Buddhist’s) doctrine is, that any such steady experiencing-Self for whose experience this aggregate is to come into being, does not exist. Hence, such experience will be for its own sake alone (i.e. it would be useless) and no one else can wish for it. Similarly, Final Release also will be for its own sake alone, and no one else can be an aspirant for such Final Release. If it is assumed that some one, other than themselves, viz. a man, may wish for both these, then he will necessarily have to be in existence both during the time of experience and at the time of Final Release, and if so, it will be contrary to your own assumption of the doctrine of ‘momentariness’ (Kṣaṇikatva). Therefore, Nescience etc. may well be (if you so insist) mutually the cause of each other, still an aggregate cannot be proved to result, merely from that, because of the absence of an experiencing-Self. — 19.
[Go top]
Uttara-utpāde: at the time of the production of the subsequent thing; Ca: and; Pūrva-nirodhāt: because the antecedent one has ceased to exist, because of the destruction of the previous thing. (Uttara: in the next, in the subsequent; Utpāde: on the origination, on the production.)🔗 (Nor can the earlier one in the series of Nescience etc. be the cause of the one next to it) because when the next (momentary) entity comes into existence, the preceding one ceases to exist. — 2.2.20. It has been said, that as entities such as Nescience etc. are merely the cause of the coming into existence (of the momentary entity (Kṣaṇa) which is the later one in the series), the aggregate does not result. Now, it will be propounded, how, even their being the cause (of the coming into existence of the momentary entity next in the series) also, is not possible. Those who hold that everything is momentary (such as, the Buddhists), understand, that when an entity, that comes into existence at a subsequent moment, does so, the entity that exists in the penultimate moment, ceases to exist. And those who hold in this way would never be able to justify the relationship of cause and effect between the entity that exists during the earlier moment and the one that comes into existence at a later moment, because, when the entity that exists in the earlier moment is ceasing to exist, or has ceased to exist, it is swallowed up into non-existence and that it can ever be the cause of the coming into existence of an entity that comes into existence at a later moment, is not reasonably sustainable. Now, if it is meant that an entity that exists during the earlier moment and which actually has come into the condition of existence and has attained the condition of a definite ascertained entity, constitutes the cause of the entity that comes into existence at the later moment, even then, it is not reasonably sustainable, because, if an entity that has actually come into existence (during the earlier moment) were to be supposed to engage itself into any operative activity, there would be the predicament of its continuing a relationship with the subsequent moment (in which the next entity comes into existence). If it again be said, that the very existence of that entity itself (which exists during the earlier moment) means its operative activity, even that view is not reasonably sustainable, because it is not possible that an effect (i.e. the entity which is supposed to come into existence at a subsequent moment) which is not coloured with the nature of its cause, can ever come into existence. And if it is understood that the nature of the cause persists in the effect, then as such nature of the cause would continue to exist during the time (i.e. the next moment) of the existence of the result, there would be the predicament (for the Buddhist) of having to abandon his doctrine of the momentariness of entities (Kṣaṇikatva). Again if the assumption is that there is a relationship of cause and effect, without the effect being coloured by the nature of its cause, then, as such a condition of things would be available at all times, it would thus lead to the predicament of an impossible position (Atiprasaṅga). Now the ‘coming into existence’ of an entity, and its ‘destruction’, can indeed either be the nature of such entity, or they may mean another condition of it, or they may be altogether different entities. None of these alternatives are however reasonably sustainable. If the ‘coming into existence’ and the ‘destruction’ of an entity are themselves the nature of such entity, then the term ‘entity’ and the terms ‘coming into existence’ and the ‘destruction’ would be synonymous. Now, if it is understood that an entity is a condition intermediate between the condition of the coming into existence and destruction of an entity, which are the initial and final conditions of the entity, the doctrine of the momentariness of entities will have to be abandoned, because even if it be so the entity would necessarily be connected with three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate and the final moment. And again if it is understood, that the ‘coming into existence’ of an entity, and its ‘destruction’ are entirely unconnected with the entity itself — as a horse and a buffalo for instance are entirely unconnected with each other — then as the entity would necessarily have no connection whatsoever with either its ‘coming into existence’ or ‘destruction’, there would be the predicament of the entity being rendered eternal (which is against the Buddhist doctrine). Now, if, the ‘coming into existence’ of an entity or its ‘destruction’, is understood to be its perception or non-perception respectively, even then, such perception or non-perception being the properties of the person (i.e. Jīva-Self) who so perceives or fails to perceive, they could not be the properties of the entity, and thus again the predicament of the entity being eternal would result, just the same. For these reasons also, the doctrine of ‘Sugata’ (i.e. Buddha) is incongruous. — 20.
[Go top]
A-sati: in the case of non-existence of cause, if it be admitted that an effect is produced without a cause; Pratijñā: proposition, admitted principle; Uparodhaḥ: contradiction, denial; Yauga-padyam: simultaneity, simultaneous existence; Anyathā: otherwise.🔗 If it be supposed that in the absence (of a cause, an effect takes place), the original declaration would be opposed to it, or, otherwise (there would be) contemporaneity (of cause and effect). — 2.2.21. With respect to the doctrine of the momentariness of an entity (i.e. destruction of an entity existing at one moment, as another entity comes into existence at a later moment — Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-Vāda) it has been said that an entity existing at the earlier moment being swallowed up into destruction it cannot possibly be the cause of an entity which comes into existence at the subsequent moment. Now, if it is said, that a result may take place even in the absence of a cause, then, the original declaration would be contradicted. The declaration, that mind and mental phenomena come into existence after having acquired four kinds of causes (viz. Adhipatipratyaya, Saha-kāri Pratyaya, Samānāntara Pratyaya and Ālambana Pratyaya), will, in the event of such assumption, have been abandoned. If it be said, that results take place without any cause, then in the absence of any impediment i.e. an obstructing reason (such as that every effect must have a cause) anything might come into existence in any place. If it be said, that an entity existing at an earlier moment (i.e. the cause), continues to exist till an entity which exists in the subsequent moment (the effect), comes into existence, then it would mean that cause and effect are contemporaneous. That way also, the original declaration would be contradicted just the same. Besides, the original declaration that all entities (Saṃskāras) have a momentary existence would be contradicted. — 21.
[Go top]
Pratisaṅkhyā(-nirodha): conscious destruction, destruction due to some cause or agency; causal destruction, destruction depending upon the volition of conscious entity; A-pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha: unconscious destruction, destruction not depending upon any voluntary agency; A-prāptiḥ: non-attainment, impossibility; A-vicchedāt: because of non-interruption, because it goes on without interruption.🔗 No deliberate annihilation or natural annihilation can be arrived at, because of, the absence of interruption (i.e. destruction). — 2.2.22. Moreover the Vaināśikas (i.e. Buddhists who belong to the Nihilist school) hold, that all that is cognized by intelligence and is different from the triad, is something which is artificial (i.e. Saṃskṛta) and momentary, and they mention this triad of entities to consist of the ‘Deliberate Annihilation’ (‘Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha’) and the ‘Natural Annihilation’ (Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha), and the Ākāśa (i.e. space). They consider each of these three to be a mere non-entity, mere non-existence and formless, and describe Deliberate Annihilation to be the intentional destruction of an entity, and Natural Annihilation to be the opposite of that, and the Ākāśa (space) to be merely the absence of any covering entity. The Sūtra-kāra will speak about the Ākāśa later on, and will for the present refute the two kinds of annihilations. Neither Deliberate Annihilation nor Natural Annihilation can be arrived at i.e. they are not possible. Whence is it so? Because of, absence of interruption (i.e. destruction). For these Deliberate or Natural Annihilations ought to be either perceivable with reference to the stream (of momentary entities) or with reference to the entities themselves. Now, they cannot possibly be perceivable with reference to the stream (of momentary entities), because there is no possibility of the interruption of the stream (of momentary entities), as the constituent members of the stream happen to be in an uninterrupted relation of cause and effect, nor can these annihilations possibly be perceivable with reference to the entities, because an annihilation in which the annihilated entity leaves no unrecognizable form, is not possible, inasmuch as during all the conditions (during which they are undergoing annihilation) they are still recognizable as being such entities, and have a connected existence (i.e. there is absence of interruption i.e. destruction). In those conditions also, in which they are not so recognizable, an inference as to their existence i.e. non-interruption or absence of destruction etc. can still be drawn from the instances in which such non-interruption i.e. absence of destruction of the entities, and their relationship to each other, is clearly recognizable. Therefore annihilations of these two kinds, imagined by our opponents (the Vaināśikas) are not reasonably sustainable. — 22.
[Go top]
Ubhayathā: in either case; Ca: and, also; Doṣāt: because of objections.🔗 Because faults do arise in both the cases. — 2.2.23. How does this annihilation of Nescience etc., which is included in this Deliberate and Natural Annihilations, as is imagined (by the Vaināśikas), result? Is it through correct knowledge with its auxiliaries (viz. Self-restraint, rules etc.), or is it spontaneous? So far as the first alternative is considered, there would result the predicament of the abandonment (by the Vaināśikas) of the doctrine that such annihilation occurs without any cause, and so far as the second alternative is concerned, there would result the predicament of the teachings (of Sugata) as to the right path, being rendered useless. In this matter, inasmuch as, considered either way, the predicament of a fault resulting cannot be avoided, the doctrine of Sugata is incongruous. — 23.
[Go top]
Ākāśe: in the case of Ākāśa or space; Ca: also, and; Aviśeṣāt: because of no specific difference.🔗 With regard to Ākāśa (Space) also, (the doctrine of the Vaināśikas that it is formless is not reasonably sustainable), because of (the Ākāśa) not having any special peculiarity. — 2.2.24. With regard to what they (i.e. the Vaināśikas) themselves hold, viz. the doctrine about the two varieties of annihilation and Ākāśa being formless or non-existent, that (part of it) which holds the two varieties of annihilations to be formless or non-existent, has been refuted earlier, and now (the other part), that the Ākāśa also is formless or non-existent, is being refuted. It is unreasonable to apply the doctrine of formlessness to Ākāśa, because, in common with the two varieties of annihilations, it is reasonably sustainable to hold the ‘Ākāśa’ to be an existing entity. On the authority of the Scriptures, viz. the passage “The Ākāśa came into existence from the Self” (TaitU.2.1), Ākāśa is well-known to be a definite existing entity. Those however who are dissenters (from this authority of the Scriptures), should be answered by the fact, that the Ākāśa is inferred to be an existing entity from its having the quality of sound, inasmuch as, qualities such as smell etc. are observed to abide in entities such as the earth etc. In the case of those who hold that Ākāśa is merely the ‘absence of any covering entity’, when one bird is already flying (in the sky) and when such a covering entity, to wit, a flying bird, is actually present (in the sky, and when, because of such covering entity there could thus be no Ākāśa), the predicament of another bird wanting to fly but not having any space (Ākāśa) available for flying, would take place. If the Vaināśika says that the other bird may by all means fly in that part i.e. where there is no such covering entity (as the first bird), then that ‘particular part’ by which such ‘absence of covering entity’ is particularized, would itself be a definite Ākāśa entity, and it would not merely mean the ‘absence of any covering entity’. Besides he (a follower of Sugata) who holds the Ākāśa to be merely the absence of any covering entity would range himself in opposition to Sugata’s own doctrine. Because in the Saugata doctrine, in the stream of replies to questions such as “Oh Bhagavān, in what does the earth abide?” after the Earth etc. are dealt with, the reply to the question “In what does Vāyu abide?” is “Vāyu has Ākāśa as its abode”. Now this would not be plausible, if Ākāśa were not to be an entity. Hence also, it would not be reasonably sustainable to hold the Ākāśa to be a non-entity. Besides, it would be contradictory to hold at one and the same time, that this triad, consisting of these two varieties of annihilations and the Ākāśa, are formless or non-existent and non-entities, and again to hold that they are eternal entities. Because, in the case of a non-entity, it is not possible to say either that it is eternal or it is non-eternal, because, a relationship as between a quality and an entity possessing such a quality, depends upon the existence of such an entity. And when a relationship as between a quality and an entity possessing such quality exists, then alone — like a pot — there is bound to be the existence of such an entity and there would be no formlessness. — 24.
[Go top]
Anusmṛteḥ: on account of memory; Ca: and.🔗 Because of (the fact of) remembrance i.e. memory also, (the Self is not momentary). — 2.2.25. Besides, the Vaināśika who understands that all entities have but a momentary existence, must necessarily hold that the Self, the percipient, also, has only a momentary existence. But that is not possible. Because of (the fact of) memory i.e. remembrance, which is something which arises following in the wake of perception or experience. Such perception (followed by memory or remembrance) is possible only if the perception is by one and the same person. It is never observed that when the perception is experienced by one, it is remembered by another person. Unless the person who perceives first and the person who perceives afterwards, are one and the same, how possibly can perception such as ‘I who saw that (yesterday), am seeing this (today)’ be possible? Besides, it is well-known in the ordinary world, that it is only when the person who sees and the person who remembers are one and the same, that there can be such direct cognition, thus — I saw that (yesterday), and I see this (today). If the one who perceives and the one who remembers are different, then the perception would be thus — It is I that remember, (but) it was another who perceived. But no one ever experiences that way. When the cognition is in that manner, all persons in this world understand that the person who perceives and the person who remembers are different entities, thus — I remember that he saw. In the present case, however, even the Vaināśika himself knows that it is he himself alone that both perceives and remembers, when he says — ‘I saw this’. And just as he would not care to say, that fire is not hot and that it does not give out light, even so, he does not care to deny what he himself has perceived, and does not say that he has not perceived. This being so, when one and the same person is connected with the two moments, the one of perceiving, and another of remembering respectively, a Vaināśika is not in a position to avoid the abandonment of his own doctrine of the momentariness of entities. How can then, a Vaināśika, who professes to hold the doctrine of the momentariness of entities, but knows the successive perceptions to be by himself only, i.e. who from his first breath since his birth upto now and from now on upto his last breath, definitely knows all past and future perceptions to have been accomplished by himself alone, not feel ashamed? Now, if he were to say, that this may well happen as a result of similarity (of successive perceptions), we can retort, that inasmuch as similarity, as for instance that “this is similar to that”, necessarily depends upon two entities, and, as in the case of a person who holds all entities to be momentary, there is absence of any one perceiver as such, of two entities similar to each other, it would be but mere incoherent jargon only, were he to say, that such cognitions are caused by similarity, because, were he to hold one and the same person to be the perceiver of the similarity between entities that exist in an earlier and in a later moment respectively, then such a person must, in that case, necessarily exist during these two moments, and thus, the initial declaration about the momentariness of all entities would be contradicted. If it is said, that the cognition ‘This is similar to that’ is an altogether different cognition (unrelated to the things) and is not a recognition caused by perceptions relating to earlier and later moments, (we reply) — No, because (to say that) this is similar to that, necessarily presupposes the acceptance of two different entities. Were perception with reference to similarity to be an altogether different cognition, a sentence such as ‘This is similar to that’ would be meaningless. (In such a case) ‘Similarity exists’ would be the sentence used. Whenever, anything which is quite well-known in the ordinary world, is not accepted by experts, then, an attempt by one expert, both for the establishment of his own doctrine and the refutation of (i.e. the attributing of a fault in) his opponent’s views, fails to be properly grasped either by the other expert or by him who makes such an attempt. What is definitely ascertained, as ‘This is so and so’ — that alone should be spoken about. If anything other than that is spoken, it would only serve to establish one’s garrulity only. It is not reasonable to attribute transactions (such as — I saw that yesterday; I see this today) to similarity, because the cognition is of the existence of an entity, and not that of a mere similarity. There may well be a doubt perhaps with regard to an external (Bāhya) entity resulting from optical illusion, as to whether an external entity is the same entity (as is perceived) or whether it is similar to it, because such doubt is possible, but no such doubt can possibly arise in a cognizer about himself, viz. as to whether the cognizer is in fact he himself or somebody similar to him, because, the realization of the cognizer’s existence is definite, thus — I who saw yesterday, am the same myself that remembers today. Therefore, also, the doctrine of the Vaināśika is not reasonably sustainable. — 25.
[Go top]
Na: not; A-sataḥ: from non-existence, of the unreal, of a non-entity; A-dṛṣṭatvāt: because it is not seen.🔗 Existence (i.e. an entity) does not (result) from non-existence (i.e. non-entity), because it is not so observed. — 2.2.26. This is again how the doctrine of the Vaināśikas is not reasonably sustainable, because, (the fact of) their not recognizing a cause which is stable and which continues to persist (in the effect) would lead them towards an undesirable conclusion, viz. that effects result from nonexistence (of any cause). They do, however, indicate, by the sentence ‘Without the destruction (of the cause) no result takes place’, that entities result from non-existence. For instance, it is only from a seed which has undergone destruction that a sprout results, and from milk which has undergone destruction that curds results, and from earth (which has undergone destruction) that an earthen pot results. (They say) if effects were to result from one unchangeable cause (such as Brahman) then such unchangeable cause being everywhere common, everything would come into existence, on every side simultaneously. Therefore they consider, that as sprouts result from seeds which have been swallowed up into non-existence, entities result from non-existence. To this, the reply is, by the Sūtra “Existence (i.e. an entity) does not (result) from non-existence because it is not so observed” — i.e. an entity does not result from nonexistence. Were an entity to result from non-existence, such non-existence being common everywhere, any assumption of a special cause (for an effect) would be meaningless. Non-existence as caused by the destruction of seeds, and the non-existence of the horns of a hare, being typically the same, because the nature of non-existence is common, there could not be any such special distinction in such nonexistence, as a result of which, a sprout should result only from a seed, and curds should result only from milk, by reason of which the assumption of any such type of special cause could have any meaning. And if non-existence, without having any special type, were to be assumed to be the cause (of effects, as the Vaināśika holds), then sprouts etc. may just as well result from the horns of a hare (which are totally non-existent) etc., but it is never observed to be so. If, however, one were to assume (the existence of) a special attribute of non-existence — like, for instance, the blueness of a lotus — as a special quality, then precisely because of the assumption of the existence of a special quality pertaining to non-existence, such non-existence would itself become an existing entity, quite as much as a lotus (which has blueness as its quality) is an existing entity. Nor can non-existence possibly ever be the cause of any creation, precisely because of its being such ‘nonexistence’, like, for instance, the total non-existence (Tucchatva) of the horns of a hare. Were entities to result from non-existence, all the resulting entities also would necessarily be characterized by non-existence. But it is not observed to be so, because all entities are perceived to possess their own individual specific qualities as existing entities. Nobody ever understands that water-troughs which are earthen, are entities which are the modifications of threads etc., while everybody cognizes the modifications of earth to be earthen. With respect to the argument advanced (by the Vaināśika), viz. that because it is not reasonably sustainable to understand an unchangeable entity to be the cause (of any effect) unless its own nature is destroyed, non-existence has to be understood to be the cause (of effects), (it must be said that) it is a wrong statement, because it is observed that gold etc. whose nature (as gold etc.) is constant and is recognized to be so, are the cause of results such as ornaments etc. Even in the case of seeds etc. whose nature is seen to be destroyed, it is not the antecedent destruction (of the seeds) that is understood to be the cause of their subsequent condition (as sprouts), because, it is understood that it is the particles (cells) of the seeds which constitute the seeds themselves, and which persist in the effect, and which do not get destroyed, that are the cause of the sprouts. Therefore as actual existence of an entity is never seen to result from the totally nonexisting horns of a hare and as on the other hand the actual coming into existence (of ornaments) is observed to result from gold etc., the doctrine that entities result from nonexistence is not reasonably sustainable. Besides, holding, to begin with (as a Vaināśika does), that mind and mental entities result from four kinds (of causes) and that, the elements, and things resulting from the elements, result from the Paramāṇus, the Vaināśika, by again imagining that entities result from non-existence, and by thus going back on his own previous assumption, only succeeds in merely perplexing the people in general. — 26.
[Go top]
Udāsīnām: of the indifferent and non-active; Api: even, also; Ca: and; Evam: thus; Siddiḥ: success accomplishment, and attainment of the goal.🔗 Even men who are idle or indifferent i.e. apathetic would thus accomplish (what they desire). — 2.2.27. If it be understood that entities result from nonexistence, then idle men who do not care to exert would attain the fulfilment of their desire, because non-existence is easily available. An agriculturist would succeed in growing corn, even without engaging himself in agricultural pursuits, a potter would be able to produce earthen pots, even without the exertion of preparing the necessary clay, a weaver would be able to obtain cloth, even without engaging himself in the weaving of yarn, quite as easily as a man who weaves. No one would have to exert for the attainment of Heaven or Final Release. But this is neither proper nor does any one understand it to be so. Therefore also, the doctrine, that entities result from non-existence, is not reasonably sustainable. — 27.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Na: not; Abhāvaḥ: non-existence; Upalabdheḥ: because they are perceived, because of perception, because we are conscious of them on account of their being experienced.🔗 There could be no non-existence (of external entities) because (they) are actually perceived. — 2.2.28. When, during what has gone before, faults with respect to the doctrine denying (the existence of) external entities, such as the unavailability of aggregates, have been set forth, the follower of Buddha who believes in the doctrine of Vijñāna i.e. mere internal cognitions or thought-forms (without there being any external i.e. objective entities corresponding to them) comes forward in opposition (to the Vedāntin). The theory of the doctrine of the reality of external entities was propounded (by Buddha), because he noticed the predilection of some of his pupils for believing in the objectivity i.e. reality of external entities (and so as to be in conformity with that view), but that never was his own view. To him, the doctrine of mere subjective cognition alone as the sole phase, was acceptable. According to that doctrine ‘of the reality of mere subjective cognitions’ — that all processes, whether they be with regard to the means of knowledge, or the object to be known, or with regard to the result of knowledge in the form of the awareness of the external object by the mind or intellect (Buddhi), are only internal, is what is reasonably sustainable, because even if external entities did actually exist, means-of-proof etc. do not come into operation, unless the mind or intellect is applied to or becomes aware of such external entities. (It may be asked by the Vedāntin) — How is it known that all these processes are only internal and that apart from mere subjective cognition, no external objective entity as such exists? (The follower of Buddha replies) Because it (i.e. the existence of external objective entities) is not possible. The external objective entity as it is understood to be, can either be atoms (Paramāṇus), or aggregates of atoms (Paramāṇus) such as (for instance) pillars etc. The Paramāṇus, however, cannot be fixed accurately or spotted to be the objects of the cognition of a pillar etc. (because it is not reasonably sustainable that they can be perceived as Paramāṇus), nor are pillars etc. cognized as being the aggregates of Paramāṇus, because of the impossibility of the aggregates being explained as being either different from, or not different from, the Paramāṇus. ‘Universals’ (Jātis) etc., also should be refuted in a similar manner. Besides, cognitions as they arise have realization (of the object) as their common factor, and this particular selective appropriation with regard to each and every different object of cognition, such as the cognition of a pillar, or of a wall, or a pot, or a piece of cloth, cannot be reasonably sustainable unless there is a special peculiarity (of form) of each of such cognitions, and hence cognitions have necessarily to be assumed to have the same form as the objects of such cognitions. And, when this is accepted, then, in as much as cognitions are thus coextensive in extent with the form of the objects of such cognitions (which are confined to such cognitions), the notion about the separate existence of a (corresponding) objective external entity is superfluous. Further as an external object and its cognition are perceived simultaneously, it means that there is no difference between an object and its cognition i.e. they both are one and the same. When one of the two is not cognized, necessarily the other also is not cognized, but supposing they (i.e. objects and their cognition) are by nature different, that would not be reasonably sustainable, because of the absence of any reason for the obstruction of the cognition of one of them, when the other of them is not cognized. Therefore also, there is non-existence of entities. This should be looked upon as in the case of dreams etc. Just as in cognitions, in a dream, or in an illusion, or in a mirage, or in a Gandharva Nagara (a phantom city in the sky), there are perceptions in the forms of the objects of cognition, and cognition itself, without the existence of any corresponding external entities, similarly during wakefulness also, the perceptions of such objects as pillars etc., deserve to be similar (viz. that there could be no external entities existing in fact), because perceptions in both these cases have no difference (between them). How (it may be asked by a Vedāntin), in the absence of any external entities as such, is this variety of perceptions of external entities reasonably sustainable? (The follower of Buddha replies) — It is so because of the variety of impressions on the mind (Vāsanās). In this beginningless transmigratory existence, as cognitions and impressions on the mind succeed each other alternately as cause and effect, quite in the same manner as seeds and sprouts succeed each other alternately, and mutually constitute the causes and effects of each other, such variety in them is not contradictory. Besides it is understood from positive and negative instances (Anvaya and Vyatireka) that variety in cognitions is caused by impressions only, inasmuch as in the matter of dreams, it is understood by both of us' (i.e. Buddhist and Vedāntin) that there is a variety of cognitions caused by impressions on the mind, even in the absence of the existence of external entities, while I (the Buddhist) do not understand that in the absence of mental impressions, there is a variety in cognition caused by actually existing external entities. Therefore, also (according to the follower of Buddha) external entities have no existence. To this we (Vedāntins) reply — There could be no nonexistence (of external entities) because external entities are actually perceived. It is not possible to understand that there could be non-existence of external entities. Why so? Because (they are) actually perceived. An external entity is invariably perceived in every cognition such as a pillar, a wall, a pot or a piece of cloth. It can never be that what is actually perceived is non-existent. For instance, if a man who is actually eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction derived by such eating, were to say — “I am not eating nor am I feeling any satisfaction”, how can he be understood to be a person whose word should be (seriously) accepted? Similarly how could a man’s word be acceptable, if, while actually perceiving an external entity as a result of its contact with a sense-organ, he were to say, that he neither perceives such entity nor does it exist? (If the opponent were to say however) — I do not say that I do not perceive any external entity but I say that I do not perceive any external entity, existing as apart from a mere subjective cognition of it. (We reply) — Of course you say that because there is no curb to your mouth, but then, it is not logical, because it is precisely by means of perception only, that the existence of an entity as apart from a mere cognition of it, has necessarily to be understood. No one understands perception itself to be the pillar or the wall, but all persons understand that they i.e. pillars etc. themselves are the objects of perception. It is in this manner that all people understand, and even those (such as the followers of Buddha) who desire to deny the existence of external entities also do, all the same, as surely speak about the external entity, thus — viz. that which is of the nature of an internal subjective cognition, appears as if it is external. Even they, who thus apprehend the perception of an external entity as is well-known to all people generally, but who desire to deny that external entities exist, speak about it, as if it is external, or else, why should they say ‘as if it is external? No one would say, that Viṣṇu-mitra appears as if he is the son of a barren woman (a total nonentity). Hence it would be reasonable for those who perceive an entity substantially as an entity, to say that it is perceived to be a substantial external entity, and not that it is perceived as if it is an external entity. But (says the follower of Buddha), as the existence of an external entity is not possible (as I have said above) I have perforce come to the conclusion that it is perceived as if it is an external entity. This conclusion (we reply) is not proper, because the possibility or the absence of possibility of the existence of an entity, depends upon the antecedent operation, or the absence of operation, of the means-of-proof (with regard to such entity) and not vice versa, viz. that the operation, or the absence of operation, of the means-of-proof depends upon the possibility or the absence of possibility (of the existence of such an entity). That which is actually perceived by the operation of one or other of the means-of-proof, is possible (of existence), and that which is not perceived by any of the means-of-proof whatsoever, is not possible (of existence). Hence, in this case, how can an entity which is actually perceived as substantially existing according to its own nature by all the various means-of-proof, be said to be either possible or not possible (of existence),. by raising such alternatives as that such external objective entities are either different or not different (from Paramāṇus), when as a matter of fact they are actually perceived? It is not that because cognitions have the form of the objects of such cognitions, that destruction of such objects results, for cognition cannot have the form of external objects if such external objects themselves did not exist, and also because, such objects are as a matter of fact perceived to be external. Hence it is that, that an object and its perception are as a rule apprehended simultaneously, is to be understood to mean, that they have a relation of cause and effect between them, and not that they are one and the same, and have no distinction between them. Besides, when there are perceptions of a pot and a piece of cloth, there is a distinction between only the attributes of the cognitions i.e. between the attributes of the pot and the piece of cloth, and not in the substantive viz. the cognition itself. For instance, when there is a white bull and a dark bull, the distinction is between the whiteness and blackness, the attributes of the bulls, and not in the generic form (Ākṛti) of a bull i.e. bull-ness. It is by means of these two attributes (the whiteness and the blackness) that their distinction from the one (i.e. the generic bullness) results, and vice versa, for it is from the one (i.e. generic bullness) that its distinction from the two attributes (whiteness and blackness) results. Therefore, there is a distinction between an object and its cognition. The same should be understood in the case of the cognition of a pot and the remembrance of it, because here also the distinction is between the substantives, viz. cognition and remembrance, and not in the object i.e. the pot. As it is, in the case of the smell of milk and the taste of milk, the distinction is between the attributes, smell and taste, and not in the substantive i.e. the milk. Besides, as regards two cognitions, one of which is earlier and the other later and which are exhausted as a result of making themselves cognized (because they are momentary), it is not reasonably sustainable to understand that they have a relationship of the one being merely a cognition and the other being the subject of cognition (because it is the Self that is the knower, while the Buddhists do not accept the existence of the Self), and hence, the several declarations or dogmas (of Buddhist doctrine) — such as those about the distinctions between cognitions, about momentariness, about the distinction between individuals and classes, about an earlier cognition generating an impression (Vāsaka) which causes a subsequent cognition (Vāsya), about the distinctions in attributes, such as existing, non-existing and both existing and non-existing attributes (Sat, Asat and Sat-Asat Dharma) caused by the influence of Nescience, about the idea of existence and non-existence, and about bondage and Final Release, inherent in the Buddhist system — would have to be abandoned. Besides, there is this other thing — you (the opponent) who claim to understand cognition as an internal subjective cognition merely, have to explain how and why you do not become conscious of the existence of an external entity such as a pillar or a wall etc. If you (the opponent) say that a cognition is actually experienced, then it is equally reasonable to understand that an external entity is also similarly experienced. If you (the opponent) say again that a cognition being like a lamp, of a self-illuminating nature, it is like a lamp, self-cognized, while an external entity is not so cognized, (then we reply) in saying so, you understand action as acting on itself — an idea which is against ordinary experience, like for instance, fire burning itself — , while you refuse to understand what is not contradictory and is well-known in the ordinary world, viz. that an external entity is cognized by means of a cognition which is different from the external entity itself, and in doing so you are indeed making an exhibition of your erudition. Besides it is not possible that cognition can be conscious of itself as apart from an (external) entity, precisely because a thing cannot act on itself. If you (the follower of Buddha) say that in case a cognition were to be apprehended by means of a thing apart from the cognition itself, that again will have to be apprehended by something else, and that again by still some other thing, and so a regressus ad infinitum would result, and besides, cognition, like a lamp, being self-illuminating, if it is imagined that for such cognition some other cognition is necessary, it would be a futile assumption, because, both the cognitions being similar, it would not be reasonably sustainable to hold that they have a relation between them, in which, one cognition is the illuminator and the other the object of such illumination, (we reply) — Both these assumptions of yours are not valid, because when a cognition is cognized, no further expectation arises about the immediate witness of such cognition (i.e. the Self), requiring in its own turn, some other witness to apprehend this first immediate witness, and hence it is not reasonably sustainable to entertain a doubt that a regressus ad infinitum would result. As the witness (i.e. the Self) and the cognition are of different nature, it is reasonably sustainable that there is a relation between them of one being the cognizer and the other being the object of cognition, because the existence of this witness (i.e. the Self) cannot be denied, inasmuch as the Self is self-proved. Moreover when you say that, like a lamp, cognition is self-illumining and does not need anything to illumine it, it would be tantamount to saying, that cognitions cognize themselves, and do not require any other means-of-proof to make themselves known, and it would be just as if you were to say, that there are a thousand burning lamps subsisting inside the big mass of a solid monolith. (Now if you the Buddhist were to retort) that, cognitions being thus of the nature of perception (as you the Vedāntin suggest), you have practically accepted my (i.e. of the follower of Buddha’s) view, (we reply) — No, because as it is seen that it is some person endowed with the faculty of vision, that is necessary to perceive the burning of the lamp, therefore, cognition also being, in common with a lamp, capable of being perceived, would require somebody other than itself to perceive it. Again, (if you the opponent were to suggest) — “You (the Vedāntin) who maintain that this witnessing Self is self-existing, practically in so many words accept my view, that cognition illumines itself, in a round-about way of reasoning”, (we reply) — No, because you (i.e. the follower of Buddha) hold that cognitions have particular attributes such as origination, destruction, and plurality, (while, we, the Vedāntins, recognize only the ‘Self’ which is eternal, unborn, indestructible). Hence, we have thus established, that cognitions, like a lamp, are cognized by some one different from such cognitions. — 28.
[Go top]
Vaidharmyāt: on account of difference of nature, because of dissimilarity; Ca: and, also; Na: not; Svapna-ādivat: like dreams etc.🔗 Because of the difference in their nature, (perceptions during wakeful condition) are not like those in a dream etc. — 2.2.29. The argument advanced by him who discountenances the existence of external entities — viz. that, as in the case of perceptions in a dream, so in the case of perceptions during waking state, perceptions of pillars etc. may well occur even without actual corresponding external objective entities (existing), inasmuch as, as perceptions, they are similar — has now to be refuted. It is said with regard to this — Perceptions during waking state do not deserve to be like the perceptions in a dream etc. Why (is it) so? Because of the dissimilarity in their nature. Dream-state and waking-state are dissimilar. What dissimilarity is there? We reply — that it consists in the subsequent contradiction, and the absence of such subsequent contradiction respectively. Things perceived in a dream by a person are contradicted on his awakening (from a dream), (for he says) — ‘Oh, I wrongly fancied I was in the company of a great person, I did not in fact meet him, my mind was overcome with sleep and this caused the illusion.’ There is a similar contradiction in the case of Māyā (illusion) etc. But a thing perceived in a waking condition — a pillar for instance — is never contradicted under any circumstances. Besides, dream experience is of course a mere remembrance or memory (of past impressions) while what is seen during waking condition, is a perception or experience (brought about, by the operation of the means-of-proof). The actual distinction between remembrance or memory (in a dream) and perception or experience (in a waking condition) which is of the nature of separation from or contact with a thing, is directly experienced by a person himself, when he says, for instance, ‘I remember my dear son, but I am not able to see him. But I do wish to see him.’ Under these circumstances, a person who himself actually experiences the difference between them, cannot say that waking perceptions are unreal, because of their actual perception by him, merely because they are perceptions similar to perceptions during dreams. It is not proper or logical for persons who claim to be intelligent, to deny the truth of their own experience. Besides, lest there may be the predicament of having to contradict their own experience, those who are unable to say, that waking perceptions are without any support, wish to say so, on the ground of their similarity to dream perceptions. That, which cannot possibly be the nature of a particular thing, can never be its nature merely because of its similarity with some other things. Fire (for instance) which is experienced to be hot, will never become a cold entity merely because of its similarity to water (merely because both are entities). The dissimilarity between the natures of cognitions in a dream condition and of those in a waking condition has already been indicated. — 29.
[Go top]
Na: not; Bhāvaḥ: existence (of impressions or Saṃskāras); Anupalabdheḥ: because they are not perceived, because (external things) are not experienced.🔗 There could he no existence (of the impressions on the mind) because (according to you — the opponent — no external entities) are perceived. — 2.2.30. The statement (of the follower of Buddha) that it is possible, that there may be variety in cognitions due to variety of impressions on the mind, even in the absence of the existence of external entities, has now to be refuted. It is said about it (by the Vedāntin) — As according to your doctrine, there is no perception of the existence of external objective entities, it is not reasonably sustainable that, there could be any impression on the mind. Diverse impressions on the mind, about entities, are caused by the perception of diverse (objective external) entities. If (as you maintain) the existence of objective external entities cannot be perceived, to what cause, then, can the variety of different impressions on the mind, be due to? If impressions on the mind are understood to exist as having no beginning in time, then on the ground of the maxim of the ‘chain of blind men’ (blind leading the blind), the result would be, the absence of any finality based on firm means-of-proof, which would only succeed in terminating all worldly transactions, and bring about an impossible position, but it would never succeed in proving your statement. This being so, the positive and negative instances enumerated by those (followers of Buddha) who refuse to concede the existence of actual objective entities, for the purpose of proving that the whole set of cognitions are caused by impressions and not by actual objective entities, should thus be understood to be refuted, because in the absence of the perception of objective external entities, the existence of the impressions (on the mind) cannot be reasonably sustainable. Besides, on the other hand, as it is understood that even in the absence of impressions on the mind, perception of objective external entities is possible, and as impressions (on the mind) are not understood to be possible in the absence of the existence of objective external entities, such positive and negative instances also necessarily establish the existence of external entities. Besides, as impressions on the mind indeed are special kinds of Saṃskāras, they cannot be imagined to be without a basis, because it is seen to be so in the ordinary world. In your (i.e. the opponent’s) case, there is no basis of any sort for the impressions on the mind, because they are not perceived by any of the means-of-proof. — 30.
[Go top]
Kṣanikatvāt: on account of the momentariness; Ca: and.🔗 (Cognition pertaining to the consciousness of Ego i.e. Ahaṅ-kāra i.e. Ālaya-Vijñāna) also, being momentary, (it) cannot be the basis for the impressions on the mind. — 2.2.31. The cognition pertaining to the consciousness of Ego i.e. Ahaṅ-kāra which indeed you (the follower of Buddha) imagine to be the basis for the impressions on the mind, also being understood to be but momentary and of a nonpermanent nature, because you hold that entities have but a momentary existence, does not, like impellent cognition. (Pravṛtti-vijñāna) of the reality of external entity (such as a pot or a piece of cloth), deserve to be the basis for the impressions on the mind. In the absence of the existence of any connecting principle whose nature persists (in every effect) in relation to all the three times (i.e. the past, present and future), or in the absence of any unchangeable entity (such as the Self) as the witness of all entities, no transactions, such as remembrance, recognition etc., which are dependent upon the impressions on the mind, and which depend upon environment, time and cause are possible. Were cognitions pertaining to Ego-consciousness, to be assumed (by you) to have a permanent nature, it would mean the abandonment of your own doctrine (of the momentariness of all entities). The faults attributed (by us), to the doctrine of the ‘momentariness of external entities’ (in the Buddhist sense), such as — “Uttarotpāde ca pūrva-nirodhāt” (Brah. Su. Bha. II. ii. 20), should be understood to apply equally to the doctrine of ‘mere internal subjective cognitions’ as the doctrine of ‘the momentariness of entities’, is common to both these tenets. In this way both these tenets (of the Buddhists), viz. the non-existence of external entities and mere internal cognitions, stand refuted. We do not propose even to extend the courtesy of taking any notice of the doctrine of Nihilism (Śunya-Vāda) by way of refuting it, as it is entirely opposed to all means-of-proof, and as this course of worldly transactions which is established by all the means-of-proof cannot be rejected in the absence of any definite knowledge of any better principle, and as it is well-known that in the absence of any exception (to be found to be against a rule) the rule is taken as firmly established. — 31.
[Go top]
Sarvathā: in every way; Anupapatteḥ: because of its not being proved illogical; Ca: and, also.🔗 Considered in all possible ways (the Buddhist doctrine) is not reasonably sustainable. — 2.2.32. Why need anything more be said? The more is this doctrine of Buddha examined, in order to ascertain whether it is reasonably sustainable, the more it gets disintegrated, much as a well dug in sand does. We are unable to find in it even the least little reasonable sustainability of any kind. Hence also the doctrine of Sugata is not acceptable. Besides, Sugata by propounding the mutually contradictory doctrines of Bahyārtha-Vāda i.e. ‘the reality of objective external entities’ (in the Buddhistic sense), of the Vijñāna-Vāda i.e. ‘reality of mere internal subjective cognitions, and of Śūnya-Vāda i.e. ‘mere nothingness’ (Nihilism), has merely succeeded in establishing, either his capacity for incoherent babbling, or his actual hatred of all beings (who are his adherents and who do not follow the Vedic Scriptures), fondly hoping that by the assimilation of the knowledge of such mutually contradictory theories, they may be perplexed. Therefore, the sense (of the Sūtra-kāra) is, that those who desire real happiness through Final Release should leave Sugata’s doctrine severely alone. — 32.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Na: not; Ekasmin: in one; A-sambhavāt: on account of the impossibility.🔗 (Contradictory attributes cannot exist) in one and the same entity, because (it) is not possible, (and therefore, the Jaina doctrine is not correct). — 2.2.33. The doctrine of the followers of Buddha has been refuted. The doctrine of the clothesless Jainas (Sans-collottes?) is now being refuted. They acknowledge seven categories, viz. the Jīva-Self (Jīva), entities other than the Jīva-Self (Ajīva), the tendency of sense-organs towards sense-objects (Āsrava), the discipline of sense-organs (Saṃvara), the ordeals (Nirjara), Bondage (Bandha), Final Release (Mokṣa). They further reduce this number according to circumstances (Yathā-yogam) to two only viz. the Jīva-Self and entities other than the Jīva-Self, as they understand that the rest (the remaining five) are covered by these two. They also talk about these very categories (in another way) as the five Astikāyas (i.e. entities) viz. Jīvāstikāya i.e. the category of Jīva-Self, Pudgalāstikāya i.e. the category of a body (wherein there is a congregation and separation of Atoms), Dharmāstikāya i.e. the category of merit, Adharmāstikāya i.e. the category of demerit, and Ākāśāstikāya i.e. the category of Ākāśa. They also again describe many other different sub-divisions of these categories, supposed to be comprised in their doctrine. They also refer to a mode of reasoning called ‘Sapta-bhaṅgī-nāya’, such as, that, may be an entity exists, may be it does not exist, may be it does and does not exist, may be it is indescribable (Avaktavya), may be it exists and is indescribable, may be it does not exist and is indescribable, may be it does and does not exist and is indescribable. Further they employ this Sapta-bhaṅgī method of reasoning to oneness (Ekatva) and eternity (Nityatva) etc. (and thus impugn the doctrine of Brahman). With regard to this, we say: — This doctrine (of the Jainas) is not logical, because, contradictory attributes cannot possibly exist (in one and the same entity). Contradictory attributes such as existing (Sat) and not existing (Asat) cannot at one and the same time belong to one and the same entity possessing an attribute (Dharma), even as coldness or hotness cannot possibly belong to the same entity simultaneously. These seven categories definitely ascertained (by Jainas) as being so many and as having such and such form, may (according to the Jaina theory) perhaps be so, or may not be so, and on the other hand, any resulting knowledge, of such an indefinite nature, which may be so, as described, or on the other hand may not be so, would be, like doubtful knowledge, certainly unauthoritative. (If the Jainas were to say) — But the knowledge of an entity which is definitely ascertained to be of more kinds than one, would not deserve to be unauthoritative, like doubtful knowledge, we reply — No. For, in the case of a man, who in such an unfettered manner, definitely understands that entities are of more than one kind, the fact of such definitely ascertained knowledge of his, also, having the same common characteristic of its being ‘an entity’ quite as much as other entities, would necessarily induce the application of optional alternatives, such as, that such an entity viz. the definitely ascertained knowledge of his, also, somehow exists or that it somehow does not exist, and thus, the indefiniteness of such knowledge would certainly be there all the same. Similarly, in the case of a person, who essays to arrive at such determination, as also in the case of the result of such determination, on the one hand, their existence somehow would result, and on the other hand also their non-existence somehow. How can then, the Tīrtha-kara, authoritative as he is (considered by the Jainas), be able to impart instruction, when the means-of-proof, the object to be known, the knower and knowledge, are all, thus, of an indefinite nature? Also how can those who follow his opinion act upon his instruction about a doctrine of such an indefinite nature? It is only when in the case of a thing, a definitely settled result is assured, that all people set about employing the means to achieve it unconfusedly, and not otherwise. Hence, any one who promulgates a Śāstra about a matter of such an indefinite nature or significance, would, like an inebriate or a mad-man, be a person, whose word cannot be accepted. Similarly with respect to the five Astikāyas, if one were to employ the option, as to whether their number is five or is not so (i.e. is not five), then according to one alternative they may be five, and according to the other alternative, they may not be five, and thus it would mean, that they may be more or less than five. It is not possible that these categories could be indescribable, because if they are so indescribable, they cannot possibly be described. But to describe them, and also at the same time, to say that they are indescribable (and yet to describe them), would be contradictory. Again if they are described, it may be that they either are definitely ascertained to be so or that they are not so ascertained. Again, if a person were to babble, that the fruit of understanding them properly, viz. correct knowledge, may supervene, or again, that it may not so supervene, or conversely, that imperfect knowledge also may either result or may not result, then, he would indeed belong to the class of inebriates or mad-men, and certainly not to the class of persons whose word should be trusted. Again, if Heaven or Final Release were on the one hand understood to exist as a reality and on the other hand understood not so to exist, and again if it were to be understood that they on the one hand are eternal, and on the other hand are non-eternal, then, any endeavour with regard to them (for their attainment) would not be reasonably sustainable. Also, there would be the predicament, that the Jīva-Self etc., which have been ascertained (by the Jainas), on the strength of their system, to exist, and as not having a beginning in time, and also ascertained as having a particular nature, would with equal facility be understood as not having any such ascertained nature. And in this manner, as, in the case of the one and only one entity, such as the Jīva-Self etc., such mutually contradictory attributes of existence or non-existence at one and the same time are not possible, and as, if one such nature (of it) is present, the presence of the other nature is not possible, and, vice versa, when a particular nature is not present, its presence there is not possible, this doctrine of the Arhat (i.e. Jina, the propounder of Jaina doctrine) is incongruous. This (refutation) should also be understood to refute the tenets about one and the same entity having contradictory attributes such as being one and many, eternal and non-eternal, separate and non-separate. As regards their tenet that aggregates of atoms, which are called Pudgalas, are formed, it has already been refuted in the earlier refutation of the doctrine of the Aṇu (of the Vaiśeṣikas) and so a separate refutation of the same again is not attempted (here). — 33.
[Go top]
Evam: thus, in the same way, as it is suggested by the Jaina theory; Ca: also, and; Ātma-a-kartsnyam: non-universality of the soul.🔗 Similarly (the Jaina doctrine is liable to the fault of) the Self not being all-pervading. — 2.2.34. Just as the fault, of the impossibility of an entity which has a particular attribute ever possessing another contrary attribute, has attached itself to the Syād-Vāda, similarly also the fault, that the Self, i.e. the Ātmā, would not be integral, would attach itself (to the Jaina doctrine). In what manner will it so arise? The followers of Arhat hold that the Jīva-Self has the same dimensions as that of the body. Now, if it has the same dimensions as that of the body, then it would mean that it is neither co-extensive with the universe, nor integral, and is limited in size, and hence, like an earthen pot etc., it will be non-eternal. And because bodies have not the same fixed dimensions, when a man whose Self has the same dimensions as his body, acquires the birth of an elephant, as a result of his actions (Karma), his Self will not be able to occupy the entire body of the elephant, and conversely, if he acquires the body of an ant, the Self could not possibly be wholly accommodated in an ant’s body. Even in the single life-time of a person, the same fault would supervene during the stages of childhood, youth and old age. (The follower of Arhat says) — may be, the Jīva-Self is composed of infinite number of parts, and the same may contract in a small body and expand in a large one. (We ask him) — you have to answer whether, that those infinite number of parts of the Self occupy the same space, is not admitted or admitted. If it is not admitted, then these infinite number of parts would not be contained in a limited space, and if it is admitted, then it would be reasonably sustainable that they would be occupying the space of only a single part, and therefore their having a dimension greater than the dimension of one part not being reasonably sustainable, there would be the predicament of the Self having the dimension of an Aṇu only. Besides it is not even possible to conceive, that the parts of the Jīva-Self limited by the space of one body only, can ever be considered to be infinite. — 34.
[Go top]
Now if it be said (by the followers of Arhat), that when the Self acquires a big body, some parts accede to the Self, and when it acquires a small body, some parts depart from the Self, alternately, we reply: —Na: not; Ca: also, and; Paryāyāt: in turn, because of assuming by succession; Api: even; A-virodhaḥ: no inconsistency; Vikāra-ādibhyaḥ: on account of change, etc.🔗 Even on the assumption of such alternatives, contradiction cannot he avoided, because the faults of modifications etc. (occurring), do supervene all the same. — 2.2.35. Even on the assumption, that some parts accede to and some depart from the Self, alternately, it is not reasonably possible to propound, without a contradiction taking place, the Self’s having the same dimensions as those of the body. Whence is it so? Because faults, such as that modifications etc. (of the Self) occur, do arise. Even on the assumption that some parts accede to and some depart from the Self, the liability of the Self that thus gets filled up or depleted constantly, to undergo modifications regularly by such accession and depletion, cannot be avoided, and if, the Self is understood to be so liable to modifications, it will necessarily be rendered non-eternal, say, like a piece of leather etc. Under the circumstances, the doctrine of bondage and Final Release as understood (by the followers of Arhat), viz., that the Self, which is surrounded on all sides by the eightfold actions, and which happens to be engulfed in the ocean of transmigratory existence, floats upwards like a gourd, as a result of the severance of such bondage, would be contradicted. Besides, as to those parts of the Self, which accede or depart, precisely because of their having this nature of coming into existence and being destroyed, they could not, just as the body etc. cannot be called the Self, be called the Self, and it will be, that, that particular part which continues to be there permanently, is the Self, and it would not be possible to point out that this particular part is the one which is there, so permanently. Besides, the thing is, that you have to explain, from what source these acceding parts come, and wherein those that depart are absorbed. They cannot possibly be said to proceed from the elements and be absorbed into them, because the Self (of which they are parts) is not an effect of elements, and by reason of the absence of any means-of-proof, it is not possible to indicate any general or particular reservoir (for all the parts as a whole or for a particular part) for such parts or for a particular part of the Jīva-Self. Besides the thing is that if it is really so the Self would be of an indefinite nature, as the dimensions of the acceding and departing parts would be indefinite. Hence, on account of the predicament of such faults etc. occurring, it is not possible to accept even this alternate accession and departure of the parts from the Self. When it is proved by means of the previous Sūtra, that even though the Self has the same dimensions as the body (as assumed by the followers of Arhat), still the predicament of the fault of its not being eternal would occur, (even though it is understood to be reasonably probable, that the Self can acquire other larger or smaller bodies), because the Self would in that case be rendered non-integral i.e. not whole or integral, the follower of Arhat may suggest as an alternative, that, may be, that even though the dimensions of the Self do not remain constant, the Self would still be eternal, on the strength of the maxim of the eternal nature of the continuous stream of water. So the Sūtra-kāra deliberately raises a doubt (in favour of the followers of Arhat) viz. that, just as the russet-robed one (Buddhist) holds, that even though cognitions are not constant, still their continuous stream may well be eternal, so might it equally well be, in the case of the clothesless Jainas (Sans-collottes), and then answers this doubt by this Sūtra, thus: — If the stream is unreal (and not substantial) there would be the predicament of arriving at the theory of Nihilism, and even if it is real, there would be the predicament of the fault of the Self being liable to undergo modifications, etc., and thus again the doctrine (of the followers of Arhat) would not be reasonably sustainable. — 35.
[Go top]
Antya-avasthiteḥ: because of the permanency of the size at the end; Ca: and; Ubhaya-nityatvāt: as both are permanent; A-viseshaḥ: because there being no difference.🔗 And because, (according to the Jainas) the dimension of the Jīva-Self in the condition of Final Release is not liable to change, the dimension of the Self in both the previous conditions also would be the same i.e. eternal (and common to all the three conditions), and therefore, there is no distinction. — 2.2.36. The Jainas hold that the dimension of the Jīva-Self in the final condition of Final Release is constant, and hence, there is the predicament, of its dimensions during the previous, i.e. initial and intermediate condition also, being constant, and therefore, its condition would be the same (during all the three conditions). Therefore, the Jīva-Self would have the constant dimension of one body only, and there would be no possibility of the acquisition of a greater or lesser body. Or else, because of the final dimensions of the Jīva-Self being thus constant it would have the same constant dimension in the earlier conditions, and hence it will have to be understood, to be uniformly either of an Aṇu or Great dimension, but never of the same dimension as that of the (changing) Body. Hence like the Saugata doctrine, the Ārhata doctrine also is incongruous and should therefore be neglected. — 36.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Patyuḥ: of the Lord (Patṛ), of Paśu-pati, of the Lord of animals; A-sāmañjasyāt: on account of inconsistency, on account of untenableness, inappropriateness.🔗 Because of the incongruity (of the view) the Lord’s (being merely the efficient cause of the world, cannot hold good). — 2.2.37. Now the doctrine (of the Māheśvaras) that the Lord is (the cause of the world) merely as a superintendent, is being refuted. How is it understood that the Sūtra means this? Because, elsewhere by Brahma-Sūtra I. iv. 23, 24, the Ācārya has already established that the Lord, by virtue of his being both the material and efficient cause, has both these natures, and now if this Sūtra were to be understood to refute the doctrine of the Lord being the cause, without any further qualification, then it would mean, that the Sūtra-kāra has stultified himself by saying something contrary to what he has said before (as a result of the contradiction involved in the former and later statement). Therefore, the doctrine that the Lord is not the material cause (Aprakṛti), but only a superintendent, i.e. merely an efficient cause, is being refuted here with special effort, because it is opposed to the doctrine of the unity (Ekatva) of Brahman as propounded by the Vedānta. This extra-Vedic concept of the Lord is of various sorts. Some, who are the adherents of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems, hold that the Lord is merely a superintendent over the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, and thus merely an efficient cause, and that the Pradhāna, the Puruṣa, and the Lord, are mutually different from each other. The Māheśvaras (i.e. the Śaivas, the Pāśu-patas, the Kāruṇika-Siddhāntins and the Kapālikas) on the other hand hold that the Lord i.e. the Paśu-pati (the Lord of the creatures) has prescribed five categories, viz. effect (Kārya), the cause (Kāraṇa), union or meditation (Yoga), injunction (Vidhi) and the end of misery (Duḥkhānta), for the purpose of the liberation of creatures from their snares (of adjuncts), and (they) describe Paśu-pati i.e. the Lord of the creatures as being only the efficient cause (of the world). Similarly the Vaiśeṣikas etc., in some way or other, in accordance with the technique of their doctrine, speak of the Lord as being an efficient cause only. So, this is how a reply is given to all that thus — Because of the incongruity involved (in the Lord’s being the efficient cause only), the Lord’s being merely an efficient cause of the world, viz. as being only a superintendent over the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, is not reasonably sustainable. How so? Because of the incongruity. How is it incongruous? (We reply) Inasmuch as the Lord in creating this diversity amongst the creatures, viz., as between the low, intermediate and high grades of creatures, would be rendered quite as unlordlike as ourselves, by reason of his being contaminated with the fault of likes and dislikes. If it be said that no such fault would attach, because it all would depend upon the difference in the actions of these creatures, (we reply) — No, because supposing actions and the Lord have the relationship of, the former being those that are promoted (by the Lord) and the latter being the promoter (of such actions), there would be the predicament of the fault of ‘reciprocal interdependence’ (Itaretarāśrayatva) (i.e. a logical see-saw). If it be urged, that such fault would not supervene because of the beginninglessness (of transmigratory existence), (we reply) — No, because, inasmuch as the fault of reciprocal interdependence would be common, in being quite as applicable to the past as to the present, the maxim of the chain of the blind leading the blind would apply. Besides, it is a tenet of those who are experts in the Nyāya system that “Faults such as passion (Rāga) and aversions (Dveṣa) have the characteristic of impelling (a person) to action (Pravartanā-lakṣaṇāḥ Doṣāḥ)”. (Nyāya Su. 1.1.18). It is observed, that no one is ever impelled to act, either in his own interest or in the interest of others, unless he is so impelled by such faults. Even he who acts in the interest of others, is impelled to act in that way, precisely because of his own interest. Hence, (if the Māheśvara view were to be accepted) as the Lord would have to be understood to have been impelled to action in his own interest, the predicament of his being rendered unlordlike would take place. Even if it be understood that the Lord is only a special type of Puruṣa, incongruity would attach to the doctrine all the same, because it is understood as a tenet that the Puruṣa is by nature apathetic or indifferent. — 37.
[Go top]
Sambandha: relation; An-upapatteḥ: because of the impossibility; Ca: and.🔗 That there is a relation (between the Lord and the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa), is not reasonably sustainable. — 2.2.38. Again (the fault of) incongruity (does occur). The Lord who is different from the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, cannot be their superintendent in the absence of any relation subsisting between them and the Lord. In the first place, there could not be a relation by way of contact (Saṃyoga) between them, because the Pradhāna, the Puruṣa and the Lord are all without any parts and all-pervading. Nor can a relation of inherence (Samavāya) subsist, as it is not possible to say that the Lord is the abode and the other two have their abode in the Lord (like a piece of cloth and its threads). And as it is not yet established that the Lord is the cause of the other two which are his effects, it is not possible to imagine any other relation (between them) which can be understood from the effects, because even the existence of a relation of cause and effect (between them) has not yet been established. If it be asked (by the opponent) — How is it in the case of those who are the adherents of the doctrine of Brahman?, (we reply) — There is no difficulty in our system. In our system, a relation of the nature of complete identity (Tād-ātmya) (between them i.e. the Lord and His illusion-causing power, Māyā) is reasonably sustainable. Besides, as the adherents of the doctrine of Brahman, explain the nature of the cause etc., on the authority of the Scriptures, there could be no rule, by which he would be obliged to understand all things, only, as he perceives them. There is a special obligation on the opponent of the Vedānta (the Sāṅkhya) to understand things as he perceives them, as he explains the nature of the cause etc., on the strength of an illustration (Dṛṣṭānta) i.e. a parallel instance. If he says, that the authority of the Āgama (as propounded by Kapila etc.) is equally available to him as the Āgama is promulgated by the Omniscient one, we reply — No, in his case there occurs the predicament of the fault of mutual interdependence, inasmuch as the Omniscience of the Omniscient one can be established only as a result of the belief in the Āgama, and a belief in the Āgama can be established only as a result of the belief in the Omniscient one. Hence the hypothesis about the Lord is not reasonably sustainable, so far as the followers of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems are concerned. A similar fault of incongruity can, in so far as it is possible, be advanced against all the other extra-Vedic conceptions about the Lord. — 38.
[Go top]
Adhiṣṭhāna: rulership; Anupapatteḥ: because of the impossibility; Ca: and.🔗 (The tenet that) the Lord is the superintendent, is not reasonably sustainable. — 2.2.39. This is again how the conception of the Tārkikas (Logicians) about the Lord is not reasonably sustainable. The Lord, even if he be as he is conceived to be by the Logicians, can work only by having the Pradhāna (as the material), even as a potter works on the earth (as the material), but this is not reasonably sustainable. It is not possible that the Lord can work by having the Pradhāna (as his material) as the Pradhāna (according to them) is devoid of any form and is not capable of being perceived, and because of its being quite dissimilar to earth etc. — 39.
[Go top]
Karaṇavat: like the senses; Cet: if, if it be conceived. Na: not (no it cannot be accepted); Bhoga-ādibhyaḥ: because of enjoyment, etc.🔗 If it be said, that as the sense-organs (are ruled by the Jīva-Self) so is the Pradhāna by the Lord, (we say) — no, the Lord (in that case) would be, liable to experience pleasure and pain (Bhoga). — 2.2.40. (If it be said) May be, just as a man (i.e. the Jīva-Self) controls and uses the unperceivable and formless set of sense-organs such as the sense of sight etc., even so, may the Lord supervise over the Pradhāna — but even so, it is not reasonably sustainable. That such a set of sense-organs is ruled over (by a person) is understood from the fact, that a person experiences pleasure and pain through them, but here (in the case of the Pradhāna and the Lord) no such experience of pleasure and pain is actually observed, and if it be understood that the case is similar to the set of sense-organs, the Lord would also be liable to experience pleasure and pain, quite as much, as a man in the condition of transmigratory existence, is subject to such experience of pleasure and pain. Or, alternatively, the two Sūtras can be explained in another way: — By the previous Sūtra, viz. “This is why (the Lord’s being the superintendent) is not reasonably sustainable”, it is meant that, that the Lord is as he is conceived to be by the Tārkikas, is not reasonably sustainable. In the ordinary world, for instance, it is as one possessing the support of a body, that a king is observed to be the ruler of the nation, and not as one without any such physical basis, so, he who would infer the Lord on the strength of such parallel instance, would have to explain how the Lord comes to be possessed of a body as an abode of the sense-organs. But it is not possible to explain it that way, because a body can come into existence only after creation takes place, and prior to such creation, the existence of a body is not reasonably sustainable. And if the Lord has no such physical basis (such as a body) it is not reasonably sustainable that he could be the promoter (of the world), because that is how it is observed to be, in the ordinary world. As regards the present Sūtra (it is said) — Now, if on the analogy of what is observed in the ordinary world, it is imagined, that the Lord has, at his own will, equipped himself with a body to serve as an abode for the sense-organs, even this is not reasonably sustainable, because supposing the Lord does possess a body, then, as in the case of an ordinary person in the condition of transmigratory existence, there would be the predicament of the Lord being liable to experience pleasure and pain, quite as much as such a man is, and it would then mean that the Lord also would be rendered quite unlordlike. — 40.
[Go top]
Antavattvam: finiteness, terminableness, subject to destruction; A-sarva-jñatā: absence of Omniscience; Vā: or.🔗 Or it may mean that the Lord is liable to come to an end or that he is not Omniscient. — 2.2.41. This is again why the Lord’s being as he is conceived to be by the Tārkikas (Logicians), is not reasonably sustainable. They hold that the Lord is omniscient and infinite (imperishable) and also that the Pradhāna and the Selfs also are infinite (imperishable) and different from each other. Then (the question arises), as to whether, the Lord has himself determined his own dimension (i.e. limit, Iyattā) and the dimensions of the Pradhāna and the Selfs (to be of such and such definite extent), or whether, it has not been so determined. Considered either way a fault is inevitable. How so? In the case of the first alternative (viz. that the dimension has been determined by the Lord), the Pradhāna, the Puruṣa and the Lord would be rendered liable to come to an end, because it is observed to be so in the ordinary world. In the ordinary world, whatever has definite ascertained dimension i.e. limit — say, for instance, a piece of cloth etc. — is seen to be liable to come to an end. Similarly, therefore, this trio of the Pradhāna, the Puruṣa and the Lord having a definite ascertained dimension i.e. limit, they would be rendered as being liable to come to an end. Numerically also, as it happens, the Pradhāna, the Puruṣa and the Lord, being three in number, are definitely ascertained by number, and we may take it that the Lord has also definitely ascertained the dimension i.e. limit of the forms of the Pradhāna and the Puruṣas. Similarly, the great numbers of men also (may be taken to have been ascertained by the Lord). Then, if from amongst such numerically determined Jīva-Selfs, who are involved in the transmigratory condition, some obtain their Final Release from the transmigratory existence (Saṃsāra), it would mean that their condition of being Saṃsārins (i.e. transmigratory beings), as also the transmigratory existence (Saṃsāra) itself, would have a certain end, and when gradually all the Jīva-Selfs will have obtained their Final Release, there will be an end of the entire transmigratory existence (Saṃsāra) itself and of all the transmigratory beings (Saṃsārins). Besides, the Pradhāna which is the basis for the Lord, and which undergoes modifications for the sake of the Puruṣa, is but transmigratory existence only and when that too comes to an end, what else can possibly be said to subsist, which can serve as the basis for the Lord to act upon, and with respect to what can the Lord be considered to be the Lord, the Omniscient? Again, if the Pradhāna, the Puruṣa and the Lord have an inevitable end, then there will be the predicament of their necessarily having a beginning also, and if they have both a beginning and an end, then there would be the predicament thereby, of Nihilism (Śunya-Vāda) resulting. Now, if to avoid this contratemps, the second alternative is accepted, viz. that the Lord has not definitely ascertained either his own dimension, i.e. limit, or those of the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, then the fault of having to abandon the doctrine of the omniscience of the Lord would crop up. Therefore also, the doctrine which the Tārkikas (Logicians) hold, viz. that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world, would be incongruous. — 41.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Utpatti: causation, origination, creation; A-sambhavāt: on account of the impossibility.🔗 (The Doctrine of the Bhāgavatas is not reasonably sustainable) because creation is not possible. — 2.2.42. So far, the doctrine of those who do not hold the Lord as being the material cause, but hold him as being the Superintendent only and as being but merely the efficient cause (of the world), is refuted. Now the doctrine of the Bhāgavatas, i.e. of those who are in agreement with the view that the Lord is both the material as well as the efficient cause (of the world), is being refuted. But (says the opponent) that the Lord is of such and such a nature and that he is the material as well as the efficient cause, is exactly what has been established (by you the Vedāntin) before, on the authority of the Scriptures, and it has been settled (as a fact) that a Smṛti which follows the Scriptures is authoritative. On what ground then is this doctrine being refuted? We say, even though this portion of the doctrine (of the Bhāgavatas) is common (to the Vedānta and the Bhāgavata doctrines) and is not discordant, there is still another portion of it which furnishes a ground for disagreement, and hence the refutation of that is now begun. The Bhāgavatas hold thus — The Bhagavān (the holy) Vāsu-deva alone is the ultimate reality and is of the nature of unsullied knowledge. He has divided himself in four ways, and has set himself up in four forms (Vyūhas) of Vāsu-deva, Saṅkārṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. ‘Vāsu-deva’, verily, is said to be the Highest Self, ‘Saṅkarṣaṇa’, the Jīva-Self, ‘Pradyumna’, the mind and ‘Aniruddha’ the ego (Ahaṅ-kāra). Amongst all these, ‘Vāsu-deva’ is the Highest Cause, and the rest, Saṅkarṣaṇa, etc., are his effects. And they hold that by propitiating such Bhagavān i.e., the Highest Lord, for a hundred years, by approaching him in his temple (Abhigamana), by collecting materials of worship (Upādāna), by sacrifice (Ijyā), by constantly reciting his name (Svādhyāya), and by contemplation (Yoga), a (man) becomes free from his torments, and attains the Bhagavān (i.e. attains Final Release). Now with regard to what is said, viz. that Nārāyaṇa who is higher than the undeveloped (Avyakta i.e. Māyā) and is the Highest Self which divides itself and sets itself up in different forms, is not sought to be refuted (by us), because, it is understood from the Scriptures such as “He becomes onefold or threefold etc.” (ChanU.7.26.2) that the Highest Self transforms itself into manifold forms. Nor is the propitiation of the Bhagavān, by going to his temple and concentrating on Him to the exclusion of all else as is recommended, at all sought to be refuted (by us), because contemplation of the Lord etc. is well-known from the Scriptures. But with regard to what is said further, viz. that ‘Saṅkarṣaṇa’ springs out of ‘Vāsu-deva’, ‘Pradyumna’ out of ‘Saṅkarṣaṇa’, and ‘Aniruddha’ out of ‘Pradyumna’, we say that the creation of ‘Saṅkarṣaṇa’, i.e. the Jīva-Self, from the Highest Self called ‘Vāsu-deva’, is not possible, because of the predicament of the fault of not being eternal etc. If the Jīva-Self is subject to being created, faults such as that of its not being eternal etc. would occur, and hence the Jīva-Self would not attain unity with the Bhagavān, nor will Final Release be possible, because when an effect (such as Saṅkarṣaṇa is, according to the Bhāgavatas) reaches back to its cause, the predicament would be, that the effect would get completely destroyed. The Ācārya will hereafter refute even the creation of the Jīva-Self, by the Sūtra — “The Self (is not created) because it is not so mentioned in the Scriptures, and according to which, it is eternal” (Bra. Su. II. iii. 17). Therefore this tenet (i.e. the Bhāgavata doctrine) is incongruous. — 42.
[Go top]
Na: not; Ca: and; Kartuḥ: from the agent; Karaṇam: the instrument.🔗 (That it is) not (ever observed) that an implement (with which an agent works) is ever produced out of the agent. — 2.2.43. This is again why the Bhāgavata doctrine is incongruous. Because, it is never observed in the ordinary world that an implement such as a hatchet etc. is ever produced out of an agent such as Deva-datta etc. The Bhāgavatas describe that from the Jīva-Self called Saṅkarṣaṇa, the mind that is called Pradyumna is produced, and from this effect Pradyumna, the Ego (Ahaṅ-kāra) that is called Aniruddha is produced. In the absence of any parallel instance (in illustration of it) we are not able to understand it to be so, nor is any Scriptural passage of such import available. — 43.
[Go top]
Vijñāna-ādi-bhāve: if intelligence etc. exist; Vā: or, on the other hand; Tat: that (Tasya iti); A-pratiṣedhaḥ: no denial (of). (Vijñāna: knowledge; Ādi: and the rest; Bhāve: of the nature (of).)🔗 Even assuming they all possess (the attribute of) knowledge, it is not possible to refute (the objection of the Vedāntins raised above). — 2.2.44. It may be said — These Saṅkarṣaṇa etc. are not understood (by us the Bhāgavatas) to be Jīva-Selfs etc. But (says the Vedāntin) then, how are they understood? They (says the opponent) are all understood to be the Lords possessing the attributes of the Lord, viz. knowledge, power to rule, strength, valour, and Tejas, and that they are Vāsu-devas all, requiring no other basis, and are pure. Therefore the fault alleged by you (the Vedāntin), viz. that the creation of them is not possible, does not arise. To this we reply — We mean to say, that even if it be so, not only is there no refutation of the fault of the impossibility of their being created, but the fault does arise in another way also. How does it so arise? If you (the Bhāgavatas) mean that all these four Lords, ‘Vāsu-deva’ and the rest, are all different and distinct from each other and that they all have equal attributes, and do not constitute the unity of Self, then (we say) that the conception of more than one Lord is superfluous, because, all that is expected to be accomplished, is already accomplished by one Lord only. Besides (in holding as you do), there is an abandonment of your own conclusion, because it is your tenet that Bhagavān Vāsu-deva is the only ultimate reality. If on the other hand you mean, that these four are the forms of only one and the same Bhagavān, and that they all have equal attributes, still the fault of the impossibility of their creation subsists all the same. In the absence of any distinguishing peculiarity (Atiśaya) in the effect, Saṅkarṣaṇa cannot be understood to be created from Vāsu-deva, Pradyumna from Saṅkarṣaṇa and Aniruddha from Pradyumna. Because as between cause and effect, there always is some distinguishing peculiarity (Atiśaya) in the effect, as there is, for instance, in the case of the earthen pot, the effect of earth. Without any distinguishing peculiarity (Atiśaya), it is not possible to distinguish between the cause and the effect. The Pañca-Rātras (i.e. the Bhāgavatas) do not understand that there is any difference as such, due for instance to more or less knowledge or power, as between Vāsu-deva and the rest. All these forms are understood by them to be without any difference and they do not understand that the forms of the Bhagavān are confined only to these four, because they further understand that this entire world, from Brahman (i.e. Brahma-deva) down to a mere blade of grass is but the form of the Bhagavān only. — 44.
[Go top]
Vipratiṣedhāt: because of contradiction; Ca: and.🔗 Also because of the contradictions. — 2.2.45. In the doctrine (of the Bhāgavatas), many contradictions are to be met with, with reference to attributes and those in whom these attributes subsist. The attributes of knowledge, ruling power, strength, valour and Tejas themselves, are also considered to be so many Selfs, and also as so many Bhagavān Vāsu-devas (in their doctrine). Besides they contradict the Scriptures also, because we observe that they cast a slur on the Scriptures when they say, that, failing to obtain the Highest Bliss from all the four Vedas, Śāṇḍilya studied this Śāstra etc. Hence it is established that this doctrine is incongruous. — 45.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
In the Vedānta we come across in various places different orders of creation, in the Scriptural statements. Some mention the creation of Ākāśa, while some do not. Some mention the creation of Vāyu, while some do not. The same (is the case) about the Jīva-Self and the Prāṇas. In the same manner contradictions with regard to the order (of creation) etc. are also to be observed. The irrelevance of other schools (such as Sāṅkhya etc.) has already been established, because of the contradictions involved (in their doctrines). Similarly the irrelevance of the Vedānta system also may be alleged on the same ground of contradictions and hence this further detailed amplification is begun, in order to make the meaning of the Scriptural statements about creation, clear, and the fruit (Phala) of making the meaning clear, is the removal of the doubts referred to (above). So to begin with, with reference to Ākāśa, it is first considered as to whether there is the creation of the Ākāśa or whether there is not.Na: not; Viyat: space, Ākāśa; A-śruteḥ: as Śruti does not say so.🔗 Ākāśa (Viyat) is not (a created entity) because there is no Scriptural statement (about it). — 2.3.1. With respect to that, the conclusion (of the opponents of Vedānta) is that the Ākāśa is not a created entity because there is no Scriptural statement (about it). In the Scriptural chapter about the creation, there is no statement about it. In the Chāndogya (Upaniṣad), having referred to Brahman as expressed by the word ‘Sat’ (being) in the Scriptural passage — “Oh mild one, ‘Sat’ alone was in the beginning, the only one without a second” (ChanU.6.2.1), that statement is followed by the statements — “It thought” and “It created Tejas” (ChanU.6.2.3), and, Tejas the middle one of the five great elements is mentioned first and thus the creation of the ‘Tejob-annas’ (i.e. Tejas, Water and the Earth) is mentioned by the Scriptures. The Scriptures of course are our authority, by means of which the generation of knowledge (in us) of supersensuous entities takes place. There is no Scriptural statement here, mentioning the creation of Ākāśa. Therefore, Ākāśa is not created. — 1.
[Go top]
Asti: there is; Tu: but.🔗 But (asserts the Sūtra-kāra) there is (such a statement in the Scriptures). — 2.3.2. The word ‘But’ has the sense of approval of another view (by the Sūtra-kāra). May be, the Chāndogya may not mention the creation of Ākāśa, but it is mentioned in another Scriptural passage. The Taittīriyakas, after introducing (the subject) thus — “Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite”, recite further, “From this Ātmā, verily, the Ākāśa came into existence” (TaitU.2.1). Hence there is a contradiction in the Scriptural passages, viz., that in some, creation starts with Tejas, in others, with Ākāśa. Still it is but proper that these Scriptural passages should be reconciled. True, it is so proper, but it is not understood how (to do so). Whence is it so? Because, the relation of the creator, that is mentioned but once only by the Scriptures, in the passage “It created Tejas” (ChanU.6.2.3), simultaneously with two entities that are stated to be created, thus — “It created Tejas, it created Ākāśa”, is not reasonably sustainable. But (it is suggested by the Vedāntin) the relation of a creator who is mentioned but once only, with two entities that are to be created, is observed to exist, as for instance when it is said, “Having cooked the soup, (he) cooks the rice”; similarly, I will construe the Scriptural passage thus — ‘Having created Ākāśa, it created Tejas’. This is not proper (says the opponent of Vedānta). From the Chāndogya it is understood that Tejas was the first creation, and from the Taittīriyaka, that Ākāśa was the first creation. Now both Tejas and Ākāśa can never at once be the first creation. By this, the contradiction, with reference to the words of other Scriptural passages also, is explained. In the Scriptural passage “From this Ātmā, verily the Ākāśa came into being”, it is not reasonably sustainable to understand, that the ablation (Apādāna) or being born from (indicated by the ablative case-ending of Ātmā) and the ‘creation’, which are mentioned but only once by the Scriptures, can simultaneously connect with both the Ākāśa and the Tejas, thus — from that, the Ākāśa came into being, from that, the Tejas came into being. Besides the creation of Tejas is elsewhere stated differently, thus — “Agni (i.e. Tejas, was created) from Vāyu” (TaitU.2.1). Now, when thus this contradiction is there, some other person says: — 2.
[Go top]
Gauṇī: used in a secondary sense, having a metaphorical sense; A-sambhavāt: because of the impossibility.🔗 The Scriptural statement (about the creation of the Ākāśa) is in a secondary sense, because (the creation of Ākāśa) is not possible. — 2.3.3. There could be no creation of Ākāśa (Viyat) just because there is no Scriptural statement (about it), and that other Scriptural passage which is cited as mentioning the creation of Ākāśa (Viyat), deserves to be (understood) only in a secondary or figurative sense. Why so? Because (the creation of Ākāśa) is not possible. As long as those who follow the opinion of the Kaṇa-bhuk (lit. one who subsists on particles of food grains, i.e. Kaṇāda, the propounder of the Vaiśeṣika system) are alive, it is not possible to establish that the Ākāśa is a created entity. For, they deny that the Ākāśa was created, because of the impossibility (of the existence) of the materials (Dravyas) of any such cause. They hold that every thing that is created is the result only of the Samavāyi (inherent), the Asamavāyi (non-inherent), and the efficient (Nimitta) causes, and many such materials (Dravyas) of the same one kind of material (Dravya) become the material (i.e. inherent) cause (of any entity). In the case of the Ākāśa there are no such more than one homogeneous materials capable of starting the creation of Ākāśa available, which material (i.e. Samavāyi) cause being so present, by the close contact (Saṃyoga) of which materials, as the Asamavāyi (noninherent) cause, Ākāśa can come into existence, and when these two causes (viz. the Samavāyi and the Asamavāyi) are thus absent (i.e. are not possible), that there could ever be any efficient cause (for Ākāśa) which can ever come into operation to help the first two causes, is far from being possible. With regard to entities such as Tejas etc., which are liable to be created, it is possible that they possess some special condition prior to their creation and after it, such as, for instance, that before the creation of Tejas, a phenomenon or effect such as ‘Light’ etc. did not exist and that such an effect as light, does exist afterwards. In the case of Ākāśa, however, it is not possible to conceive of the existence of any such special condition of Ākāśa, either before the Ākāśa is created or after it comes to be created. Before the creation of Ākāśa, what possibly can be conceived of as existing, and at the same time, as not having any space, or not having a cavity or not having interstices in it? That Ākāśa is not liable to creation is proved, because of its being dissimilar (in its attributes) to earth etc., and also because it has the characteristic of being all-pervading. Therefore, just as in the ordinary world, a word is used in a secondary or figurative sense, as for instance when it is said “Make ‘Ākāśa’ (i.e. room)” or “‘Ākāśa’ (i.e. room) has become available” (where the word Ākāśa is used in the secondary sense of ‘room’), or just as Ākāśa, one as it is, is figuratively indicated as being the Ākāśa of the pot, or the Ākāśa of the jar, or the Ākāśa of the house, or just as, even in the Vedas we find it expressed thus — “The forest creatures should be tethered (or killed?) in the Ākāśa-spaces”, similarly the Scriptural passage about the creation of the Ākāśa, should also be construed in a secondary or figurative sense. — 3.
[Go top]
Śabdāt: from the Śruti texts, because Śruti says so; Ca: also, and.🔗 Also because of the word (Śabda i.e. the Scriptures). — 2.3.4. Besides, the word (Śabda i.e. the Scriptures) itself proclaims that the Ākāśa is an entity which is not subject to creation, for it says — “That this Vāyu and the Antar-ikṣa (i.e. Ākāśa) are immortal” (BrhU.2.3.3). What is immortal can never be subject to creation. The Scriptural word also, when it compares Brahman with the Ākāśa, with reference to Brahman’s attributes i.e. nature of immortality and its immanence (i.e. all-pervading nature) in the passage “Brahman is all-pervading and eternal like the Ākāśa”, shows that Ākāśa also has these attributes. That an entity like this can be an object of creation is not reasonably sustainable. “The Self (Ātmā) should be understood to be eternal even as this Ākāśa is eternal” is an instance in point, as also the Scriptural passages — “Brahman has Ākāśa as its body” (TaitU.1.6.2), “Ākāśa is the Self” (TaitU.1.7.1) etc. Were Ākāśa to be an object of creation, it could not possibly be used as a qualifying adjective of Brahman, as ‘blue’ can be used as a qualifying adjective of a lotus. Therefore, it is understood that Brahman, in common with Ākāśa, is surely eternal. — 4.
[Go top]
Syāt: is possible; Ca: also, and; Ekasya: of the one and the same word; Brahma-śabdavat: like the word Brahman.🔗 It may well be, that like (the word) Brahman, even the one word (Sambhūta i.e. came into being) (is used both in its principal and secondary sense). — 2.3.5. This Sūtra is by way of a reply (to the doubt raised by the Vedāntin about the word (Pada) ‘Sambhūta’). It may be this way. How again (says the Vedāntin) can one and the same word ‘Sambhūta’ (i.e. originated, or came into being) in one and the same chapter (Adhikāra), viz. “From this Self, verily, the Ākāśa originated (came into being)” (TaitU.2.1), be possibly said be used in a secondary sense with regard to the Ākāśa, when it is used in the principal sense in the case of Tejas etc. which come later on, and to which it is later on applied (i.e. after using it in the case of the Ākāśa)? It is replied to (by the opponent) thus: — It may well be that the word ‘Sambhūta’ can be used with reference to different subjects both in the principal and in the secondary sense, just as the word ‘Brahman’ (is so used). For instance, in the topic (Adhikāra) “Know Brahman by means of penance, penance is Brahman” (TaitU.3.2), the use of the word ‘Brahman’ is in the secondary sense with reference to the word ‘food’ etc., and in the principal sense with reference to the word ‘bliss’ (Ānanda), or just as in the case of the word ‘penance’ (Tapas) which constitutes the means of realizing Brahman, the word ‘Brahman’ is used in its secondary sense, and in the case of ‘Brahman’ which is the object to be known, it is used in the primary (i.e. real) sense. (Asks the Vedāntin) — How again, if (according to you) the Ākāśa is not subject to creation, can you justify the declaration — “(Brahman) is one and the only one without a second” (ChanU.6.2.1)? Verily, with Nabhas (i.e. Ākāśa) as a second entity, (not subject to creation as held by you) Brahman becomes ‘Sa-dvitīya’ (i.e. with a second), (i.e. like Brahman, another entity, Ākāśa, also is not subject to creation, so that it cannot be said that Brahman is the only one without a second). And how then can it be, that, everything becomes known, when Brahman (alone) is known? To this the reply (of the opponent of the Vedānta) is: — The statement that Brahman is ‘one only’ can be reasonably sustainable, when it is considered with reference to its own effect (i.e. when, for instance, during Pralaya etc. no effects as such of Brahman exist, and it is not meant that nothing other than Brahman exists). Just as in the ordinary world, if some person, having observed clay, a staff, and a wheel at the house of a potter, on a previous day, and having observed earthen pots of various kinds spread about there on the next day, were to say, ‘There was only mere clay here on the previous day’, he, by such ascertainment or determination, only means that only the effects of clay (i.e. pots etc.) were not in existence on the previous day, and does not mean, that the staff, wheel etc. also, were not there (on the previous day), similarly, this Scriptural statement about Brahman being ‘one only without a second’ only means to exclude the existence of any created entity, other than Brahman only as a superintendent (Adhiṣṭhātṛ), i.e., that, even though it is seen that a potter is the superintending entity over the clay which is the material cause of the earthen pots, still there is no other creator other than ‘Brahman’ which is the material (as well as the efficient) cause of the world. It is not, that even though Brahman has the Nabhas (i.e. Ākāśa) along with it, as a second entity, it is thereby rendered Sa-dvitīya (i.e. that it becomes associated with a second entity). It is only when entities have different attributes that they are said to be different. It is not that prior to creation, there is difference of attributes between Brahman and Nabhas (i.e. Ākāśa), like milk and water mixed up with each other, because they both possess the same attributes of being all-pervading and incorporeal, in common. At the time of creation, however, Brahman alone endeavours to create the world while the other (i.e. Ākāśa) remains motionless, and it is because of that, that it is understood that Brahman and Ākāśa are different entities. Similarly, in the Scriptural passage “Brahman has the Ākāśa as its body” (TaitU.1.6.2), Brahman and Ākāśa are said to be non-different figuratively, and hence it is that it becomes established that by knowing Brahman, the knowledge of everything results. Besides, every effect that comes into being, does so as being nonseparate from Ākāśa in the space-time relation, and the Ākāśa also exists as non-separate with Brahman, in the same space-time relation, and hence, by knowing Brahman and its creation, Ākāśa also comes to be known just as well. Just as when a few drops of water are added to a pot full of milk, the drops of water are known, along with milk, and it is not that when the milk is known, the drops of water do still remain to be known, similarly, as the Ākāśa is nonseparate from Brahman and its creation, in the space-time relation, by knowing Brahman, Ākāśa also becomes known. Therefore the Scriptural statement about the creation of Ākāśa is only in the secondary sense (which means, that Ākāśa like Brahman, is eternal and not a created entity). — 5.
[Go top]
This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the reply is: —Pratijñā-a-hāniḥ: non-abandonment of the proposition; A-vyatirekāt: from non distinction, on account of non-difference, because of absence of exclusion; Śabdebhyaḥ: from the words namely from the Śrutis.🔗 The non-abandonment of the declaration can happen to be so (only if it is understood) that there is non-difference (between Brahman and its effects). (The same is understood) even from the Scriptural words. — 2.3.6. It is understood from different Vedānta texts, that there are declarations of the following kinds — viz. “By which, that which is not heard, becomes heard, that which has not been deduced by reasoning, becomes so deduced, that which is not realized, becomes realized” (ChanU.6.1.1); “Oh, verily, when the Self is seen, heard, cogitated upon and realized, all this becomes known” (BrhU.4.5.6); “By knowing what, Oh Bhagavān, does all this become known?” (Mu. 1.1.3); “Outside of myself (Ātmā) there is no knowledge at all”. These declarations will not happen to have been abandoned, i.e. they will not happen to be obstructed, thus only, viz., provided all created entities in general are non-different from Brahman, which is (the entity) to be known. But, if it be understood that there is difference (between Brahman and the creation in general), then, the declaration that “By knowing the one, all else becomes known” will have been abandoned. It is only if it is understood that all the entire set of entities in general owe their origin to Brahman, that their non-difference (from Brahman) becomes reasonably sustainable. It is only from the Scriptural words, that, in accordance with the maxim of nondifference between cause and effect, the declaration is understood to be established. Similarly, having made a declaration thus — “By which that which is not heard, becomes heard”, it is by such parallel instances of clay etc. which purport to expound the non-difference between cause and effect, that the declaration is justified. It is precisely for establishing this, that subsequently, the Scriptural passages “Oh mild one, ‘Sat’ (being) alone was in the beginning, the one only, without a second” (ChanU.6.2.1), “It thought”, “It created Tejas” (ChanU.6.2.3), after demonstrating that the entire set of creation in general owes its origin to Brahman, further demonstrate their non-difference with it by beginning with the statement — “All this has that as its Self” (ChanU.6.8.7), (and by repeating the same) right up to the end of the chapter (Prapāṭhaka). Therefore, if Ākāśa were not to be an effect of Brahman, it would not be known, even when Brahman becomes known, and thus the abandonment of the declaration would result. It is by no means proper to render the Scriptures unauthoritative, by such abandonment of the declaration. Again in every Vedānta statement, different Scriptural words by means of different parallel instances, proclaim the very same declaration, viz. “That which is all this, is the Self” (BrhU.2.4.6), “It is this immortal Brahman alone, that is seen right before (one)” (Mu. 2.2.11) etc. Therefore, Ākāśa also, quite as much as Agni (i.e. Tejas) etc., is created. The statement, that as there is no Scriptural statement, Viyat (i.e. Ākāśa) is not created, is not proper, because another Scriptural passage about the creation of Viyat (i.e. Ākāśa) has been cited, viz., “Verily from this Self, Ākāśa came into being” (TaitU.2.1). (The opponent says) — Oh, it is true of course that you have cited (such passage), but it is in conflict with another Scriptural passage — “It created Tejas”. (The Vedāntin replies) — No, because all the Scriptural passages are duly reconciled. (The opponent retorts) — We don’t object to the reconcilement of such Scriptural passages as are not contradictory to each other, but we have here rightly spoken about the contradiction, viz., that it is impossible that the creator that has been mentioned only once by the Scriptural passage, can properly be connected with two entities-to-be-created, and that the two entities cannot, at one and the same time, be the ‘first-to-be-created’, or that any option about it can be available. (The Vedāntin says) — This is no fault, because in the Taittīriyaka, the creation of Tejas is mentioned as the third (entity) to be created, thus — “Verily from this Self, the Ākāśa came into being, Vāyu from Ākāśa, and Agni (i.e. Tejas) from Vāyu” (TaitU.2.1). It is impossible to construe this Scriptural statement in any other manner, while it is possible to construe the Chāndogya statement thus — ‘After having created Ākāśa and Vāyu it created Tejas’. This Scriptural statement, while being one which has the main purport of intimating the creation of Tejas only, cannot possibly be able to bar or deny the creation of Ākāśa which is well-known from another Scriptural passage, because, one and the same sentence cannot possibly operate in two ways. The creator, however, one as he is, may well create more than one entity one after another. In this way, when the possibility (Kalpanā) of reconcilement (of different Scriptural passages) is there, a Scriptural statement should not be abandoned as having a contradictory meaning. It is not that we mean to connect the creator who is mentioned only once, with two entities to be created, because the other entity to be created is accommodated by following another Scriptural statement. Just as, for instance, the origination of all entities from Brahman, directly referred to in the Scriptures in the passage “All this verily is Brahman and one should calmly meditate on it as Tajjalān (i.e. in it all entities are born, in it they are absorbed and in it they have movement)” (ChanU.3.14.1), does not prevent or obstruct the order of creation beginning with Tejas, as referred to elsewhere, similarly the Scriptural statement about the origination of Tejas from Brahman, cannot prevent the order of creation beginning with Nabhas (i.e. Ākāśa) as mentioned in another Scriptural passage. But (it is objected by the opponent) the sentence “Tajjalān, one should calmly meditate on it” has the purpose of enjoining calmness, and not the purpose of dealing with creation, and so it does not deserve to prevent the order of creation established elsewhere. “It created Tejas” is a sentence about creation. Therefore, here, the order as stated by the Scriptures should be accepted. The reply is — No, the entity Viyat (i.e. Ākāśa) as established by another Scriptural passage, should not be rejected, by following that order of creation, in which Tejas is mentioned first, because ‘order’ (Krama) is but only an attribute of entities. Besides, in the passage “It created Tejas”, there is no word signifying an order, but the order is understood only from the meaning, and that order has to be rejected, because of the order established by another Scriptural passage — “Agni (Tejas) was created from Vāyu”. Again in connection with Viyat (Ākāśa) and Tejas, the taking of them either optionally or collectively, as being the first-creation, has been rejected, i.e. option (Vikalpa) has been rejected on the ground of impossibility, and the taking of them collectively (Samuccaya) has been rejected on the ground of not having been accepted, respectively. Therefore, there is no conflict of the Scriptural statements (in Chāndogya and Taittīriyaka Upaniṣad). Besides, if in order to justify the declaration made in the Chāndogya, right in the beginning of the sentence “By which, that which is not heard, becomes heard”, the Viyat (i.e. Ākāśa), even though it is not mentioned, has necessarily to be enumerated in the entities created, on what ground (Kim-aṅga) then, is the Viyat (i.e. Ākāśa), which is specifically mentioned in the Taittīriyaka (as a created entity), not to be included (amongst the created entities)? Now with respect to the statement (by the opponent), viz., that in as much as the Ākāśa has the same space-time relation with all entities and Brahman and not a different one, it automatically becomes known along with Brahman and its effects (Kāryas) and the original declaration does not thus happen to be abandoned, and the Scriptural statement about Brahman “being the only one without a second” is not in the least disturbed i.e. contradicted and it is reasonably sustainable that, like milk and water, Brahman and Ākāśa are nondifferent, — it is said (by the Vedāntin), this knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one thing, should not be explained with the help of the maxim of milk and water, but it is thought, that it should, on the other hand, be explained rather, on the basis of the parallel instance of clay etc. which is stated later on, according to the maxim of the cause and effect (which means that by the knowledge of the nature of the cause, the nature of the effect becomes known). The assumption of the knowledge of everything on the strength of the maxim of milk and water (as you the opponent say), would not be perfect or correct knowledge, because the knowledge of water acquired through the knowledge of the nature of milk would not mean the acquisition of perfect or correct knowledge (of water). It is not reasonably sustainable that the Scriptures — like ordinary men — ascertain a thing to be such and such, by illusorily deceptive or untrue statements. If the deliberate and emphatic statement of the Scriptures, viz. “Brahman is the only one without a second”, were to be explained on the basis of the maxim of milk and water, the Scriptural statement would be embarrassed. It would not be logical to understand, that the statements about “the knowledge of all as a result of the knowledge of the one” and that “Brahman is the only one without a second”, are with reference only to Brahman’s own creation (and thus to exclude the Ākāśa from its purview), because they would then apply equally in the case of the parallel instance of clay etc. It would not have been stated by the Scriptures, as it is stated here, as something quite extra-ordinary, thus — “Oh Śveta-keto, my dear, since you are so conceited, thinking yourself as learned, and are so proud, did you also ask (your teacher) for that instruction, whereby that which is not heard, becomes heard etc.?” (ChanU.6.1.2–3). Therefore, it should be understood, that this statement about the knowledge of every entity (by the knowledge of Brahman), is about every entity without exception, and it is stated in the Scriptures with reference to the fact that every entity is the creation of Brahman. — 6.
[Go top]
With regard to the objection taken, thus: — as the creation of Ākāśa is not possible, the creation of it as spoken of by the Scriptures is in the secondary sense, we reply: —Yāvat-vikāram: so far as all modifications go, wherever there is an effect; Tu: but; Vibhāgaḥ: division, separateness, distinction, specification; Lokavat: as in the world. (Yāvat: whatever; Vikāram: transformation.)🔗 As is seen in the ordinary world, wherever modifications i.e. effects exist, there only, separateness is present. — 2.3.7. The word ‘But’ in the Sūtra is meant to refute the doubt about the impossibility (of the creation of Ākāśa). A doubt, viz., that the creation of Ākāśa is not possible, should really not be entertained, inasmuch as wherever a collection of effects (i.e. modifications) is observed — be it a pot or a small earthen pot or a water trough, or a bracelet, an armlet or an ear-drop or a needle, or an arrow or a sword, they are all understood to be distinct separate entities, while nothing that is not an effect, is in any way and anywhere observed to be distinct and separate. It is actually understood that the Ākāśa is distinct and separate from the earth etc., therefore, it also deserves to be an effect (i.e. a created entity). By all this, it is explained, that entities like the quarters, time, the mind, or the Paramāṇu etc. also, are effects or modifications. (The opponent says) — Well, in that case as the Self (Ātmā) also is distinct and separate from the Ākāśa etc., it comes to this, that the Self, like a pot etc., is also an effect (or modification). (We reply) — No, because there is a Scriptural passage thus — “Ākāśa came into being from the Self” (TaitU.2.1). If, therefore, even the Self (Ātmā) were to be an effect, then, as the Scriptures do not speak anywhere about any other entity higher than the Self, in that case, the Self also being, like a pot etc., an effect (and thus not being the root-cause of all effects), the entire set of effects including the Ākāśa etc. would be devoid of the Self (Nirātmaka), and this would lead to the doctrine of the void (Nihilism). The Self (Ātmā) being precisely the Self (Ātmā) however, any notion about the possibility of its repudiation is not reasonably sustainable. So far as any person is concerned, the Self (Ātmā) cannot be adventitious (Āgantuka), because its existence is self-established (i.e. it proves itself). This self-establishment of the existence of the Self does not depend upon any means-of-proof, but, on the other hand, it is the Self (of every person) that utilizes such means-of-proof as direct perception etc., for the establishment of the existence of entities which are yet to be established. Nobody understands that entities such as the Ākāśa etc. are independent of any means-of-proof and that their existence is self-established. The Self, on the other hand, being the substratum or basis for the employment of the means-of-proof, its existence is supposed to be fully established, prior to such employment of the means-of-proof. Repudiation of such an one, is not possible. It is an adventitious entity that can be repudiated, and never one’s own nature, because he who would seek to be such a repudiator, would, being the Self (Ātmā) himself, be the Self’s own nature. Fire Agni) cannot possibly repudiate its own heat. Similarly even though in the case of an entity-to-be-known, the knowledge of it, as it is at present, or, as it existed in the immediate or distant past, or as it will exist in the near or distant future, is different at the present, past, or future time, (yet when somebody says) — ‘It is I, that know an entity that exists at present; it is I, that knew the entity which existed in the immediate or distant past; and it is I, that will know the entity which may exist in the near or distant future’, the knower (i.e. I, the Self) is never different (but is constant all the time), because, he has a nature which is always constant. Similarly, even when the body is reduced to ashes, there is no destruction of the Self, because the Self has the nature of being always in the existence (i.e. of being eternal), and it is not possible to understand that it ever has any other nature. In this manner, it is precisely because the nature of the Self can never be repudiated, that it can never be an effect (i.e. an entity created), while the Ākāśa of course is such an effect. The objection raised (by the opponent of the Vedānta) — viz., that the Ākāśa is not created as there is no homogeneous and more than one material which could be the material cause of the Ākāśa — is now being answered. In the first place there is no such rule that only homogeneous — and never heterogeneous — materials start the production of effects. The threads and their contacts (the inherent and non-inherent cause of cloth) do not belong to the same category, because it is understood that the thread is a material and contact is a quality. Nor is there any such rule that efficient causes such as shuttles and looms must belong to the same category: If it be said (by the opponent), that when it is understood that causes must belong to the same category, only the inherent (Samavāyi) causes are meant, and not causes of other kinds (such as the non-inherent and efficient causes), even then, that is not an inexorable rule. It is observed that a rope is prepared from threads and Neelgai hair etc., which belong to different categories, and party-coloured blankets are woven from threads and wool. Supposing it is assumed, that causes have a common category in the sense that they have existence and they are materials, such a rule (about homogeneous material of a Samavāyi cause) would be meaningless, because all entities, qua entities, have the same common category. Nor is there any such rule, that more than one cause alone start producing effects and not one cause only, because it is held (by the opponent of the Vedānta) that an Atom (Aṇu) or the mind (Manas) starts initial activity, and also because it is understoood that a single Atom (Paramāṇu) as such, or a single mind (Manas) as such, starts the initial activity and it does not have to wait till each forms a group with other such homogeneous materials. If it be said that the rule (as the opponents of Vedānta suggest) about many similar causes, applies only in the case of the beginning of the production of a substance (Dravya), we reply — No, because we do accept the view oi modifications (Pariṇāma-Vāda). Such a rule (as you suggest) may well be there, if it is understood (by you the opponent) that it is materials helped by contact (between such materials) that start the production of a different material. But it is understood (by us) that it is that very material, as and when it acquires another special condition, that is termed an effect (Kārya), and at times many such materials as the earth and seeds etc. together undergo modifications in the form of sprouts etc., and at other times, only a single material undergoes modification, as for instance when milk etc., turn into curds etc. It is not that there is any such ukase (order or mandate) of the Lord, that only one cause and one cause alone should produce an effect. Hence, it is firmly established on the authority of the Scriptures that the entire world sprang into existence from the one and only one Brahman in a regular order, beginning with the creation of the elements such as the Ākāśa, etc. and the same has already been stated in the Sūtra “(If it be said that the Vedānta view) is not (correct), because it is seen that (for producing an effect) there is preparation and assemblage (of means), (we reply) — No, because (Brahman) is like milk” (Bra. Su. II.i.24). Again with regard to the statement (of the opponent), viz., that if it is supposed that the Ākāśa was created, it is not possible to conceive of any peculiarities of its pre-Ākāśa or post-Ākāśa conditions, it is not logical. It seems to us, that, that peculiarity (viz. the sound-quality), by which we determine that the Ākāśa possesses a nature of its own, and which distinguishes it from the earth etc., at the present moment, did not exist in the pre-Ākāśa condition. And just as Brahman is not an entity possessing the same qualities of grossness etc., which belong to the nature of the earth (which is Brahman’s effect), because of the Scriptural statement that Brahman is “neither gross nor atomic” (BrhU.3.8.8), similarly, it is not that it possesses the nature of the Ākāśa, because, it is understood from the Scriptures that it is not of the nature of the Ākāśa, inasmuch as it is sans-Ākāśa (Anākāśa). Again, with regard to the statement (of the opponent), that as the Ākāśa is dissimilar in qualities to earth etc., it is not subject to creation, (we say) that it is not proper, because it is reasonably sustainable, that in the face of the opposition of the Scriptures, any inference as to the impossibility of its being subject to creation, is fallacious. Besides, an inference about its being subject to creation, has already been indicated, and it is also possible to infer that the Ākāśa is, like a pot etc., perishable, as it is the substratum of perishable qualities. (If it is said) that in the case of the Jīva-Self, an inference of the above sort does not apply (because even though it is the substratum of perishable qualities such as intelligence, will, and endeavour, you, the Vedāntin, consider it to be eternal), we reply — No, because, so far as Upaniṣads are concerned, it is not accepted as established that the Jīva-Self is the substratum of perishable qualities, and any one who considers the Ākāśa to be a created entity (a Vedāntin for instance) does not consider it as established, that the Ākāśa has the qualities of being all-pervading etc. With regard to the statement (of the opponent of Vedānta), that the Ākāśa is not subject to creation, on the authority of the Scriptural word, (we reply) that such a Scriptural statement about the Ākāśa being immortal (Amṛta), should be considered in the same way as when the Scriptures say, that Gods are immortal (Gods are called immortal figuratively, because relatively to man, their span of life (like Methuselah) is very long), because, it has already been expounded that the Ākāśa has both an origin and an end. When again it is said, that “the Self is all-pervading and eternal like the Ākāśa” the comparison has reference to the well-known greatness of the Ākāśa, for indicating that the Self’s greatness is not surpassed by the greatness of any other entity, and not to indicate that the Self is similar to Ākāśa (and thus suggesting that both are eternal), just as, for instance, when it is said that the sun runs fast like an arrow, it is only to indicate the sun’s great velocity, and not to indicate that its velocity is equal to the velocity of an arrow. By all this, the Scriptural statement about the Ākāśa being eternal, and the Self’s comparison with it, is explained. Besides the Scriptural statement “The Self is greater than the Ākāśa etc.” proves that the Ākāśa has lesser dimensions, and (the Scriptural statement) “There is no likeness of (or comparison for) the Self” (SvetU.4.19) shows that Brahman is not comparable (with anything else). The Scriptural statement “Any entity other than this (Brahman) is perishable” (BrhU.1.1.1) shows, that entities other than Brahman, Ākāśa etc. for instance, are perishable. The argument, that like the use of the word ‘Brahman’ for penance, the Scriptural statement about the creation of the Ākāśa should be understood to be in a secondary sense, is refuted by the direct Scriptural statement about the creation of the Ākāśa and also by inference. Therefore, it is thus established that Viyat (i.e. the Ākāśa) is a creation of Brahman. — 7.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Etena: by this, i.e., the foregoing explanation about Ākāśa being a production, by this parity of reasoning; Mātari-śvā: the air, the mover in mother, space; Vyākhyātaḥ: is explained.🔗 By this (i.e. what has gone before) Air (Mātari-śvan) (also) is explained. — 2.3.8. This is an Atideśa (i.e. an extended application of the reasoning of the previous Sūtra). By this explanation about Viyat (i.e. the Ākāśa), air (Mātari-śvā) also which has Viyat as its substratum, is explained. In the case of air also, similar opposite views may be ceteris paribus (other things being equal) arranged, thus. The view (of the opponent of Vedānta) would be, that as a Chāndogya chapter of genesis makes no mention about the coming into being of Vāyu, it is not created. The opposite view would be — But there is mention of Vāyu, in the Taittīriyaka chapter of genesis, thus — “Vāyu (comes into being) from Ākāśa” (TaitU.2.1). Hence as there is a conflict of the Scriptural passages, the opinion (of the opponent) is that, because of impossibility, the Scriptural passage about the creation of Vāyu is in a secondary sense. The impossibility is, because, in the Scriptural passage “This Vāyu is that divinity which never goes to rest (lit. never sets)” (BrhU.1.5.22), there is a denial that Vāyu ever goes to rest, and also because of the Scriptural mention of its immortality etc. The conclusion (of the Vedāntin) is that air is created, because, it is only thus that the original declaration is not stultified, because it is understood that wherever there is modification, separateness is necessarily present. The denial about the air ever going to rest is with reference only to the subject of Apara Vidyā (lower knowledge) and is merely relative, in the sense that air never goes to rest, as Agni etc. do. The Scriptural mention about immortality is something which has been already refuted (in the previous Sūtra). (The opponent says) — In the Scriptures, in one place, in the chapter about genesis, there is mention about the creation of Vāyu and Ākāśa, and in another place there is non-mention equally of both, so in the absence of any special feature, one Adhikaraṇa (topic) is good for both (Ākāśa and Vāyu), so why make this Atideśa? The reply is — This is true no doubt, but this Atideśa is made for the purpose of removing the doubt slow-witted persons may entertain, by the mere words (of the Scriptures), because, may be, some one may consider it to be eternal, inasmuch as the Scriptures in the Saṃvarga Vidyā etc. refer to Vāyu as being the holy one fit to be worshipped (Mahā-bhāgatva) and because of the denial (of the idea) that it is a divinity that goes to rest. — 8.
[Go top]
[Go top]
A-sambhavaḥ: no origination, no creation; Tu: but; Sataḥ: of the Sat, of the true one, eternally existing, of Brahman; An-upapatteḥ: as it does not stand to reason, on account of the impossibility of there being an origin of Brahman.🔗 ‘Sat’ (Ātmā) is not created, because, creation of it is not reasonably sustainable. — 2.3.9. Having learnt from the Scriptures, how, even Viyat (Ākāśa) and Vāyu (air) whose creation seemed to be impossible, are also liable to be created, somebody may have a notion that even Brahman also may be so liable to be created from something or other. Similarly having also learnt from the Scriptures, that from modifications (i.e. effects) such as the Ākāśa, further modifications come into being, some one may perhaps consider that Ākāśa may have come into being from Brahman, which may itself also be a created entity. This Sūtra viz. “Because creation of it, is not reasonably sustainable” is for removing that doubt. Verily there should be no such doubt, that Brahman which is of the nature of ‘Sat’ (Ātmā), is created from some other entity. Why so? Because it is not reasonably sustainable. Brahman is purely ‘Sat’ (Ātmā). It is not possible that it (i.e. Brahman) may come into being from another such purely ‘Sat’ (Ātmā) entity, because in the absence of some speciality i.e. idiosyncrasy (Atiśaya), a relationship such as that between a cause and its modification, is not reasonably sustainable. Nor can it (i.e. Brahman) come into being from any particularly special ‘Sat’ (Ātmā) inasmuch as it is contrary to what is actually observed, because the particular is derived from the general, (as for instance) a pot from clay etc., and never the general from the particular. Nor can Brahman come into being from ‘nothingness’ i.e. non-existence (‘Asat’), because ‘nothingness’, i.e. nonexistence is devoid of the Self (Nirātmaka). Besides the Scriptures themselves have taken exception (to such a thing) by the passage — “How can ‘Sat’ (Ātmā) come into existence from nothingness i.e. non-existence (‘Asat’) (ChanU.8.7.1)? Another passage from the Scriptures rules out any such creator of Brahman, thus — “He (the Ātmā) is the cause, the Lord of the Lord of the sense-organs (i.e. Jīva-Self), he has no creator and nobody is his Lord” (SvetU.6.9). Again a possibility of the creation of Viyat and air is indicated (above), but there is no such indication of the possibility of the creation of Brahman itself mentioned anywhere, and that exactly is its distinction (from Ākāśa and Vāyu). Because it is observed that modifications result from modifications, it is no reason why Brahman also should deserve to come into being from a modification, because, unless a root-cause (Mūlaprakṛti) is understood or accepted, the predicament of indefiniteness (Anavasthā) would result. Whatever is understood (by you) to be the root-cause, that exactly is our Brahman, and hence there is no contradiction. — 9.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tejaḥ: fire; Ataḥ: from this, namely from air which has been just spoken of in Sūtra 8; Tathā: thus, so; Hi: because, verily; Āha: says (Śruti).🔗 Tejas (came into being) from this (i.e. Vāyu), Scriptures also declare the same. — 2.3.10. The Scriptures, in Chāndogya, declare that Tejas has the ‘Sat’ (Ātmā) i.e. Brahman as its root-cause, while Taittīriyaka declares that Vāyu is the root-cause, so, there being contradiction in the Scriptures with regard to the origin of Tejas, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that Tejas has Brahman as its origin. Whence is it so? Because, beginning with “Sat (Ātmā) alone etc.”, the instruction is that “It created Tejas”, and also because the declaration about the knowledge of everything (through the knowledge of ‘Sat’ (Ātmā) i.e. Brahman is possible, only if everything owes its creation to Brahman, and also because of the Scriptural passage “Tajjalān” (ChanU.8.7.1) which is a passage showing the origin of all generally from Brahman, and also because, beginning with the Scriptural statement “From this the Prāṇa came into being”, another Scriptural passage gives instruction, that every entity, without any exception, comes into being from Brahman. In the Taittīriyaka also, by the passage “He, having done penance, created all this, whatsoever it is” (TaitU.3.6.1), the Scriptures make a general (Aviśeṣa) statement. Therefore the passage “From (i.e. after) Vāyu, the fire i.e. Agni (was created)” should be understood to signify an order (of creation), i.e., After Vāyu, fire i.e. Agni came into being (from Brahman). With regard to this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) it is said — That Tejas came into being from this i.e. the Mātari-śvā. Whence is it so? Because so it is said (by the Scriptures), thus — “From Vāyu, Agni (came into being)”. If Tejas were to be understood to have come into being directly from Brahman (i.e. without any other intermediate creation intervening between Tejas and Brahman) and not from Vāyu, the Scriptural passage “From Vāyu, Agni (i.e. Tejas, came into being)” would be contradicted. (The opponent says) — It has been said that it may signify an order (of creation). We reply — No, it appears, that in as much as, earlier in the passage “From this Ātmā (‘Self’) verily the Ākāśa came into being” (TaitU.2.1.1.) the word ‘Ātmanaḥ’ is indicated to be governed by the ablative case, i.e. having the sense of being the Apādāna i.e. ablation, indicating ‘being born of’ that, which is governed by the ablative case, (viz. Ātmanaḥ, here), and because, this same ‘coming into being’ (i.e. Genesis) is the subject matter of this chapter, and also because, subsequently in the chapter of creation, the same ablative (indicating Apādāna) is to be observed in the passage “From earth, the herbs (came into being)” (TaitU.2.1.1), therefore, in the passage “From Vāyu, Agni (came into being)” also, it is the Apādāna — ablative only (indicating ‘being born of’ and not any order of creation). Besides, were we to understand the passage to mean ‘subsequently (Ūrdhvam) to Vāyu, Agni came into being’, we would necessarily have to read into the passage, the ‘Upapadārtha-yoga’ while to understand the passage to involve the Kārakārtha-yoga, thus — Agni came into being from Vāyu (as its source), is just apt (Kḷpta) and it is not necessary to imagine any such word as ‘after’ (Ūrdhvam) after Vāyu. Therefore, this Scriptural passage intimates that Tejas has ‘Vāyu’ as its origin. But (says the opponent) the other Scriptural passage — “It created Tejas” — also intimates that Tejas has Brahman as its origin. No (we reply), because even if it were to be understood to mean, being born in a successive order (Pāram-parya-jatva i.e. that Tejas was created from something created in between Brahman and itself viz. Vāyu), there would be no contradiction. Even if it be understood that after having created Ākāśa and Vāyu, Brahman having now reached the condition of Vāyu, created Tejas, even then, the fact that Tejas thus has Brahman as its origin, would not involve a contradiction, as for instance, when the Scriptures say — “Just as, her (cow’s) warmed milk (Śṛtam), her curds (Dadhi) and her cheese (Āmikṣa)” (in spite of the fact that cheese (i.e. Āmikṣa) is made from curds, and curds from milk, and neither cheese nor curds are derived directly from the cow) there is no contradiction. Besides the Scriptures indicate how Brahman abides in its effects as the Self of these effects, thus — “That (Brahman) made itself manifest” (TaitU.2.7.1). Smṛti also, similarly, beginning with the enumeration of “Intelligence, knowledge, and absence of infatuation” (BhG.10.4) says thus — “It is from myself alone that all the various sorts of conditions of beings came into existence.” (BhG.10.5). Even though intelligence etc. are observed to come into being directly and immediately from their own causes, still all this aggregate of entities are, either directly i.e. immediately and indirectly i.e. meditately (Praṇāḍyā), derived from the Lord. By all this (which has gone before) Scriptural passages which do not intimate any order of creation are properly explained, because, they are all reasonably sustainable, while, those that intimate a certain order of creation are not reasonably sustainable in any other way. The original declaration even, has reference only to the descent of all entities from ‘Sat’ (Ātmā) and it does not mean that they should all have descended directly and immediately from ‘Sat’ (Ātmā), and hence there is no contradiction (between the Scriptural passages). — 10.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Āpaḥ: water. (Ataḥ: from it; Tathā: thus; Hi: because; Āha: says the Śruti.)🔗 The waters (also). — 2.3.11. The words “(came into being) from (Tejas), for the Scriptures say so” are to be supplied from the previous Sūtra after “waters” (in the present Sūtra). The waters came into being from this, i.e. Tejas. Whence is it so? When the Scriptural statements are thus — “It created the waters” (ChanU.6.2.3), “From Agni, waters (came into being)” (TaitU.2.1), there could be no doubt (about the truth of the statements). Having explained the creation of Tejas, (the Sūtra-kāra) when about to explain the creation of the earth says, by laying down this Sūtra, that waters come in between (Tejas and the Earth) so that water (Āpaḥ) may not be left out. — 11.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Pṛthivī: earth; Adhikāra: because of the context, because of the subject matter; Rūpa: colour; Śabda-antarebhyaḥ: on account of other texts (Śruti).🔗 (The word “Anna” means) the earth, because of the subject, form (i.e. Rūpa), and other Scriptural statements. — 2.3.12. A Scriptural passage says thus — “The waters thought, may we be many, may we bring forth; they created Anna” (ChanU.6.2.4). Here there is a doubt as to whether by the word ‘Anna’ rice and barley etc., or articles of food such as cooked rice etc., are meant to be referred to, or the earth (is meant). The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that (by ‘Anna’) either rice and barley or cooked rice should be understood, because in the ordinary world, by the word ‘Anna’ that alone is understood, and the complementary passage also supports that meaning, thus: — “Therefore wherever it rains, rice and barley are produced in abundance” (ChanU.6.2.4). When there is rain, only rice and barley, and not the earth, grow abundantly. To this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — By the word ‘Anna’ the earth alone is meant to be spoken of as that which comes into being from waters. Whence is it so? Because of, the subject (Adhikāra), the form (i.e. Rūpa), and other Scriptural passages also. For the sentences “It created Tejas” and “It created waters” show that the subject here is about the great elements. Hence it is not justifiable to skip over the element ‘earth’ which comes next in the order, and to capriciously understand that rice etc. are meant (by the word ‘Anna’). In the complementary passage also, the form i.e. Rūpa (as described) also appears to fit in with the earth thus — “That which is black (in form) is ‘Anna’”. Articles of food such as cooked rice etc. are not as a rule of a black colour, nor are rice or barley. (The opponent says) — Oh, but neither is there a rule that earth also must be black. It is seen that there are fields white as milk or red like burning coal. (We reply) — This is no fault, because what is meant (by the black form of the earth) is with reference to the preponderance in the earth of the colour black, while neither white nor red (do so predominate). The Paurāṇikas also speak of the dark night as the shadow of the earth, viz. Śarvarī (i.e. night), and night of course is felt to be black, and hence it is appropriate (to say) that the form (Rūpa) of the earth is black. Another Scriptural passage also dealing with a similar subject says, that earth comes into being from waters, thus — “That which was like the skum (Śara) of the water, formed itself into a mass, and that became the earth” (BrhU.1.2.2). They also indicate that barley etc. are produced from the earth, thus — “From the earth vegetation (Oṣadhis) came into being, and from that, the food”. In this way the subject matter etc., which propounds the earth, being thus relevant i.e. present here, how can barley etc. be reasonably understood (by the word ‘Anna’)? The argument that it is well-known (that ‘Anna’ means food) is negatived by the very subject matter (Adhikāra) etc. It should be noted, that the complementary passage also, showing that food etc. has the nature of earth, shows thereby, that the earth is the product of the waters. Thus, what is expressed by the word ‘Anna’ is but the earth. — 12.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tat (Tasya): His (of Brahman); Abhidhyānāt: because of the volition, reflection; Eva: even, only; Tu: but; Tat-liṅgāt: because of His indicating marks; Sah: He.🔗 It is He (the Highest Self) that, precisely with profound premeditation, on each particular thing (creates all effects), because there is an indicatory mark about it (in the Scriptures). — 2.3.13. A doubt having arisen — as to whether the elements such as Viyat (Ākāśa) etc. themselves alone create their own effects i.e. modifications, or whether it is the Highest Lord Himself abiding in the elements as their Self, that creates the various effects after profound thought — , the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that the elements themselves create their own effects. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures declare their independence in that respect thus: — “Vāyu came into being from the Ākāśa, Agni from Vāyu” (TaitU.2.1.1). But (says the Vedāntin), that there could be independence of action in non-sentient (entities), is denied. (The opponent of the Vedānta says) — This is no fault, because the Scriptures themselves speak of the elements also as being sentient thus: — “That Tejas thought”, “That these waters thought” (ChanU.6.2.4). This being the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta), it is said — It is the Highest Lord alone which abides in these elements as their Self, that creates each and every effect after profound thought. Whence is it so? Because there is an indicatory mark about Him. Because, the Scriptures, by saying thus — “He who abides in the earth, and is within the earth, and whom the earth knows not, and whose body is the earth, and who controls the earth from within” (BrhU.3.7.3), indicate, that the activity of the elements is to be seen only when they are presided over (by the Highest Self). Similarly, the Scriptures, beginning with “He thought, may I be many and create”, show that the Highest Lord is the Self of us all, thus: — “He became ‘Sat’ and ‘Tyat’” (i.e. entities which have form, and which have no form (i.e. Rūpa) respectively), “It made itself manifest as its own Self” (TaitU.2.6.1). The ‘thinking’ and ‘hearing’ by Tejas and water etc. spoken of (by the Scriptures) should be looked upon as being due to the Highest Lord having entered into them (as their controller from within i.e. the Antar-yāmi), because the Scriptures deny there being any other seer, thus — “Other than Him there is no seer” (BrhU.3.7.23); and also because, He, as the seer, is what is relevant to the context here and is intended to be spoken of, thus — “He thought may I be many and create”. — 13.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Viparyayeṇa: in the reverse order; Tu: indeed, but; Kramaḥ: order, the process of dissolution; Ataḥ: from that (the order of creation); Upapadyate: is reasonable; Ca: and.🔗 The order (in which dissolution takes place) is the reverse of this (i.e. the order in which creation takes place). It is also reasonably sustainable. — 2.3.14. The order in which creation takes place has been considered (already). Now, the order in which dissolution takes place is being considered. (The question being), whether there is no fixed order of dissolution, or whether it is the same as the order of creation, or the reverse of it. All the three conditions of these elements, viz. their creation, preservation and dissolution, are, according to Scriptures dependent upon Brahman, thus: — “From whom, all these elements i.e. beings come into being, by which, after they come into being they continue to live, and in which at dissolution they enter” (TaitU.3.1.1). So, in connection with this, the conclusion (arrived at by the opponent of Vedānta) is, that as no special peculiarity (about the dissolution) is stated, there is no definite rule about it, or else, as an order of creation is mentioned by the Scriptures, if one expects an order for dissolution also, such dissolution also may take place in the same order (as of creation). This being the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) we reply — The order in which dissolution takes place, deserves to be in an order reverse to that, in which creation takes place. Even so, is it observed in the ordinary world, (for it is seen) that a person descends a staircase, in an order reverse to that in which he ascends it. Besides, it is also seen that the entities, such as a pot or a pitcher, which come into being from clay, at the time of dissolution, return to the condition of clay, and snow and hail, which come into being from water, return to the condition of water. Hence it is reasonably sustainable, that the earth which owes its origin to water, returns to the condition of water, after the period of its subsistence as earth comes to an end, and waters which come into being from the Tejas, return to the condition of Tejas. It should therefore be understood, that this entire creation, by reverting to the condition of a subtle and still more subtle cause successively, finally gets absorbed into the most subtle cause viz. Brahman. It is not logical (to suppose) that an effect by avoiding (to be absorbed into) its own cause, gets directly absorbed into the cause of its own cause. In various places in the Smṛti etc. also, the order of dissolution is indicated to be an order which is in reverse of the order of creation, thus — “Oh divine sage, the earth, the basis of all this world is dissolved into waters, the waters into Jyotis (Tejas) and the Jyotis into Vāyu (i.e. Ākāśa).” As it is only in the case of creation that the order of creation is mentioned in the Scriptures it does not deserve to hold good in the case of dissolution, and not being logical, dissolution does not expect it (i.e. order of creation) to apply in its own case. It is not logical that a cause should be dissolved while the effect (of such cause) yet subsists, because, it is not reasonably sustainable, that an effect should continue to subsist, after its cause is dissolved, while, that the cause should exist, even when its effect is dissolved, is logical, because it is observed to be so in the case of clay etc. — 14.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Antarā: intervening between, in between; Vijñāna-manasī: the intellect and the mind; Krameṇa: in the order of succession, according to the successive order; Tat-liṅgāt: owing to indication of that, as there is indication in Śruti to that effect, because of an inferential mark of this; Iti: thus, this; Cet: if; Na: not, no, not so, the objection cannot stand; A-viśeṣāt: because of no speciality, as there is no speciality mentioned in Śruti about the causation of the elements, because there being no particular difference, on account of non-difference.🔗 If it be said that the creation and dissolution of intelligence (Vijñāna) and the mind (must be found a place) in between (Brahman and the elements) in the ordinary sequence, because there are indicatory marks (about their existence, and hence the order is interfered with), we say — No, because there is no difference. — 2.3.15. It has been mentioned, that the coming into being and the dissolution of elements i.e. beings, take place in the direct order and in reverse order (literally, Anuloma and Pratiloma, i.e. along the lie of the hair and against the lie of the hair) respectively. It has also been mentioned, that creation proceeds from the Self and its dissolution also takes place in the same Self. (The opponent says) — It is also well-known from the Scriptures and the Smṛtis, that mind along with the organs-of-sense, and intelligence, exist sure enough, because there are indicatory marks about their existence, such as — “Know Intelligence to be the charioteer, and the Mind to be the reins; they say the sense-organs are the steeds” (KathU.1.3.3) etc. Now, as all entities are understood to have come into being from Brahman their (i.e. of Intelligence etc.) coming into being and their dissolution must also necessarily be placed somewhere in between (other entities) in their order of creation and dissolution respectively. Besides in the Ātharvaṇa (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad), in the chapter on genesis, the organs-of-sense are enumerated in the order of creation, somewhere between the elements and the Self, thus: — “From the Self, the Prāṇa, the mind, all the organs-of-sense, the Ākāśa i.e. the Vāyu, the Tejas, Water, and the Earth which is the support of all the entities, come into being” (MunU.2.1.3). If it be said, therefore, that there would be the predicament of the order of creation and dissolution referred to earlier, being disturbed, we reply — No, because there is no disturbance or change in the order of creation and dissolution. If, therefore, the organs-of-sense are modifications of elements, their coming into being and their dissolution are included in the coming into being and dissolution of the elements and it is not necessary to look for a separate order (of creation and dissolution) in their case. And there positively is an indicatory mark about their being modifications of elements, thus — “O mild one, the structure of the mind, is that of the earth, of the Prāṇa, that of water, and of the speech, that of Tejas” (ChanU.6.5.4). The occasional separate reference to elements and organs-of-sense should be construed in accordance with the maxim of a Brāhmaṇa and a Parivrājaka (i.e. a Sannyāsin or a Peripatetic). If, on the other hand, supposing organs-of-sense are not the modifications of the elements, even then the order of creation of the elements is not disturbed by the organs-of-sense, because it may in that case be understood, that in the order of creation, the organs-of-sense came into being first and then the elements, or the elements came into being first and then the organs-of-sense. Because in the Ātharvaṇa merely a mention of the organs-of-sense and the elements in a particular order has been made, and not that of the order of their creation. In other places also the order of the creation of the elements and the organs-of-sense is mentioned separately, thus — “The Prajā-pati (Sūtrātmā) verily was all this in the beginning. He thought about his own self. He created the Manas (i.e. the mind). There was then the mind only. It thought about its own self. It created the speech etc.”. Therefore, no break in the order of creation is occasioned (by the mention of intelligence and the mind, in between the Self and the elements). — 15.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Cara-acara-vyapaśrayaḥ: in connection with the bodies fixed and movable; Tu: but, indeed; Syāt: may be, becomes; Tad-vyapadeśaḥ: mention of that, that expression, i.e., to popular expressions of births and deaths of the soul; Bhāktaḥ: secondary, metaphorical, not literal; Tad-bhava-bhavitvāt: on account of (those terms) depending on the existence of that. (Tad-bhāva: on the existence of that, i.e., the body; Bhāvitvāt: depending.)🔗 The reference (to birth and death) is in the principal sense with reference to moveable and immovable entities. When the terms Birth and Death are used in connection with the Jīva-Self, they are in a secondary sense, because existence (of the Jīva-Self) is possible only when a body etc. exist. — 2.3.16. May be, somebody may have a mistaken notion, that the Jīva-Self is subject to birth and final dissolution (i.e. death) because in the ordinary world, there are such references as, Deva-datta is born, Deva-datta is dead etc., and also because of the injunction for the performance of such ceremonies as Jāta-karma and Antyeṣṭi etc. (at birth and death respectively), and that mistaken notion we will now remove. The Jīva-Self cannot be subject to birth and death, because, that it has a relation to the fruit mentioned by the Śāstras, is reasonably sustainable, because were the Jīva-Self liable to be destroyed along with the body, then in that case injunctions and prohibitions with a view to the acquisition or avoidance of desirable and undesirable things respectively (by the Self) in another body, would be meaningless. It is also mentioned in the Scriptures — “It is this (i.e. this body), which is abandoned by the Jīva-Self, that really dies and not the Jīva-Self” (ChanU.6.11.3). But, (says the opponent of the Vedānta), it is indicated that in the ordinary world the terms birth and death are used with reference to the Jīva-Self. (We reply) — It is no doubt true that you have indicated that it is so, but this reference to the birth and death of the Jīva-Self is in a secondary sense. (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — With reference to what entity then can this reference possibly be in the primary (i.e. real) sense, if this reference (in the case of the Jīva-Self) is in the secondary sense? (We reply) — The reference is in the primary i.e. true sense with respect to the entire set of moveable and immoveable entities. These terms ‘Birth’ and ‘Death’ have reference to the bodies of moveable and immoveable entities. These moveable and immoveable entities both come into being and die, hence, while the terms ‘Birth’ and ‘Death’ are used in the principal (i.e. real) sense with reference to these entities, they are used figuratively in the case of the Jīva-Selfs which abide in them, because these terms are used, only if such bodies exist. It is only when a body becomes manifest or disappears, that these terms ‘Birth’ and ‘Death’ are used, and not when it does not either manifest itself or disappear. No one has ever observed a Jīva-Self being born, or observed it to have died, elsewhere than when it is related to a body. The Scriptures show that the terms ‘Birth’ and ‘Death’ depend upon its (i.e. the Jīva-Self’s) being in contact with or its separation from a body, in the Scriptural passage — “This person (Puruṣa i.e. Jīva-Self) is said to come into existence, when it has acquired a body, and this person (Puruṣa i.e. Jīva-Self) is said to die, when it goes out of the body” (BrhU.4.3.8). The injunction as to Jāta-karma etc. also should be understood to be only with reference to the manifestation of a body, because there is absence of (i.e. no possibility of) the manifestation of the Jīva-Self. The Sūtra-kāra will explain in the next Sūtra, whether, like the Ākāśa etc., the Jīva-Self comes into being from the Highest Self or it does not do so. By this Sūtra it is merely mentioned that births or deaths in the gross sense (as they are applied popularly to the Jīva-Selfs) are really dependent upon the body, and they do not apply to the Jīva-Self. — 16.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Na: not (produced); Ātmā: the individual soul; A-śruteḥ: because of no mention in Śruti, as it is not found in Śruti; Nityatvāt: because of its permanence, as it is eternal; Ca: also, and; Tābhyaḥ: from them (Śrutis), according to the Śrutis.🔗 The Jīva-Self does not come into being, because there is no Scriptural statement about its coming into being, (like the Ākāśa). Besides, according to those i.e. the Scriptures the Self is eternal. — 2.3.17. There indeed is such an entity as the Ātmā, called the Jīva, which presides over this cage of the body and organs-of-sense and which is connected with fruits of actions. There being a conflict in the Scriptural statements, as to whether it (i.e. the Jīva) comes into being from Brahman, like Vyoma (i.e. Ākāśa) etc., or whether, like Brahman, it is not subject to being born, there is a doubt. In some Scriptural passages the coming into being of the Jīva-Self from the Highest Brahman is mentioned by illustrations, such as those of the sparks of fire etc., and, from some other Scriptural passages it is understood, how the Highest Brahman without having undergone any modification enters into its own effects and is thereby known as being in the condition of the Jīva-Self, but where, its coming into being is not mentioned. With regard to this (Atra) the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that the Jīva-Self does come into being (as an effect of Brahman). Whence is it so? Because, (it is only thus that) the original declaration is not contradicted. The original declaration — viz. “When one is known, all else becomes known automatically” — is not contradicted, only if all this entire set of the creation of entities (including the Jīva-Self) owes its origin to Brahman. Were the Jīva-Self to be an entirely different entity altogether (and not an effect of Brahman), this declaration would be contradicted. It is not possible to identify the unmodified Highest Self with the Jīva-Self, because of the difference in (their) characteristics i.e. natures. The Highest Self is of the nature of being free from all sin etc. whatsoever, while the Jīva-Self is quite the opposite of that. That the Jīva-Self is an effect (from its cause — Brahman), is established because of its being circumscribed or delimited. Inasmuch as, every entity, such as the Ākāśa etc., is an effect because it is so circumscribed or delimited, so all these effects, including the Ākāśa, are understood to be subject to being created. The Jīva-Self, also, therefore, inasmuch as it is the performer of meritorious and unmeritorious action, and is also subject to pleasure and pain, and has a separate existence in every individual body, deserves to be a created entity, at the time of the coming into being of this entire set of creation. Besides, the Scriptures also after first giving instruction about the creation of all this set of the objects of enjoyment and the organs-of-sense such as the Prāṇa (vital breath) etc., thus — “Just as from fire minute sparks i.e. scintillae fly about, even so from this Self all Prāṇas spread out” (BrhU.2.1.20), further give instruction about the separate creation of the experiencing Selfs, thus — “All the Jīva-Selfs without exception proceed (from the Highest Self)”. Besides another Scriptural passage — “Just as from a well-kindled fire thousands of sparks i.e. scintillae similar in nature (Sarūpāḥ) (to the fire) fly around, even so, Oh mild one, all these different existences (i.e. Jīva-Selfs) spread around from this Imperishable (i.e. Brahman), and are also ultimately absorbed into it” (MunU.2.1.1) — speaks about the coming into being of all Jīva-Selfs, and their ultimate dissolution into it. The word “similar in nature” (Sarūpāḥ) shows that the Jīva-Selfs are similar in nature to the Highest Self, inasmuch as they possess sentiency. The non-mention (of a thing) in the Scriptures in one place, does not deserve to restrict that which is mentioned in another place, because something which is mentioned in some Scriptural passage in addition to what is stated in other Scriptural passages and which is not contradictory to anything (mentioned in these Scriptural passages), has necessarily to be understood as implied in all places. The Scriptural passage which mentions the entry (of the Highest Self) into its own effects, also, under the circumstances, ought to be explained as meaning the modification of the Highest Self into its own effects as the Jīva-Self, like the Scriptural passage — “That made itself manifest as its own Self” (TaitU.2.6.1). Therefore, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that the Jīva-Self does (of course) come into being (i.e. it is a created entity). To this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the reply we give is: — The Self i.e. the Jīva-Self is not subject to being created. Whence is it so? Because there is no Scriptural passage (about its creation). In very many places (in the Scriptures) in the chapter on genesis there is no mention of it. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been remarked (by me) that non-mention in a particular passage is unable to restrict a statement (to that effect) in other passages of Scriptures. (We reply) — Of course it is true that it is so said (by you), but what we say is, that its creation itself is not possible. Whence is it so? Because according to them (i.e. the Scriptural passages) the Self is eternal. And also because of the word ‘Ca’ (Also), and also because of the characteristics of being ‘unborn’ etc. That the Self is eternal is understood from the Scriptures, and it is also understood that it is not subject to being born, and that it is not an effect or modification, and that it is the unmodified Brahman itself that subsists as the Jīva-Self and which has Brahman as its Self. That an entity of this nature i.e. form should be liable to being created, is not reasonably sustainable. (Says the opponent) — What are those Scriptural passages? We reply — “The Jīva-Self does not die” (ChanU.6.11.3); “This great unborn Self which is undecaying, deathless, immortal, and fearless is itself Brahman” (BrhU.4.4.22); “This ancient one is unborn, eternal and everlasting” (KathU.1.2.18); “The wise one (i.e. the Self) is neither born nor does it die” (KathU.1.2.18); “Having brought it into being, it itself entered into it” (TaitU.2.6.1); “I will now enter into them myself as the Jīva-Self, and evolve names and forms” (ChanU.6.3.2); “This Self permeated into it right down i,o the extremity of the fingernails” (BrhU.2.4.7); “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7); “I am Brahman” (BrhU.1.4.10); “This Self is Brahman, the experiencer of everything” (BrhU.2.5.19). These and such, other Scriptural passages, which speak about the Jīva-Self’s. being eternal, being there, they obstruct the possibility of the creation of the Jīva-Self. But (says the opponent of the Vedānta) it has already been said (by us) that because of its being separate i.e. circumscribed (Pravibhakta), it is a modification, and as such is subject to being created. To this, it is replied (by us) — It is by no means a separate i.e. a circumscribed entity by itself, because of the Scriptural statement — “There is only one God immanent in all beings, it is all-pervading and is the inner-Self of all things” (SvetU.6.11). That it appears as if it is circumscribed etc., is because of the limiting adjuncts such as intelligence (Buddhi) etc., even as the Ākāśa (appears as if if is separate i.e. circumscribed) because of its connection with jars etc. The Śāstra passage also which is similar, viz. “This Jīva-Self is Brahman, having the structure of intelligence (Vijñāna), the structure of the mind, the structure of Prāṇa, the structure of sight (Cakṣus), and having the structure of the sense-organ of hearing (Śrotra)” (BrhU.4.4.5) etc., shows that the Jīva-Self though being of the nature of Brahman which is unmodifiable and one and one only, has the structure of manifoldness such as intelligence etc. That it has the structure of that i.e. intelligence etc., means, that by reason of the nonmanifestation of its own characteristic nature, which is different from intelligence etc., it merely appears to be tinged with the complexion of that particular nature of intelligence etc., and should be looked upon to be like a man whose mind is constantly centered upon women (‘Strīmayo Jālmaḥ’, i.e. a voluptuary like a gay Lothario or a Don Juan for instance). Those rare instances in Scriptures, where its origination and dissolution is spoken of, should be construed as being the result of its contact with such limiting adjuncts (as Buddhi etc.), so that, it is said to be created when such adjuncts come into being and is said to be dissolved, when such adjuncts get dissolved. The Scriptures themselves declare similarly, thus — “Being knowledge incarnate and having risen from these beings or elements, it perishes when the beings or elements themselves perish. After it has departed, it has no further cognition” (BrhU.4.5.13). Similarly, that there is merely the dissolution of the adjuncts and not the destruction of the Self, is also declared by the Scriptures (when the Scriptures expound, in reply to a question which the Scriptures raise first, by putting it in the mouth of Maitreyī thus — “It is exactly here, Oh Bhagavān, that you have altogether bewildered me. I do not comprehend what you have said, viz. that after it has departed i.e. died (Pretya) it has no further cognition”) thus — “Oh Maitreyī, I am indeed not wanting to say anything to bewilder you. The Self, Oh Maitreyī, is imperishable and has the characteristic of being indestructible. What in fact takes place, is that it (i.e. the Self) is merely decontaminated i.e. separated from the sense-organs” (BrhU.4.5.14). It is only thus, that the original declaration is not contradicted, i.e., when it is understood, that it is the unmodified Brahman itself that exists as the Jīva-Self. Again, the difference in their individual characteristics is caused by the limiting adjuncts only. The Scriptural passage “After all this, do speak to me of that only by which Final Release may result”, by denying, that the Jīva-Self, whose structure is knowledge and which is the relevant topic here, has any characteristics of a transmigratory existence, further expounds, how the Jīva-Self is the Highest Self. Therefore (the conclusion is that) the Self is not subject either to being created or to being dissolved. — 17.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Jñaḥ: intelligent, intelligence, knower; Ataḥ eva: for this very reason, therefore.🔗 Hence it is, that (the Jīva-Self) is eternally all-knowing. — 2.3.18. Now, on account of the conflict of opinion between the contesting parties, in as much as to whether, as held by the followers of Kaṇa-bhuk (i.e. the Vaiśeṣikas), the Jīva-Self, though per se non-sentient, is possessed of the nature of adventitious sentiency, or whether, as held by the Sāṅkhyas, it possesses the nature of eternal sentiency, a doubt (has arisen). What then is the conclusion? The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that the attribute of the sentiency of the Jīva-Self is only adventitious as resulting from its conjunction with the mind, like the quality of redness etc. resulting from the conjunction of Agni (fire) and an earthen pot. Assuming that it has eternal sentiency, then, even those who are asleep or in a fainting fit or possessed (by a malignant spirit) would manifest sentiency, but after such people have come round, on their being interrogated, such people reply that they were not conscious of anything, and they are again observed to possess sentiency. Hence (the conclusion is that) because of its being intermittently sentient, the Jīva-Self possesses merely adventitious sentiency. The reply to this conclusion is — The Jīva-Self is sentient and possesses eternal consciousness, precisely for this very reason, viz. that it is not subject to creation, and that it is but only the Highest Self i.e. Brahman, which, not being liable to any modification, subsists as the Jīva-Self, as a result of being affected by limiting adjuncts. The Scriptures speak of the Highest Self, as having the nature of sentiency i.e. consciousness, thus — “Brahman is knowledge and bliss” (BrhU.3.9.28); “Brahman is truth, knowledge and the infinite” (TaitU.2.1.1); “It is neither inside nor outside, but is wholly incarnate solidified knowledge” (BrhU.4.5.13) etc. Now if the Jīva-Self is but this Highest Self only, then it is understood that the Jīva-Self also must possess the nature of eternal sentiency i.e. consciousness, even as heat and light are eternally the nature of Agni (fire). Commencing the chapter dealing with the Jīva-Self as one having knowledge as his structure (Vijñānamaya), there are such Scriptural passages as — “(During the condition of sleep) while being wide-awake himself, he (i.e. the Jīvātmā) looks upon the quiescent i.e. sleeping (sense-organs)” (BrhU.4.3.11); “That Puruṣa is Self-refulgent during this condition (of dreams). There is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower i.e. the Self” (BrhU.4.3.30). That the Jīva-Self does possess such nature, is further established, by means of the continuity of knowledge through the medium of all the sense-organs, thus — ‘I know this, I know this’, on the authority of the Scriptural passage — “He who knows ‘I am smelling this’ is the Self” (ChanU.8.12.4). (Assuming the opponent of the Vedānta to say) — if the nature of the Jīva-Self is that of eternal sentiency i.e. consciousness, that would render the sense-organs such as the sense-organ of smell (Ghrāṇa) etc. superfluous, we reply — No, because they (the sense-organs) have the function of the ascertainment of such special objects-of-sense as smell etc. The Scriptures moreover specifically declare it to be so, thus — “The olfactory sense-organ is for the perception of smell” (ChanU.8.12.4). The objection raised, viz. that persons who are asleep do not perceive anything, is answered by the Scriptures themselves, which declare, With reference to the condition of sleep, thus: — “That it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is not conscious of anything during the condition of sleep, means, that even while it is looking on it refuses to see (i.e. actually perceive). Because of its not being liable to perish, there is no cessation of the activity of perception on the part of the seer i.e. the Self, as there is nothing else, then, as apart and different from itself, which it can possibly see” (BrhU.4.3.23). What is meant is, that there is absence of the activity of its sentiency, because, there is no object (other than itself) that can be seen, and it is not that there is absence of sentiency itself. It is like the non-manifestation of the light pervading the Ākāśa by reason of the absence of any object to be illuminated and not because it does not possess its nature (of illuminating). The reasoning of the Vaiśeṣikas etc. being in conflict with the Scriptures, it is rendered fallacious. Hence we conclude that the Jīva-Self has the nature of eternal sentiency i.e. consciousness. — 18.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Utkrīnti: passing out, coming out; Gati: going; Āgatīnām: returning.🔗 Because (the Scriptures declare that the Jīva-Self) emerges (out of the body), goes about, and returns (to the body), therefore (the Jīva-Self is of the size of an Atom (Aṇu). — 2.3.19. Of what dimension the Jīva-Self is, is now considered, viz. whether it has the dimensions of an Atom (Aṇu), or whether it has a medium dimension, or whether it has a great i.e. infinite dimension. But (says the Vedāntin) it has been stated, that the Self is not subject to creation and has eternal sentiency i.e. consciousness and, hence, it follows that the Jīva-Self is in fact the Highest Self, and as the Highest Self is declared by the Scriptures to be infinite, whence could then there arise any anxiety about the consideration of its dimension? The reply (of the opponent of the Vedāntin) is — What you say is true of course, but the Scriptural statements, about the Jīva-Self’s emerging (out of the body) and going about and returning, force us to the conclusion, that the Jīva-Self has a limited dimension. Besides the Scriptures themselves occasionally speak about its atomic (Aṇu) dimension, and it is for clearing up all this, that this consideration of it is begun. The conclusion (of the opponent of the Vedānta) is, that because of the Scriptural statements about the Jīva-Self’s emerging out of the body and going about and returning (to the body), it has a limited atomic (Aṇu) dimension. As regards its (of the Jīva-Self’s) emerging out of the body, the Scriptural statement is — “When it (Jīva-Self) sallies forth (from the body) it does so along with all these (i.e. sense-organs such as speech etc.)” (Kaush. 3.3). As regards its going about — “Verily all those (i.e. Jīva-Selfs) who depart from this region, go to the region of the moon only” (Kaush. 1.2). And as regards its returning — “From that region it (Jīva-Self) returns to this world for doing Karma (action)” (BrhU.4.4.6). These Scriptural statements about the emerging, going about and returning of the Jīva-Self, force us to the conclusion that the Jīva-Self has but a limited dimension, because it cannot be imagined that an all-pervading entity can possibly have any movement (because being all-pervading it has no scope for movement). Now, when therefore it is taken as finally determined that it has a limited size, it is understood, that it can be only of the dimension of an atom (Aṇu), because during the examination of the Ārhata (i.e. Jaina) doctrine, the doctrine that the Jīva-Self’s dimension is that of a body, has already been refuted. — 19.
[Go top]
Sva-ātmanā: (being connected) directly with the agent, the soul; Ca: and, only, also; Uttarayoḥ: of the latter two, namely, of Gati and Āgati, of the going away and coming back, as stated in the previous Sūtra.🔗 (The Jīva-Self is of the dimension of an Atom i.e. Aṇu) because the latter two actions (i.e. going about and returning to the body) have relation to the doer of such actions i.e. the Jīva-Self (according to the Scriptures). — 2.3.20. May be, giving up (i.e. Utkrānti) of the mastership over the body by the Jīva-Self may be possible, even without any movement on the part of the Jīva-Self, in the same sense, in which a Lord’s Lordship (over his township) is given up by the Lord, — merely by the Jīva-Self ceasing to have such mastership of the body, as a result of its actions having been exhausted; but the latter two actions, viz. going out (of the body) and returning (to the body), cannot at all be possible in the case of a Jīva-Self which is not capable of movement as they (i.e. these two actions) have a relation to the Self of the Jīva, because the root verb “to go” (and “to return”) implies an activity abiding in an agent (of such action). The going out of and returning to (the body) by the Jīva-Self, which is not of a medium dimension (because the Jīva-Self’s having a medium dimension has already been refuted) are possible, only if the Jīva-Self has an atomic (Aṇu) dimension (because if the Jīva-Self were to be all-pervading there could not be any scope for its movement). However, going out of and returning to (the body of) the Jīva-Self, being thus assumed to exist, the giving up (Utkrānti) can only be properly understood to mean, the moving out of the body (Apasṛpti), because its going out and returning (to the body) are not possible unless it has first moved away from the body, inasmuch as, going out and returning, without moving away from the body, is not possible. Besides the Scriptures which have declared certain regions of the body, as the several exits (Apādāna) from which the moving out of the Jīva-Self takes place, thus — “Either from the eye, or from the head, or from other parts of the body” (BrhU.4.4.2), “Taking these elements of light (Tejas) etc. with itself, it, the Jīva-Self, enters the Hṛdaya” (BrhU.4.1); and the passage “And taking up the light elements, it returns to its place” (BrhU.4.3.11) shows that the Jīva-Self’s going about the returning is possible even when it is inside a body. Because of this fact also, it is established that the Jīva-Self has the dimensions of an atom (Aṇu). — 20.
[Go top]
Na: not; Aṇuḥ: minute, atomic; A-tat: not that, otherwise, namely opposite of Aṇu; Śruteḥ: as it is stated in Śruti, because of a Śruti or scriptural text; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Na: not; Itara: other than the individual soul, i.e., the Supreme Self; Adhikārāt: because of the context or topic, from the subject matter of the portion in the Chapter.🔗 If it be said (by the Vedāntins) that (the Jīva-Self is) not Aṇu because the Scriptural statement is about its not being so (Atat-śruteḥ), (we, the opponents of Vedānta reply) no, the subject (there) is with reference to the other (i.e. the Highest Self). — 2.3.21. If it be said by the Vedāntin — It may be like this, that the Jīva-Self is not Atomic (Aṇu). Why so? Because there is Scriptural statement about its not being so. The meaning is, that the Scriptural statements which refer to it as having a dimension different from that of an atom (Aṇu), thus — “Verily, that great unborn Self who, as amongst the Prāṇas (i.e. organs-of-sense) is one whose structure is knowledge” (BrhU.4.4.12), “(Who) like the Ākāśa is all-pervading and eternal”, “Truth, knowledge and infinite is Brahman” (TaitU.2.1.1), would be contradicted if the Jīva-Self were to be of the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu). (The reply of the opponent of Vedānta is) — This is no fault. How so? Because the subject of this chapter is the other one (i.e. the Highest Self). For this Scriptural statement about a different dimension occurs in a chapter (Prakriyā) dealing with the Highest Self, because generally in the Vedānta the Highest Self alone is relevant as being the entity to be known. Also because, in the Scriptural statements such as “Spotless and beyond the Ākāśa” the chapter specially refers to the transcendental one (i.e. the Highest Self). But (says the Vedāntin) in the Scriptural statement “This one, who amongst the Prāṇas is one whose structure is knowledge” it is the Jīva-Self that is indicated as having a relation to greatness (of size). (The opponent of Vedānta replies) — That reference should be looked upon, just as the reference to Vāma-deva is looked upon, from the point of view of the Śāstra (vide Bra. Su. I.i.30). Therefore by the Scriptural statement, which refers to a different dimension, having reference to the Highest Self, the Atomic dimension of the Jīva-Self is not thereby contradicted. — 21.
[Go top]
Sva-śabda-unmānābhyām: from direct statements (of Śruti texts) and infinitesimal measure; Ca: and. (Sva-śabda: the word itself; the word directly denoting ‘minute’; Unmānābhyām: on account of the measure of comparison; Ut: subtle; Māna: measure, hence subtle division; hence smaller even than the small. Sva-śabda-unmānābhyāam: as these are the words directly denoting ‘minute’ and to expression denoting smaller than the small as measured by division.)🔗 (The Jīva-Self is Atomic Aṇu in dimension) because there is a direct Scriptural statement about it and about its minute dimension. — 2.3.22. This is again why the Jīva-Self is of the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), viz. there is a direct Scriptural statement of a word suggestive of an Atomic (Aṇu) dimension of it, thus — “This Jīva-Self into which the Prāṇa (the vital breath) has entered in a five-fold manner, and which has the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), has to be comprehended by the mind” (MunU.3.1.9), and because of its connection with the Prāṇa, it is understood that it is the Jīva-Self that is designated as Atomic (Aṇu). Similarly, the minute dimension stated in the Scriptures also indicates the atomic nature of the Jīva-Self, thus — “This Jīva-Self should be understood to be (of the dimension of) the hundredth part of the hundredth part of a young hair” (SvetU.5.8); also “The inferior Avara Self (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is of the dimension of the point of a goad” (SvetU.5.8) is another dimension (that is also mentioned). — 22.
[Go top]
(Here somebody objects) — But assuming the Jīva-Self to be atomic in dimension, because of its being confined necessarily to only one portion (of the body), perception by it all over the body would be contradictory. However, it is seen, that those who have taken a plunge in the pool of the Jānhavī experience a feeling of coolness all over the body, and they experience heat all over the body during summer time. (To this the Sūtra-kāra replies): —A-virodhaḥ: non-conflict, no contradiction, no incongruity, it is not incongruous; Candanavat: like the sandal paste.🔗 There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandalwood. — 2.3.23. Just as a drop of yellow sandalwood paste, though it is in contact with only a portion of the body, creates a refreshingly pleasurable sensation over the whole body, even so, the Jīva-Self may well be able to have perception over the whole body, even though confined to only one portion of the body. The Jīva-Self being connected with the skin, that it has perception all over the body, is not contradictory, because the Jīva-Self’s connection with the skin is all over the extent of the skin, and the skin envelops the whole body. — 23.
[Go top]
Avasthiti: existence, residence, abode; Vaiśeṣyāt: because of the speciality, on account of specialisation; Iti: thus, this; Cet: if (if it be argued); Na: not (so), no, the argument cannot stand; Adhyupagamāt: on account of the admission, or acknowledgment; Hṛdi: in the heart; Hi: indeed.🔗 (If it he objected to by the Vedāntin that the cases are not parallel) because of the peculiar circumstance (in the illustration of sandalwood paste and the Self), (we reply) — No, because (there is peculiarity of circumstance also in the case of the Jīva-Self) as that (the Self has its abode) in the Hṛdaya. — 2.3.24. Here it is urged (by the Vedāntin), that the statement “There is no contradiction as in the case of sandalwood paste” is not logical, because the illustration and that of which it is the illustration are not equally balanced i.e. similar. It is only when it is established that the Jīva-Self is confined to one part of the body only, that the illustration of sandalwood paste would be proper. What is evident, however, is, that on the one hand the sandalwood paste has this peculiarity of circumstance, viz. that of existing only in one part of the body and also that it' refreshes the entire body, while, on the other hand, the Jīva-Self evidently has perception all over the body and not that it is present in only one part of it. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that it may be so inferred, (the Vedāntin replies) — No, such inference is possible, because, the doubt as to whether the perception by the Jīva-Self all over the body is because it pervades the whole body like the skin-organ (of touch), or because of its being all-pervading like the Nabhas (i.e. Ākāśa), or because, like a spot of sandalwood paste it is of the size of ah Atom (Aṇu) occupying only a part of the body, is not removed (even if such an inference is allowable). To this, it is said (by the opponent of Vedānta) — This is no fault. How? Because it is precisely so understood, viz. that like the spot of sandalwood paste, the Jīva-Self also exists only in a part of the body, and has a peculiarity of circumstance. If you ask ‘How?’, it is said that in the Vedānta it is recited that the Jīva-Self abides in the Hṛdaya, thus — The instruction is: — “This Jīva-Self (abides) in the Hṛdaya” (Prashna 8.3.3); “It is in the Hṛdaya that this Jīva-Self (abides)” (ChanU.8.3.3); “What is that Self? It is he who is in the Hṛdaya, and who amongst the Prāṇas (sense-organs) has knowledge as his structure, a Puruṣa who is the flame of light in the Hṛdaya” (BrhU.4.3.7). Therefore, as both the illustration, and the entity that it illustrates, are without any dissimilarity, it is but proper that (the Sūtra is): — “There is no contradiction as in the case of sandalwood paste”. — 24.
[Go top]
Guṇāt: on account of its quality (of intelligence); Vā: or (a further example is given); Ālokavat: like a light. (Or Lokavat: as in the world, as in cases of ordinary experience).🔗 Or because of the attribute (of sentiency, the Jīva-Self may pervade the whole body), as (we experience) in the ordinary world in the case of light (Ālokavat). — 2.3.25. Because of the Jīva-Self’s attribute of sentiency pervading the whole body, even though it has an atomic (Aṇu) dimension, its action of pervading the whole body is not contradicted. (It is) just as it is experienced in the ordinary world, viz. that the light of gems and lamps etc. which occupy only a part of the inner apartment of a house, fully pervades the whole inner apartment and does its work (of giving light) effectively over the whole inner apartment. Sandalwood paste, consisting as it does of parts, may perhaps be capable of creating a refreshing and pleasurable sensation all over the body, by the diffusion of its parts, still, as the Jīva-Self is Atomic (Aṇu) in its dimension and has no parts, it may well be doubted whether it can move about over the whole body, and that is why it is stated — “Because of the attribute, as in the case of light”. — 25.
[Go top]
(Says the Vedāntin) — How again, can an attribute be present elsewhere than in the substance to which such attribute belongs? It is never observed that ‘whiteness’ — a quality of a piece of cloth — exists elsewhere than in the cloth itself. (If the opponent of Vedānta were to say), it may well be like the light of a lamp, (the Vedāntin replies) — No, because the light (of a lamp) also is understood to be a substance (Dravya). A lamp is but the Tejas substance with its particles in a massed condition, and the same Tejas particles when they are in a loose condition, are ‘light’. To this (the opponent of Vedānta replies): —Vyatirekaḥ: expansion, extension beyond (the object i.e., soul); Gandhavat: like the odour.🔗 (The quality of sentiency) may exist apart (from the Self), like ‘smell’. — 2.3.26. Just as even though ‘smell’ is but a quality, it exists apart from the substance to which such quality of smell belongs, because we find that we do perceive the smell of flowers even when the flowers are not in evidence before us, even so, though the Jīva-Self is of an Atomic (Aṇu) dimension, its attribute of sentiency may exist apart from it. Hence it cannot invariably be, as a rule, that, it is not reasonably sustainable, that an attribute (of the Jīva-Self) such as sentiency, cannot, as Rūpa (form) cannot, exist apart from that which is its substratum, because it is seen, that smell, even though it is a quality, can exist separately from the substance to which it belongs. (If it be said by the Vedāntin) that smell can become separate from the substance to which it belongs, only along with the separation of (a part of) its substratum, (we reply) — No, because there will then be the predicament, of the substance, from which such separation of its quality along with (a part of) the substance takes place, itself getting dissipated. It is however experienced that it does exist without being so dissipated. Were it not to be so, it would lose its heaviness and other qualities which belong to it originally. (If it be said by the Vedāntin) — May be, the parts in which this smell abides, and which get separated, being very minute, the separation, even though it is there sure enough, is not detected, and the minute Paramāṇus of the substance which are scattered round about, cause the sensation of smell by entering the nostrils, (we reply) — No, because the Paramāṇus are supersensible, and in the case of Nāga-kesara etc., a distinct heavy smell is experienced. Ordinarily people experience a smell only, and not the substance which possesses such smell. If it be said, that because the existence of Rūpa (form) as apart from the substance to which it belongs, is not actually experienced, it is not logical to think that a quality can exist as apart from the substance to which such quality belongs, (we reply) — No, because actual direct perception precludes an inference from coming into operation. Therefore those who care to expound (a thing) ought to accept it to be just as it is met with in the ordinary world. It is not possible to lay down a rule, that because the quality, of taste is experienced by the tongue, the quality of Rūpa (form) also can be experienced only by the tongue. — 26.
[Go top]
Tathā: thus, in the same way; Ca: also; Darśayati: (the Śruti) declares.🔗 The Scriptures also declare similarly. — 2.3.27. The Scriptures, after declaring that the Hṛdaya is the abode of the Jīva-Self, and that it has the dimensions of an Atom (Aṇu), also further declare by such passages as “Right down to the hair and the tips of the nails” (ChanU.8.8.1) that the Jīva-Self pervades the whole body by means of its quality of sentiency. — 27.
[Go top]
Pṛthak: separate, different; Upadeśāt: because of teaching or statement.🔗 Also because of the separate instruction (about Jīva-Self and its sentiency). — 2.3.28. It is understood from the Scriptural statement “Having mounted the body by means of sentiency (Prājña)” (Kaush. 3.6), which mentions the Jīva-Self and its sentiency as being the agent and the instrument of action respectively, that the Jīva-Self pervades the body only by its quality of sentiency. Similarly, the Scriptural passage “Then (the sentient person) having absorbed into himself all the sentiency of the sense-organs” (BrhU.2.1.17), by giving instruction about sentiency being separate from the agent (i.e. the Jīva-Self), strengthens the same view. Therefore (according to the opponent of Vedānta) the Jīva-Self is of an Atomic (Aṇu) dimension. — 28.
[Go top]
The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being this (we reply): —Tad-guṇa-sāratvāt: on account of its possessing for its essence the qualities of that (viz., the Buddhi); Tu: but; Tad-vyapadeśaḥ: that declaration (as to its atomic size); Prājñavat: as in the case of the Intelligent Lord.🔗 But, it is because (the Jīva-Self) has the quintessence of that (attribute of intelligence — Buddhi) i.e. ‘Tad-guṇa-sāratvāt’, that there is a reference like that (Tad-vyapadeśāḥ), (viz. of its being of an Atomic dimension) as in the case of the intelligential Self (Prājña i.e. the Highest Self). — 2.3.29. The word ‘But’ refutes the view (of the opponent of Vedānta). It is not that the Jīva-Self is Atomic (Aṇu). It has already been stated, that the Jīva-Self is but the Highest Brahman, because there is no mention in the Scriptures about its creation and because the Scriptures have declared that Brahman itself entered (the created entities as the Jīva-Self), and also because of the instruction that there is complete identity (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self). Now, if the Jīva-Self is but the Highest Brahman, then it deserves to be of the same dimension as that of the Highest Brahman, and as the Highest Brahman has been declared by the Scriptures to be all-pervading, therefore, the Jīva-Self also is all-pervading. It would be only thus, that all the Scriptural and Smṛti declarations about the Jīva-Self being all-pervading, such as — “That great unborn Self, who, as the Jīva-Self, has amongst the Prāṇas the structure of knowledge (Vijñāna)” (BrhU.4.4.22), would be justified. It is not reasonably sustainable, that the Jīva-Self having the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), can be conscious of pain which pervades the whole body. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta), that it may well be so conscious, because of its connection with the skin (Tvak — sense of touch), (we reply) — No, because (were it to be so), when one is pricked in the skin by a thorn, pain should be felt over the entire extent of the body, as the connection between the thorn and the skin, is all over the extent of the skin which envelops the whole body, but, a man who is pricked by a thorn (in the foot) is conscious of pain in the sole of the foot only. It is not reasonably sustainable that the attribute of an Atom (Aṇu) can extend beyond its substratum (i.e. the Aṇu) of which it is the attribute, because an attribute is coextensive with the substratum, of which it is the attribute. An attribute which does not subsist in its own substratum but subsists beyond it, would itself cease to be an attribute. It has already been explained also, that the refulgence of a lamp is another substance (and not an attribute). And, in as much as smell is understood to be an attribute, it deserves to travel only with its own substratum, inasmuch as otherwise there will be the predicament of its losing its very nature of being an attribute. Bhagavān Dvaipāyana has expressed a similar view, thus: — “Experiencing a smell about water, even if some people, who are not clever, understand it to belong to the water, one should know that it belongs only to the earth, and only happens to have resorted to water or air (along with the earth)”. Were sentiency, as the attribute of the Jīva-Self, to occupy the entire body, then the Jīva-Self cannot possibly have the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu). Sentiency is its essential nature, just as heat and light are the essential natures of fire Agni). No such distinction between them, as, that one is an attribute, and the other is its substratum, can be here understood. Besides it has already been refuted that it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) can have the dimensions of a body. Therefore, as the only remaining alternative, the conclusion is that the Jīva-Self is all-pervading. How then is it (says the opponent of Vedānta) that there is a declaration that it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) has the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu)? The reply is — That declaration about its being of the dimension of an Aṇu, is because it has the quintessence of the attribute of that (i.e. Buddhi, i.e. intelligence). The attributes, viz. desire, aversion, pleasure, pain etc., are the attributes of intelligence. The quintessence of the attributes of intelligence (Buddhi) constitutes the principal characteristic of the Jīva-Self during its condition of transmigratory existence as the Jīva-Self. (Here at this stage the Bhāṣya-kāra has dissolved the compound word ‘Tad-guṇa-sāratvam’ which need not be translated.) There could be no transmigratory existence for the mere pure Self, without these attributes of intelligence (Buddhi). The condition of transmigratory existence appertaining to the Jīva-Self’s appearing to be an agent and an experiencer, has, the superimposition of the nature of the limiting adjuncts, such as the qualities of intelligence etc., (on the pure Self) as the cause, though the pure Self as such is in the real sense eternally free, and is not really an experiencer or an agent, and is not in fact subject to any transmigratory existence. Therefore, the reference to its dimension (as its being Atomic i.e. Aṇu) is with reference to the extent of intelligence (Buddhi), because of the Jīva-Self’s having the quintessence of the attribute of intelligence (Buddhi) (during the transmigratory condition). The reference to its passing out (from the body) etc. is because of the passing out (Utkrānti) etc. of the intelligence and not with reference to the passing out (Utkrānti) of its own Self. Further, having declared that the Jīva-Self has the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu) by the Scriptural statement — “The Jīva-Self is to be understood to be the hundredth part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair, and is meant to be infinite” (SvetU.5.19), it is again declared, that it is infinite and all-pervading. This can be reasonably understandable, only if the Jīva-Self be understood, to be of the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), in a figurative sense, and to have infinitude in the highest real sense. It can never be imagined, that both can be true in the principal sense. (Its) infinitude cannot possibly be understood to be in the figurative sense, because all the Upaniṣads purport to explain that the Jīva-Self is, in fact, the Brahman Self. Similarly when the Scriptures instruct that it is of the size of the point of a goad, by making use of another unit of measurement, thus — “The subordinate one (Avara) (i.e. the Jīva-Self) because of its attributes of intelligence and body, is perceived also to be of the dimension of the point of a goad only” (SvetU.6.8), they do so, merely because of its connection with the attribute of ‘intelligence’ and not because it is so in itself (i.e. not because it is so, per se). Again the Scriptural statement “This Self is Atomic (Aṇu) in dimension and should be realized by the mind” (MunU.3.1.9) does not claim to instruct that the Jīva-Self has the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), because what is relevant there, is that the Highest Self is unperceivable by the eye etc., and that it is understandable only through (its) knowledge and its grace being vouchsafed (to a man). Besides, it is not reasonably sustainable, that the Jīva-Self has the dimensions of an Atom (Aṇu) in the primary sense of the word Atom (Aṇu). Therefore, the statement about its being of the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu) should be construed as purporting to refer, to the abstruseness of the Highest Self, or to its being under the influence of a limiting adjunct. Similarly in the case of such Scriptural passages as “Riding astride the body by means of intelligence” (Kaush. 3.6) etc., which speak of difference (between the Jīva-Self and intelligence), it should be construed to mean that the Jīva-Self uses the body as its mount, by means of the intelligence which acts as an adjunct. Or else, it should be understood to be only a mention in a secondary sense, similar to the mention of the stony body of a pestle and mortar (Śilā-putraka), It has been stated already that there is no such division understood here, as between an attribute; and its substratum. The statement about Hṛdaya being the abode is also because the Hṛdaya is the abode of intelligence. Similarly the Scriptural passages “By the passing out of what, shall I also pass out, and by what being firmly settled, shall I also become firmly ensconced”; (Prashna 6.3), “He created the Prāṇa” (Prashna 6.4) also indicate that the ‘passing out’ etc., also depend upon the limiting adjuncts. By reason of the absence of any such ‘passing out’ the absence of any ‘straying about’ and ‘returning’ also is understood. There could not possibly be any ‘straying about’ and ‘returning’ of one, that has: not first emerged out of the body. Hence this reference to the Jīva-Self having the dimension of an Atom (Aṇu), is, like that in the case of the knowing Highest Self, because it has the quintessence of the attribute of intelligence (Buddhi) as the limiting adjunct. Just as in the chapters which deal with the meditation on qualified Brahman, the Highest Self is referred to as being “Minuter than a grain of rice or barley” (ChanU.3.1.14) by reason of its having the quintessence of that (i.e. Buddhi) as a limiting adjunct, or as “Having the structure of the mind, having Prāṇa as the body, and being one who is the quintessence of all odours” (ChanU.1.14.2), or as “Being one who is the quintessence of all tastes, whose desires are true, and whose conceptions are all true” (ChanU.3.14.2). — 29.
[Go top]
(Here the opponent of Vedānta says) — If it is imagined that the transmigratory condition of the Jīva-Self is on account of its having the quintessence of the quality of intelligence, then it may well be, that intelligence and the Jīva-Self being different from each other, their contact will necessarily have to come to an end (some time) and when this intelligence thus gets disconnected from the Jīva-Self, the Jīva-Self being undiscernible when thus separated, there will result the predicament, of its not continuing in its transmigratory condition, or, of ceasing to exist altogether. The Sūtra-kāra gives a reply (to the above): —Yāvat: so long as; Ātma-bhāvitvāt: as the soul (in its relative aspect) exists; Ca: also, and; Na doṣaḥ: there is no defect or fault; Tad-darśanāt: because it is so seen (in the scriptures), as Śruti also shows that.🔗 There would he no such fault, because, it is seen (from the Scriptures) that such association (between the Jīva-Self and intelligence) continues as long as the Jīva-Self (continues to be in the transmigratory condition). — 2.3.30. No such doubt, viz., that the fault indicated towards the end of the preceding Sūtra would result, should be entertained. Whence is it so? Because this association of intelligence (Buddhi) and the Jīva-Self continues, as long as the Jīva-Self continues to be in a transmigratory condition, and, as long as its transmigratory condition does not cease as a result of correct i.e. perfect knowledge. It is only as long as this association with this limiting adjunct of intelligence continues, that the Jīva-Self has the characteristic of being a Jīva-Self and has a transmigratory condition. In the truest sense, however, as apart from such nature imagined through association with the limiting adjunct of intelligence, there is no such entity as the Jīva-Self. During the ascertainment of the proper meaning of the Vedas, no sentient Supreme Spirit (Dhātu) other than the Omniscient Lord which has the nature of being eternally free is to be met with, on considering hundreds of Scriptural passages, such as “There is no other seer, hearer, thinker and knower, other than this” (BrhU.3.7.23), “There is nothing else than this. That is the seer, hearer, thinker or knower” (ChanU.6.8.7), “That thou art” (ChanU.6.1.6), “I am Brahman” (BrhU.1.4.7) etc. How, (again it is asked by the opponent of Vedānta), is it known that this association continues as long as the Jīva-Self continues? The reply is — Because it is so seen. The Śāstra also indicates similarly thus — “He who as amongst the Prāṇas, has ‘knowledge’ as his structure, he, the Puruṣa, who is the internal light in the Hṛd, who assuming the likeness (of the intellect) moves about in both the worlds, and meditates as it were, and vibrates as it were” (BrhU.4.3.7). There the meaning of having knowledge as his structure, means having intelligence (Buddhi) as his structure, because elsewhere, in the passage “Having knowledge, mind, Prāṇa, the sense-organ of sight, and the sense-organ of hearing as his structure”, having knowledge as its structure is stated along with the mind etc. By the expression “Having the structure of intelligence”, having the quintessence of the quality of that (i.e. intelligence), is meant, just as by ‘Deva-datta the libertine’, one who mainly has a passion for women is meant. Moreover, the passage “Who (i.e. the Jīva-Self) being like (intelligence) moves about in both the worlds” shows, that even when the Jīva-Self goes to another world, it is not separated from intellect. (If we ask ourselves the question) whose likeness does it have when it moves?, (the explanation is) — from its proximity with intelligence, we understand that intelligence (Buddhi) is meant, and that same thing is indicated by, “Meditates as it were, vibrates as it were” (BrhU.4.3.7), which does not mean that it itself meditates or vibrates, but it meditates as it were and vibrates as it were, vicariously, through intelligence, as it (i.e. the intelligence) meditates and vibrates. Again, this contact between the Jīva-Self and intelligence is due to false-knowledge. False-ignorance is not removed until true knowledge dawns, and as long as the knowledge, that the Self is Brahman, does not supervene, this association of the Jīva-Self with intelligence does not come to an end. The Scriptural passage also indicates the same thing, thus — “I have understood this great Puruṣa, who is endowed with the self-refulgent lustre of the Sun, and who is beyond the darkness of ignorance. It is only by knowing Him (i.e. the Highest Puruṣa) that a person transcends death. There is no other way to final emancipation” (SvetU.3.8). — 30.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) with respect to the conditions of deep sleep and universal dissolution (Pralaya), it is not possible to understand that the Jīva-Self has any connection with intelligence (Buddhi) because the Scriptures say — “Oh mild one, he then becomes one with the Highest Self (‘Sat’) i.e. becomes merged into his own Self” (Cbhan. 6.8.1). Besides it is also understood that there is a dissolution of the entire creation. How then, can it be, that there is connection of the Jīva-Self with intelligence as long as the Jīva-Self endures (in the transmigratory condition)? To this the reply is: —Puṃstva-ādivat: like the virile power etc.; Tu: verily, but; Asya: its, i.e., of the connection with the intellect; Sataḥ: existing; Abhivyakti-yogāt: on account of the manifestation being possible, because of appropriateness of the manifestation.🔗 Because, like virility, though it (the connection between intelligence and the Jīva-Self) already exists (in a seed form) it merely becomes manifest (later on). — 2.3.31. Just as in the ordinary world, virility etc. which do exist in a seed form during childhood and are not then recognizable as such, and are therefore considered to be non-existent, become manifest on the advent of adolescence i.e. puberty etc. — and it is not, as if they do not exist (in childhood) but spring up (later on), because, were it to be so, there would be the predicament of their manifesting themselves in the case of eunuchs also — , similarly, this embodied Jīva-Self’s connection with intelligence, even though it does exist as a potential power, during deep sleep or universal dissolution, becomes manifest on (a person’s) waking up, or at the time of creation (after every Pralaya). It is only in this way, that it is logical, because, nothing really can possibly spring into existence capriciously (i.e. without a cause), as, otherwise, there would be the predicament of an effect coming into existence unwarrantably, without a cause. The Scriptures moreover indicate how the waking up (of a man) from deep sleep (in the same transmigratory condition as before) is caused by the existence of ignorance (Nescience) in its seed form, thus — “Having merged in the Highest Self (Sat) they fail to realize that they have so merged”, “All those who here (in this world) are (some particular entity), whether they be a tiger or a lion or a wolf etc., (that again they become)”. (ChanU.6.9.3). Therefore, it is established that this connection of the intelligence with the Jīva-Self continues as long as the Jīva-Self continues as such (i.e. up to the time the Jīva-Self attains Final Release from limiting adjuncts). — 31.
[Go top]
Nitya-upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-prasaṅgaḥ: there would result perpetual perception or non-perception; Anyatara: otherwise, either of the two; Niyamaḥ: restrictive rule; Va: or; Anyathā: otherwise. (Upalabdhi: perception, consciousness; Anupalabdhi: non-perception, non-consciousness.)🔗 Otherwise (i.e. if the existence of the internal sense organ i.e. Āśrama is not assumed) there will either he constant perception or constant non-perception (on the part of the Jīva-Self) or else one of the two (viz. Jīva-Self or the Āśrama) will have to be understood to be subject to a limitation (of its power). — 2.3.32. This internal sense-organ which constitutes itself as the limiting adjunct of the Jīva-Self, is referred to in a different place, as mind or intelligence or knowledge or thought. Occasionally by the division of its modes, it is termed as ‘the mind’ when it functions as the doubter, and as ‘intelligence’ when it has the function of arriving at some specific determination. Now an internal-organ of this type must necessarily be understood to exist, because, if it is not so understood there would be the predicament of there being either constant perception or constant nonperception. When the embodied Jīva-Self, the organs of sense and objects of sense which constitute the means of perception, are together (in combination) there would be constant perception, and if, even when such causes exist together, their result is absent, then there would constantly be non-perception. But it is never observed to be so. Or perhaps, it will have to be understood that there is an impediment to the power either of the Jīva-Self or of the organ-of-sense. An impediment to the power of the Jīva-Self is not possible, because it is not subject to any modification (of itself). Nor can it be so in the case of the organ-of-sense, because when an organ-of-sense has its power unimpeded during an earlier and a later moment, its power cannot be subject to any impediment, capriciously, (during the intervening moment). Therefore, that (entity) by whose awareness or want of awareness, perception or non-perception respectively result, is the mind. The Scriptures also declare similarly, thus — “I was absentminded, that is why I did not see. I was absent-minded and hence I did not hear” (BrhU.1.5.3), “It is by the mind that one sees or hears” (BrhU.1.5.3). The Scriptures also indicate, that desires etc. are its (mind’s) modes, thus — “Desire, volition, doubt, faith, disbelief, constancy, want of constancy, shame, reflection, fear — all this is but the mind only” (BrhU.1.5.3). Therefore, it is but appropriate that the reference to it (i.e. the Jīva-Self as having the dimension of an Atom i.e. an Aṇu) is because “it has the quintessence of that” (i.e. intelligence). — 32.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Kartā: agent; Śāstra-arthavattvāt: in order that the scriptures may have a meaning, on account of the scriptures having a purport.🔗 This (Jīva-Self) is the Agent, because (it is only thus) that the Śāstra (i.e. the Scriptures) can have a purpose. — 2.3.33. Along with the same topic, viz., that of the Jīva-Self having the quintessence of the quality of intelligence, another characteristic of the Jīva-Self also, is elaborated (by the Sūtra-kāra). This Jīva-Self is in fact an agent. How so? Because it is only thus that the Śāstra (the Scriptures) can have a purpose. It is only in this way, that the Śāstra (the Scriptures) purporting to give injunction such as “He should sacrifice”, “Give oblation (to the sacrificial fire)”, “Give away (gifts)” can have a proper purpose. Otherwise, it would be purposeless. It is precisely because the Jīva-Self is an agent (a doer, i.e. Kartā), that an instruction as to a particular special duty is given (by the Śāstra i.e. the Scriptures). Supposing there were to be no such capacity as an agent (in the Jīva-Self) it (i.e. instruction as to a particular special duty) would not be reasonably sustainable. Similarly it is only thus, that the Scriptural statement “He who has the nature of knowledge is the seer, hearer, meditator and knower, agent” (Prashna 5.9) can have a purpose. — 33.
[Go top]
Vihāra: wandering at will, play, sporting about; Upadeśāt: on account of declaration, as Śruti declares.🔗 Because there is instruction (in the Scriptures) about the wanderings of the Jīva-Self. — 2.3.34. This is again why the Jīva-Self is an Agent (i.e. a doer), because the Scriptures, in the chapter dealing with the Jīva-Self, give instruction that in the dream condition the Jīva-Self strolls about thus: — “He the immortal one, goes about at pleasure” (BrhU.4.3.12), “Moves about at pleasure in his own body” (BrhU.2.1.18). — 34.
[Go top]
Upādānāt: on account of its taking (the organs).🔗 Also because (the Jīva-Self) employs i.e. uses (the organs-of-sense i.e. instruments). — 2.3.35. This is again why the Jīva-Self is an agent, because in the Scriptures in the chapter dealing with the Jīva-Self, there is mention about the Jīva-Self using the organs-of-sense i.e. instruments thus: — “(The Puruṣa) having by means of his intelligence, taken to himself the power of perception, from the organs-of-sense” (BrhU.2.1.17), “Taking up his Prāṇas (i.e. sense-organs) with him” (BrhU.2.1.18). — 35.
[Go top]
Vyapadeśāt: on account of mention, from a statement of Śruti; Ca: also, and; Kriyāyām: in respect of performance of rites; Na cet: if it were not so, or else, otherwise; Nirdeśa-viparyayaḥ: reversal of the statement, change of designation.🔗 (The Jīva-Self is an agent (Kartā), also because of the mention of the Jīva-Self as the agent, with respect to action. (Were the Jīva-Self) not designated (as the agent) of action (by the word Vijñāna) a designation of a converse nature (about it) would have been made by the Scriptures). — 2.3.36. This again why the Jīva-Self is an agent (Kartā), because the Śāstra (the Scriptures) designates the Jīva-Self as the agent both in secular and Vedic actions, thus: — “‘Vijñāna’ (Understanding i.e. the Self which has understanding) performs the sacrifice and actions also” (TaitU.2.5.1). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), by the word ‘Vijñāna’ it is intelligence that is understood. How ever then can the Jīva-Self be indicated, by it, to be the agent? We reply — No, this designation precisely is of the Jīva-Self and not of intelligence. Were it not to be the designation of the Jīva-Self, then there would have been a converse designation, thus — ‘Vijñānena’ (By means of understanding), because it is seen in other places that when by the word ‘Vijñāna’ intelligence (Buddhi) is meant to be designated, the designation is by the use of the instrumental case (Tritīya i.e. Karaṇa-Vibhakti) thus — “Having by means of ‘Vijñāna’ i.e. intelligence (i.e. Buddhi) taken to himself ‘the power of knowing’ (of the sense-organs)” (BrhU.2.1.17). On the other hand, here, the designation being in the same case-ending as that of the agent (i.e. the Jīva-Self), thus — “Vijñānam (the Ātmā) performs the sacrifice” (TaitU.2.5.1), it suggests the agency of the Self which is different from intelligence (Buddhi), and so it is faultless. — 36.
[Go top]
Here (the opponent of Vedānta says) — If the Jīva-Self, an entity distinctly different from intelligence (Buddhi) were to be the agent, then being independent, it would as a rule uniformly do only that which is dear and beneficial to itself, and not the other way (i.e. against its own interest), but it is observed to be doing even that which is contrary (i.e. against its own interest). It is not reasonably sustainable therefore that there should be any such non-uniform tendency in the Jīva-Self. The reply (of the Vedāntin) is: —Upalabdhivat: as in the case of perception; A-niyamaḥ: (there is) no rule.🔗 As in the case of perception there is such non-uniformity (of tendency in the Jīva-Self). — 2.3.37. Just as the Jīva-Self, independent though it is, so far as its power of perception is concerned, perceives both what is desirable and undesirable in a non-uniform manner, even so, it also may well do both what is desirable and what is undesirable in an equally non-uniform manner. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that even in the case of perception there is no such independence (in the Jīva-Self) because of its dependence on the employment of the means of perception, we reply — No, because the acquisition of the means of perception has merely the purpose of presenting the objects of sense (to the Jīva-Self) and in as much as the Jīva-Self possesses intelligence, it has not to depend upon anything else, in the matter of perception. Besides even so far as purposive actions are concerned, there never is complete independence in the Jīva-Self, because it has to depend upon particular environment, time and causes. It is not, that an agent ceases to be an agent, merely because he depends upon such auxiliaries. A cook, even though, in the matter of cooking, he has to depend upon fuel and water, he nevertheless still has the culinary ability in him. The tendency of the Jīva-Self, therefore, towards doing both desirable and undesirable actions in the non-uniform manner, is not contradictory merely because of the variety of the auxiliaries of actions. — 37.
[Go top]
Śakti-viparyayāt: on account of the reversal of power (of the Buddhi).🔗 Because of the reversal of power. — 2.3.38. This is again why the Jīva-Self, as distinct from Vijñāna (intelligence), deserves to be the agent. Were intelligence, as understood by the word ‘Vijñāna’ to be the agent, then thereby, there would be a reversal of power, viz., the power of being the organ-of-sense, which belongs to intelligence, would be lost, and would be substituted by the power of an agent. Now, assuming intelligence to possess the power of an agent, it will have to be understood, that ‘intelligence’ itself is the subject of the ego-consciousness. Because it is the general experience that the tendency (towards activity) is preceded by the consciousness of ego, thus — I go, I return, I eat, I drink etc. When intelligence is thus understood to be equipped with the power of an agent, then another sense-organ able to accomplish all its ends, will have to be imagined to belong to it, because it is seen that notwithstanding the agent’s ability (to act), he proceeds to act through some instrument (of action). Hence, the dispute (between the Vedāntin and his opponent) is merely about the nomenclature, while there is not the least difference (between them) with regard to the entity (indicated by any such nomenclature), because it is the common ground (of both) that the agent is different from the instruments i.e. sense-organs of action. — 38.
[Go top]
Samādhi-abhāvāt: on account of the impossibility of Samādhi; Ca: and, also. (Samādhi: meditation or contemplation; A-bhāvāt: for want, for impossibility, as it becomes an impossible thing).🔗 (The Self of course is an agent) because otherwise meditation (on the Highest Self) would not be possible. — 2.3.39. The instruction that Vedānta gives with regard to meditation, which has the realization of the Highest Self described in the Upaniṣads, as its fruit, thus — “(Oh Maitreyī), the Self should be seen, heard, cogitated upon and meditated upon. He should be sought, he should be desired to be known” (BrhU.2.4.5.), “Meditate on the Self as Om” (MunU.2.2.6), would not be reasonably sustainable, if the Jīva-Self were not to be an agent. From this also it becomes established that the Jīva-Self is the agent (Kartā). — 39.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Yathā: as; Ca: also, and; Takṣa: the carpenter; Ubhayathā: in both ways, is both.🔗 Also, just as a carpenter (is seen to possess) a dual capacity (even so the embodied individual Jīva-Self also has a dual capacity). — 2.3.40. It has so far been demonstrated on the strength of reasons, such as — (only if it is considered that way) that the Śāstra can be said to have a purpose etc. — , as to how the Jīva-Self is an agent, and it is now being further considered whether such agency of the agent (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is its innate nature or whether it is caused by the limiting adjuncts. Here, (the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is) that it is because of these reasons themselves — viz. such as that the Śāstra can have a purpose, only if it is considered that way — , and also because of the absence of any reason for there being any exception to it, that the Jīva-Self’s being an agent is its innate nature. To this conclusion, we reply: — That the Jīva-Self is an agent by reason of its innate nature, is not possible, because of the predicament of there being no Final Release. If, being an agent were to be the Jīva-Self’s innate nature, there is no possibility of its ever being released from such activity as an agent, even as fire, for instance, can never be rid of its heat. There could be no attainment of the highest aim of man (i.e. Final Release) for one, who is not free from such agency, since agency is of the nature of pain. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the attainment of the highest aim of a man (i.e. Final Release) may be achieved, even while the power of action subsists, merely by the avoidance (of actions, by the agent), and such avoidance (of action by the agent), in its turn, can result from the avoidance of its cause, just as, even though fire has the power to burn, there is absence' of such action of burning, when fire is separated from its fuel. (We reply) — No, because, it is not possible for such causes, which are connected (with the Jīva-Self) through a relation of having the nature of potential power, to' be totally non-existent. But (says the opponent of Vedānta, again) Final Release may still be achieved by the Jīva-Self (as an entirely new acquisition) because such means of attaining Final Release are mentioned (by the Scriptures). (We reply) — No, because any thing that is dependent on such means (for its coming into existence) is necessarily non-eternal (and ergo — Final Release would be non-eternal). Besides it is declared (by the Scriptures) that Final Release is accomplished by expounding, that the Highest Self is eternally pure, enlightened, and free. Expounding in this manner cannot be possible, if the Jīva-Self’s being an agent were to be natural to it. Therefore, such agency of the Jīva-Self is due to the superimposition on it of the characteristics of the limiting adjuncts, and is not natural (to it). The Scriptures also say so, thus — “It meditates as it were, it vibrates as it were” (BrhU.4.3.7), and by the passage “The wise call him, who is endowed with body, organs-of-sense and mind, as the experiencer” (KathU.1.3.4). The Scriptures also indicate that it is the Self itself, when it is affected with limiting adjuncts, that acquires the special nature of being the experiencer etc. To those who can discriminate properly, there is no Jīva-Self as such as apart from the Highest Self, that is an agent or an experiencer, because the Scriptures have declared “There is no other seer than this (Highest Self)” (BrhU.4.3.23) etc. (The opponent here says), If (as you the Vedāntin say) that there is no such other sentient Jīva-Self that is of a transmigratory nature and is an agent, and is separate from the aggregate of intelligence etc., as apart from the Highest Self, then it would be that the Highest Self itself, would be one who has this transmigratory nature, and who is an agent and an experiencer. (We reply) — No, because this condition of being an agent and an experiencer is brought about by Nescience. The Śāstra (the Scriptures) also, after indicating that the Jīva-Self is an agent and an experiencer only during the condition of Nescience, thus — “Where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other” (BrhU.2.4.14), further on, rules out even the selfsame Jīva-Self’s being an agent and an experiencer, when such Jīva-Self itself attains enlightenment, thus — “When all this becomes to him but the Self only, by what can one see, and what?” (BrhU.2.4.14). Similarly (the Scriptures) having referred to the exhausted condition of Jīva-Self, caused by the contamination of the limiting adjuncts during the condition of wakefulness and dreams, similar to that of a falcon flying about in the sky, further on, refer to the absence of such, exhausted condition in the Jīva-Self when it is embraced by the Highest Self during the condition of deep sleep, beginning with “That really is its true form (Rūpa), wherein, it is one, whose desires are all fulfilled, whose only desire is merely to be itself (Ātma-kāma) and who is sans-desire and is untouched by any pain (Śokāntara)” (BrhU.4.3.21), and the Scriptures then conclude thus — “This is its highest goal, this is its highest accomplishment, its highest world, and its highest bliss” (BrhU.4.3.32). The same thing is expressed by the Ācārya (by the above Sūtra) — “Also just as a carpenter etc.”. The ‘Ca’ (Also) used in the Sūtra is used in the sense of ‘Tu’ (But). It should not be considered that the Jīva-Self’s being an agent is natural to it, in the same manner in which heat is natural to fire. Just as in the ordinary world, a carpenter who has his tools, such as an axe etc., in his hand (for working with), is an agent and is in that way conscious of pain, but, when the self-same carpenter, having laid down his tools such as the axe etc. and having reached home, is at nobody’s beck and call, relaxes and is off-duty, and thus feels happy, similarly, the Jīva-Self, while it is connected, with the notion of duality caused by Nescience, is an agent, and is unhappy during the condition of wakefulness and dreams, but when for the purpose of overcoming its fatigue it enters its own self i.e. the Highest Self and is relieved of the aggregate of actions and organs-of-sense during the condition of deep sleep, and is no more an agent, it becomes happy. Even so, in the condition of Final Release also, the Jīva-Self having the darkness of Nescience dispelled by the lamp of knowledge, and by emerging as the pure Highest Self, becomes happy. The illustration of the carpenter should be understood to apply to this extent only, viz. that the carpenter is an agent, only when he requires such definite particular tools as an axe etc. for such particular work of cutting etc., but is not an agent so far as his own body is concerned, even so, the Jīva-Self becomes an agent only as it requires organs-of-sense such as the mind etc. for all its activities, but is not an agent so far as it itself is concerned. It is not as if the Jīva-Self has limbs, like the carpenter, by which it either picks up the organs-of-sense or throws them away, just as the carpenter picks up his axe etc. by the hand or throws them away. With regard to the objection (raised by the opponent of Vedānta) that the Jīva-Self is an agent by its very nature, because thus only, can the Śāstra (the Scriptures) be said to have a purpose, (we reply) — No. So far as the Śāstra which deals with injunctions goes, it merely accepts the conventional agency of the Jīva-Self as ordinarily conceived, and gives instruction about a particular duty, but does not itself purport to establish any such agency of the Jīva-Self. We have said already that the Jīva-Self’s being an agent is not natural to it, because the Śāstra gives instruction about its true Self being Brahman. Therefore, the Śāstra of injunctions may well proceed by accepting the conventional agency of the Jīva-Self as caused by Nescience. The reference by the Śāstra (to the Jīva-Self) as “The agent, the knowing Self and Puruṣa” (Prashna 4.9) may well be of the nature of an Anuvāda and may merely refer in a conventional manner to the agency (of the Jīva-Self) as caused by Nescience. This much is sufficient also to refute (the objections of the opponent of Vedānta, about) the ‘moving about (Vihāra)’ and ‘taking up’ (Upādāna) (referred to in Sūtras 34 and 35), because they also are of the nature of an Anuvāda. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the instructions (of the Scriptures) about the ‘moving about’, thus — “In the condition of dreams while the organs-of-sense are dormant (the Jīva-Self) moves about in its own body at pleasure” (BrhU.2.1.18), indicate the agency to be of the pure Self, thus — “The Puruṣa having taken up intelligence through the intelligence (Vijñāna) of the organs-of-sense (i.e. Prāṇas).” The use of the instrumental (in Vijñānena) and objective case-endings in the case of the means such as the organs-of-sense (Buddhi etc.), intimates that the pure Self is an agent. To this, the reply is — It is not that even during the condition of dreams, there is any complete cessation of the use of the organs-of-sense of the Self, because the Scriptures, in the passage “It is along with intelligence that the Jīva-Self having entered the dream-state, goes beyond this world” (BrhU.4.3.7), also declare how the Jīva-Self even in that condition is still in association with intelligence. The Smṛti also says thus — “When the organs-of-sense are dormant but the mind is not dormant (i.e. is still working) and is experiencing the objects-of-sense, know that to be the dream-state”. The Scriptures declare that desires etc. are the modes of the mind and the same are witnessed during dream-state, therefore, (the Jīva-Self) moves about along with the mind during the dream-state. The wandering during that condition, also, is of the nature of mental impressions and not in the real sense. Thus the Scriptures also describe the activities of dream-state as qualified by an ‘as it were’, thus — “Enjoying the company of women, or laughing, or eating, as it were, or seeing frightful things, as it were” (BrhU.4.3.13). People in the ordinary world also speak about their dreams similarly — “I ascended the peak of the mountain, as it were, or, as it were, I saw the forest”. Even with regard to the Scriptural statements about ‘taking up’, even though there is an indication that the organs-of-sense are governed by the instrumental and objective cases, it should still be understood that the agency of the Jīva-Self is only while it continues to be affected by the organs-of-sense, because it has already been indicated that the pure Self as such could never possibly be the agent. In the ordinary world also, expressions (of thoughts) take various forms, thus — the warriors fight, the king fights (vicariously) through his warriors. Besides in the Scriptural mention of this ‘taking up’ (Upādāna) also, it is intended only to speak of the cessation of the activity of the organs-of-sense, and not of the independence of any thing, because, it is observed that during the condition of deep sleep there is a cessation of the activity of the organs-of-sense, even without any such deliberate intention. That reference which has been made earlier, viz. “Vijñānam (understanding i.e. Self) performs the sacrifice”, causes one to arrive at the conclusion that intelligence alone is the agent because it is well-known that the word ‘understanding’ means intelligence, and also as it is mentioned immediately after ‘the mind’, because, the Scriptural passage “Faith is its Caput” (TaitU.2.4) recites faith etc. as the limbs of the Jīva-Self whose structure is knowledge, and faith etc. are well-known to be the attributes of intelligence, and also because the complementary passage is — “All Gods i.e. sense-organs worship intelligence as the Highest and as Brahman” (TaitU.2.5.1), and also because it is well-known that intelligence is the highest and first-born, and finally, also because, from another Scriptural passage “That which is called the sacrifice comes later and later in order, of speech and intelligence (Buddhi)”, it is understood that a sacrifice is dependent upon speech and intelligence (Buddhi) for its accomplishment. Even if it be understood that the organs-of-sense are the agent, yet there is no substitution of the power of intelligence, i.e. intelligence would not lose its power as an organ-of-sense and acquire the power of an agent (i.e. Kartā), because all causes (Kārakas) have necessarily to be the agents of their own respective functions. It is only with respect to perception that the organs-of-sense are sense-organs as such, but perception itself is by the Jīva-Self. With regard to that even, there could be no agency as such in the Jīva-Self, because, eternal perceptivity is its nature. Nor can such percipient (i.e. the Self) have such agency due to its ego-consciousness, because ego-consciousness itself is an object of perception (by the Self), and even though matters stand thus, there could be no predicament of having to imagine any extraneous organs-of-sense, because intelligence itself is understood to be such an organ-of-sense. The objection, that meditation (Samādhi) would not be possible, should be understood to have already been refuted on the same ground, on which ‘that it is only thus that the Śāstra can be understood to have a purpose’ has been refuted, because it is by presupposing such conventional agency (in the Jīva-Self, as established by other authority) that an injunction about ‘meditation’ is given. Therefore, it is thus firmly established that the Jīva-Self is an agent, only in so far as it is such an agent as a result of the limiting adjuncts (and is not so in reality). — 40.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Parāt: from the Supreme Lord; Tu: but, indeed; Tat: agency, agentship; Śruteḥ: from Śruti, so declares the Śruti.🔗 But, this agentship of the Jīva-Self is caused by the transcendent (Para) Highest Lord, because the Scriptures declare it (to be so). — 2.3.41. It becomes necessary to consider, whether, with regard to this agentship of the Jīva-Self spoken of by the Scriptures and depending upon the limiting adjuncts during the condition of Nescience, the Jīva-Self is quite independent of the Lord or is dependent upon Him. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that the Jīva-Self is not dependent upon the Lord, so far as its agentship is concerned. Whence is it so? Because of the absence of any reason for such dependence (on the Lord). This Jīva-Self, subject as it itself is, to the faults of passion and aversion, and equipped as it is with all the other paraphernalia of means, may well be able to experience such agentship for itself. In what way then can the Lord help it (i.e. the Jīva-Self)? It is not generally known in this world, that in the matter of agricultural pursuits etc., in addition to a bullock, another entity such as the Lord also is needed. Were the Lord to create all these beings duly endowed with such essentially painful agentship, he would expose himself to the fault of pitilessness i.e. cruelty, and invidiousness also, in ordaining in them such agentship involving non-uniform results. But (says the Vedāntin) it has been said before (that such partiality and cruelty are not attributable to the Lord, because he depends upon the actions of the beings), viz., in Bra. Su. Bha. II. i. 34. No doubt, it has been so said and it would also be proper, provided (in the present case) such dependence (by the Lord upon actions of beings) were at all possible. Such dependence by him would be possible provided the beings possessed merit and demerit, and they would have such merit and demerit provided they were to possess agentship in them. Now if such agentship were to be dependent upon the Lord (as you the Vedāntin suggest) on what (other things, inherent in his beings) would the Lord depend? Supposing it does happen to be so (i.e. such agentship is dependent upon the Lord), then the Jīva-Self would be liable to be visited with the consequences of actions which it has not committed (because assuming that the Lord has not to depend upon the meritorious and unmeritorious actions of beings, he would have to be supposed to render such fruits, even without action on the part of beings). Therefore, its agentship is its own and is natural to it. The Sūtra-kāra refutes this conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) with the word “Tu” (But) and declares — “Is caused by the transcendent (Para) Highest Lord” (words in the above Sūtra). During the condition of Nescience, when the Jīva-Self is blinded by the darkness of ignorance, and is unable to distinguish itself to be different from the aggregate of sense-organs, this transmigratory existence, characterized by the Jīva-Self’s being an agent and an experiencer, deserves to result as sanctioned by the Lord, i.e. the transcendent Highest Self, who resides in all beings, presides over all their actions, is the immediate witness (of everything), and quickens intelligence in everybody, and Final Release also deserves to be attained only by means of true knowledge generated (in the Jīva-Self) by His grace. Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statement to that effect. Though the Jīva-Self is contaminated with faults and is equipped with all the necessary paraphernalia of means, and though in the ordinary world it is not seen that the Lord is the means or cause of such activities as agricultural pursuits etc., yet it is conclusively understood from the Scriptures that the Lord is the motivating cause of all tendencies (of the Jīva-Self). Even so do the Scriptures declare in passages of the following type — “He makes those whom he wishes to lead to the abyss, do evil deeds” (Kaush. 3.8), and “He, who, himself dwelling in the Jīva-Self, controls it from within” (Śata-patha Bra. 14.6.7.30). — 41.
[Go top]
But (still persists the opponent of Vedānta) if the Lord is the prime-mover of all actions, partiality or invidious distinctions and cruelty will necessarily attach (to the Lord), and besides, the Jīva-Self would still be visited with consequences of actions not committed by it. The reply is — No.Kṛta-prayatna-apekṣaḥ: depends on works done; Tu: but; Vihita-pratiṣiddha-avaiyarthya-ādibhyaḥ: so that the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions may not be meaningless. (Vihita: ordained; Pratiṣiddha: prohibited; A-vaiyarthya-ādibhyaḥ: on account of non-meaninglessness.)🔗 But in order that the injunctions and prohibitions etc. (in the Scriptures) may not be rendered meaningless, (it is proved that the Lord) depends upon the efforts made (by the Jīva-Self). — 2.3.42. The word “Tu” (But) has the purport of refuting the fault alleged. In causing the Jīva-Self to act, the Lord depends upon that effort in the nature of merit and demerit which is made by the Jīva-Self. Hence, those faults attributed (by the opponent of Vedānta) do not occur. Depending upon the disparity between meritorious and unmeritorious actions of the Jīva-Self, the Lord serving merely as the accidental cause, like the rain, distributes these unequal fruits of the meritorious and unmeritorious actions of the Jīva-Self, even as, in the ordinary world, rain is the common cause, by which large and small creepers etc., or rice and barley etc., grow up out of their own particular individual seeds. Just as, in the absence of rain or these particular seeds, the differences in their sap, flowers, and the green colour of the leaves (Palāśa — Chlorophyl) do not occur, even so it is just proper (to say) that depending upon the efforts made by the Jīva-Self, the Lord may give it auspicious or inauspicious fruits (of its actions). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it cannot be reasonably sustainable that the Lord depends upon the efforts made by the Jīva-Self, if the Jīva-Self’s very agentship is dependent upon somebody other than itself i.e. upon the transcendent (Highest Self). (The reply is) — This is no fault. Even though its agentship is dependent upon the Lord, it is the Jīva-Self, after all, that does, in fact, act. The Lord causes it to act in the present, depending upon what it did in the past, and He made it act in the past by depending upon what it did before even that past, and as this transmigratory existence is beginningless, the argument is thus flawless. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — How again, is it understood that the Lord depends upon the effort made (by the Jīva-Self)? The reply is — (It is to be so presumed) as, otherwise, Scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be rendered meaningless etc. It is only if it is supposed to be so in this manner that injunctions and prohibitions of the nature of “One desirous of heaven should sacrifice”, “A Brāhmaṇa may not be killed” would have any meaning, otherwise they would be meaningless, and the Lord Himself would be made a substitute for the observance of these injunctions and prohibitions (in the sense, that their work would be done by the Lord himself), inasmuch as the Jīva-Self is entirely dependent upon the Lord (i.e. he would merely be an automaton i.e. a Robot) in the hands of another (i.e. the Lord). In the same manner the Lord may vouchsafe calamities as the fruit, to a man who does what is enjoined, an$ may render good to one who does what is tabooed, and thus the authority of the Scriptures would be undermined. The Sūtra-kāra by the word ‘etc.’ in the Sūtra, indicates that were the Lord not to depend upon the efforts of men i.e. of the Jīva-Selfs in the ordinary world, the efforts would be rendered meaningless, as also environment, time and causes, and there would be the predicament of all those faults referred to above, occurring. — 42.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Aṃśaḥ: part; Nānā-vyapadeśāt: on account of difference being declared; Anyathā: otherwise; Ca: and; Api: also; Dāśa-kitava-āditvam: being fisher-men, knaves, etc.; Adhīyate: read; Eke: some (Śrutis, Śākhās of the Vedas).🔗 (The Jīva-Self) is a part (of Brahman) because of the representation (in the Scriptures) of its being different from the other, and that it is also non-different (from Brahman), because, some (i.e. Ārtharvaṇikas) speak of Brahman, in another way also, as being a fisherman and a knave or a gambler etc. — 2.3.43. That, as between the Jīva-Self and the Lord there is a mutual relationship, as between one who is favoured and one who confers such favour, respectively, has already been spoken of. Now such mutual relationship is observed in the ordinary world to exist only as between those who are bound up with each other, as for instance between the master and his servant or as between the fire and its scintillae. Hence, when as between the Jīva-Self and the Lord, a mutual relationship as between one who is favoured and one who confers such favour is understood to subsist, and when it is being considered as to whether such mutual relationship between them is a relationship as between the master and his servant, or as between the fire and its scintillae, the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of the Vedānta) is, that either there is no rule as to that, or that the relationship between the Lord and the Jīva-Self is similar to that between the master and servant between whom, as is well-known, there is a relation of the nature of the ruler and the ruled. To this conclusion, the reply is — It is a part (Aṃśa). The Jīva-Self deserves to be a part of the Lord even as the scintilla is a part of the fire. When it is said that it is a part, what is meant is that it is a part, as it were. It is impossible that it could be a part in the principal or literal sense of that which is partless (i.e. the Lord). If so (intervenes the opponent of Vedānta), inasmuch as the Lord has no parts, why cannot the Jīva-Self be the Lord himself? (The reply is) — Because it has been stated that they are different. If, in fact, there were to be no difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Lord), then declarations signifying difference between them, such as “He should be searched for, to know him should be desired” (ChanU.8.7.1), “After knowing him one becomes a sage (Muni)” (BrhU.4.4.22), “Who residing within the Jīva-Self rules it from within” (BrhU.3.7.23) would not fit in properly. But (the opponent of Vedānta may say) this declaration of difference fits in very well, if it is understood that such difference is similar to the difference between the master and servant. The reply to this is — “Because some (Ātharvaṇikas) speak of Brahman in another way also” (in the Sūtra). It is not that merely by the declaration of difference (between the two), it is understood that the Jīva-Self is a part (of the Lord), but that there is a statement the other way which propounds non-difference (between them) also. The followers of one branch of the Atharva-Veda i.e. Ārtharvaṇikas, recite in the ‘Brahma-Sūkta’, that Brahman is identical with fishermen, slaves and gamblers etc. also, thus — “Fishermen are Brahman, slaves are Brahman, and these gamblers also are Brahman. Dāśas are these fishermen, slaves are those who waste themselves in the service of their master, and the others, the gamblers, all these are Brahman”, and thus the Scriptures by giving instances of these low creatures, show that all these Jīva-Selfs who have entered into this aggregate of bodies and sense-organs, brought about by names and forms, are but Brahman. Elsewhere also, in the chapter (Prakriyā) dealing with Brahman, the same sense is conveyed, thus — “Thou thyself art a woman, a man, a youth, a maiden. Thou thyself art a crabbed old man going about with a staff, and thou gettest born thus, in all ways and in all directions” (SvetU.4.3); “Having created all forms, the wise one gives them names and sits calling them by their names” (Tait. Ara. 3.12.7). The same meaning is conveyed by another Scriptural passage, thus — “There is no seer, other than this” (BrhU.3.7.23). Sentiency is common, as between the Jīva-Self and the Lord, even as heat is common, both to the fire and its scintillae. That the Jīva-Self is thus a part (of the Lord) is understood by appreciating that there is both difference and non-difference (between them). — 43.
[Go top]
Whence again is it understood that the Jīva-Self is a part?Mantra-varṇāt: from the words of the Mantra, from the letters in sacred verses, because of description given in the sacred Mantras; Ca: also, and.🔗 Also because of the words of the Mantras. — 2.3.44. The words of the Scriptural Mantras also intimate this fact, thus — “So much is its greatness, and the Puruṣa is even greater than that; His (one) foot (i.e. part) comprises all the beings, and the remaining three feet are in heaven, (and are) immortal” (ChanU.3.12.6). The Scriptures here indicate by the word ‘beings’ (Bhūtas), the entire set of immoveable and moveable things, the Jīva-Self being at their head. Also because it is said — “One who does not kill any being elsewhere than the Tīrthas (i.e. in observances according to the Śāstra, i.e. while performing sacrifices)”. Part, foot, portion, are all synonymous terms. Therefore, it is understood that the Jīva-Self is a part (of the Lord). — 44.
[Go top]
Whence again is it understood that the Jīva-Self is a part?Api: also; Ca: and; Smaryate: it is (so) stated in the Smṛti.🔗 Besides, the Smṛti also mentions similarly. — 2.3.45. In the ‘Īśvara-gītā’ also, the Smṛti mentions how the Jīva-Self is a part of the Lord, thus — “It is but my eternal (Sanātana) part, which, in the world, has become the Jīva-Self.” With regard to what has been said (by the opponent of Vedānta) viz. that it is only as between the master and servant that the relationship of the one that rules and the one that is ruled, is seen to subsist, (what we say is) — be that as it may in the ordinary world, it is, however, here ascertained through the Śāstra, that there is a relationship of a part to the whole or a relationship in which there is one that rules and one that is ruled. There is nothing contradictory in saying that the Lord who has unexcelled limiting adjuncts (such as omniscience etc.) is the one that rules, and the Jīva-Self that has inferior limiting adjuncts (such as bodies etc.) is the one that is ruled. — 45.
[Go top]
Here (the opponent of Vedānta) says — If it be understood that the Jīva-Self is a part of the Lord, then along with the sufferings of this transmigratory existence experienced by the Jīva-Self, the Lord also would suffer as well, even as in the ordinary world, by any localized pain either in Deva-datta’s hands or feet (which are parts of his body), Deva-datta, whose body it is, would himself be the sufferer. Therefore, those who have reached Godhood would suffer the greatest pain, and under such circumstances (it would seem that) even the transmigratory existence (of the Jīva-Self) in the earlier stage would be preferable (to the later stage of the greatest pain after the attainment of Godhood), and thus, there would be the predicament of true knowledge being rendered purposeless. The reply to this is: —Prakāśa-ādivat: like light, etc.; Na: is not; Evam: thus, like this, like the individual soul; Paraḥ: the Supreme Lord.🔗 Similar to light etc., the Highest Self (does not experience pain) like (the Jīva-Self). — 2.3.46. We understand on the contrary, that the Highest Lord does not experience the pain inherent in transmigratory existence, as does the Jīva-Self. The Jīva-Self having identified itself with the body, as it were, through the influence of Nescience, considers itself through ignorance, as the sufferer of pain caused to the body, but the Lord never identifies himself with a body, nor does he feel that he himself is suffering. Even in the case of the Jīva-Self, the experience of pain by it, is not in the real sense, but such experience is as it were caused by the confusion i.e. delusion due to its failure to discriminate between itself and the limiting adjuncts such as the body and the organs-of-sense, brought about by names and forms produced by Nescience. Just as the Jīva-Self experiences pain caused by burns or bruises of the body, through the confusion i.e. delusion of identifying itself with the body, similarly, through confusion i.e. delusion it experiences pain by identifying itself with the body of a son or a friend by entering into them, as it were, and by saying to itself ‘I myself am the son, I myself am the friend, and by imagining the pain suffered by a son or a friend, as suffered by itself, through its love of such a son or such a friend. From this it is definitely ascertained that the experience of pain is caused by the confusion i.e. delusion due to false identification (Abhimāna). It is so understood from positive and negative instances also, when for instance, many persons having sons and friends and having such false attachment, happen to be sitting together along with some others (who have no such sons or friends), and when it is proclaimed (by somebody) that the son or friend has died, it is only those who have such attachment in the form of a son or a friend that are stricken with grief, and not those peripatetics (i.e. Parivrājakas or Sannyāsins) who are devoid of any such false attachments. Hence, it is observed, that even in the case of persons in the ordinary world, true knowledge has a definite use or meaning (Arthavattvam). How much more will such use or meaning then be, to one, who refuses to recognize any other object but the Highest Self, which is completely devoid of any notion of being any object as such, and whose nature is of eternal sentiency? Therefore there could never be the predicament of true knowledge being purposeless (as was suggested by the opponent of Vedānta). The words ‘similar to light etc.’ (in the Sūtra) furnish the statement of an illustration, viz., just as when the solar or lunar light which occupies the Ākāśa, on being affected by such limiting adjuncts, as the little finger etc., assumes a straight or crooked aspect according as the little finger etc. are straight or crooked, but it really has no such aspect in itself, and it does not in fact become so in the real sense, or just as the Ākāśa is seen to be moving, when earthen pots etc. are moving, but it does not itself move in fact, or just as when a reflection of the sun in a water-trough appears to vibrate when the water-trough is shaken, but the sun whose reflection it is, does not vibrate in fact, even so, when the so-called Jīva-Self which is but only a portion as it were (of the Lord), and is brought into existence by Nescience and is then equipped with intellect, suffers from pain (or rather appears so to suffer), the Lord, whose part (as it were) the Jīva-Self is, is not in the least affected by any such pain. We have said already that even the supposed suffering of pain by the Jīva-Self, is caused by Nescience (and it is not real), and the Vedānta texts uniformly expound, how, when the Jīva-Self’s notion of selfhood, which is brought into being by Nescience, is itself effaced, the Jīva-Self is nothing but the Highest Self or Brahman itself, by such Scriptural passages as “That thou art” etc. Hence, there could be no predicament of the Highest Self or Brahman being affected by pain (supposed to be) suffered by the Jīva-Self. — 46.
[Go top]
Smaranti: the Smṛtis state; Ca: and, also.🔗 Smṛti also says (similarly). — 2.3.47. Vyāsa and others also say in the Smṛti, how the Highest Self is not affected by the pain suffered by the Jīva-Self, thus — “As between the two i.e. the Jīva-Self and the Highest-Self (Tatra), the Highest Self is declared by the Smṛti, to be eternal, sans-attributes, and unaffected or untouched by fruits of actions, even as a lotus leaf is not touched by water, but the other one whose nature is action (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is the one who is affected by bondage and Final Release, and again comes into contact with the aggregate of the seventeen (i.e. the body which consists of the ten organs-of sense, five Prāṇas, the mind and intellect)”. The word ‘Ca’ (in the Sūtra) means, that it should be understood to be implied, that the Scriptures also declare similarly, viz. “One of the two (i.e. the Jīva-Self) eats the sweet fruit, and the other (i.e. the Highest Self) while it does not eat, merely looks on” (SvetU.4.6), “Similarly, the one Self of all beings, who is beyond (the pale of the world), is not affected by worldly pain” (KathU.2.2.11). — 47.
[Go top]
Here (the opponent of Vedānta says), if there is then, only one internal Self of all beings, how could there be the Vedic and worldly acquiescences (Anujñā) to perform acts, and inhibitions (Parihāra) i.e. injunctions and prohibitions? (The Vedāntin says) — But it has been stated that the Jīva-Self is but a part (as it were) of the Lord. And it is reasonably sustainable, that assuming this conventional difference, these acquiescences to perform (any act) and inhibitions, which depend on such difference, may very well be there, without causing any confusion. What is it, then, to which you object? (To this, the opponent of Vedānta says) — It can’t be so, because those Scriptural passages which declare the non-difference of the Jīva-Self (with the Lord), also propound the Jīva-Self’s not being a part, thus — “After creating that, it itself entered into it” (TaitU.2.6.1); “There is no other seer than this” (BrhU.3.7.23); “One who sees all things as different, goes from death to death” (BrhU.4.4.19); “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7); “I am Brahman” (BrhU.1.4.10) etc. But (says the Vedāntin) it has been said, that it is by realizing the difference and non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self or Brahman), that ‘that the Jīva-Self is a part (of Brahman)’ is proved. (To this the opponent of Vedānta replies) — It would be like this, provided it were intended to propound both the difference and non-difference, but herein, it is the non-difference that is intended to be propounded, the attainment of the man’s aim in life being dependent upon the realization that the Jīva-Self is but Brahman only. It is the natural conventional difference that is referred to, and it has been said that the Jīva-Self cannot possibly be a part in the real sense, of Brahman, which is devoid of any part, and it is only the Highest Self, the internal Self of all beings, that subsists in the form of the Jīva-Self, and therefore, it is necessary to explain, how acquiescences and inhibitions are reasonably sustainable. We explain that as follows: —Anujñā-parihārau: injunctions and prohibitions; Deha-sambandhāt: on account of connection with the body; Jyotir-ādivat: like light etc.🔗 “Like Jyotis (i.e. Tejas) etc., injunctions and prohibitions (become feasible) by the (Jīva-Selfs) contact with a body”. — 2.3.48. Though the Self is but one only, injunctions and prohibitions of the following sort become feasible through its (i.e. the Self’s) contact with bodies, thus — injunction, for instance, that “the wife should be approached at the proper time”, or a prohibition that “the wife of a preceptor must never be approached”, or injunction that “an animal should be sacrificed as an offering to Agni and Soma”, or a prohibition that “no beings should be killed”, or even in the ordinary world, a permission that “a friend should be entertained”, or a prohibition that “an enemy should not be neglected” etc. Contact with the bodies is ‘body-contact’. Now, what is this body-contact? It means the generation of a perverse notion (in the Self) that this aggregate of body etc., is the Self itself. It is observed to exist in all beings (and is expressed thus) I go, I come, I am blind, I am perplexed, I am not perplexed, etc. Now, nothing else but true knowledge is able to remove this perverse notion, and this confusion i.e. delusion is constantly present in all beings, before true knowledge dawns, and even though the oneness of the Self is properly understood, such injunctions and prohibitions become plausible because of the notion of difference (between the Jīva-Self and Brahman) created by the Self’s contact with limiting adjuncts such as a body etc., brought about by Nescience. Then (says the opponent of Vedānta), the conclusion necessarily follows, that such injunctions or prohibitions are meaningless in the case of a person who has attained true knowledge. (We reply) — No. It is precisely because such person has accomplished his aim (Puruṣārtha) that he does not remain a fit subject for being enjoined (about such injunctions or prohibitions), for it is only he, who is fit to be so enjoined, that can be enjoined to discard or accept (this, that or any other thing). How can any one, who does not recognize anything (beyond the Ātmā) as being fit either for discarding or accepting, be possibly enjoined? The Self can never be enjoined upon receiving instruction about itself. (If the opponent of the Vedānta were to suggest) — It is precisely such person as realizes the body to be different from the Self, that is fit to be enjoined, (we reply) — No, because it is only when the notion of being bound up with the body is present in the Self, that it becomes fit for instruction. Though it is true that it is only when a person recognizes the body to be different from the Self, that he is fit to be enjoined, it is only that person who does not realize that his Self is not bound up with the body — even as the Ākāśa is not bound up (with a jar) — that considers himself to be fit for being enjoined. Because no person who understands that he is not bound up with a body is seen to be fit for being enjoined. How can, then, a man who realizes the oneness of Self, be ever fit to be enjoined (about either injunctions or prohibitions)? It is not, that in the case of a man who has attained true knowledge and is not therefore a proper person to be enjoined, there would be the predicament of such person behaving as it pleases him, because in all cases it is the wrong notion (about the Self being bound up with the body) that promotes action, and those who have attained true knowledge never have any such notion. Therefore injunctions and prohibitions are possible only on account of the relationship (of the Self) with the body. This is just as it is in the case of Jyotis (Tejas). Though Tejas is the same as fire Agni), fire from a crematorium only is never accepted while fire in other places is accepted. Similarly, though light of the sun is the same everywhere, it is only the light in an impure (Amedhya) place that is rejected, but not that in a pure (Śuci) place. Similarly so far as earthly things go, things such as diamonds and beryls etc. are accepted but not the human cadaver etc., or just as the excreta of a cow are accepted because of their purity, but not that of any other species. — 48.
[Go top]
A-santateḥ: on account of non-extension (beyond its own body); Ca: and; A-vyatikaraḥ: there is no confusion (of results of actions).🔗 There could be no confusion (of actions or fruits), because the Jīva-Self is not in simultaneous connection (with all bodies). — 2.3.49. (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — Injunctions and prohibitions may well be possible, even though the Jīva-Self is but one only, because of its connection with every particular different body. Again if it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that, if it is understood that the Jīva-Self is but one only, so far as its connection with the fruits of actions goes, it is bound to cause confusion, in as much as the Lord of all bodies (i.e. the Self) is but one Jīva only (even though the bodies are many), (we reply) — No, it could not be so, because of connection not being constant. There is no constant and comprehensive connection of the Jīva-Self who is an agent and an experiencer, with all bodies. It has been said already, that the Jīva-Self is subject to limiting adjuncts, and because of these limiting adjuncts not being comprehensive and constant (Asantānāt), there could be no simultaneous connection of the Jīva-Self with all bodies, and hence there could not be any confusion of actions or confusion of fruits of actions. — 49.
[Go top]
Ābhāsaḥ: a reflection; Eva: only; Ca: and.🔗 Also, (the Jīva-Self) is but merely a false appearance i.e. reflection (of the Highest Self) — 2.3.50. It should be understood, that this Jīva-Self is but merely a false appearance i.e. reflection of the Highest Self, similar to the reflection of the sun in water. It is neither the Highest Self actually, nor is it quite a different entity altogether. Hence, just as when one reflection of the sun in one piece of water vibrates, another such reflection of the sun in another piece of water does not vibrate, similarly, when one Jīva-Self is in contact with the fruits of actions, another Jīva-Self is not in contact with these fruits of action, and thus there is no confusion of Jīva-Selfs and fruits of actions. And in as much as such false appearance is caused by Nescience, it is reasonably sustainable to hold, that the transmigratory existence also, is caused by Nescience, and when this Nescience is removed, the instruction, that the Self is Brahman in the real sense, is thus reasonably sustainable. In the case of those who hold the Jīva-Selfs to be many (i.e. the Sāṅkhyas), however, in as much as the Jīva-Selfs are many and at the same time all-pervading, such confusion is unavoidable. How is it so? Because, the Sāṅkhyas hold that the Jīva-Selfs are many, eternal, of the nature of sentiency, sans-attributes, and unexcelled (by any other thing), and the Pradhāna serves the common purpose of them all, and that through the Pradhāna they all attain enjoyment and Final Release. According to the Sāṅkhyas, the Jīva-Selfs are many and all-pervading and they have a common material nature, similar to an earthen pot or a wall, and they are by themselves non-sentient, and the equally minute and non-sentient minds are their implements. From the mutual contact of the material of the Selfs and the mind, nine special attributes (Guṇas) such as desire etc. result, and each one of these qualities is connected with the Jīva-Selfs in a Samavāya relationship, without any confusion arising, and this exactly means transmigratory existence (Saṃsāra). Absolute non-existence resulting from the non-generation of these nine qualities of the Self is equivalent to Final Release. This is how the Vaiśeṣikas hold. This being so, in the case of the Sāṅkhyas, all Jīva-Selfs being of the nature of sentiency, and proximity of the Pradhāna being common to them all, when one Jīva-Self comes into contact either with pleasure or with pain, the rest also must inevitably come into contact with such pleasure or pain. (If it be said) — The activity of the Pradhāna being for the attainment of the chief aim of a man i.e. Final Release, an adjustment (by which only a particular Self will be subject to such pleasure or pain) will somehow take place, as, otherwise, such activity of the Pradhāna would happen to be only for the purpose of establishing its own greatness, and thus Final Release would not be possible, (we reply) — This is not proper. It is not possible to understand any such adjustment as depending upon the attainment of the desired aim (i.e. Final Release). It must be shown that such an adjustment is somehow reasonably sustainable. In the absence of such reasonable sustainability, the wished-for Final Release cannot take place, while on the other hand, in the absence of proof of any cogent reason for such adjustment, confusion (of actions and their fruits) is bound to take place. In the case of the Vaiśeṣikas i.e. the Kaṇādas, when the mind connects with one Jīva-Self, as the proximity of the Pradhāna is common, connection with other Jīva-Selfs would also take place, and hence, the cause being common, the fruits also would be common, and thus when one Jīva-Self is connected with pleasure or pain, all Jīva-Selfs will also simultaneously connect with such pleasure or pain. — 50.
[Go top]
The opponent of Vedānta argues — May be, an adjustment may take place on account of the ‘unseen principle’ (Adṛṣṭa). The reply of the Sūtra-kāra is — No.Adṛṣṭa-aniyamāt: There being no fixity about the unseen principle. (A-dṛṣṭa: the fate, the accumulated stock of previous actions, waiting as a latent force to bring forth fruits in future, merit or demerit acquired by the souls by thoughts, words and actions; A-niyamāt: for want of any binding rule, on account of non-determinateness.)🔗 Because, No such rule is possible, in the case of the ‘unseen principle’. — 2.3.51. The Jīva-Selfs being many, and like the Ākāśa all-pervading, and also being in proximity with every body externally as well as internally, they acquire the unseen principle as a result of meritorious and unmeritorious actions of the mind, speech and body. The Sāṅkhyas hold that it does not inhere in the Jīva-Selfs (because they are sans-attributes) but abides in the Pradhāna, which being common (to all the Jīva-Selfs), the unseen principle cannot possibly be the regulator of the enjoyment of pleasure or the suffering of pain. In the case of the Vaiśeṣikas (Kaṇādas i.e. the Atomists) also, the unseen principle — in common with the case of the Sāṅkhyas — is acquired through the connection of the mind with the body, and in the absence of any principle regulating the unseen principle of each Jīva-Self separately, the same fault (as in the case of the Sāṅkhyas) would occur. — 51.
[Go top]
(The opponent of Vedānta says) — Resolutions etc., such as ‘I want to win this fruit’, ‘I wish to avoid that fruit’, ‘I shall try for this’, ‘I shall do this’ etc., which are observed to motivate each Jīva-Self to action, may well regulate the relation of the mastery of that Self with reference to its own unseen principle. (We reply) — No.Abhisandhi-ādiṣu: in resolutions, etc.; Api: even; Ca: and; Evam: thus, like this, in the like manner.🔗 The same should be understood to be the case with such resolutions etc. — 2.3.52. As these resolutions also, which are made in the proximity of all Jīva-Selfs by the conjunction of a Jīva-Self with the mind, are common to all Jīva-Selfs, they are not reasonably sustainable, because in the absence of any cause for such adjustments, the fault referred to above does attach to them, all the same. — 52.
[Go top]
Pradeśāt: on account of particular locality or environment, from (difference of) place; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Na: not so, the argument cannot stand; Antar-bhāvāt: on account of the self being in all bodies.🔗 If it be said (that an adjustment of pleasure and pain would take place) because of (every Self) having its own separate part (Pradeśa, in each individual body), (we reply) no, because of the inclusion (Antar-bhāva, of all the Jīva-Selfs in all bodies). — 2.3.53. If the opponent of Vedānta were to say, that even though the Jīva-Self is all-pervading, its connection with the mind which has its seat in the body, will necessarily occur only with that particular restricted part of the Self which is circumscribed by that particular body, and hence an adjustment of the resolution, unseen principle, pleasure and pain, will be accomplished by such particular restricted part, even that is not reasonably sustainable. How is it so? On account of the ‘inclusion’. As all the Selfs have the common nature of being all-pervading, they will all be included in all bodies. Besides, it is not possible for the Vaiśeṣikas to imagine any such part of the Jīva-Self, as being circumscribed by any particular body. And even if it is so imagined, as such an imaginary part of the Self, which is devoid of any separate parts, would exist but in imagination only, it will not be able to regulate an action in the highest real sense. It would not be possible to determine that a body created in the proximity of all the Jīva-Selfs, belongs to any one particular Jīva-Self and no other. And even if it be understood that these Jīva-Selfs have such particular parts, two Jīva-Selfs who have to experience similar pleasure or suffer similar pain may perhaps do so in one and the same body, inasmuch as the unseen principle of both may perhaps abide in one and the same part. Moreover, it is observed, that when Deva-datta has physically left that particular place where he has actually experienced pleasure or pain, and such place is subsequently occupied physically by Yajña-datta, he also experiences similar pleasure or pain, as the other, and it would not be so, unless the unseen principle of both Deva-datta and Yajña-datta were to occupy the same region. Besides, in the case of those who consider that the Selfs have parts, there would be the predicament of the absence of enjoyment of heaven etc. because such unseen principle would be produced in the body of a Brāhmaṇa etc., but the enjoyment of heaven etc. would belong to a different region. Besides, in the absence of an illustration, the all-pervading nature of all these diverse Jīva-Selfs would not be reasonably sustainable. You (the opponent of Vedānta) had better say what these entities are which are at once many and yet occupy one common region. If you were to say that form (Rūpa) etc. are such entities, (we reply) — No, inasmuch as these forms (Rūpa) etc. are to that extent identical with the entities to which they belong, and the forms themselves, besides, have different essential characteristics. But there is no difference in the characteristics of these diverse Selfs. If the opponent of the Vedānta were to say, that difference in the characteristics (of the Self) may be reasonably sustainable on the strength of an inference about the ultimate special differences i.e. ultimate essential characteristics (Antya-viśeṣa) (we reply) — No, because the conception of differences in the characteristics of the Selfs and the conception of the ultimate essential characteristics would be open to the fault of mutual interdependence (or a logical see-saw). The Vedāntins moreover do not concede that the Ākāśa etc. are all-pervading, because, they understand them to be created entities. Therefore, it is thus proved that the doctrine of the unity of the Self, alone, is flawless. — 53.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tathā: thus, likewise, similarly, like the creation of the five primal elements as stated in the previous section; Prāṇaḥ: the Prāṇas, the organs.🔗 In a similar way, the vital airs (i.e. Prāṇas are created). — 2.4.1. By the third Pāda, the conflict of Scriptural passages with respect to the topic (about the creation) of the Ākāśa etc. has been cleared up. Now by this fourth (Pāda, the conflict) with respect to the topic (about the creation, number and real nature) of the vital airs (i.e. Prāṇas) is being cleared up. So far as that topic on the subject of Genesis is concerned, in the Scriptural passages such as “It created the Tejas” (ChanU.6.2.3), “From this ‘Self’ the Ākāśa came into being” (TaitU.2.1.1) etc., the creation of Prāṇas is not mentioned, while occasionally, the noncreation of the same is referred to, in.-as much as, in passages such as “In the beginning, this (i.e. the world) was non-existent” (Tait 2.7), “They asked, what was that, that was non-existent? Verily the ‘Ṛṣis’ were then, in the beginning, non-existent. They asked, what are these Ṛṣis? The Prāṇas verily are the Ṛṣis”, the Scriptures speak about the existence of the Prāṇas prior to Genesis. In some other places the Scriptures recite the creation of Prāṇas also thus — “Just as from a glowing fire minute scintillae fly around, similarly from the Self, the Prāṇas issue forth”; “From this (Ātmā) are born Prāṇas, the mind, and all sense-organs” (Mund 2.1.3); “From it the seven Prāṇas are born” (MunU.2.1.8); “He created the Prāṇa and from Prāṇa, faith, space, air, Jyotis, waters, Earth, sense-organs, mind and food” (Prashna 6.4). The conclusion arrived at — from the conflict of Scriptural passages, and the lack of ascertainment of any reason for determination — is, that there is nothing that is reasonably sustainable, or rather, as the Scriptures have mentioned the existence of Prāṇas) prior to the Genesis, the conclusion arrived at is that the Scriptural passages which speak of the creation of Prāṇas are in a metaphorical i.e. in a secondary sense. To this, the Sūtra-kāra replies — “Also in a similar way, the vital airs (are created)”. How, it is asked (by the opponent of Vedānta), in the absence of any relevant standard of comparison (Upamāna) here, is the word ‘Tathā’ (in a similar way) appropriate (Akṣarānulomyam)? Towards the end of the last preceding Pāda, the finding of a fault in the opinion of those, who hold that there are many Jīva-Selfs and that they all are all-pervading, was the relevant point, which of course cannot be the standard of comparison here, because of the absence of similarity. It is only when there is similarity that anything can be said to be the standard of comparison. As for instance — As the lion is, so is Bala-varmā. If it be said (by the Vedāntin), that it (i.e. the word ‘Tathā’) is meant for the purpose of explaining the similarity of Prāṇas with the ‘unseen principle’ (Adṛṣṭa), viz. that, as the ‘unseen principle’ is generated in the proximity of all the Jīva-Selfs, it is not possible to determine, as to what particular Jīva-Self’s unseen principle it is, similarly, it is not possible to determine with respect to all the Ātmās generally, as to what particular Jīva-Self, the Prāṇas belong to; then (we the opponents of Vedānta reply) — that, as it has already been explained by saying that as there is no rule about a particular body belonging to a particular Self, it is as good as explained (that the same is the case about Prāṇas) and so this Sūtra would be merely a repetition. It is not possible to compare the Prāṇas with the Jīva-Self, inasmuch as it would contradict the conclusion to be arrived at here, because it has already been said that the Self is not created, while it is intended to state here that Prāṇas are (created). Therefore (says the opponent of Vedānta) it strikes us that this word ‘Tathā’ (in a similar way) is inappropriate here. (We the Vedāntins reply) — No, because even here a connection (of the Prāṇas) with a standard of comparison (Upamāna), in the Scriptural illustration used (in the Sūtra) is reasonably sustainable. Here, passages which speak of the creation of Prāṇas are the illustration used, such as — “From this Self all Prāṇas, all worlds, all Gods, all beings are created” (BrhU.2.1.20), — the meaning of which is, that just as the world etc. are created from the Highest Self, so are the Prāṇas. Similarly it should be understood, that in the passage “From him are produced the Prāṇas, mind, all the sense-organs, space (Ākāśa), air (Vāyu), light (Tejas), water and earth which supports everything” (MunU.2.1.3) also, that the Prāṇas, like space, etc., are created (is mentioned). Or in the alternative, one could rely upon such remote connection with a standard of comparison (Upamāna), as is understood in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (Jai. Su. 3.4.32) — “Like the bad omen of throwing up i.e vomiting of a Soma drink (during Paundarīka-sacrifice)”, where it is construed to be connected with a very remote standard of comparison, thus — Just as in the preceding Pāda it is understood to have been mentioned that the Ākāśa etc. are the modifications (result as from causes) of the Highest Brahman, so it should be understood here also, viz. that the Prāṇas are the modifications of the Highest Brahman. It is asked (by the opponent of Vedānta) again, on what ground is the creation of Prāṇas based? (The reply is) that it is so mentioned in the Scriptures. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — But we have said that in some places the creation of Prāṇas is not mentioned. (The reply is) — The non-mention of a thing in one place cannot invalidate what is mentioned elsewhere (about that thing). Hence, it being common (both to Ākāśa and the Prāṇas) that the Scriptures speak of their being created, it is properly said, that like Ākāśa etc., the Prāṇas also are created. — 1.
[Go top]
Gauṇī: secondary sense; A-sambhavāt: on account of impossibility, as it is impossible, being impossible.🔗 (That Prāṇas are created is proved) because of a metaphorical sense not being possible. — 2.4.2. The suggestion again — that the Scriptural passage about the creation of Prāṇas is in a metaphorical sense, because the Scriptures mention the existence of Prāṇas before the Genesis — is now refuted (by the Sūtra-kāra) by the Sūtra thus — “(That Prāṇas are created is proved) because of a metaphorical sense not being possible”, because, otherwise, there would be the predicament of having to abandon the original declaration. Having made the original declaration (by implication), by the Scriptural passage “By knowing what, Oh Bhagavān, all this becomes known?” (MunU.1.1.3), — viz. that by the knowledge of one, all becomes known, it is further declared in order to prove it, thus — “From it the Prāṇa is created” (MunU.2.1.3). That original declaration, can only be held proved, provided it is assumed that the whole world including Prāṇa etc., is a modification of Brahman, because of the fact, that a modification (i.e. an effect) thus can never exist as apart from its material cause (Upādāna-Kāraṇa). If the Scriptural passage about the creation of Prāṇas, were to be in a metaphorical sense, the original declaration will, in that case, have been abandoned (because if Brahman is not the material cause of Prāṇas, they will not be known, even if Brahman is known). Again, a concluding statement about the subject-matter of the original declaration is also made (by the Scriptures) thus — “The Puruṣa (i.e. Brahman) alone is all this ‘Karma’ (action), ‘Tapas’ (penance), and the transcendent and immortal Brahman” (MunU.2.1.10); “This universe is but Brahman and it is the Highest and the Best” (MunU.2.2.11). Similarly, the Scriptural passage “All this becomes known by seeing, hearing, cogitating upon, and by knowing, the Self” should be understood as making the same declaration. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — How then, is there the Scriptural statement about the existence of Prāṇas prior to the Genesis? (We reply) — It is not with reference to the root-cause (i.e. Brahman), because it is understood from the Scriptural passage “(It i.e. Brahman is) sans-Prāṇa, sans-mind, pure, and transcending the High imperishable” (MunU.2.1.2) that the root-cause is devoid of any such special characteristics as Prāṇa etc. This assumption about the existence of Prāṇas prior to the Genesis, should rather be understood to be with reference to the subsequent cause (Brahma-deva i.e. Hiraṇya-garbha, which itself is an effect of Brahman), as, viewed with reference to effects emanating from such subsequent cause (Brahma-deva) itself, because, it is understood as established from both the Scriptures and the Smṛtis, that the several conditions of things evolved and made manifest by names and forms have an interrelation of cause and effect as between themselves (such as that between clay and a pot etc.). In the topic about the Ākāśa (beginning of Pāda III above), the Sūtra (which has exactly the same words as in the present Sūtra) being a Sūtra which states the view of the opponent of Vedānta, it was explained as follows — that the Scriptural passage about the creation (of Ākāśa) is in the metaphorical sense, because of the impossibility (of the creation of Ākāśa). There the conclusion (that the Ākāśa is a creation) was established on the ground, that to hold otherwise (as the opponent of Vedānta suggests) would involve the abandonment of the original declaration. Here the very same words are used, as a Sūtra establishing a conclusion (of the Vedāntin), and it’ is construed to mean — “Because of a metaphorical sense not being possible”. Those who would understand the present Sūtra to have the same meaning as the previous Sūtra, would, in that case be ignoring the fact, that they would thus be overlooking the conclusion which would be arrived at necessarily, viz. that it would lead to the abandonment of the original declaration. — 2.
[Go top]
Tat: that; Prāk: first; Śruteḥ: from Śruti, on account of the Śruti text being mentioned; Ca: and, also.🔗 Also because it (i.e. the verb Jāyate) is used by the Scriptures earlier (with reference to Prāṇas). — 2.4.3. This is again why the Scriptural mention with regard to the creation of Prāṇas, similar to that of the Ākāśa, is in the principal sense (and not in the figurative sense), viz., that the same word ‘Jāyate’ which means ‘is born’ and is used by the Scriptures earlier in the case of Prāṇas, happens to apply (later on) also to the Ākāśa etc. which come after Prāṇas. In the Scriptural passage “From this is born the Prāṇa” (MunU.2.1.3) it has already been established that the creation of Ākāśa etc., is in the principal sense; therefore, in common with it, the word ‘Jāyate’ in the case of Prāṇas also deserves to be in the principal sense. It is not possible to interpret the same one word, which is pronounced only once, in one and the same chapter and sentence, and which applies to more than one (thing), as being in the principal sense in one case, and in a figurative sense in another, because, otherwise, there would be the predicament of a word having a disparity of form (of being both in the principal and the figurative sense). In the same way, in the Scriptural passage “He created the Prāṇa, and then faith from Prāṇa” (Prashna 6.4), the word ‘created’ used by the Scriptures in the case of Prāṇa applies afterwards to ‘faith’ etc., which also are subject to being born. The same reasoning applies, where a word implying ‘being born’ (Jāyate), which is used later on in the Scriptures, relates to a thing mentioned earlier, as for instance, the word ‘spread out’ or ‘come forth’ (Vyuccaranti) recited towards the end, in “all beings spread out”, also relates to the foregoing Prāṇas etc. — 3.
[Go top]
Tat-pūrvakatvāt: being preceded by them (the elements); Vācaḥ: of the organ of speech.🔗 Because the Scriptures mention that speech (and the Prāṇas and mind) are born from (the elements), therefore, it is established that Prāṇas are liable to be created. — 2.4.4. Even though in the earlier chapter, dealing with “it created Tejas” (ChanU.6.2.3), the creation of Prāṇas is not mentioned, but only the creation of the three elements (Tejob-anna, that is, the Tejas, water and earth respectively) is mentioned, still as ‘Speech’, ‘Prāṇa’ and the ‘Mind’ have been stated to have been born from ‘Tejas’, ‘Water’ and ‘Earth’ respectively, and as having Brahman as their cause, therefore, in common with them, it comes to be established that all the Prāṇas also, deserve to have their origin from Brahman. Similarly, that speech, Prāṇa, and the mind are preceded by Tejas, Water and Earth respectively (as their cause), is spoken of in the same chapter, thus — “Oh mild one, mind has an earth-structure, Prāṇa a water-structure, and speech a Tejas-structure” (ChanU.6.5.4). Here, if the Scriptural statement that these mind etc. have the structure of earth etc., respectively, is in the principal sense, then, that they (i.e. speech, Prāṇas, and mind) are created from Brahman, of course follows. Supposing the Scriptural statement to be in a figurative sense, still, as the Scriptures speak of the evolution by names and forms as being effected by Brahman, and as (the Scriptures) in the introductory portion declare thus — “By which, what is not heard, becomes heard” (ChanU.6.1.3), and as they in the concluding portion say — “In it, all this that is, has its Self” (ChanU.6.8.7), and as it is well-known to be so from other Scriptural passages also, it is understood, that the statement, that these mind etc., have the structure of earth etc., is made only for the purpose of elaborating the fact of their being the effects of Brahman, and therefore also, it comes to be established that the Prāṇas are the modifications (i.e. effects) of Brahman. — 4.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Sapta: seven; Gateḥ: from the movement, being so known (from the scriptural passages); Viśeṣitatvāt: on account of the specification; Ca: and.🔗 Prāṇas are seven, because, it is understood (from the Scriptures) and also because of their being detailed (as seven). — 2.4.5. The conflict of the Scriptures with respect to the ‘creation’ of Prāṇas has been removed. Now it is proposed to remove the conflict with regard to their number. The Sūtra-kāra will speak about the Chief Prāṇa later on. For the present he would determine, as to how many these Prāṇas are. The doubt (about their number) arises, because of the conflict of the Scriptures. In one place, they are said to be seven, thus — “From it the seven Prāṇas are born” (MunU.2.1.18). In another, that, as having the attribute of sense-organs, they are eight, thus — “The sense-organs (are) eight and (there are) eight sense-objects” (BrhU.3.2.1); somewhere, (they are mentioned) as being nine, thus — “Seven Prāṇas verily are located in the head, and (there are) two lower ones” (Tait. Sam. 5.1.7. 1). In some place (they are mentioned) to be ten, thus — “There are indeed nine Prāṇas in a person, and the navel is the tenth”; and in another place as being eleven, thus — “There are ten Prāṇas in a man, and the Self is the eleventh” (BrhU.3.9.4). They are again mentioned to be twelve in some place, thus — “All sensations of touch have their abode in the skin” (BrhU.2.4.11). In some place they are mentioned to be thirteen, thus — “The eye and that which can be seen” (PrasU.4.8) etc. In this manner the Scriptures are in conflict, as to the exact number of Prāṇas. What then is your (i.e. of the opponent of Vedānta) conclusion? That the Prāṇas are seven only. Whence is it so? Because it is so understood from the Scriptures, thus — “From it the seven Prāṇas are born” (MunU.2.1.8); and they are detailed as — “Seven verily are the Prāṇas in the head”. But (says the Vedāntin) in the Scriptural passage “Seven and seven are these Prāṇas located in the cave (i.e. the human body)”, this repetition (of the number seven ‘Sapta’) shows that they exceed the number seven. This is no fault, (replies the opponent of Vedānta). The repetition means that taking into consideration the differences in the Puruṣas they are seven in each person, and not that the Prāṇas themselves are understood to be different according to their real nature, viz. seven of one nature, and seven of another. But (says the Vedāntin) they have also been described as being eight and so on in several places, how then, can they be seven only? (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — It is true of course that they have been so described, but it is precisely because such contradiction occurs that one definite number (of Prāṇas) has to be fixed, and the number seven has been chosen as being preferable as being the conception of a small number (Stoka-kalpanā), and it is understood, that the other numbers (exceeding seven) are referred to by Scriptures with reference only to the difference in the modes of the Prāṇas. — 5.
[Go top]
To this the reply is: —Hasta-ādayaḥ: hands and the rest; Tu: but; Sthite: being determined, being a fact, while abiding in the body; Ataḥ: therefore; Na: not; Evam: thus, so, like this.🔗 But hands etc. are there spoken of as Prāṇas, (so it should) not (be considered) that way. — 2.4.6. But other Prāṇas such as hands etc., over and above the seven Prāṇas are spoken of by the Scriptural passages such as — “The hands verily are the apprehenders (Grahas), and as they are appropriated for action by the sense-objects (Atigrahas), it is but by hands only that a man acts” (BrhU.3.2.8). It being established, that there is an excess over seven, the number seven can be explained as being included (in the greater number). Whenever there is a contradiction as to the number (of any thing) being more or less, the greater number has to be accepted, because the lesser number is always included in the greater number, but not vice versa, i.e. the greater number is not included in the lesser number. Hence it should not be maintained that Prāṇas are seven, only because it involves the preferable conception of a lesser number (Stoka-kalpanā), but by accepting the greater number, it should be maintained that there are eleven Prāṇas. The Scriptural passage which illustrates this, is — “There are ten Prāṇas in a person, with the Self (Ātmā) as the eleventh” (BrhU.3.9.4). By the word ‘Self’ here the internal sense-organ is understood, because of the chapter being about the sense-organs. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), illustrations are given about the Prāṇas being more than eleven viz. that they are twelve or thirteen. (We reply) — No doubt, such illustrations are given, but beyond a set of eleven actions, there are no other actions which would justify the conception of any additional Prāṇas than eleven. There are five sense organs of intellect, to serve the purpose of the five kinds of knowledges, having sound, touch, colour, taste and smell as their subjects, and there are five sorts of actions, viz. speaking, taking up, moving about, evacuation, and bliss (of the procreative act), with five sense-organs of action to serve their purpose, and then there is the mind, possessing many functions and serving all objects, which operates in all the three-fold division of time (i.e. past, present and future). This same mind is variously referred to as the mind, the intellect, the ego (Ahaṅ-kāra or Citta), and there is a Scriptural passage having a similar purpose, which enumerates a series of different functions such as desire etc. and says — “All this is but the mind” (BrhU.1.5.3). Besides he who considers the Prāṇas to be seven belonging to the head would in fact mean that he considers them to be four only. Though they are four they are counted to be seven because of their different locations viz. the pairs of ears, eyes, nostrils, and only one of ‘speech’. It cannot moreover be maintained that the other Prāṇas (over and above the seven) are but merely the different functions of the same seven Prāṇas, because the functions of hands etc. are entirely dissimilar (to the functions of these seven sense-organs). Similarly, when the Scriptures speak of ten Prāṇas, thus — “There verily are nine Prāṇas in a Puruṣa, with the navel as the tenth”, they are said to be so, not on the ground of their different natures as sense-organs, but only with reference to the ten vents in the body. There is no such Prāṇa as the navel, known anywhere. The navel is said to be the tenth because it also is a separate location of the Chief Prāṇa. Sometimes the Prāṇa series is enumerated for the purpose of illustration. Thus, the Scriptural statement with regard to the Prāṇas being so different, it is necessary to consider with what view a particular statement is made. It has now been firmly established, that considered in relation to their respective functions, the conclusion that they are eleven is authoritative. The following is an alternative construction of the two Sūtras (viz. Nos. 5 and 6). (The opponent of Vedānta says) — The Prāṇas are seven only, as it is understood from the Scriptures, that they are seven only, thus — “As he (the Self) goes out (of the body), the Prāṇas follow him, and as the Prāṇa goes out, all the Prāṇas (i.e. sense-organs) follow him” (BrhU.4.4.2). But (says the Vedāntin) the word ‘All’ also is recited here, so how could it be that it is understood from the Scriptures that there are only seven (Prāṇas)? Because (says the opponent of Vedānta) they are so particularized here. Only seven Prāṇas beginning with the eye and ending with the skin (Tvak), are particularized as being relevant here, because the Scriptures enumerated them in a series thus: — “When that person in the eye turns back (from the body) he ceases to perceive form (Rūpa) etc.” (BrhU.4.4.1); “They say he (the Jīva-Self) has become one (with the Highest Self) and does not see” (BrhU.4.4.2). The word “All” is always understood to mean, all that, which is relevant (to the context). Thus — When it is said that all Brāhmaṇas should be served dinner, it is only all those that have been invited that are meant and no others, so here also, only those seven Prāṇas which are relevant here, are understood by the word ‘All’ and no others. But (says the Vedāntin) here ‘Understanding’ (Vijñāna) is indicated as the eighth in the series, how then is it maintained that only seven are enumerated in the series? (The opponent of the Vedānta replies) — This is no fault, inasmuch as, even though there is a difference in their modes the ‘Mind’ and ‘Understanding’ are in their nature but one and the same, hence it is reasonably sustainable to hold, that they are seven. Therefore, the Prāṇas are seven only. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — It is realized from Scriptural passages such as “The hand is an apprehender (Graha)” (BrhU.3.2.8) that hands etc., also, are sense-organs over and above the seven. By the term ‘Graha’ their nature of apprehending is understood, in as much as the Jīva-Self is held in bondage by this bond called ‘Graha’. It is not that the Jīva-Self is held in bondage in one body, because the bondage is similar in other bodies, so that it is tantamount to saying that the bondage called ‘Graha’ is equally so in other bodies also. The Smṛti also is similar, thus — “He comes into contact with the aggregate of the eight i.e. Prāṇa etc., which becomes his indicatory mark. His bondage consists in being apprehended by them, and his Final Release means his being relieved of them”, which shows, that before Final Release is obtained there is no freedom from the bondage called ‘Graha’. Similarly in the Ātharvaṇa, while detailing the series of sense-objects and sense-organs such as “The eye and that which is seen, etc.”, hands etc. are similarly mentioned as sense-organs, along with the objects of such sense-organs, thus — “Hands and what can be taken hold of, the Upastha (the organ of generation) and what can be enjoyed, the anus and that which is evacuated by it, and the feet and the going with them” (Prashna 4.8). Similarly, the Scriptures indicate the exodus of the eleven Prāṇas from the body, thus — “These ten are the Prāṇas in a person, with the ‘Self’ as the eleventh, and while they depart from this mortal body, they cause a person to roar” (BrhU.3.9.4). The word ‘All’, which goes with the word ‘Prāṇa’, and thus speaks of all the Prāṇas without exception, cannot possibly be restricted in its application to only the seven Prāṇas on the strength of the subject matter of the chapter, because the word of the Scriptures (Śruti), when in conflict with the chapter (Prakaraṇa), has (according to the Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation) greater authority. When it is said, that all Brāhmaṇas should be served with dinner, it is logical to say that it includes all the Brāhmaṇas on the earth, on the strength of the word ‘All’, but as it is not possible to serve dinner to all of them, its applicability is restricted to only those who are invited. But here, there is no reason why the sense of the word should be contracted (to mean only seven Prāṇas). So by the word ‘All’ all Prāṇas without exception are to be taken as meant, and thus it all is flawless, when it is understood, that the mention of a series of seven Prāṇas is only by way of illustration. Therefore, it is thus established, that considered from the point of view of the word (i.e. the Scriptures) and their functions, the Prāṇas are eleven. — 6.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Aṇavaḥ: minute; Ca: and, also.🔗 The Prāṇas (i.e. sense-organs) are also of Aṇu (minute) dimension. — 2.4.7. Now, the Sūtra-kāra adds up another characteristic of the Prāṇas. Their being Aṇu in dimension means, that their form (Rūpa) is not visible, and that they are not perceptible to touch and are minute, and not that they are like Atoms (Paramāṇus) because, (were they to be atomic), there would be the predicament of their function of pervading the entire body not being reasonably sustainable. They also are minute because, were they to be gross in dimension, they would be perceivable by those who happen to be near about a dying man, as they come out of the body, like a snake from its hole. They also are limited in size, because, were they to be all-pervading, that would contradict the Scriptural statements about their emerging from the body and their going away and returning to it. Nor could it be established in that case that the Jīva-Self possesses the essence of the quality of that (i.e. intelligence). (If the opponent of Vedānta were to say) — Even if they were to be all-pervading they may function in the region of the body just as well, (we reply) — No, because, it is reasonably sustainable, that every function is an, organ-of-sense. Whatsoever is the means of perception, whether it be a function or any other thing, is according to us an organ-of-sense, hence the contention (between us) would merely be with regard to the nomenclature, and therefore any conception about their being all-pervading would be meaningless. Therefore we conclude that the Prāṇas are minute and limited in dimension. — 7.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Śreṣṭhaḥ: the best, the highest, the chief Prāṇa (vital force or life-energy); Ca: and, also.🔗 And, the superior (Prāṇa) also, (is a created entity). — 2.4.8. The Sūtra-kāra purports to extend the application of (the proposition about) Prāṇas being modifications of Brahman (i.e. as an effect from a cause), to the Chief Prāṇa. (The opponent of Vedānta, says) — It has already been stated that all Prāṇas without an exception, are the modifications of Brahman, as for instance in the Scriptural passage — “From this is born the Prāṇa, the mind, and all the organs-of-sense also” (MunU.2.1.3). Thus, the Scriptures speak separately of the creation of Prāṇa along with that of the mind and the organs-of-sense. Also because of the Scriptural statement — “He created the Prāṇa” (Prashna 6.4.). Why is then this extended application (Atideśa) made? (We reply) — To remove a further doubt. In the Nāsad-āsīya Sūkta (Ṛg-Veda Sam. 8.7.17), which has Brahman as its chief topic, there occurs the following Mantra — “There was not Death at that time (i.e. at the time of the Pralaya i.e. the great flood) nor manna i.e. ambrosia (Amṛta, fit for the Gods), nor were there the Moon and the Sun, the symbols of the night and the day respectively. It, alone by itself, was spontaneously vibrating (i.e. breathing) without the air. Nothing else then was, nor anything transcending that, existed” (Ṛg-Veda Saṃhitā 8.7.17). Now, as from the word ‘vibrating’ (Ānīt) the function of breathing is understood, it may be suggested that before Genesis, Prāṇa was in existence, and one may think therefore that Prāṇa is not subject to creation, and it is just this notion which this extended application (Atideśa) is meant to remove. Even the word ‘vibrating’ (Ānīt) does not suggest the existence of Prāṇa before the Genesis, because it is qualified by the word ‘without air’ (Avātam) and also because of the Scriptural passage “Sans-Prāṇa, Sans-mind and Pure”, by which it is indicated that the root-cause (i.e. Brahman) is devoid of any special feature or attribute such as the Prāṇas etc. Therefore the word ‘vibrating’ i.e. breathing (Ānīt) is used here only with a view to indicate the existence of a cause (before the creation of the world). The word ‘superior’ is used by the Scriptures with reference to the Chief Prāṇa, thus — “The Prāṇa verily is the oldest and the most superior” (ChanU.5.1.1). It is the oldest, because, it acquires its function simultaneously with the ejaculation of the semen (during the act of procreation), because were it not to be so, the semen ejaculated into the uterus would suppurate or would not achieve conception. The sense of hearing is not the oldest because it acquires its function after its special seat viz. the ear (Cochlea?) is developed. The Prāṇa is superior, also because of its superior qualities as shown by the Scriptural passage — “Indeed we are unable to sustain ourselves without you etc.” (BrhU.6.1.13). — 8.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Na: not; Vāyu-kriye: air or function; Pṛthak: separate, separately; Upadeśāt: because of the teaching, on account of its being mentioned. (Pṛthag-upadeśāt: because of the separate mention.)🔗 (The Chief Prāṇa) is neither air (Vāyu) nor a function (Kriyā), because the Scriptures give instruction about it separately. — 2.4.9. Inquiry is now being made as to the nature of this Chief Prāṇa. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that on the authority of the Scriptures, the Prāṇa is air (Vāyu). The Scriptures say — “That which is Prāṇa is air and it is of five sorts — Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna.” Or else according to the doctrine of another school (the Sāṅkhya school) it is but the combined function of all the organs of sense. The followers of that doctrine say — “The Prāṇa has this combined common function of all the organs-of-sense.” To this we reply — Prāṇa is neither the air nor a function of a sense-organ. Whence is this so? Because there is separate instruction about Prāṇa. There is separate instruction about Prāṇa, from that of Vāyu, thus — “Prāṇa alone is the fourth part i.e. foot (Pada) of Brahman (speech, eye and the ear being the other three, when mind is to be meditated upon as Brahman) and it shines and glows with Vāyu as its light” (ChanU.3.18.4). Now, if Prāṇa were to be merely the Vāyu, it would not be stated separately from it. Similarly, there is separate instruction about the functions of the organs-of-sense, in as much as, after enumerating speech etc. in a series, a separate instruction about Prāṇa is given in various places. Also because the function of an organ-of-sense and that which has such function are identical i.e. without a difference. Now it would not have been mentioned separately like this from an organ-of-sense, if Prāṇa were to be only its function. Such separate instruction about Prāṇa from the organs-of-sense and the air, as is given in the following Scriptural passage “From it is born the Prāṇa, the mind, all the organs-of-sense, the ether i.e. space (Kham) and the air” (MunU.2.1.3), should also be taken into account. It is not possible that all the organs-of-sense can have one function collectively, for each has a function of its own, and an aggregate of the sense-organs collectively could have no active function. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it may well be so on the strength of the maxim of ‘Pañjara-calana’ (i.e. the moving of the net). Just as eleven birds in one and the same net, each having its own separate function, join together and move the net, similarly the eleven Prāṇas existing in one and the same body, and each having its own separate function, may join together, and may acquire a common function as that of the Chief Prāṇa, collectively. (We reply) — No. That the birds, each of whom has its own separate but similar function conducive to the movement of the net, may perhaps move a net, may be quite in order, because it is actually seen to be so, but here in this case (or the Prāṇas) it does not stand to reason, that the Prāṇas (i.e. organs-of-sense), each possessing a different function of its own such as hearing etc., can get together and collectively function as the Chief Prāṇa, because there is no authority for it, and because breathing is a function absolutely different and dissimilar to the function of hearing etc. Again if the Chief Prāṇa were to be supposed to be the function of the sense-organs collectively, then the glorification of the Chief Prāṇa’s superiority, and the conviction arrived at by speech etc. of their own subordinate position, with reference to the Chief Prāṇa, would not be possible. Therefore, the Chief Prāṇa is different both from the air (Vāyu) and action (Kriyā). (The opponent of Vedānta says): How then is there a Scriptural passage as follows — “That which is Prāṇa is but Vāyu”? (We reply) — It is this Self-same Vāyu — which after having attained the Adhyātma condition and having come into connection with the body and having divided itself five-fold, and then existing in such specialized condition, that is called the Chief Prāṇa. It is an entity neither different from Vāyu, nor is it Vāyu merely, and hence there is no conflict between the Scriptural passages showing difference and nondifference (and thus seemingly appearing to contradict each other). — 9.
[Go top]
(The opponent of Vedānta here says) — It may well be then, that the Chief Prāṇa also attains freedom — like the Jīva-Self — in this body, in as much as it is superior (to the other Prāṇas i.e. organs-of-sense and the organs-of-sense are understood to stand in a subordinate position to it. Similarly the Scriptures speak of the various kinds of the exalted greatness of the Chief Prāṇa, thus — “When speech etc. are all dormant, the Chief Prāṇa alone is awake, it is not overcome by Death, it is the universal absorber, and absorbs the organs-of-sense such as speech etc., and it protects the other organs-of-sense, even as a mother protects her sons.” Therefore there is the predicament of the Chief Prāṇa — like the Jīva-Self — having independence. This view, the Sūtra-kāra refutes as follows: —Cakṣur-ādivat: like the eyes and the rest; Tu: but; Tat-saha: along with them; Śiṣṭi-ādibhyaḥ: on account of (its) being taught, because of the scriptural instructions and other reasons.🔗 But like the sense-organ of sight (Cakṣus) etc. (the Chief Prāṇa is subordinate to the Self) because instruction to that effect is given along with the sense-organ of sight etc. and for other reasons also. — 2.4.10. The word ‘but’ refutes, the (alleged) independence of the Chief Prāṇa, like that of the Jīva-Self. Just as the sense-organs of sight etc., like the subjects of a king, are instrumental towards the activity of and enjoyment by the Jīva-Self, and are by no means independent, even so, the Chief Prāṇa though this Prāṇa is, it, like the minister of a king, is a subordinate instrument of all actions of the Jīva-Self, and is not independent. Whence is this so? Because instruction about it is given along with the sense-organs such as the sense-organ of sight etc., in the “Dialogue of the Prāṇas” etc. It is appropriate that instruction about those who are similar in nature is given in a common way about all being taken collectively (by the Scriptures), like the Bṛhat and Rathāntara Sāman hymns for instance (which are always recited together). The word ‘etc.’ (in the Sūtra) indicates other reasons in refutation of the independence of the Chief Prāṇa, such as its being made up of component parts (of the five great elements) and its being non-sentient etc. — 10.
[Go top]
(The opponent of Vedānta here says) — If it be understood that the Chief Prāṇa, like the sense-organ of sight etc., is a subordinate instrument of the Jīva-Self, then, just as ‘form’ or colour (Rūpa) is the object of the organ of the sense of sight, some such corresponding object-of-sense for the Chief Prāṇa is necessary. The sense-organ of sight etc. serve as subordinate instruments of the Jīva-Self, by their individual functions such as perceiving the form or colour (Rūpa) etc. Moreover, a set of only eleven functions-of-sense, such as perceiving the form (Rūpa) etc., have been enumerated so far, for which eleven Prāṇas (i.e. organs-of-sense) are assumed (to exist). Over and above these eleven functions, no twelfth function-of-sense as such, is known to exist, for which a twelfth Prāṇa has to be understood to exist). — To this, the Sūtra-kāra gives a reply, thus: —A-karaṇatvāt: on account of (its) not being an instrument; Ca: and, also; Na: not; Doṣaḥ: defect, objection, fault; Tathā: thus, so; Hi: as, because; Darśayati: teaches, scripture shows, declares.🔗 (The Chief Prāṇa) not being an instrument (i.e. an organ-of-sense) there is no fault. The Scriptures also indicate similarly. — 2.4.11. So far as this predicament of requiring an extra object-of-sense (for the Chief Prāṇa, as an instrument of sense) is concerned, it is no fault, because the Chief Prāṇa is not an instrument or an organ-of-sense. It is not at all understood, that like the sense-organ of sight etc., the Chief Prāṇa is an instrument or an organ-of-sense, by way of its delimiting and determining any object (by cognizing it). It is not as if, because of this, it (i.e. the Chief Prāṇa) has no function (Kārya) to accomplish. How is it so? Because the Scriptures, in the ‘Dialogue of the Prāṇas’ etc., indicate the special accomplishment of the Chief Prāṇa which is impossible (of existence) in the case of the other Prāṇas (i.e. organs-of-sense). The Scriptures, beginning with “Once the Prāṇas (i.e. organs of sense) quarrelled amongst themselves as to which one of them was the most superior”, and then laying down thus — “He verily is the superior one, on whose quitting the body, it looks as if it is at its worst” (ChanU.5.1.6–7), and “thereafter demonstrating, that in spite of each one of the other Prāṇas (i.e. organs-of-sense), such as speech etc., going out of the body (one at a time), the body still continued to live even in the absence of that particular function of that particular Prāṇa (i.e. organ-of-sense), further demonstrate, how there occurred the predicament of the complete prostration of the body, and the weakening of the powers of speech etc. as a result of the Chief Prāṇa going out of the body, and they thus show, that the body and its organs-of-sense are sustained by the Chief Prāṇa alone. The Scriptures speak of this same thing, thus — “The superior Chief Prāṇa said to them, Oh, do not get perplexed, it is I that support and sustain this body (Bāṇa) by thus dividing myself five-fold.” The Scriptures also indicate, how the body is protected by the Chief Prāṇa, when the sense-organ of sight etc. are dormant, thus — “protecting this inferior nest, i.e. the body, by means of the Chief Prāṇa” (BrhU.4.3.12). And the Scriptural passage “As soon as the Chief Prāṇa goes out of any limb, it atrophies” (BrhU.1.3.19) and another Scriptural passage “By means of that Chief Prāṇa by which the Jīva-Self eats and drinks, the Jīva-Self protects the other Prāṇas (i.e. organs-of-sense)” show, that the nourishment of the body and organs-of-sense depends upon the Chief Prāṇa. Another passage indicates how the going away and staying on of the Jīva-Self, depend upon the Chief Prāṇa, thus — “By the going away of what, shall I (the Jīva-Self) go away, and by the staying on of what, shall I stay? He created the Prāṇa” (Prashna 6.3.4). — 11.
[Go top]
Pañca-vṛttiḥ: having fivefold function; Manovat: like the mind; Vyapadiśyate: is described, it is taught, it is designated.🔗 It is indicated (by the Scriptures) that, like the mind, (the Chief Prāṇa) has a fivefold accomplishment. — 2.4.12. This is why there is a special accomplishment of the Chief Prāṇa, because it is indicated by the Scriptures, that it has a five-fold mode, viz. as that of “Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna” (BrhU.1.5.3). This distinction between the modes is with reference to its five-fold accomplishment. Prāṇa has the mode of going ahead, and has the accomplishment of exhalation etc. The Apāna has the mode of going back in the reverse, and has the accomplishment of inhalation. Vyāna has its locus at the junction of Prāṇa and Apāna and is the cause of having the accomplishment of acts requiring strength of virility. Udāna has an upward mode, and is the cause of the accomplishment of going out (of the body). Samāna is the one that conveys the food juices evenly to all the parts of the body. It is in this manner that, like the mind, the Chief Prāṇa has a five-fold mode. The meaning is that just as the mind has a five-fold mode, so has the Chief Prāṇa also. The five modes of the sense-organs, such as the ear etc., as the cause, having sound etc., as their object, are well-known, but those other modes (of the mind) such as ‘desire (Kāma) and ‘resolution’ (Saṅkalpa) etc., which also are enumerated, may not be accepted here, because there would then be an excess over the number five. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) as even here, there is yet another mode of the mind which is independent of the ear etc., viz., having the (knowledge of) the past and the future as its object, this excess over the number is present here, just the same. (We reply) — Then in that case, following the maxim ‘An opinion of even an opponent which is not objected to, may, when necessary, be adopted’, the five-fold modes of the mind known in the science of Yoga, viz. ‘Right knowledge, error; imagination, slumber and memory’ (Pātañjala Yoga Sūtra 1.1.6), may be accepted here. Or, it should be understood that the mind is used as an illustration here, merely on account of its having manifold modes. It should be construed, that the Prāṇa also is a subordinate instrument of the Jīva-Self, because like the mind, it has a five-fold mode. — 12.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Aṇuḥ: minute; Ca: and.🔗 (The Chief Prāṇa) is also minute. — 2.4.13. Like the other Prāṇas (i.e. the organs-of-sense) the Chief Prāṇa also should be understood to be minute, and here also ‘minuteness’ only means being invisible to the eye and being limited (in dimension) and not that it is like a Paramāṇu (Atom), in as much as, it pervades the entire body by means of its five-fold function. It is invisible to the organ of sight because it is not observable by a person who happens to be near about (a dying person) while it is going out of (the body), and is limited (in dimension) because of the Scriptural statements about its emerging from the body, going about, and returning to the body. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), that the Chief Prāṇa is all-pervading is also mentioned (by the Scriptures) thus — “It (i.e. the Chief Prāṇa) is like a grub, a mosquito, an elephant, the three worlds and all this (which we see about us i.e. the universe)” (BrhU.1.3.22) etc. The reply is, that when it is said to be all-pervading it is meant only in its spiritual (i.e. Ādhidaivika) aspect, and with reference to its unitary and universal form, and as being the Self of all Prāṇas — like the Prāṇa of the Hiraṇya-garbha — , and not in its aspect in relation with the body (i.e. Ādhyātmika aspect). Besides, there is no fault of any kind, because it is indicated by the Scriptures which speak of its similarity to a grub etc., as to how the Chief Prāṇa which abides in every creature is limited in its dimension. — 13.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Jyotir-ādi-adhiṣṭhānam: presiding over by Fire and others; Tu: but; Tad-āmananāt: because of such statement in Sruti, on account of the scriptures teaching that.🔗 But, (the Prāṇas) have Jyotis (i.e. Tejas — light) etc. as their presiding deities, because it is so declared (by the Scriptures). — 2.4.14. It is now considered whether these Prāṇas which are the relevant subject here, are able to accomplish what they have to do, on their own (ability), or, only when presided over by deities. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they accomplish what they have to do on their own (ability), equipped as they are with the power to accomplish what they have to do. Besides, if it were to be understood that their ability is due to their being presided over by deities, then there would be the predicament of these presiding deities having to be the experiencers, and the Jīva-Self would thus cease to be such an experiencer. Hence, (it must be understood that) their activity is as a result of their own greatness. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being this, the reply to that is — “But (the Prāṇas) have deities such as the Jyotis etc. as their presiding deities.” The word “But” (in the Sūtra) thus refutes the view of the opponent of Vedānta. It is understood that this set of the organs-of-sense (Prāṇas) such as speech etc., which are presided over by deities such as Jyotis etc. and which consider Agni (fire) as their own Self, start accomplishing their own particular activity. The Sūtra-kāra also gives the reason for it, thus — “Because it is so declared (by the Scriptures)”. The Scriptures declare thus — “Agni (Tejas) transformed itself into speech and entered the mouth” (AitU.1.2.04) etc. This transformation of itself (i.e. of Agni) into speech, and its entering the mouth, is spoken of, after assuming its (i.e. of Speech) being presided over by a deity. If this relation to a deity is denied, no other specific relation of Agni with either speech or the mouth is observable. Similarly, the passage — “Vāyu transforming itself into Prāṇa entered the nose” (AitU.1.2.04) should also be construed in the same manner. Elsewhere also, (the Scriptural passage) “Speech is the fourth foot or part (Pāda) of Brahman (the eye, ear and mind, being the other three feet), it shines and gives out heat (i.e. accomplishes what it has to do) by means of Agni (Tejas)” (ChanU.3.18.3), which speaks of speech etc. being illumined (i.e. made manifest) by Agni etc., strengthens the same conclusion. The same meaning is indicated by the Scriptural passage which speaks of ‘speech’ etc. becoming Agni etc. thus — “Verily the Prāṇa helped ‘speech’ (which has precedence over all in the Udgīṭha ritual), to reach beyond death (which is of the nature of the sin of falsehood) and when thus freed from death, it (immediately) turned itself into a deity called Agni” (BrhU.1.3.12). Generally everywhere where there is an analogous enumeration of speech etc. and Agni etc. by a dichotomous division (i.e. binary classification, between that which is guided and that which guides) into Adhyātma and Adhidaivatā aspects, it is made by assuming this relation. A Smṛti passage also shows how speech etc. are presided over by Agni etc., thus — “Brāhmaṇas who have realized the truth say, that speech is Adhyātma, and that which is spoken viz. ‘the word’ is Adhibhūta i.e. a natural element, and in their case the fire is the Adhidaivatā (i.e. the divine element)”. The statement made by the opponent of Vedānta, viz. “Prāṇas act on their own, equipped with the ability to accomplish their effects”, is not correct, because, carts etc. which possess the potentiality of movement, actually move only when bullocks etc. are harnessed to them. So when such a potentiality (of movement) is reasonably sustainable either way, it is determined on the authority of the Scriptures, that the Prāṇas are presided over by deities. — 14.
[Go top]
The objection taken, viz., that there would be the predicament of the presiding deities being made the experiencers, and not the Jīva-Self, is refuted as follows: —Prāṇavatā: with the one possessing the Prāṇas (organs); Śabdāt: from the scriptures.🔗 The Prāṇas (have relation) with that to which they belong (i.e. the Jīva-Self), on the authority of the Scriptures. — 2.4.15. Even though the deities preside over the Prāṇas, it is understood from the Scriptures, that the Prāṇas are connected with that to whom such Prāṇas belong i.e. the Captain of the body and the aggregate of the instruments of action (i.e. the Jīva-Self). Even so says the Scriptural passage — “Now that Ākāśa wherein the sense-organ of sight has entered, there is the Seeing-Self (Cākṣuṣa-Puruṣa). The sense-organ of sight is for the purpose of his seeing, and he who knows that he would smell this, is the Self, the nose is what one smells with” (ChanU.8.12.4), and declares that the Prāṇas have a relation with the embodied Jīva-Self alone. Besides the various organs-of-sense have each a different deity presiding over it, and they cannot possibly be imagined to be the experiences, for it is understood, that the embodied Jīva-Self alone is the experiencer in this body, as coordination i.e. unity of the Jīva-Self and the sense-organs (Pratisandhāna) is possible, (in its case, such as — ‘I who am seeing this, am the same one, that is hearing — Ānanda-giri’). — 15.
[Go top]
Tasya: its; Ca: and; Nityatvāt: on account of permanence.🔗 Also, on account of its (i.e. the embodied Jīva-Self’s) eternal nature (i.e. Nityatva) (in the body). — 2.4.16. It is this embodied Jīva-Self that is constantly in the body as the experiencer, because of the possibility of its being affected by merit (Puṇya) and demerit (Pāpa) and the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and, not the deities who — inasmuch as they reside in an exalted sphere in the glory of power — do not deserve to be the experiencers of pleasure and pain, in this insignificant body. There is besides a Scriptural passage to that effect, thus — “It is only merit that goes to them, sin verily does not contaminate the Gods” (BrhU.1.5.20). It is only with the embodied Jīva-Self that the Prāṇas have a permanent association, because it is seen that when the Jīva-Self leaves the body, the Prāṇas follow in its wake, as is seen in the Scriptural passage — “As he (i.e. the Jīva-Self) goes out, the Chief Prāṇa follows him, and as the Chief Prāṇa goes out, all the other Prāṇas (i.e. organs-of-sense) follow in its wake” (BrhU.4.4.2). Hence although the deities are the regulators of the organs-of-sense, still the Jīva-Self’s condition of being the experiencer does not terminate thereby, for the deities are concerned with the organs-of-sense and not with the Jīva-Self i.e. the experiencer. — 16.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Te: they; Indriyāṇi: the organs; Tad-vyapadeśāt: because designated as such; Śreṣṭhāt anyatra: except the chief, other than the chief Prāṇa which is the highest. (Anyatra: elsewhere, except; Śreṣṭhat: than the best or the chief Prāṇa.)🔗 These Prāṇas (other than the Chief Prāṇa) are the organs-of-sense, because it is so indicated by the Scriptures. — 2.4.17. The one Chief Prāṇa and the other eleven Prāṇas (i.e. the organs-of-sense) have been enumerated. Now with regard to that, a doubt arises, as to whether these other Prāṇas are but the several different modes of the Chief Prāṇa, or whether they are essentially different entities. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they are the several different modes of the Chief Prāṇa. Whence is it so? Because, the Scriptures having placed the Chief Prāṇa and the other Prāṇas in close proximity, have proclaimed them as having the Chief Prāṇa as their Self, thus — “(The Prāṇas said) Oh, well, may we all have his (i.e. the Chief Prāṇa’s) form, and they all attained his form” (BrhU.1.5.21). Besides, the term ‘Prāṇa’ being common to all, it is understood that they are all one and the same, otherwise it would mean that one and the same word ‘Prāṇa’ would have more than one meaning, which would not be logical, or else, in one case it would have the primary meaning and in the other case it would have a secondary meaning. Therefore just as Prāṇa, Apāna etc. are the five modes of one and the same Prāṇa, so ‘speech’ etc. also are but such eleven modes of one and the same Prāṇa. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — Speech etc. are entities essentially different, from Prāṇa (i.e. the Chief Prāṇa). Whence is it so? Because they are indicated separately. What is this difference in the indication about them? These Prāṇas (i.e. organs-of-sense) exclusive of the Chief Prāṇa, which are relevant to the topic, are spoken of as the eleven organs-of-sense because it is seen that they are referred to that way in the Scriptures. In Scriptural passages of the type of “From it the Prāṇa was born, as also the mind and all the organs-of-sense” (MunU.2.1.3), the Chief Prāṇa and the organs-of-sense are indicated separately. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if it be so, then the mind, also, like the Chief Prāṇa, would be excluded, as not being an organ-of-sense, because the passage is seen to make a distinction in the indication, thus — “The mind and all the organs-of-sense”. (We reply) — This is true no doubt, but as the Smṛti mentions eleven organs-of-sense, mind also, along with the organs of hearing etc., has to be included amongst the organs-of-sense, while it is not known, either in the Scriptures or the Smṛtis, that the Chief Prāṇa is an organ-of-sense. It is thus reasonably sustainable that this difference in the reference about them is due to an essential difference in the nature of the entities as such, otherwise, were all to be essentially one and the same entity it would be contradictory that one and the same Prāṇa, should, and, at the same time, should not, be referred to as an organ-of-sense. Therefore, the others (i.e. the organs-of-sense) are entities essentially different from the Chief Prāṇa. — 17.
[Go top]
Whence is it again that the Prāṇas i.e. organs-of-sense are entities essentially different (from the Chief Prāṇa)?Bheda-śruteḥ: on account of the scriptural statement of difference.🔗 Because in the Scriptures the Chief Prāṇa is indicated separately (from speech etc.). — 2.4.18. Everywhere in the Scriptures the Chief Prāṇa is indicated separately from speech etc. Beginning with — “They said to speech (Vāk)” (BrhU.1.3.2), and after having stated how speech etc. were destroyed by the demons by their sins, and having then concluded the chapter about ‘Speech etc.’, the Scriptures have thereafter separately enumerated the Chief Prāṇa, as the one who destroyed the demons, thus — “Then they spoke to this Prāṇa of the mouth (Āsanyam)”. Other Scriptural passages also which speak of the difference, should be cited as illustrations, viz., “He (i.e. the Brahma-Deva) created the mind, speech and the Chief Prāṇa for himself (as the means of experience)” (BrhU.1.15.3). Therefore also, the Prāṇas (i.e. the organs-of-sense) are entities essentially different from the Chief Prāṇa. — 18.
[Go top]
Whence again is it that they are different?Vailakṣaṇyāt: on account of difference of characteristics; Ca: and.🔗 Because of dissimilarity in characteristics. — 2.4.19. Because there is dissimilarity between the characteristics of the Chief Prāṇa and the others (i.e. the other Prāṇas i.e. organs-of-sense). It is the Chief Prāṇa alone, that is awake when speech etc. are asleep. He is the only one that is not appropriated by Death, while the others are. The sustainment or the fall of the body respectively, is due to its presence or its going out of the body respectively, and not of the organs-of-sense, and while the organs-of-sense are the cause of the perception of the objects-of-sense, not so the Chief Prāṇa, and thus there is a great deal of dissimilarity of this nature between the characteristics of the Chief Prāṇa and of the organs-of-sense. Therefore also it is established that they are essentially different entities. With regard to what is said (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz. that because of the Scriptural statement “That they all assumed his form” the Chief Prāṇa and the organs-of-sense are identical, (we say) that it is not logical. There also, dissimilarity (between them) is discernible, when what has gone before and what has followed (this statement) is considered. There also, having enumerated the organs-of-sense such as speech etc. by the Scriptural passage — “Speech (Vāk) maintained that it would keep on speaking” (BrhU.1.5.21) and thereafter having spoken of their being seized by Death in the form of exhaustion, thus — “Death by becoming exhaustion overcame them, therefore, speech does become exhausted” (BrhU.1.5.21), it enumerates separately by itself the Chief Prāṇa as the only one that is unconquered by Death, by the Scriptural passage “Death could not capture him, who is this central Prāṇa” (BrhU.1.5.21), and thus establishes its superiority by the Scriptural passage “(The sense-organs said) He verily is the best of us all” (BrhU.1.5.21). Hence in consonance with it, this assumption of the form (Rūpa) of the Chief Prāṇa by speech etc. should be understood to mean that speech etc. are solely dependent upon the Chief Prāṇa for the attainment of their functional ability without let or hindrance, and not that they are identical with it. Hence it is thus established that the word ‘Prāṇa’ is used for the organs-of-sense in a secondary sense. The Scriptures also indicate how the word ‘Prāṇa’, which indicates the Chief Prāṇa only, is used in a secondary sense in the case of the organs-of-sense, by the passage — “They all assumed his form, therefore, it is that they are called by that name” (BrhU.1.5.21). Therefore organs-of-sense are essentially different from the Prāṇa i.e. the Chief Prāṇa. — 19.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Saṃjñā-mūrti-kḷptiḥ: the creation of name and form; Tu: but; Tri-vṛt-kurvataḥ: of Him who does the tripartite creation, of His who made the elements triple; Upadeśāt: on account of scriptural teaching, as Śruti has stated so. (Saṃjñā: name; Mūrtiḥ: form; Kḷptiḥ: creation; Tri-vṛt: tripartite, compound; Kurvataḥ: of the Creator.)🔗 But the apt arrangement of names and forms is the work of Him who makes the triple agglomeration (Trivṛt-karaṇa), according to the instruction given by the Scriptures. — 2.4.20. In the chapter dealing with ‘being’ (Sat), after having spoken about the creation of Tejas, Water and the Earth, the further instruction given is — “This deity thought, Oh well, after having entered these beings as the Jīva-Self, I shall evolve names and forms, I shall make each of these three (deities), partake of a part of the other two” (ChanU.6.3.2). Here a doubt arises, as to whether this evolving of the names and forms is the handiwork of the Jīva-Self or of the Highest Lord. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that this evolving of the names and forms is the handiwork of the Jīva-Self. Whence is it so? Because of the qualification (with the words) “By this the Jīva-Self”. Just as, in the ordinary world, when a sentence such as “I shall enter the enemy force by means of scouts, and estimate the strength of the enemy forces” is used, though in fact the estimate is made by the scout, it is attributed to and superimposed on the king himself, because he is the directive cause of it, and, also inasmuch as the ‘first person’ is used viz. “I shall estimate”, even so, though the evolving of names and forms is accomplished by the Jīva-Self, it is attributed to and superimposed upon by the deity upon itself, because the deity is the directive cause of it, in as much as the ‘first person’ viz. “I shall evolve” is used. Moreover in the case of names such as a Ḍittha, Ḍavittha, or in the case of forms, such as a jar or a trough, it is seen that it is the Jīva-Self to whom the agency belongs. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being this, the Sūtra-kāra replies — “But the apt arrangement of names and forms”. The word ‘But’ refutes the opponent’s view. The evolving of names and forms by one who makes the triple agglomeration, indicates the Lord, because the Scriptures indicate that the agency which makes the triple agglomeration can indubitably belong to Him only. This evolving of names and forms such as the fire, the Sun, the Moon, and the lightning, or of Kuśa-grass, Kāśa-grass, Palāśa tree or beasts or deer or man, is of various sorts, in so far as every species and every individual is considered in it, and it deserves to be the handiwork of the Lord alone, who is the creator of Tejas, Water and the Earth. Whence is it so? Because of such instructions in the Scriptures. After the opening sentence “That this deity thought”, and by the use of the first person singular, viz. “I shall evolve”, the instruction given is that this evolving is the handiwork of the Highest Brahman alone. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been concluded that this evolving is made by the Jīva-Self, because of the qualifications made viz. “With this living Self”. (We reply) — It is not so. The words ‘With this living Self’ go with the words ‘having entered’, as they come after them and not with ‘shall evolve’. Were they to go with ‘I shall evolve’, then the first person singular ‘shall evolve’, which would then go with the deity, will have to be considered as used in a figurative sense. The Jīva-Self, unaided by the Lord could not possibly have the power to evolve the various kinds of names and forms such as mountains, rivers, seas etc. and even if it has any such power with respect to any (of these), it (i.e. such power) is dependent on the Highest Lord Himself. It is not, however, that the Jīva-Self is an absolutely different entity from the Highest Lord — just as a scout is different from the king — on account of the qualification “By the Self”, and also because this existence of the Jīva-Self as the Jīva-Self is dependent on the limiting adjuncts alone. Hence any such evolving accomplished by it, is tantamount to its having been evolved by the Highest Lord Himself. This is the conclusion derived from all the Upaniṣads, viz., that the evolving of names and forms is the Lord’s handiwork, because of such passages as “The Ākāśa verily is the revealer of names and forms” (ChanU.6.14.1). Therefore, this evolving of names and forms is the handiwork of the Highest Lord who makes the triple agglomeration. The Scriptures desire to say, that as this evolving of names and forms is preceded by the triple agglomeration, every single evolution of a name and form can be said to have been spoken of as being brought about by the Parameśvara who is the maker of Tejas, Water and Earth. This triple agglomeration is indicated by the Scriptures in the case of the fire,.the Sun and the Moon and lightning, by the passage — “The red glow of Agni is the Tejas form, the whiteness is the Āpaḥ form and the darkness is the Anna form (i.e. earth) etc.”. (ChanU.6.14.1). In this way the form called Agni is evolved, and as an object is perceived only when its form is evolved, the name Agni is evolved. The same (argument) should be understood as applying to the Sun, the Moon and the Earth. By the mention of this illustration of Agni, a similar triple agglomeration of the three elements — the Earth, the Water and the Tejas — may be taken to have been mentioned generally, because the introductory and the concluding portion (of the passage) is common to all of them. This is how this common introductory portion says — “Each of these three deities undergo triple agglomeration” (ChanU.6.3.4), and this is how the common concluding portion — beginning with “That which became red as it were was the Tejas form” etc., and ending with “whatever was not properly known before, was but the combination of these deities” (ChanU.6.4.6–7). — 20.
[Go top]
This external triple agglomeration of the three deities being already there, now the Scriptures speak of another triple agglomeration in the Ādhyātmika aspect, thus — “These three deities when they arrive at a man’s stage undergo triple agglomeration”, and the Ācārya now proceeds to indicate it — on the authority of the Scriptures — with a view to remove the suspicion of any possible fault, as follows: —Māṃsa-ādi: flesh and the rest; Bhaumam: are effects of earth; Yathā-śabdam: as Śruti has said so, as declared by the scripture; Itarayoḥ: of the other two, namely fire and water; Ca: also, and.🔗 Bodily flesh is of the nature of earth according to Scriptures, and it is also of the nature of the others (i.e. Water and Tejas). — 2.4.21. According to the Scriptures, the Earth when it has undergone triple agglomeration, and is used by man (in the form of food), bodily flesh etc. result from it. The Scriptures are to that effect, thus — “Food (i.e. Earth) when it is consumed is turned into three sorts — the solid element in it is turned into excreta, the middle one is turned into flesh and the subtle element becomes the mind” (ChanU.6.5.1). The meaning is — what is consumed in the form of food such as rice, barley etc. is but the earth which has undergone triple agglomeration, the solid part of it is thrown out as the excretra, the middle one builds up the flesh of the body, and the subtle one becomes the mind. As indicated by the Scriptures, it should be understood, that of the other two i.e. Tejas and Water, similar effects take place. Thus the urine, the blood and the Prāṇa are the products of Water, while the products of Tejas are the bones, the nerves and the speech. — 21.
[Go top]
(The opponent of Vedānta says here) — If every thing is either the material element or matter according to the Scriptures, thus — “He made each undergo triple agglomeration”, then what is the significance of such special designations as ‘This is Tejas’, ‘This is water’, ‘This is earth’, and also of the statements, that ‘Food eaten becomes the flesh’, ‘Water that is drunk becomes the blood’, and ‘Tejas that is absorbed becomes bones’ etc.? With regard to this it is said: —Vaiśeṣyāt: on account of the preponderance; Tu: but; Tad-vādaḥ: that special name.🔗 But such designations are due to their individual distinctive nature — due to their individual distinctive nature. — 2.4.22. The word ‘But’ has the effect of refuting the alleged fault. Such distinctive designations are because of the special distinctions, which here means ‘preponderance’. Though such triple agglomeration takes place (in the case of each) it is seen that there always is a preponderance of some one particular material element, thus — Agni has a preponderance of Tejas, liquid has that of Āpaḥ, and food has that of Earth. This triple agglomeration is for the purpose of rendering phenomenal existence possible, because were all these to be one and the same after such triple agglomeration — like the three strands of a rope for instance — such distinctive phenomenal existence of the three would not result. Therefore, notwithstanding this triple agglomeration, it is because of this distinctive nature of each that special designations such as Tejas etc. become reasonably sustainable. The repetition of the words ‘distinctive nature’ indicates the end of the Adhyāya. — 22.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
In the second Adhyāya the conflict of Smṛti and Nyāya {reasoning) with the doctrine of Brahman as propounded in the Vedānta, was refuted, and it was fully explained as to how it was needless to have any regard for the views of others, and the mutual conflict of Scriptural passages was also removed. It was also said therein, that certain entities which are different from the Jīva-Self, but which form its instruments (such as Prāṇa etc.), are born from Brahman. Now in this third Adhyāya, a set of topics such as, the manner of the Jīva-Self’ s progress during transmigratory existence as equipped with these instruments, its (i.e. the Jīva-Self’s) other states, the nature of Brahman, the differences or non-differences between the Vidyās (Cognitions or Lores, or Upāsanās), and the question as to whether the various Guṇas i.e. the attributes (of Brahman) mentioned in the various Vidyās, are to be accepted cumulatively or separately as mentioned (in each Vidyā), the attainment of the aim of life as a result of correct i.e. perfect knowledge, the distinctions between the injunctions which are the means of the attainment of correct i.e. perfect knowledge (such as Sannyāsa etc.), and the absence of any regular rule with regard to the fruit of Final Release, will be expounded, and also any thing else which may become necessary, according as the occasion for it arises. So, in the first Pāda, with reference to the Vidyā of the five fires (i.e. Agnis), the difference in the ways of the progress (of a man) during transmigratory existence, would be explained, as that is the means for creating revulsion (to worldly things), because the Scriptures towards the end (of the Pañcāgni Vidyā) declare — “Let (a man) therefore feel revulsion (for the sorrowful mundane existence, in which, as in a sea, the various creatures are constantly engulfed)”. It is also understood, from the words of the chapter relating to transmigratory existence (of the Jīva-Self), beginning with “Thus these Prāṇas gather together round him” and ending with “It creates for itself another newer and a more benign form” (BrhU.4.4.1, 4), and from the possibility of (the Jīva-Self’s) experiencing the fruit of meritorious and unmeritorious actions (by giving up one body and acquiring another), that the Jīva-Self, along with the Chief Prāṇa, sense-organs, and the mind, enveloped in Nescience, action (Karma), and the impression of the previous life, leaves the former body and attains a new one. Now, it is considered (here), whether the Jīva-Self goes away (from the body) enveloped in the subtle elements, which are the seeds of the body etc., or whether it goes away unenveloped. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is that it goes away unenveloped. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures which declare that it takes up with itself the particles of energy (Tejas) i.e. the organs-of-sense (Tejo-mātras) do not say that it takes up with itself the subtle elements (Bhūta-Mātras) also. The Scriptural passage “He who takes up to himself particles of energy (Tejas)” (BrhU.4.4.1) intimates, by the words “Particles of energy (Tejas)”, the Self’s taking up the organs-of-sense with it. In the concluding portion of the passage also, it speaks of the organs of sight etc., but there is no mention about the Selfs taking up with it the subtle elements also. They are, besides, easily obtainable everywhere, i.e. they exist wherever a body has to be created, and hence the Jīva-Self’s taking them up with itself would be purposeless. Therefore, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being, that the Jīva-Self goes out unenveloped, the Ācārya replies: —Tad-antara-pratipattau: for the purpose of obtaining a fresh body (Tat: that, i.e. a body; Antara: different, another; Pratipattau: in obtaining); Raṃhati: goes, departs, Sampariṣvaktaḥ: enveloped (by subtle elements); Praśna: from question; Nirūpaṇābhyām: aid for explanations.🔗 During the attainment of another body (the Jīva-Self) sallies forth (from the body) enveloped (by the subtle elements, as indicated) by the question and its reply i.e. explanation. — 3.1.1. “During the attainment of another (body), (the Jīva-Self) goes enveloped etc.”. It should be understood that during the attainment of another body (the Jīva-Self) moves out i.e. goes away enveloped by the subtle elements, the seeds oi the body. Whence is it so? Because of the question and the reply i.e. explanation. The question is, thus — “Do you know how during the fifth oblation Āpaḥ (water) attains the name of a man (Puruṣa-vacasaḥ)?” (ChanU.5.3.3). The explanation is in the form of a reply, thus — Having indicated (the offering of) the five oblations in the form of faith, Soma, rain (Vṛṣṭi), food and semen respectively, in the five Agnis (fires), viz. the heavenly world, the cloud (Parjanya), the earth, the man and the woman respectively, (the Scriptures declare), “Thus during the fifth oblation, Āpaḥ (water) attains the name of a man” (ChanU.5.9.1). Therefore, it is understood, that it is as enveloped in water, that the Jīva-Self sallies forth (from the body). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), another Scriptural passage shows, that (the Jīva-Self), like the caterpillar, does not give up its hold on the previous body, as long it does not reach the other body, thus — “Just as the caterpillar on the grass” (BrhU.4.4.3). This (we reply) is not contradictory, in as much as, here, merely the lengthening out of the expectancy about the object to be reached, viz. the body to be brought about by previous action (Karma) of the Jīva-Self so enveloped in Āpaḥ (water), is compared with the caterpillar. Therefore, this, according to the Scriptures, being the manner of the attainment of another body, all those other various conceptions generated by the mind of man, such as, that the all-pervading sense-organs and Jīva-Selfs, acquire their function on attaining another body, depending upon their actions (Karma) (the Sāṅkhya view), or that the Jīva-Self alone by itself acquires its function there (i.e. in the new body) while the sense-organs, like the body, are born in those particular different environments of experience (the Buddha view), or that the mind alone proceeds to the new environment of experience (the Vaiśeṣika view), or that the Jīva-Self alone flies away from one body and reaches another, even as a parrot flies from one tree to another (the Jaina view), should all be ignored as being in conflict with the Scriptures. — 1.
[Go top]
Says (the opponent of Vedānta), from the question and the reply i.e. the explanation cited, it comes to this, that on the strength of the word Āpaḥ from the Scriptures, it is, as enveloped in Āpaḥ only, that (the Jīva-Self) sallies forth (from the body). How is it, then, so comprehensively understood from that, that the Jīva-Self sallies forth as enveloped in all the subtle elements? Hence, the reply is: —Tri-ātmakatvāt: on account of (water) consisting of three elements; Tu: but; Bhūyastvāt: on account of the preponderance (of water).🔗 Because (Āpaḥ) has a triple composition (of elements). (Āpaḥ is particularly mentioned) because of its preponderance. — 3.1.2. (The Sūtra-kāra) removes the doubt (alleged by the opponent of Vedānta) by the word ‘because’ (Tu). According to the Scriptures, Āpaḥ consists of a triple agglomeration. When Āpaḥ is understood to be the one that starts (the creation of a body) the other two elements also have necessarily to be understood (to have been involved with it). A body has a triple nature, because, all the three (elements), viz. Tejas, water and earth, are perceived to have been involved in its making. It is triple (in its nature) also because it has three constituent humours, viz. the wind, bile and phlegm (Vāta, Pitta, Kapha). It is not possible to begin the creation of a body merely with Āpaḥ, ignoring the other two elements. Therefore the Scriptural statement about the Āpaḥ attaining the name of a man (Puruṣa-vacasaḥ), is merely because of its preponderance (and it does not mean that the other two elements do not go into the making of it), nor is it, that the word Āpaḥ employed in the question and the reply, is employed merely with respect to Āpaḥ, alone by itself. Besides in all bodies a profusion of fluid matter such as the secretions and blood, etc., is observable. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), it is seen that solid matter preponderates in a body. (We reply) — It is no fault, because, may be, in comparison with the other elements, fluid matter preponderates. It is of course seen that even in the seed of the body characterized by semen and ovum also, fluid portion preponderates, while action (Karma) is but the efficient cause which starts the creation of another body. Also action (Karma) such as the Agni-hotra etc. is dependent upon such fluid things, as Soma, ghee, milk etc. The Ācārya will say hereafter how Āpaḥ which invariably accompanies action (Karma) and is therein called “Faith”, is offered as an oblation, in the Agni (fire) in the form of the heavenly world, and this also makes the preponderance of Āpaḥ known, and it is understood, that such preponderance shows, that by the word Āpaḥ, all the other seeds of the body such as the subtle elements have to be understood, and hence (the proposition of the Vedāntin) is flawless — 2.
[Go top]
Prāṇa: of the Prāṇas (the sense organs); Gateḥ: because of the going out; Ca: and.🔗 Also because of the going away of the Prāṇas. — 3.1.3. One Scriptural passage says, that during the acquisition of another body, the Prāṇas depart (from the previous body), thus — “When he (the Jīva-Self) goes out, the Chief Prāṇa goes out after him and when the Chief Prāṇa goes out, all the other Prāṇas (organs-of-sense) follow in the wake of the Chief Prāṇa” (BrhU.4.4.2). This going away of all the Prāṇas is not possible, unless they have some support, and hence it is understood that because of the going away of the Prāṇas, the Āpas which constitutes their support, also go away with the Prāṇas, along with the other elements. As observed in the case of living bodies, Prāṇas, unless they have a support, can neither depart nor abide anywhere. — 3.
[Go top]
Agni-ādi: Agni and others; Gati: entering; Śruteḥ: on account of the scriptures; Iti: as thus; Cet: if; Na: not so (it cannot be accepted); Bhāktatvāt: on account of its being said in a secondary sense.🔗 If it be said (that the Prāṇas do not depart with the Jīva-Self) because of the Scriptural statement about their entering the Agni etc., (we reply) — No, because (that statement is) in a metaphorical sense. — 3.1.4. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) — It may as well be, that during the acquisition of another body, the Prāṇas, of course, do not accompany the Jīva-Self, because of the Scriptural statement about their entering into Agni etc., which indicates that at the time of death, Prāṇas such as speech etc. enter into deities such as Agni etc., thus — “Where the speech of this dead person gets absorbed into Agni and his vital breath into the air etc.” (BrhU.3.2.13), we reply — No, because (the statement) is metaphorical. The Scriptural statement about speech etc. entering into Agni etc., is in a secondary sense, because it is not observed in the case of the hairs of the body or the head, that they do go like that. The Scriptures there say thus — “The hairs of the body enter into herbs, the hairs of the head enter into trees” (BrhU.3.2.13). It is not possible that the hairs of the body and the head fly away (from the body) and approach the herbs and trees respectively. Nor could the Jīva-Self itself be imagined to be going away, if it is denied that its limiting adjunct, the Prāṇa, goes away with the Jīva-Self (from the body). Nor is it reasonably sustainable, that there could be any experience (by the Jīva-Self) in a new body, in the absence of the Prāṇas. Besides the going away of the Prāṇas with the Jīva-Self is clearly stated elsewhere (in the Scriptures) (BrhU.4.4.2). Hence, it is only with reference to the fact that deities such as Agni etc. which preside over and support speech etc., withdraw their support at the time of death, that it is stated in a metaphorical way, that speech etc. enter into Agni etc. — 4.
[Go top]
If it be said that (it cannot be understood that water during the fifth oblation attains the condition of man) because Āpas are not mentioned in the case of the first (oblation),Prathame: in the first of the five oblations described in the Chandogya Śruti; A-śravanāt: on account of not being mentioned; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Na: not; Tāḥ eva: that only, i.e., water; Hi: because; Upapatteḥ: because of fitness.🔗 (we reply) — No, because it is reasonably sustainable that Āpas are meant. — 3.1.5. (If the opponent of Vedānta says) — It may well be, that it is not definitely determined, that “during the fifth oblation Āpas attain the name of man” because, there is no Scriptural statement here, about Āpas, in the first (oblation). Here, the five Agnis such as the heavenly world etc. are mentioned by the Scriptures as the supporters of the five oblations (i.e. in them these oblations are offered). Having stated with regard to the first of them (i.e. the heavenly world) thus — “This world, verily, Oh Gautama, is the fire” (ChanU.5.4.1), Faith (Śraddhā) has thereafter been indicated to be the oblation material, thus — “In this Agni, the Gods offer ‘faith’ as an oblation” (ChanU.5.4.2). The Scriptures do not mention water there, as the material of oblation. Well may you imagine, that Āpas are the material of oblation in the case of the four Agnis which come after (the Agni as the heavenly world), because it is reasonably sustainable in their case, that Soma etc. which are used as the offerings (as oblations) have a preponderance of fluid matter, but it would be doing violence (to the text) to reject ‘Faith’ as mentioned by the Scriptures in the case of the first Agni, and to imagine Āpas (as meant by the term Faith) which are not mentioned at all by the Scriptures (as being the material of oblation to be offered in the heavenly world — Agni). ‘Faith’, as is well-known, is a particular conception or notion. Hence it is not logical (to understand) that Āpas during the fifth oblation attain the condition of man. (We reply) — This is no fault because even there, in the case of the first Agni, by the word ‘Faith’ the self-same Āpas are meant. Whence is it so? Because it is reasonably so sustainable, and it is reasonably sustainable to hold that this sentence becomes unambiguous, only if its beginning, the middle portion and its concluding portion are thus consistent with each other. Otherwise, when, the question asked is, thus — “The manner in which during the fifth oblation Āpas attain the condition of man”, if something which is not Āpaḥ, viz., ‘Faith’, is thus introduced as the material of oblation, then as the question would be of one sort, and the reply thus having no relation to the question, there would be no syntactical harmony (in the sentence). The Scriptures also indicate the same thing, viz. that ‘Faith’ is water (Āpaḥ), when it concludes thus — “In this manner Āpas attain the name of man during the fifth oblation”. Similarly it is noticed that the downpour of Soma as the result of ‘Faith’, as it grows gross and tangible, has a preponderance of Āpaḥ, which is a logical reason for ‘Faith’ being ‘Āpaḥ’, because, an effect is always similar to its cause. Besides, the term known as ‘Śraddhā’, being either an attribute of the mind or of the Jīva-Self, it is not possible to extract it out of that to which it belongs (i.e. the mind or the body of a man) and take it up (in the hand) for sacrificing, just as an animal’s heart etc., can be extracted from an animal and taken up, and hence, the word ‘Faith’ does mean Āpas. It is reasonably sustainable to accept the word ‘Faith’ for Āpas, because of its use in a Scriptural passage, thus — “Faith indeed is Āpaḥ.” Āpas are the seed of the body and they attain minuteness or subtlety and similarity in form to faith, and hence they can be synonymous with the word ‘Faith’, just as a person possessing leonine prowess is referred to as the ‘Leo’. Besides, Āpaḥ can be properly referred to as ‘Faith’, as it is in close relation with action (Karma) backed by ‘Faith’, just as the word, ‘a dais’ (Mañca), can be used for men (who occupy the dais). Also, because of Āpaḥ being the cause of Faith, it would be reasonably sustainable to use the word ‘Faith’, as in the Scriptural passage — “Āpas, indeed generate faith in him (viz. the sacrificing host i.e. the Yajamāna) for holy actions”. — 5.
[Go top]
A-śrutatvāt: on account of this not being stated in the Śruti; Iti: this; Cet: if; Na: not; Iṣṭa-ādi-kāriṇām: in reference to those who perform sacrifices; Pratīteḥ: on account of being understood.🔗 If it be said (that the Jīva-Self does not ascend enveloped in water), because there is no Scriptural mention (about it), (we reply) — No, because it is perceived to be so by reason of the fact that those who perform Iṣṭi (a sacrifice) etc. (attain the lunar world). — 3.1.6. (If the opponent of Vedānta says), it may be (even as you the Vedāntin say), that because of the question and the reply, Āpas (i.e. water) in the order of Faith etc. respectively, may during the fifth oblation attain the form of man, but (I still maintain that) Jīva-Selfs do not go out (of the bodies) enveloped in water, because there is no Scriptural statement about it. There is no word in this Scriptural passage here, which refers to Jīva-Selfs, just as the word Āpas occurs therein, and hence it is not logical (to say) that the Jīva-Self goes out enveloped (in water). (We reply) — This is no fault. Why? Because a reference to those who perform Iṣṭis (Sacrifices) is understood (here). For the Scriptures, beginning with the passage “Those who in the city (which term is indicative of householders) practise meditation by performing Iṣṭa (i.e. Agni-hotra etc.) and Pūrta (i.e. digging of wells, ponds etc.), and Datta (giving monetary help to the deserving, out of the Vedi), reach Dhūma (i.e. the deity abiding in smoke)” (ChanU.5.10.3), afterwards declare, that those who perform such Iṣṭis (i.e. Agni-hotra etc.) arrive at the moon by the Pitṛ-yāṇa way (the way of the manes) indicated by the Smoke, thus — “From Ākāśa (space) to the moon, who is King Soma (the food of the Gods)” (ChanU.5.10.4). Those self-same persons (i.e. those who perform Iṣṭi etc.) are understood here, also in a corresponding Scriptural passage — “In that Agni, the Gods sacrifice ‘Faith’ and from that oblation, King Soma is born” (ChanU.5.4.2). In the case of those who perform such Iṣṭis (i.e. Sacrifices), that, curds, milk etc. (which they use) and which form the means of performing Agni-hotra and Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa sacrifices, are virtually Āpas, containing as they do a preponderance of liquid matter, is evident. Those Āpas when offered (as oblation in the Āhavanīya fire become subtle and assume the form of merit (Apūrva), and take their resort with the performer of Iṣṭis. And when he dies the Ṛtvij (sacrificial priest) consigns his body according to a funeral ceremony to the cremation fire, while reciting the Mantra — “May he (the Yajamāna) attain the heavenly world, Svāhā”. Hence, what is meant by the statement “Those Āpas in the form of oblations, which invariably accompany these sacrificial acts based on ‘Faith’, and are of the form of merit (Apūrva), envelop those Jīva-Selfs who have performed the Iṣṭis, and carry them to that world, for affording them the fruit of these Iṣṭis” is, here in the present context, expressed by the verb ‘to sacrifice’ thus — “He sacrifices faith” (BrhU.6.2.9). Similarly in the Agni-hotra chapter, by the complementary passage in the form of replies to six questions, viz. “This brace of oblations which are sacrificed, go up” (Śata. Bra. 6.2.6) etc., it is properly indicated, that these oblations of the Agni-hotra attain the other world in order to start the function of affording the fruit (of actions). Hence it is just proper (to say) that the Jīva-Selfs enveloped in water in the form of oblations, move out (of the body) for experiencing the fruits of their actions (in another body). — 6.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta), how is this, i.e. the going of these performers of Iṣṭis for the purpose of experiencing the fruit of their actions to other bodies, understood (to be so), when the Scriptures indicate, that those who have thus ascended to the moon by the path of the smoke, become food, thus — “This is King Soma, that is the food of the Gods, which the Gods eat” (ChanU.5.10.4), and the other parallel passage of the Scriptures also indicates thus — “Having attained the moon, they become food, and the Gods there eat them up, just as here, the priests at a sacrifice drink King Soma, cup after cup, i.e. no sooner one cup is filled up, it is emptied” (BrhU.6.2.16)? There could be no experiencing of any fruit by those, who are gobbled up by the Gods, like tigers etc. To this the reply is:Bhāktam: Metaphorical; Vā: but, or; An-ātma-vittvāt: on account of their not knowing the Self; Tathā: so; Hi: because; Darśayati: (Śruti) declares, shows.🔗 Or else, the Jīva-Selfs being called ‘Food’ (of the Gods) is in a metaphorical or secondary sense because of their not having realized the Self (Ātmā i.e. Brahman). The Scriptures also indicate the same. — 3.1.7. The word ‘or else’ (Vā) has the purport of refuting the alleged fault. Their being ‘the food’ is not meant in the principal sense, but only in a metaphorical sense. Were their being ‘food’ to be in the principal sense, the Scriptural passage which confers competency (on a person), thus — “One who desires the heavenly world should sacrifice”, would be contradicted. If those who perform Iṣṭa were not to have experience (of the fruits of their actions) on the Lunar Sphere, why would they unnecessarily perform ritualistic action (such as Iṣṭi etc.) involving a good deal of trouble? The word ‘food’ moreover, which is commonly used as the means of such experience (of fruits of actions), is observed to be used also for that which is not food, as for instance — that the subjects (Viṣas) are food for Kings, animals are food for the subjects (Viṣas). (Cf. Napoleon’s — “Soldiers are fodder for the cannon.”) Hence in their case, what is meant by ‘eating’, is the pleasurable association of the Gods with those who have performed Iṣṭis etc., who, like a man having pleasurable associations with his dear ones such as wife, son, friend or servant etc., have come to be in a subordinate position to the Gods (as compared with the Gods), and not the chewing and swallowing up of them like a Modaka (a sweet thing). The Scriptural passage “Verily the Gods neither eat nor drink but are satisfied merely by seeing this nectar (in the form of Soma) (as if they have actually eaten)” (ChanU.3.6.1) denies any masticatory activity etc. on the part of the Gods. That those performers, of Iṣṭa etc. who have come to occupy a subordinate position to the Gods, also do have experience (of the fruits of actions) is reasonably sustainable, even as it is, in the case of King’s servants who live on him. It is reasonably sustainable, that these performers of Iṣṭa etc. are fit objects of enjoyment for the Gods, inasmuch as they have not yet realized the Self (Ātmā i.e. Brahman, and consequently are ignorant), for the Scriptural passage “Now, he who worships a deity, feeling that the deity is a different entity than himself, is ignorant like a beast and even so is he to the Gods” (BrhU.1.4.10) shows how those who have not yet realized the Self (Ātmā i.e. Brahman) serve as objects of enjoyment for the Gods. It is understood that even in this world he serves the Gods as a beast, by pleasing them by Iṣṭa and similar actions, and in the other world also he serves them similarly by depending on them for his maintenance and by experiencing the fruits (of his actions) as directed by them. The following is another explanation of (the latter part of the Sūtra) — “Because of their not having realized the Self (Ātmā i.e. Brahman). The Scriptures also indicate the same.” These (persons) who indulge in mere ritualistic actions such as Iṣṭa etc., but do not endeavour to combine knowledge with such actions, are those who have not realized the Self (Ātmā i.e. Brahman). The Lore (Vidyā) of the five Agnis is here metaphorically treated as the Lore (Vidyā) of the Self (Ātmā i.e. Brahman) as is understood from the chapter (which deals with the knowledge of the Self). These performers of Iṣṭa etc., being devoid of the knowledge of the five Agnis, are by way of a Guṇa-vāda (i.e. in a secondary sense) referred to as food (for the Gods) with a view thus to glorify the Lore (Vidyā) of the five Agnis, because as is understood from the gift of the passage, it is desired here, to enjoin the Lore (Vidyā) of the five Agnis. Another Scriptural passage similarly indicates the possibility of their having experience in the Soma (Lunar) World, thus — “Having enjoyed exalted status in the Soma (Lunar) World, he comes back (to this world)” (Prashna 5.4). Another Scriptural passage also, viz., “What constitutes a hundred joys of the fathers (manes) who have conquered the world of the manes (Pitṛ-loka), is but only a single joy of these princes of Action (Karma-devas), who attain Godhood by their actions” (BrhU.4.3.33), indicates, how the performers of Iṣṭa, sojourning which the Gods, obtain the experience of enjoyment. In this way, the statement about these performers of Iṣṭa being the food (for the Gods) being in a metaphorical sense, it is understood that the Jīva-Selfs go up (to the moon for experience) and therefore it is quite properly said, that' the Jīva-Self ascends enveloped (in Āpaḥ). — 7.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Kṛta: of what is done, of the Karma; Atyaye: at the end, at the exhaustion; Anuśayavān: with a remainder of the Karma; Dṛṣṭa-smṛtibhyām: as can be understood from direct statement in Śruti and Smṛti; Yathā itam: by the way he went; An-evam: differently; Ca: and.🔗 After actions are worked out i.e. exhausted (the Jīva-Selfs return to this world) with an Anuśaya (residue of actions) as is seen on the authority of the Scriptures, and the Smṛti. They return in the reverse way (to that in which they ascended). — 3.1.8. The descent (to this world) of those, who have performed Iṣṭa etc., and have ascended to the sphere of the moon by the way of smoke etc., and have completely experienced the fruits of actions, is stated by the Scriptures, beginning with “Having stayed there (i.e. in the sphere of the moon) till their quantum of actions is exhausted (Yāvat-sampātam), they return by the same way by which they have ascended” (ChanU.5.10.15), and upto “Those whose Caraṇa (conduct) has been good, attain a good birth such as that of a Brāhmaṇa etc. and those whose conduct has been reprehensible, attain the birth of a dog etc.”. Now, it is considered here, whether the Jīva-Selfs who have experienced the fruit of all their actions, descend (to this world) with or without any Anuśaya. The conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) is, (that they descend) without any such Anuśaya. Whence is it so? Because of the special mention — “Till their quantum of actions (Sampāta) is exhausted”. The word (Sampāta) here means the aggregate of actions, thus — “That by which (they) ascend to that world (i.e. the sphere of the moon) from this (world), for experiencing the fruit (of actions)”. The words “Having stayed there till their quantum of actions is exhausted” show that the fruits of all the actions of a Jīva-Self are experienced, even there (in the world of the moon). And by another Scriptural passage also, viz. “When all that action (of theirs) is requited or exhausted (by the experience of fruit)” (BrhU.6.2.16), the same meaning is expressed. (Says the Vedāntin), I would say that it means thus — Whatever action is fit to be exhausted by experiencing its fruit there (i.e. in the world of the moon), that alone is exhausted there (and not that all actions are exhausted there). (The opponent of Vedānta replies) — It cannot be so imagined, because, another Scriptural passage refers to “Whatsoever (Yat kiñca) without any exception”, thus — “Having in this world of the moon, exhausted the effect of all actions whatsoever which he has done in this world, he returns therefrom to this world for doing action (Karma) again”. (BrhU.4.4.6), which, as it, in general, refers to whatsoever action without exception, shows that all actions without exception are exhausted here (i.e. on the Lunar Sphere). Besides, death is the revealer of i.e. it makes manifest, all actions whose fruits have not yet begun to be experienced, because, it is not reasonably sustainable, that before death there could be any revelation of such actions as have been obstructed by other actions whose fruition has already begun. Besides, it (death) ought to be understood to be the revealer of all actions (without any exception), whose fruition has not till then begun, because, the cause (viz., death which reveals actions) being the same common cause, the result does not deserve to be different. It is not reasonably sustainable, that in the proximate presence of a lamp as a common cause, a jar alone is revealed (to sight), while a piece of cloth is not. Therefore the Jīva-Selfs descend without any Anuśaya. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being this, we reply: — When actions are exhausted, (the Jīva-Self does of course descend) with an Anuśaya. When that particular set of actions, with which he (the Jīva-Self) has ascended to the Lunar Sphere for experiencing their fruits, is exhausted, the watery body which this Jīva-Self has acquired for itself on the Lunar Sphere, for the purpose of experiencing such fruits of actions, is dissolved by contact with the fire (in the form) of grief, caused by visualizing the exhaustion of all such experience of the fruits of this set of actions, even as hailstones are dissolved by contact with the rays of the sun, or the solidity of ghee is dissolved by contact with the flame of a 'sacrificial fire. Hence when actions such as Iṣṭa etc. are exhausted by the experiencing of their fruit, the Jīva-Self descends to this earth along with an Anuśaya. Whence is it so? Because of what is seen (Dṛṣṭa i.e. the Scriptures) and the Smṛtis. For it is in this manner, that the descent of the Jīva-Self with its Anuśaya, is indicated by the Scriptures, thus — “For, those who have done good deeds in this world necessarily attain a good birth such as that of a Brāhmaṇa or a Kṣatriya or a Vaiśya, and those whose actions have been disreputable, necessarily attain a disreputable birth such as that of a dog or a swine or a Chāṇḍāla (out-caste)” (ChanU.5.10.7). It will later on be described (by the Ācārya) that the word “Caraṇa” means Anuśaya (the residue of unrequited actions). This division of the experience of pleasure and pain, in a high or low degree by every being, is evident amongst all beings from their very birth, and as it is not possible that it could be adventitious, it indicates the presence of an Anuśaya, because it is generally understood from the Śāstra, that worldly prosperity and demerit are the result of good and bad actions respectively, as their cause. The Smṛti also, by the passage “The (members of) various caste and order of life, having died after doing actions, and having experienced the fruits of their actions, are born again with this unrequited residue of their actions, and have a particular environment, caste, family, form, age-limit, knowledge, character, wealth, pleasure, intellect”, shows how, the Jīva-Selfs descend with an Anuśaya. Now, what indeed again is this Anuśaya any way? Some say here — Anuśaya is a sort of a residue of actions, left over from actions performed for the acquisition of heaven, and the fruits of which have been experienced, and is like (for instance) the residue of oil sticking to a pot. Just as when a pot of oil is emptied, it does not get emptied completely but some residue of oil does still remain sticking to the pot, even so is Anuśaya. But (says the Vedāntin), because ‘Adṛṣṭa’, the unseen principle (the quantum of merit and demerit), is always antagonistic to action, it is not logical (to say) that there could be any residue from actions whose fruits have been experienced. (Their reply is) — This is no fault. We do not understand that the fruits of actions in their entirety are experienced. But (says the Vedāntin) is not it, that the Jīva-Self is understood to have ascended the Lunar Sphere for experiencing the fruits of the entire set of actions without any exception? (Their reply is) — Well, but it is not possible to continue to stay on there when there is but only a small residue of actions. Just as, some servant having approached the King’s household with all the implements of service (including the limbs of his body useful for work), but having lost most of his implements during his long sojourn there, has only the umbrella and the wooden shoes i.e. Pādukās (Cf. Dutch Sabots?) left with him, is not thereafter able to continue in the household of the King, similarly having merely the Anuśaya left with him, the Jīva-Self is no longer able to stay on the Lunar Sphere. (The Bhāṣya-kāra says) — This is by no means logical. It has already been said that it is not reasonably sustainable that there should be a residue of actions performed for the sake of obtaining the heavenly world whose fruits have been experienced, inasmuch as it (i.e. Adṛṣṭa) is antagonistic to actions. But (says that somebody referred to above) it has also been stated by us that the experience of the fruit of the entire set of actions which have the heavenly world as its fruit, could not be had. (We the Vedāntins reply) — It is not proper (to maintain), that actions performed with an aim to attain the heavenly world do not produce the whole fruit for a person while he is in the heavenly world, but produce a modicum of fruit even after he is displaced from such heavenly world. Such an assumption is not proper for those who accept the Scriptures as an authority. It of course is reasonably sustainable, that some oil should still keep sticking to a pot of oil (which has been emptied) because it evidently is so, or that a servant may happen to have only a small part of his service implements left with him, but here, any such residue of actions having the heavenly world as its fruit, is neither evident nor conceivable, inasmuch as it is contradictory to the Śāstra of the fruits of actions. It must necessarily be understood that there could be no such Anuśaya i.e. residue of actions such as Iṣṭa etc. whose fruit is the attainment of heaven, like ghee sticking to a pot. However, if Anuśaya be at all assumed to be only a part of such good actions as Iṣṭa etc. as a result of which the experience of heaven is obtained (by the Self), then it could only be a residue of a good type of actions and not otherwise, and if so, it would contradict the Scriptural statement which makes a division of Anuśaya (into good and bad Anuśaya) such as — “Those whose conduct is good and those whose conduct is disreputable” (ChanU.5.10.7). Hence when that particular set of actions whose fruit is to be experienced in the next world is exhausted (by the enjoyment of its fruit), another set of actions whose fruit is to be experienced in this world, still remains, as Anuśaya, and it is with this Anuśaya that these Jīva-Selfs descend (from the Lunar Sphere) to this world. With regard to the objection raised (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz. that because of the reference to “What-so-ever” (Yat kiñca), i.e. “without any exception”, the Jīva-Selfs descend without any sort of such Anuśaya, after having exhausted all the actions performed here (in this world) by experiencing the fruits thereof, (the Vedāntin’s reply is) — It is not so, because the existence of Anuśaya is definitely established (by us). It is thus understood, that it is after having begun experiencing the fruits, of all those actions performed in this world, whose fruit is to be experienced in the next world, and after exhausting these actions (that the Selfs descend). That other objection also — viz. that death reveals all such actions, the experiencing of the fruit of which is not till then begun without any exception, and that there could be no such division of actions, such as those whose fruition is begun in the next world and those whose fruition is begun in this world — is answered by the very same statement about the existence of Anuśaya. It must besides be explained (by the opponent of Vedānta), on what ground it is understood (by him) that death reveals all those actions whose fruit has not yet begun. If it be said, that it is not reasonably sustainable, that the operation of such other action, which is obstructed by that action whose fruition has started, does not begin, and that such operation begins at the time of death when the latter action is exhausted, then it has to be explained, viz., Just as (as you the opponent of Vedānta say) it is not reasonably sustainable, that the operation of that action, which is obstructed by another action whose fruition has already begun before death, can possibly begin, similarly, even at the time of death, as the simultaneous commencement of the fruition of actions having fruits contrary in nature to each other is not possible, it is not reasonably sustainable, that, the operation of a comparatively weak action, which is obstructed by a powerful action, can ever begin. It is not possible to say that many actions whose fruits have to be experienced during another birth, and which are simultaneously revealed at the time of one and the same single death, can begin only on a new birth, merely because of the common circumstance of the absence of the beginning of fruition of these several actions, as it would contradict the fact, that each action has its own fruit. Nor can it be maintained that only some actions become manifest at death and some are annihilated, as it would contradict the rule, that every action must necessarily have its fruit. It is not possible, that, in the absence of causes such as an expiatory ritual etc., annihilation of any action can take place. The Smṛti also declares how actions obstructed by other actions having a contrary fruit, endure for a long time, thus — “Sometimes good actions merely stand by (without producing any fruit), as long as a person continues to be engulfed in transmigratory existence and is not released from misery”. If all these actions which have not started their fruition were to be made manifest at the time of one and the same single death, and were they to start but one fresh existence only, then, in that single fresh existence, be it that of a heavenly, hellish, or beastly kind, in the absence of any competency i.e. Adhikāra (in any being) for doing actions in such sort of single fresh existence only, no merit or demerit would result, and thus in the absence of any cause (for a new birth) no other fresh existence would come into being, and the statement of Smṛtis — that each single act of killing a Brāhmaṇa etc. is the cause of several births (required for expiating the sin) — would thus be contradicted. It is not possible to imagine that there could be any means other than the Śāstra, by which the nature, the fruit, and the means, of merit (Dharma) and demerit (Adharma), can be understood. It is not possible, that death could be the cause of the manifestation of the fruit of a ritualistic action such as the ‘Kārīri’ Iṣṭi, whose fruit (viz. rain) is observed here in this world, and hence the idea about death being the cause of the manifestation (of actions) also falls short of covering all possible cases. The illustration of the lamp also stands refuted, by indicating the relative strength or weakness of actions. This should be looked upon as being similar to the manifestation or non-manifestation of gross or minute form (Rūpa) of things. While the proximity of a lamp to things, is the same, it only reveals gross things, but not the minute ones, even so, when all the various actions, whose fruition has not yet commenced, have the same chance (of being made manifest), death reveals only the stronger action and not the one which is comparatively weaker. Therefore, the doctrine chat all actions become manifest (at the time of death) is not proper, as it is contrary to the Scriptures, Smṛtis and also Nyāya (reasoning). Similarly the fear that there would be the predicament of the want of Final Release if there is a residue of actions, is groundless, inasmuch as the Scriptures declare that all action is exhausted when real i.e. perfect knowledge supervenes. Therefore, it is clearly established that the Jīva-Selfs descend (to this world) along with an Anuśaya and when they do so descend, they do so in a manner which is reverse to that by which they happen to have ascended (to the Lunar Sphere). “As they went” means as they ascended, and, “unlike that” means, in the reverse way, because Smoke and the Ākāśa included in the ‘Pitṛ-yāṇa’ path (the path of the manes) are also mentioned in the path of descent, and also because of the expression “as they ascended” — which suggests the manner of descent to be in the reverse way. The reverse way also is understood, by the absence of any reference to night etc. and the additional reference to clouds etc. — 8.
[Go top]
Caraṇāt: on account of conduct; Iti: thus, so; Cet: if; Na: not so; Upalakṣaṇa-arthā: to signify secondarily, indirectly, meant to imply or connote; Iti: thus; Kārṣṇājiniḥ: Kārṣṇājini thinks, holds, says.🔗 If it be said (that a particular species of birth) is the result of Caraṇa (meritorious and unmeritorious actions, and no Anuśaya need be assumed), (we say) — No, because (the Scriptural statement about Caraṇa) according to Kārṣṇājini, is indicative of Anuśaya by implication. — 3.1.9. (If the objection of the opponent of Vedānta is) — It may be, that the Scriptural statement cited for the purpose of propounding the existence of Anuśaya, viz., “For, those whose conduct has been good etc.” (ChanU.5.10), shows, that a particular species of birth is due to Caraṇa and not Anuśaya, because, Caraṇa is different from Anuśaya. Caraṇa, Ācāra and Śīla are synonymous, while by the word Anuśaya, a residue of actions other than those whose fruit has already been experienced, is meant. Even the Scriptures indicate, how action and Caraṇa are different, thus — “Even as his actions are, and his conduct is, he becomes” (BrhU.4.9.5); also, “You should follow only such of our actions as are faultless and not the others, and, you should contemplate upon (and accept) only such conduct of ours as is good and no other” (TaitU.1.11.2). Therefore, as the Scriptural statement indicates that it is due to Caraṇa that a particular species of birth comes about, the existence of Anuśaya is not thereby established. (We reply) — This is no fault, because Ācārya Kārṣṇājini is of opinion that the Scriptural statement (about Caraṇa) is in a secondary sense indicative only of Anuśaya. — 9.
[Go top]
Ān-arthakyam: purposeless, useless, irrelevancy; Iti: thus, as; Cet: if; Na: not so; Tat: that (conduct); Apekṣatvāt: on account of dependence on that.🔗 If it be said, that conduct (Caraṇa) would be rendered futile (if it be held that it does not cause a particular species of birth, we reply) — No, because actions depend upon that (i.e. Caraṇa). — 3.1.10. If it be said — It may be like this: Why should the direct Scriptural meaning of the word ‘Caraṇa’ which is conduct (Śīla), be rejected and the word be understood in a secondary significance, to mean Anuśaya? It may well be, that an auspicious or inauspicious species of birth respectively can be the fruit of the good or bad nature of conduct (Śīla) which is directly enjoined or prohibited respectively by the Śāstra. It is absolutely necessary that even conduct (Śīla) must be understood to have some fruit, as otherwise conduct would be without any purpose. (To this, Kārṣṇājini replies) — This is no fault. How is it so? Because Caraṇa (meritorious or unmeritorious actions) is dependent upon that (i.e. Anuśaya). Ritualistic action, such as Iṣṭa etc., depends upon Caraṇa, because nobody whose conduct is not good is competent to perform such ritualistic action. On the authority of such Smṛtis as “The Scriptures do not sanctify i.e. purify a person who is devoid of good conduct”, conduct cannot be without any purpose, even when it is supposed that conduct is subservient to man (and not to action). When the whole set of actions such as Iṣṭa etc. starts fructifying, conduct which is so subservient to man may well start producing some supplementary speciality in the fruit of such actions. It is well-known in the Scriptures and Smṛtis that it is action that creates all objects. Hence, Kārṣṇājini is of opinion, that it is action alone, i.e. Anuśaya — which is the secondary significance of the word Caraṇa (conduct) — , that is the cause of a particular species of birth. When it is possible to understand actions to be the cause of a particular species of birth, it is improper to understand, that Śīla causes a particular species of birth. No one who is able to run on his legs, would ever deserve to crawl i.e. creep on his knees. — 10.
[Go top]
Sukṛta: good or righteous deeds; Duṣkṛte: (and) bad or unrighteous deeds; Eva: only, merely; Iti: thus; Tu: but; Bādariḥ: (Sage) Bādari.🔗 Bādari (is of opinion, that Caraṇa) does mean good and evil actions. — 3.1.11. Ācārya Bādari considers that by the word ‘Caraṇa’, both good or evil actions taken together, are (directly) meant, and that Caraṇa (Conduct), Anuṣṭhāna (Performance) and Karma (Actions) are all synonymous. It is also similarly observed, that the root ‘Carati’ is commonly used in the case of all actions generally with respect to him who performs meritorious religious rituals such as Iṣṭa etc., and with respect to a man who performs meritorious actions, people say, that the high-souled man performs (Carati) Dharma (i.e. meritorious actions). And Ācāra also is but one kind of meritorious action. The distinction which is sometimes observed to be made between Karma and Caraṇa, is reasonably sustainable on the strength of the Nyāya maxim of “a Brāhmaṇa and a Parivrājaka (i.e. a Brāhmaṇa who has taken Sannyāsa)”. Hence, the conclusion is that the men of good actions are those, whose acts are approved (by all generally) and men whose actions are filthy are men whose actions are censurable (by all generally). — 11.
[Go top]
[Go top]
An-iṣṭa-ādi-kāriṇām: of those who do not perform sacrifices etc.; Api: even; Ca: also; Śrutam: is declared by the Śruti.🔗 The Scriptures declare that even those who do not perform Iṣṭa etc. also (ascend to the Lunar Sphere). — 3.1.12. It has been stated, that those who perform Iṣṭa etc., ascend to the moon. Now it is considered, whether those also who do not perform Iṣṭa etc. ascend to the moon or whether they do not. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that it is not, that only those who perform Iṣṭa etc. ascend to the moon. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures speak of the moon as the destination, equally of even those who do not perform Iṣṭa etc. So say the Kauṣitakins generally, thus — “Verily those who depart from this world, they all go to the moon”. (Kaush. 1.2). Besides it cannot be imagined that those who are about to be born again, begin a new body without first having reached the moon, because the number of oblations is duly fixed according to (the Scriptural statement) “During the fifth oblation” (ChanU.5.9.1), whence, all must needs ascend to the moon. If it be said (by the Vedāntin) that it is not proper that both those who perform the Iṣṭa and the others (i.e. those who do not), alike have the same destination, (we the opponents of Vedānta reply) — No, because there is absence of experience (of the fruit of actions) on the Lunar Sphere for those others (who do not perform Iṣṭa etc.). — 12.
[Go top]
Saṃyamane: in the abode of Yama; Tu: but; Anubhūya: having experienced; Itareṣām: of others (of those who do not perform sacrifices); Āroha-avarohau: the ascent and descent; Tat: of them; Gati: (about their) courses; Darśanāt: as can be understood from the Śruti.🔗 But, the others (i.e. those who do not perform Iṣṭa etc.) have also their ascent and descent, after having suffered in Saṃyamana (i.e. Death’s abode), because, in the Scriptures, their course is seen to be in that way. — 3.1.13. The word ‘But’ refutes the opponent’s view. It is not, that all ascend to the moon. Whence is it so? The ascent to the moon is for the experience (of the fruits of action) and not without any purpose, nor is it merely for the purpose of descent either, because, a man goes up a tree for gathering flowers and fruits and not without any purpose, or merely for sustaining a fall (therefrom). It has been stated already that those who have not performed any Iṣṭa etc. do not have any experience on the moon. Therefore, it is only those who have performed Iṣṭa etc., that ascend to the moon and not the others. As far as those other people are concerned, they, having descended to Saṃyamana (the abode of Yama, the God of Death) and having suffered the torments befitting their evil deeds, again return to this world, and it is thus, that their descent and ascent take place. Whence is it so? Because, that they follow such a course is to be observed (from the Scriptures), for in a Scriptural passage similar in purport, and put in the mouth of Yama (Death), it is indicated, how those who depart (from this life) without having performed Iṣṭa etc., find themselves in the clutches of Yama, thus: “The light of Sāmparāya (i.e. the means of attaining the higher world) is not for him who is ignorant and is constantly erring and is infatuated by wealth, and who considers this (i.e. the present) world to be the only world, and that there is no beyond. Thus does he come into my clutches time and again” (KathU.1.2.6). There are several indicatory marks which show, how a man gets into the clutches of Yama (Death) such as — “(Let oblations be offered so as to please) Yama, to whom all men go” (Ṛg. Sam. X.14.1). — 13.
[Go top]
Smaranti: the Śrutis declare; Ca: also.🔗 The Smṛtis also declare the same. — 3.1.14. Learned men such as Manu, Vyāsa etc., in the legend of Naciketas declare, how (those who do not perform Iṣṭi etc.) suffer from the fruition of filthy actions in Saṃyamana, which is under the control of Yama. — 14.
[Go top]
Api ca: also, moreover; Sapta: the seven (hells).🔗 Besides (there are) seven (hells). — 3.1.15. Besides, the Paurāṇikas also declare that there are seven hells such as the Raurava etc. which are the places for the experience of the fruits of evil deeds, and those who do not perform Iṣṭa etc., reach those places. The meaning is — how ever can they ascend to the moon? — 15.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta), it is contradictory to say that the experience of tortures by the sinful are controlled by Yama, as it has also been said that Citra-gupta and various other dignitaries preside over Raurava etc. (The reply is) — It is not so.Tatra: there (in those hells); Api: also, even; Ca: and; Tad-vyāpārāt: on account of his (Yama’s) control; A-virodhaḥ: no contradiction.🔗 There is no contradiction as there also, it is Yama’s writ that runs. — 3.1.16. There is no contradiction, because there also, he (i.e. Yama) is understood to be the chief dignitary. Smṛtis declare, that it is only as appointed by Yama, that Citra-gupta and others are the dignitaries there. — 16.
[Go top]
Vidyā-karmaṇoḥ: of knowledge and work; Iti: thus; Tu: but, only; Prakṛtatvāt: on account of these being the subject under discussion.🔗 Those who do not perform Iṣṭa etc. do not ascend by the path either of knowledge or action, because the paths of knowledge and action are relevant to the context here. — 3.1.17. In the Lore (Vidyā) of the Five Fires (Agnis), while replying to the question ‘Do you know how this world (i.e. the moon) does not get filled up (to capacity)?’, the Scriptures say — “In neither of these two ways (do they, who do not perform Iṣṭa etc., go). They, as (being) insignificant creatures, are continually being reborn. Do thou be born, and do thou die — is this, their third condition. That is why this world (i.e. the moon) does not get filled up (to capacity)” (ChanU.5.10.8). Here, (by the expression) by those two ways, are meant the paths of knowledge and action. Whence is it so? Because they are relevant (to the context) here. It is knowledge and action that are (referred to as) relevant for the purpose of the attainment of the Deva-yāna and the Pitṛ-yāṇa paths. (In the Scriptural passage) “Therefore those who know it to be so (viz. that water (Āpaḥ) in the fifth oblation attains the name of man)” it is described, that it is by this Lore (Vidyā) that the Deva-yāna path is to be attained. (The Scriptural passage) “Iṣṭa and works of public utility and charity, mean action (Karma) and it is described that the Pitṛ-yāṇa path is to be attained by that (i.e. Karma)” (ChanU.5.10.1–3). It is in this context, that there occurs (the Scriptural passage) — “In neither of these ways etc.”. What is meant to be said is, that for those who are not competent to attain the Deva-yāna path by the attainment of knowledge, and those who are not competent to attain the Pitṛ-yāṇa path by means of action, there is the third path which is characterized by these insignificant creatures, which constantly recur (i.e. get born and die). It is because of this also that those who do not perform the Iṣṭa etc., do not attain the moon. (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — May be, that even they ascend to the moon, and having descended therefrom become these insignificant creatures. (We reply) — That is not so, because (were it to be so) their ascent would be without any purpose. Again were all those who die to attain the lunar sphere after dying, (it would mean that) the reply would be that this world would be filled up by those who die, which would be contradictory to the question (viz., How is it that this world does not get filled up to capacity?). The reply should be given in a way which would show as to how this world does not get filled up. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that it is so inferred, because it is understood that there is a descent, (we reply) — No, because there is no Scriptural statement (about it). It is true of course, that it is reasonably sustainable that this world is not filled up fully because of the descent, but the Scriptural passage “This is the third condition why this world (of the Moon) does not get filled up” (ChanU.5.10.8) shows that it is logical that it does not get filled up fully precisely because of non-ascent. Besides as descent would be common also to those who have performed Iṣṭa etc. there would be the predicament of this mention of the third path being rendered purposeless. The word ‘because’ (Tu) refutes the doubt about the ascent of all without any exception, caused by the words in the recension of another branch (viz. the Kauṣītaki branch). Therefore it comes to this, that the word ‘all’ in the case of this other branch has reference to those who are competent (to ascend to the Moon) i.e. it means, that all those who are competent and who depart from this world, do verily go up to the Moon. — 17.
[Go top]
With regard to the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta) that, all without exception deserve to ascend to the Moon for the acquisition of a body, as it is reasonably sustainable by reason of the fact that the total number of oblations is fixed (to be five), according to the Scriptural statement “During the fifth oblation etc.”, — the reply is:Na: not; Tṛtīye: in the third; Tathā: so thus; Upalabdheḥ: it being perceived or seen to be.🔗 Not, in the case of the third path, because it is seen to be so. — 3.1.18. With regard to the third path, the rule of five oblations for the attainment of a human body need not be accepted. Whence is it so? Because it is seen to be so. For even so, in the manner described, the acquisition of the third path is seen to be, regardless of the rule of the five oblations, thus: “Do thou be born and do thou die, that is third path” (ChanU.5.10.8). Besides (in the Scriptural statement) “During the fifth oblation Āpas attain the name of man”, the number of oblations is mentioned as being the cause of a human body and not as a cause of the body of an insect or a butterfly, because the word ‘Puruṣa’ is a word for the human species. Besides, the instruction is, about Āpas attaining the name of man during the fifth oblation, and it is not that in the case of the other oblations, water attaining the name of man is denied, because, otherwise there would result a fault of a sentence being equivocal i.e. bearing two meanings. It may therefore be understood that in the case of those to whom the ascent and descent is possible a body may well be attained during the fifth oblation and in the case of others a 'body may well be begun as a result of water coming into contact i.e. combining with other elements, even in spite of the fixed number of oblations. — 18.
[Go top]
Smaryate: is stated in Smṛtis; Api: also; Ca: and; Loke: in the world.🔗 Besides (that it is so), so far as the ordinary world is (concerned), is well-known. — 3.1.19. Besides with regard to the ordinary world, it is known how Droṇa and Dhṛṣṭa-dyumna etc. and Sītā and Drau-padī etc. were not born from the womb. In the case of Droṇa etc. there was no fifth oblation into a woman, and with regard to Dhṛṣṭa-dyumna etc. there were no oblations with respect either to a man or a woman. Just as in their case the fixed number of oblations were disregarded, so may it well be in other cases also. The popular belief is that a female crane also conceives without being inseminated, (merely in the presence of clouds). — 19.
[Go top]
Darśanāt: on account of observation; Ca: also, and.🔗 Also, because it is (so) seen. — 3.1.20. Besides amongst the four kinds of beings, viz. the viviparous, the oviparous, those born out of sweat, and those born out of plants, because the latter two are seen to be generated without the sexual act, (the rule about) the fixed number of oblations is disregarded and it may well be so in other cases also. — 20. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) (there is a Scriptural passage thus) — There are only three sources of these beings, viz. those which are born from eggs, those which are born from other living beings and those which spring out of plants. Thus the Scriptures here speak of three kinds of beings. How then are four classes of beings understood? To this, the reply is:
[Go top]
Tṛtīya-śabda: the third term; Avarodhaḥ: inclusion; Saṃśoka-jasya: of that which springs from heat and moisture.🔗 The Sweat-born (Saṃśoka-ja i.e. born from sweat caused by the heat of the body) are covered by the third term. — 3.1.21. (In the Scriptural passage) “Those born out of an egg, those born out of a living being, and those born from sprouts i.e. plants”, it should be understood that the third term includes even the sweat-born, because both equally are generated from earth and water, and there is no contradiction, because the view about distinction is confined to generation from an immovable (element) which is dissimilar to the generation from the movable entities. — 21.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Sā-bhāvya-āpattiḥ: attainment of a similarity of nature with them; Upapatteḥ: being reasonable.🔗 Because, (that, beings which descend from the moon) attain similarity (to Ākāśa etc.), is reasonably sustainable. — 3.1.22. It has already been stated, that those who have performed Iṣṭa etc., after ascending to the lunar sphere, and after staying there till their actions are worked out i.e. exhausted by the experiencing of the fruits thereof, descend with a residue of actions (Anuśaya). Now the manner of their descent is being examined. With regard to that there is this Scriptural passage about the descent — “They again return to the same path by which they ascended, i.e. Ākāśa, from Ākāśa to Vāyu, from Vāyu he becomes smoke, and from smoke he becomes the (air) atmosphere, from the atmosphere he becomes the cloud and then comes down as rain” (ChanU.5.10.5). Here a doubt arises. Whether they descend after being transformed into the actual form of Ākāśa etc. or whether, after becoming only similar to Ākāśa etc. The conclusion (arrived at by the opponent of Vedānta) is that they are transformed into the actual form of Ākāśa etc., because so the Scriptures declare, as otherwise, a secondary significance would result, and when there is a conflict as between the literal meaning of the words of the Scriptures and their secondary significance, it is logical to accept the literal meaning of the words of the Scriptures. The passage such as “having become Vāyu he becomes Smoke” could only be understood to be apt only if it be possible for such beings to be transformed into the actual form of these entities. Therefore, the conclusion is, that such beings are transformed into the actual form of Ākāśa etc. We (the Vedāntins) reply — They only attain similarity to Ākāśa etc. When the aqueous body attained for the purpose of experiencing the fruits of actions on the sphere of the moon, is being dissolved, after such experience has come to an end, it becomes subtle like Ākāśa, and thence it surrenders itself to Vāyu and thereafter comes into contact with smoke etc. The same is here explained by — “Just as the ascent was made, they come to Ākāśa, and from Ākāśa, to Vāyu etc..” (ChanU.5.10.5). Whence is it so? Because it is reasonably sustainable. And it is only thus that it becomes reasonably sustainable, because otherwise, that one entity is transformed into the actual form of another, cannot be reasonably sustainable in the principal sense. If it were to change actually into the very form of Ākāśa, its descent in the order of Vāyu etc. is not reasonably possible, because Ākāśa being all-pervading and the Jīva-Selfs being necessarily always in contact with it, it is not possible that that there can be any relation (as between the Jīva-Selfs and the Ākāśa) other than their changing into only a similarity with Ākāśa. It is of course logical to accept the secondary significance of a Scriptural statement when the literal interpretation of it is not possible. Hence, ‘becoming similar to Ākāśa’ is itself here spoken of metaphorically, as the entity itself becoming the Ākāśa etc. — 22.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Na: not; Aticireṇa: in a very long time; Viśeṣāt: because of special statement of Śruti.🔗 (These individual Jīva-Selfs who become similar to Ākāśa etc. during the descent) do not remain so, for long, because there is a special statement (about it). — 3.1.23. Here, a doubt arises (as to the intervening period) between their becoming (similar to) Ākāśa, and their further going down to (the stage of) rice etc., viz. whether they remain for a long time in a condition similar to the one they have acquired earlier, before they become similar to their later condition, or whether they stay for a short time only. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being, that there is no rule (as to that) because of the absence of any Scriptural authority (stating any such rule), we reply — (That they remain in the condition similar to Ākāśa etc.) not for long. They remain only for a very short time in the condition similar to Ākāśa etc., and they reach this place (i.e. the earth) along with showers of rain. Whence is it so? Because of a special statement, in which, the Scriptures instruct that it is so, with reference to their condition after reaching the condition of rice etc., thus — “From here, verily (their passage) is difficult and more difficult (Durniṣprapataram, i.e. increasingly difficult)” (ChanU.5.10.6). The meaning is that moving away from the condition similar to rice etc., is rendered more and more difficult (which by implication means that the earlier movements are easier) and that indicates that during the earlier stages (of descent) the movement is easy. The special statement about the descent being pleasant and painful has reference to the shortness or length of the rate of descent, during that period, inasmuch as by reason of the non-development of a body (till then), there is no possibility of any experience (of the fruits of actions). Therefore (the conclusion is that) before attaining the condition of rice etc. the descent of the Jīva-Selfs (from the earlier condition) is quick i.e. after only a short time. — 23.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Anya-adhiṣṭhiteṣu: into what is possessed or occupied by another; Pūrvavat: like the previous cases; Abhilāpāt: on account of the scriptural statement.🔗 (These Jīva-Selfs during their descent come into contact with Vrīhi plants etc.) which have been already occupied by other (Jīva-Selfs) as in previous cases, because there is a Scriptural reference to it. — 3.1.24. In that same statement about the descent in the form of a shower of rain, it is said — “They here are born either as rice or barley, or as herbs or trees, or as sesamum or pulse” (ChanU.5.10.6). With regard to this a doubt arises, thus — Whether these Jīva-Selfs having such a residue of actions (Anuśayins), at this juncture attain the species of immovable entities (Sthāvara) and experience pleasure or pain respectively of such immovable entities, or whether they merely come into contact with such immovable entities occupied by other Jīva-Selfs. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that these Jīva-Selfs who having such a residue of actions (i.e. being Anuśayins) have attained the species of immovable entities, experience pleasure or pain peculiar to such species. Whence is it so? Because it is reasonably sustainable, that the root ‘to be born’ has its principal meaning, and also because it is well-known from the Scriptures and Smṛtis, that this species of immovable entities is the place where fruits of actions are experienced, and also because it is reasonably sustainable that religious actions involving the killing of animals such as sacrifices as Iṣṭi etc. produce undesirable fruit. Therefore, that those having such a residue of actions (i.e. the Anuśayins) are born as rice etc., is to be understood in the principal sense. It is similar to being born as a dog etc. Just as the birth of the Jīva-Selfs having such residue of actions (i.e. Anuśayins) in the species of a dog or a hog or a Cāṇḍāla (out-caste) is in the principal sense (of the terms) and they become subject to the pleasures and pains of that species, even so it is, in their birth as rice etc. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — These Jīva-Selfs having such residue of actions (i.e. Anuśayins), merely come into contact with such rice etc., which are already occupied (by other Jīva-Selfs), and do not experience the pleasure and pain of such Jīva-Selfs as it is in the previous cases. Just as their being transformed into Vāyu and smoke means merely their having contact with them, similarly here, by their becoming rice etc., and belonging to the immovable species, merely their contact with them is meant. Whence is it so? Because the statement here, also, is similar to that. How is it similar? (It is similar) because it is so mentioned without its involving any action. Just as, there is no mention of any action, (in the text) beginning with (their becoming) Ākāśa, down to their coming down as showers of rain, similarly (there is no such mention) in the case of their being born as rice etc. Therefore, those beings having such a residue of actions (i.e. Anuśayins) are not the experiencers of any pleasure or pain here. On the other hand, where their being such experiencers of pleasure or pain is meant, there is a reference to such action, such as — “those whose actions are good and those whose actions are filthy”. Besides, if the birth of these beings having such a residue of actions (i.e. Anuśayins) as rice etc., were to be in the principal sense, then whenever such rice is gathered, or pounded or cooked, or eaten, these Jīva-Selfs having such a residue of actions (i.e. Anuśayins) who have occupied such rice etc. would abandon such rice, because, it is well-known that an individual Jīva-Self occupying a particular body, deserts such body when it is so harassed, and also because, were it to be so, the Scriptures would not refer to such individual Jīva-Selfs later on, as becoming inseminators (Retaḥ-sig-bhāva). Hence these beings having such residue of actions (i.e. Anuśayins) merely come into contact with rice etc. which have already been occupied by other Jīva-Selfs. By this (i.e. by this argument), that the verb-root ‘to be born’ is used in the principal sense, is refuted, as also (the argument) that such immovable entities are places for the experiencing (of fruits of actions). It is not, that we deny that immovable entities can be the proper places for experiencing (such fruits of actions). It may well be the place for such experience in the case of those creatures who by their unmeritorious actions have attained the species of immovable entities. We only wish to emphasize that those who descend from the moon with such residue of actions (Anuśayins) do not attain the condition of immovable entities. — 24.
[Go top]
A-śuddham: unholy; Iti: so, thus; Cet: if; Na: no, not so, (the objection cannot stand); Śabdāt: on account of the word, on account of the scriptural authority.🔗 If it be said that (action such as a sacrifice etc.) is impure, (we reply) — No, because of the Scriptures. — 3.1.25. Again, the objection raised (by the opponents of Vedānta) that as Sacrificial actions are impure, inasmuch as they involve the killing of animals, therefore they produce undesirable fruit, and hence, birth as rice etc., which these Jīva-Selfs having a residue of actions (Anuśayins) attain, must be understood to be in the principal sense, and the notion of its being of a secondary significance, is useless, is now being refuted. (We reply) — No, because the knowledge of meritorious or unmeritorious action is acquired from the Scriptures. It is the Scriptures (Śāstra) alone which are the means of determining that a particular action is meritorious or unmeritorious, inasmuch as they (i.e. merit or demerit) are supra-sensual and have unregulated environment, time and occasion as their cause. What is done as a meritorious action according to a particular environment, time and occasion, becomes unmeritorious under some other environment, time and occasion, and therefore, as apart from the Scriptures (Śāstra), nobody is able to attain the knowledge of meritorious or unmeritorious action. It is precisely on the authority of the Scriptures (Śāstra) that the Jyoti-ṣṭoma sacrifice involving the killing (of animals) is understood to be a meritorious action, so, how possibly can it be characterized as being unmeritorious? But (says the opponent of Vedānta) by declaring that “no creatures should ever be killed” the Scriptures (Śāstra) themselves instruct (us) that such killing of creatures is unmeritorious. (We reply) — Of course (it is so) but that is a general rule, while (the injunction) that ‘an animal be sacrificed to Agni and Soma’ is an exception (to that rule). A rule and its exception have their application in their own proper individual sphere. Therefore, Vedic sacrificial action is pure as it is performed by men of authority, and is considered uncensurable, and (a Jīva-Self’s) birth as an immovable thing is properly not its fruit, and (the Jīva-Self’s) birth as rice etc. does not deserve to be like the birth of a dog etc., because that has been spoken of (by the Scriptures) with respect to those whose conduct has been filthy, and there is no such special liability here (in the case of these Jīva-Selfs who become rice). Therefore, in the case of those who descend from the moon along with a residue of actions (Anuśayins), their becoming rice etc. merely figuratively means their coming into contact with rice etc. — 25.
[Go top]
Retaḥ-sig: one who ejects the seminal fluid; Yogaḥ: connection with; Atha: then afterwards.🔗 Thereafter, (these Jīva-Selfs) come into contact with those who are the inseminators. — 3.1.26. This is again why the Jīva-Selfs becoming rice etc., means their merely coming into contact with them, viz., that after their becoming rice etc., the Scriptures mention about their becoming inseminators, thus — “Whosoever eats food and inseminates, that again, the Jīva-Self becomes” (ChanU.5.10.6). This becoming an inseminator cannot possibly be in the principal sense. It is only long after a person is born and after he reaches adolescence that he becomes capable of inseminating. How can then the Jīva-Selfs with a residue of actions (i.e. Anuśayins) who accompany the food eaten (by a person) be understood to become so in the principal sense? Therefore a Jīva-Self’s becoming an inseminator should be understood to be merely its coming into contact with potential inseminators, and there is no contradiction because becoming rice etc. only means coming into contact with such rice etc. — 26.
[Go top]
Yoneḥ: from the womb; Śarīram: the body.🔗 From the womb, a body (is born). — 3.1.27. Then, what the Scriptures (Śāstra) mean is that after coming into contact with an inseminator and after the womb is inseminated, the Jīva-Self with a residue of action (Anuśaya) attains a body, in which it can experience the fruits (of residual actions), thus — “those whose actions are good” etc. (ChanU.5.10.7). From this also, it is understood that, it is not, that, the Jīva-Selfs having a residue (i.e. Anuśayins) when during their descent they become rice etc., acquire a body which experiences pleasure and pain. Therefore, it is thus established that what is termed as the birth of the Jīva-Selfs having a residue of action (Anuśayins), as rice etc. merely means their contact (with them). — 27.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
In the preceding Pāda the various ways of the progress of the Jīva-Self during its transmigratory condition have been elaborated upon, by the illustration of the Lore of the Five Agnis (Pañcāgni-Vidyā). The Scriptures beginning with “When he sleeps” further on declare — “There are no chariots, no horses, no roads, (but) he creates such chariots, horses and roads” (BrhU.4.3.10) etc. With regard to this, a doubt (arises) — whether in the dream ‘condition creation is as real, as it is in the waking condition, or whether it is merely an appearance i.e. it is illusory (Māyāmayī).Sandhye: in the intermediate stage (between waking and deep sleep, i.e., in the dream state); Sṛṣṭiḥ: (there is real) creation; Āha: (Śruti) says so; Hi: because.🔗 In the twilight (i.e. dream) condition, there is creation because the Scriptures also speak about it. — 3.2.1. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — It is understood that in the dream condition creation is real. (Says he) — The word ‘Sandhyā’ means the dream condition as the Scriptures use the term thus — “The twilight i.e. dream condition is the third condition” (BrhU.4.3.9). Or else it is the condition of being between the two worlds, i.e., it comes to mean the twilight i.e. dream condition as it exists where the two conditions of wakefulness and deep sleep meet, and in that twilight condition where wakefulness and deep sleep meet, creation deserves to be real. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures which of course are authoritative, themselves declare — “And he creates chariots, horses, and roads” (BrhU.4.3.10). It is also understood to be so, as the concluding portion refers to him as the Kartā (Agent). — 1.
[Go top]
Nirmātāram: Creator, the shaper, the builder, the maker; Ca: and, more over; Eke: some (followers of the particular Śākhās of the Vedas); Putra-ādayaḥ: sons, etc.; Ca: and, also.🔗 (The followers) of one branch also consider him (i.e. the Ātmā) to be the creator (of things desired in a dream, i.e. of Kāma), and also (Kāma means) sons etc. — 3.2.2. Besides, the followers of one branch speak about the Jīva-Self in this twilight condition to be the creator of all objects of desire, thus — “This Puruṣa is the one, that keeps vigil while the sense-organs sleep, the creator of all objects of desire” (KathU.2.2.8). Here, inasmuch as they are objects of desire, sons etc. are considered to be such objects of desire. But (says the Vedāntin) by the word Kāma, only special desires are spoken of. No (it is replied), because (the Scriptures) with reference to the passage “You may ask for a boon about being long-lived (lit., living for hundred years), and about sons and grandsons” (KathU.1.1.23) have time and again used the word ‘Kāma’ as meaning sons etc. which is relevant to the context, in the concluding portion, thus: — “I shall make you the experiencer of all desired objects” (KathU.1.1.24). We infer from the chapter and the complementary portion, that the creator is the intelligential Highest Self (Prājña). This chapter deals with the intelligential Highest Self (Prājña), (as is seen from the Scriptural passage) “(This one) who is different (Anyatra) from meritorious action and unmeritorious action too” (KathU.1.2.14), and the complementary passage also refers to Him, thus — “That indeed is the bright one, that is Brahman, the one that is described as the immortal. All the worlds are contained in Him and none can go beyond Him” (KathU.2.2.8). Now, it is understood, that the world of the waking condition, created by this intelligential Highest Self, is of a real nature and so the other one created in the dream condition also deserves to be similar (i.e. real). The same reasoning, according to the Scriptures, applies to the waking and dream conditions, thus — “This is as good as his waking condition, say they, for what he sees during the Waking condition, he sees in the condition of sleep also” (BrhU.4.3.14). Hence (the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta) is that the creation in the dream condition is of course of the nature of reality. — 2.
[Go top]
To this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the Sūtra-kāra gives reply —Māyā-mātram: mere illusion; Tu: but; Kārtsnyena: entirely, fully; An-abhivyakta-sva-rūpatvāt: on account of its nature being unmanifested.🔗 But (creation in the dream condition) is mere appearance i.e. illusion, because of its nature of not being a complete manifestation (of the attributes of reality). — 3.2.3. The word ‘but’ refutes the view of the opponent. It is not, as is said, that the creation in a dream, is creation in its real sense. The dream creation is but mere appearance i.e. illusion, and there is not even an iota (lit., whiff) of reality (about it). Whence is it so? Because of its nature of not being a complete manifestation (of the attributes of a real entity). A dream is not of that nature in which the attributes of a real entity are fully manifested. What again is meant by this totality (of manifestation)? (It means) the existence of the requisite environment, time, and necessary materials (Sampatti) and the absence of subsequent obliteration. In the case of a dream, this requisite environment, time and necessary materials (Sampatti) and the non-liability of obliteration associated with real things, cannot be possible. There is not available for instance (in the case of a dream) a proper space necessary for a chariot. There cannot possibly be sufficient space for a chariot in the limited space of a body. But (it may be argued), may be, the dreamer may see objects which are outside the body, because he does perceive things occupying a different place. The Scriptures also indicate how a dream occurs outside the body (of the dreamer), thus — “The Immortal one, having moved out of the nest (of the body) goes about as he pleases” (BrhU.4.3.12), and these different perceptions, as this staying in or going out (of the body), would not be reasonably understandable in the case of a person dreaming if he were not to go out (of the body). (We reply) — No, it cannot be possible for a person in sleep to be able to go out to a place hundreds of Yojanas away, and to return from thence, in a trice. Occasionally a person speaks of his dream, in which he does not mention his returning (from a place to which he has gone in his dream), thus — “I was overcome by sleep today, and I slept here in the Kurus and went to the Pāñcālas in my dream, and woke up there.” If he were really to go out of his body, then he would wake up in Pāñcālas as he is supposed to have gone there, but as a matter of fact he actually wakes up in the Kurus. His body along with which, he dreams about having gone to another country, is seen by people near about, to be where he actually sleeps. Besides the other countries, which he is supposed to see in his dream, are not as a matter of fact as he sees them, and were he in fact to speed away (to these countries), he would see them as he would see them in his waking condition. Besides the Scriptures declare the dream to be in a body, beginning thus — “When he moves about in a dream”, and then declaring later — “He moves about in his own body at his pleasure” (BrhU.2.1.18). Hence, as it involves a contradiction with the Scriptures and reasoning, the Scriptural passage which refers to the going out of the nest (of the body) should be understood in its secondary sense, to mean that the Immortal one goes out, as it were, from the body. Any one who even while he is in his body, has no (present) use for it, may be said to be out of the body, as it were. The difference in the perception as between staying in and going out of the body, may, under the circumstances, be understood to be mere deception. There is also a confusion of time, in a dream. For instance, when he gees to sleep during the night, (in the dream) he considers it to be day time in Bhārata-Varṣa (India). Similarly while a dream lasts only for a moment, he feels as if he has lived through a crowded period of many years. Besides, in a dream, there are not the means i.e. materials necessary for perceptive knowledge and action. As the organs-of-sense happen to have been withdrawn inwards (during sleep), a person dreaming has then no eyes etc. (properly functioning as in the waking state), by which he would, in fact, see any chariot etc. Whence could he then have the power to manufacture a chariot in a moment and whence also for the matter of that can he have the timber etc. necessary for it? Besides the chariot etc. seen by him in his dream, are obliterated when (later on) he wakes up. Not only that, but even during the dream itself, its own creations are equally subject to obliteration, inasmuch as, the end of a dream, contradicts its beginning. What is understood to be a chariot, in a dream, is again in a moment seen as a man, and what is understood to be a man, is again seen as a tree. Besides the Scriptures (Śāstra) categorically declare the absence of any chariots etc. in a dream thus — “(In the dream condition) there are no chariots, no horses and no roads” (BrhU.4.3.10). Therefore the experience in a dream is merely an appearance i.e. it is illusory. — 3.
[Go top]
Sūcakaḥ: indicative, suggestive; Ca: moreover, and; Hi: because, as for; Śruteḥ: from the Śruti; Ācakṣate: say, affirm; Ca: also; Tad-vidaḥ: dream-experts, those who know the secrets of dream.🔗 On the authority of Scriptures (a dream although an appearance i.e. an illusion, is yet) a portent too. Expert interpreters (of dreams) also say so. — 3.2.4. (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — A dream, then, being an illusion, is it not, that there could not be even an iota of reality about it? (We reply) — It is not so. A dream is a portent of coming good or bad (events), for the Scriptures declare thus — “If (a person) while he is engaged in performing a religious ritual so that a desire of his may be fulfilled, beholds a woman in his dream, he may infer the augmentation (of his desire) from such vision of his dream” (ChanU.5.2.9), and they also declare, how some dreams are indicative of death before long, thus — “When he sees a dark man with black teeth, he kills him” (ChanU.5.2.9). Those who are experts in dream lore say thus — To dream about riding an elephant etc. is auspicious, while to dream about riding a donkey etc. is inauspicious. They also hold that some dreams caused by some incantations (Mantras) or deities or some particular material, are indicative of just a suggestion of truthful meaning. (What is meant is) that even with regard to these matters, may the things suggested by the dream, be, for the matter of that, real enough, but those things seen in a dream which are said to be suggestive in this way, viz., the vision of a woman etc., are of course unreal, because they do become obliterated (after the dreamer wakes up). Therefore, that dreams are but a mere appearance i.e. an illusion, is reasonably sustainable. It being so, the words “The Scriptures also speak about it (Āha hi)” (in Sūtra 1 of Pāda ii of this Adhyāya) should therefore be explained as being used in a secondary sense. For instance, when it is said that the plough sustains the bullocks etc., it is so said, because it is the indirect means, and not because a plough actually sustains the bullocks, similarly the man sleeping being only the accidental cause (of a dream) it is said that he creates chariots etc., and that he is the creator (Kartā) of the chariots etc., and it is not that the person that is asleep does actually create the chariots etc. It should rather be said, that, his being the creator, is so, in as much as he is the cause of the good or bad deeds, which in their turn are the cause of the experience by him of the pleasure or fear etc. brought about by the dream vision of the chariot etc. It is because the self-luminous refulgence of the Self (Ātmā) is difficult of being properly recognized, that the Scriptures have made a reference to a dream, because during the condition of wakefulness, as a result of the contact of the organs-of-sense with their objects, and the fact of being mixed up with the light of the Sun etc., the Self’s being so self-luminous i.e. refulgent, is difficult of being recognized. Hence, if the statement about the creation of chariots etc. is construed to be as it is stated by the Scriptures (i.e. directly or literally) then the self-luminousness and refulgence of the Self would fail to be properly ascertained; therefore, the statement about the absence of chariots etc. should be construed as a direct Scriptural statement and the statement about the creation of the chariots etc. should be construed in a secondary sense. This would serve to explain the Scriptural mention about the creation (“the creator of all objects of desire,” in Kaṭha 5.8, in Sūtra 2 of Pāda ii of Adhyāya III, as being in the secondary sense). Again, with regard to the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that it is the intelligential Highest Self that is spoken of as the creator (in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad), we say that, that also is not correct, because, in another Scriptural passage — “He having himself destroyed (his body in the waking state) and created (a body out of his impressions), he sleeps (and dreams) by (the help) of his own refulgence and light” (BrhU.4.3.9), the Scriptures speak of the activity being that of the Jīva-Self. Even here, by the passage “He who keeps vigil while the senses sleep”, which is a reference to something which is well-known (Anuvāda), it is the Jīva-Self that is described to be the creator of desired objects. And it is precisely because of that, that the Scriptures, by the complementary passage “That verily is the bright one, that is Brahman”, refute that the Jīva-Self is really the Jīva-Self, and instruct (us) that it is but Brahman only, as referred to in “That thou art” (ChanU.6.9.4) etc., and not that, that this chapter deals with Brahman is contradicted, nor that we deny the activity of the intelligential Highest Self (Prājña), even in the dream state, because, that he is the Lord of all and that it is he (i.e. the intelligential Highest Self) who presides in all the different states, is reasonably sustainable. It is merely emphasized (by us) that the creations of the dream condition, are not real in the sense in which creations such as Ākāśa etc. are real. Moreover, even the creation of Ākāśa etc. also, is not a reality in the absolute ultimate sense, as has been explained (in Bra. Su. II. i. 14), and it has been elaborately established by us already that the whole phenomenal world is wholly illusory. Prior to the realization of Brahman, the entire phenomenal world, such as the Ākāśa etc., stands as it is, in a valid form and is said to be relatively true, but the creations in a dream are obliterated every day. The illusory character of dream creations, therefore, comes to be so stated separately in a special sense (of being totally illusory). — 4.
[Go top]
Para-abhidhyānāt: by meditation on the Supreme Lord; Tu: but; Tiro-hitam: that which is hidden; Tataḥ: from Him(the Lord); Hi: for; Asya: his, of the individual soul; Bandha-viparyayau: bondage and its opposite, i.e., freedom.🔗 (Attributes which are (in fact) common to the Highest Self i.e. the Lord and the Jīva-Self, but are) obscured, become manifest in the Jīva-Self by meditation on the transcendental one (i.e. the Highest Self i.e. the Lord), for bondage (Bandha) and its opposite (i.e. Final Release) of the Jīva-Self are due to that Highest Self i.e. the Lord. — 3.2.5. (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — It may even be like this, that the Jīva-Self is but only a part (Aṃśa) of the transcendental one (i.e. the Lord), even as a scintilla (is a part) of the fire. And this being so, just as ‘to burn’ or ‘to give out light’ are powers common both to the fire and its scintilla, even so the powers of ‘knowledge’ and of the ‘rulership (of the world)’ are common both to the Jīva-Self and the Highest Lord, and hence the Jīva-Self’s dream-creation of chariots etc. may well be possible as a result of its Lordly power and knowledge, as being deliberately desired by it (Sāṅkalpikī). To this we reply — Even though there is a relationship as that of a part to the whole, as between the Jīva-Self and the Lord, still, that the Jīva-Self and the Lord have attributes contrary to each other is directly evident. But (asks the opponent of Vedānta) is it, then, that the Jīva-Self and the Lord have no common attributes? (We reply) — No, it is not that it (Jīva-Self) has not such common attributes, but, even though it has such common attributes, they happen to be obscured as a result of being hidden from view (Tiro-dhānāt) by Nescience. Obscured though they thus are however, they become manifest only in a few rare cases such as that in the case of a person, for instance, who keeps striving after and meditating upon the Lord, and who has acquired supernatural faculties, and whose darkness of ignorance is dispelled as a result of the grace of God (vouchsafed to him), even as a man whose power of vision is obscured by Timira (a disease of the eye — Diplopia) happens to have his vision restored to him as a result of the potency of the medicines, and it is not that they become manifest by themselves in the case of all persons. Whence is it so? Because it is “through Him” (Tataḥ) i.e. because of the Lord as a cause, that a Jīva-Self falls into bondage or acquires Final Release. The bondage is due to the ignorance of the knowledge of the nature of the Lord and Final Release occurs as a result of the acquisition of such knowledge (of the nature of the Lord). To the same effect is the Scriptural passage — “All bonds are sundered by knowing the Lord, and all sufferings having thereby come to an end, births and deaths cease. It is by meditation on Him, that, after death, the third stage, viz. the supreme Lordship of the universe, supervenes, and a man becomes absolutely detached i.e. isolated (Kevala) and one whose desire is only for the Self (Ātmā) only” (SvetU.1.11). — 5.
[Go top]
Deha-yogāt: from its connection with the body; Vā: and, or; Saḥ: that (the concealment of the soul’s rulership); Api: also.🔗 Or, this obscurement (of the powers of Knowledge and Lordship of a Jīva-Self) also is, on account of its contact with the body. — 3.2.6. Why again (says the opponent), even when the Jīva-Self is but a part of the transcendental Self, should it have its powers of Knowledge and Lordship obscured, when it is reasonable that such Knowledge and Lordship should not be so obscured, even as the power of a scintilla ‘to burn’ and ‘to give light’ is not obscured? We reply — (What you say) is true of course, but this obscurement of the powers of Knowledge and Lordship of the Jīva-Self results, on account of its contact with the body, i.e., with the body, organs-of-sense, mind, intelligence, objects-of-sense and sensations etc. The simile for that is — Just as, though Agni has the power to burn and to give light, still such powers become obscured when the Agni remains concealed in the ‘Araṇi’ (sticks of Śamī tree which by their mutual friction produce fire) or when again it is covered over with ashes, similarly, the obscurement of the Knowledge and Lordship of the Jīva-Self is due to the confusion resulting from the failure of discrimination caused by its contact with limiting adjuncts such as names and forms which are brought about by Nescience. The word “or” (in the Sūtra) serves the purpose of the refutation of the doubt about the Jīva-Self and the Lord being entities separate from each other. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), let the Jīva-Self then be for the matter of that an entity separate from the Lord, inasmuch as its Knowledge and Lordship is obscured, why is there any need of the assumption of its contact with the body? We reply — No, that the Jīva-Self can ever be an entity separate from the Lord, is not reasonably sustainable, because, beginning with the passage “This here deity thought” (ChanU.6.3.2), the Scriptures later on refer to the Jīva-Self as the Ātmā in the passage “Having itself entered as this Jīva-Self (Ātmā)” (ChanU.6.3.2), and by the passage “That is truth, that is Ātmā, Oh Śveta-keto, that thou art”, the Scriptures instruct that it has the Lord’s own nature (Īśvarātmatva). Hence, non-different as the Jīva-Self is from the Lord, it comes to have its Knowledge and Lordship obscured by its contact with the body. Hence again, the creation of chariots etc. in a dream, by the Jīva-Self through his desire, does not fit in properly, because, if it could so create at its will, it would never care to experience any unpleasant unwanted dream, as nobody would ever wish for unpleasant or unwanted things. Again, with regard to what is said, viz. that the Scriptural passage about a dream being similar to the Jīva-Self’s waking state (BrhU.4.3.14), would establish the reality of dream creations, (we say) that, that statement (about a dream being just like its waking state), does not imply the reality of dream-creations, as it would contradict the Self’s self-refulgence and also because the Scriptures themselves have declared the absence of chariots in a dream. The meaning is, that, inasmuch as dreams are the product of the impressions received during the condition of wakefulness, that the statement that they appear like the waking state is so stated, only because they appear to be similar. It is, therefore, reasonably sustainable that dreams are but a mere appearance i.e. an illusion (Māyā). — 6.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tad-abhāvaḥ: absence of that (dreaming) i.e., deep sleep; Nāḍīṣu: in the nerves (psychic currents); Tat-śruteḥ: as it is known from the Śrutis; Ātmani: in the self; Ca: and, also. (Tat: about it.)🔗 There is absence of that (i.e. a dream) in the Nāḍīs and in the Self (Ātmā), according to the Scriptures. — 3.2.7. The condition of dreams has (so far) been examined, and now the condition of deep sleep is being examined. With regard to that condition of deep sleep, there are the following Scriptural passages. In one place — “Now when this (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is completely and serenely asleep (i.e. wherein the organs-of-sense are completely out of action), it does not dream dreams, but happens to have entered the Nāḍīs” (ChanU.8.6.3). In another passage referring to Nāḍīs themselves, the Scriptures say — “He moves along those (i.e. Nāḍīs) and sleeps in the Purītat (the envelope of the Hṛdaya)” (BrhU.2.1.19). In another place again, referring to the Nāḍīs, thus — “When in sleep, he happens to be in the Nāḍīs, and does not dream any dreams whatsoever and becomes one with the Prāṇa (Brahman) itself” (Kaush. 4.19). Again elsewhere — “He sleeps in this Ākāśa within the Hṛdaya” (BrhU.2.1.17). Similarly in another place — “Then, at that time, he becomes one with the ‘Sat’ i.e. becomes one with its Self” (ChanU.6.8.1). And also — “Embraced by the intelligential Self, he is not aware of anything external nor internal” (BrhU.4.3.21). Now (says the opponent of Vedānta), a doubt arises here, as to whether these Nāḍīs etc. are the various different places for sleep, independent of each other, or whether by mutual interdependence they collectively form but only one place of sleep. What then is the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta)? It is that they all constitute different places of sleep. Whence is it so? Because all these have one and the same use. Things which have the same use, such as rice and barley (in a sacrifice, for instance), are not seen to be dependent on each other, (and a sacrificer may optionally use either of them). Nāḍīs etc. are seen to have one and the same purpose, as for instance, in the Scriptural passages “He happens to have entered into the Nāḍīs” (ChanU.8.6.3), “He sleeps in the Purītat” (BrhU.2.1.19), wherein there is the use of the same locative case in both. But (says the Vedāntin) it is not seen that there is such use of the locative in the case of the word ‘Sat’, in “Then (he) becomes one with the ‘Sat’” (ChanU.6.8.1). (The opponent of Vedānta replies) — This is no fault, because even there (where the ‘Sat’ is governed by the instrumental case) it is understood that it is meant to have the same sense of the locative case. The complementary sentence there, purports to say that the Jīva-Self wishing to find a haven, approaches the ‘Sat’, thus — “Failing to obtain a haven (Āyatana) anywhere else (he, the Jīva-Self) takes shelter with the Prāṇa” (ChanU.6.8.2), where by the word ‘Prāṇa’ the ‘Sat’ which is relevant here, is understood. The word Āyatana (haven of rest or sanctuary) has the sense of the locative case. In the complementary sentence also, it is seen that the locative is used thus — “Having become merged in the ‘Sat’, they are not aware that they have become merged in the ‘Sat’” (ChanU.6.9.2). In all these cases, the nature of deep sleep, which is characterized by the cessation of all special cognition, does not differ. Therefore, because they all have the same use, (the Jīva-Self) approaches optionally any one of these Nāḍīs etc. as the place for the purpose of sleep. As against this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) it is propounded as follows — “There is absence of that (i.e. experience of dreams) in the Nāḍīs and in the Ātmā (Self)”. The absence of ‘that’ means the absence of any dream-vision which is the relevant subject here, and which means deep sleep. By ‘in the Nāḍīs and the Self’ is meant that the Jīva-Self approaches the Nāḍīs etc. for the purpose of deep sleep, not optionally but as taken together collectively. Whence is it so? Because there is a Scriptural statement (to that effect). The Scriptures mention the Nāḍīs etc. (i.e. the Nāḍīs, the Purītat and Brahman) as the places of deep sleep, and that (statement) can be properly understood, only if they (i.e. the Nāḍīs) are taken together collectively along with the other places (as the place of sleep). If it is understood that they each are to be taken optionally, then, (if only one of these three is accepted as the place of sleep) the others (i.e. the other two places) would then be ruled out, and in either supposition there would be contradiction of other Scriptural passages. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has already been said, that they all have the same use, and can be optionally understood (to be the places of sleep), like for instance, rice or barley. The reply is — No, merely because it is indicated that they (i.e. the Nāḍīs etc.) have the same case-ending, it does not mean, that they all have the same use, and an option (as to their choice as a place of sleep) is available, for, in (sentences such as) “He sleeps in the palace”, “He sleeps in the bed” etc., even though it is seen, that, for things having different uses, but which are taken collectively, the same one case-ending is used, such as in “He sleeps in the palace” and “He sleeps in the bed”. Similarly, here also, with regard to the passage “He sleeps in the Nāḍīs, the Purītat and Brahman”, that they can be taken together collectively is reasonably sustainable. The Scriptural passage “When asleep he remains in them (i.e. the Nāḍīs), sees no dreams whatsoever, and becomes one with the Prāṇa (i.e. Brahman) itself” (Kaush. 4.19) being understood to be but one sentence only, the Scriptures indicate, that during such sleep the Nāḍīs and the Prāṇa (i.e. Brahman) are to be construed collectively. It has of course been already understood, in Sūtra I.i.28, viz. “Prāṇa (is Brahman) because it is so understood”, that. Prāṇa is Brahman. Where the Scriptures mention the Nāḍīs as the place of sleep, as it were independently, thus — “He then crawls into the Nāḍīs” (ChanU.8.6.3), there even it is understood, from the fact that ‘Brahman’ which is mentioned elsewhere as well-established (as being the place of deep sleep) is not expressly ruled out, that the Jīva-Self ultimately reposes in Brahman itself, approaching it by way of the Nāḍīs. Even when it is so, the use of the locative case in the case of the word Nāḍī is not contradictory, because one who approaches ‘Brahman’ through the Nāḍīs, does of course go through the Nāḍīs, even as, whosoever enters the sea through the Ganges can also of course be said to be one who has entered the Ganges also. Besides, here, as it is intended to speak about the way to Brahma-Loka which is approached by way of rays and Nāḍīs, this description about the entering into the Nāḍīs is by way of the glorification of Nāḍīs. The Scriptures, after having said — “He enters the Nāḍīs” (ChanU.8.6.3), purport to glorify the Nāḍīs by saying afterwards — “No sin whatsoever contaminates him” (ChanU.8.6.3). The Scriptures also speak about the reason why no sin attaches, thus: — “Because then he becomes one with Tejas” (ChanU.8.6.3). The meaning is, that having his organs-of-sense enveloped by the Tejas of the Nāḍīs, known as ‘bile’ (Pitta), he does not see the external objects of sense. Or else, by the word Tejas, it is Brahman that is indicated, because in another Scriptural passage — “It is Brahman itself, Tejas itself” (BrhU.4.4.7), the word Tejas is used as meaning Brahman. The meaning is, that, as by way of the Nāḍīs, he becomes one with Brahman, no sin, whatsoever, attaches to him. The attainment of Brahman is understood to be the reason of the absence of any attachment of sin, because of a Scriptural passage such as — “All sins are rolled back from here, as this Brahma-Loka is free from sin” (ChanU.8.4.1). This being so, it is understood that the Nāḍīs, which in common with Brahman which is well-known from passages elsewhere to be the place of (the Jīva-Self’s) repose, are to be construed collectively with it. Similarly, inasmuch as the Purītat is mentioned in connection with the chapter dealing with Brahman, it also is, in a subordinate way to Brahman, understood to be the place of deep sleep, because when the Ākāśa of the Hṛdaya is referred to as the place of deep sleep, thus — “He sleeps in this Ākāśa which is inside the Hṛdaya” (BrhU.2.1.17), the Scriptures also mention, thus — “He sleeps in the Purītat” (BrhU.2.1.19). Purītat is spoken of as that which envelops the Hṛdaya, and one who sleeps in the Ākāśa of the Hṛdaya — which itself is inside the Purītat — , one can also be said to be sleeping in the Purītat, just as one who resides in a town surrounded by a wall is also said to reside inside the wall. It is already understood from the Sūtra “The small (Ākāśa, is Brahman) because of reasons which come after” (Bra. Su. I. iii. 14) that the Ākāśa in the Hṛdaya is Brahman. Similarly, that the Nāḍīs and the Purītat are understood to be taken collectively, is understood from “He having approached through them, sleeps in the Purītat” (BrhU.2.1.19) — as it is (construed to be) but one sentence. Now it is well-known that the ‘Sat’ and ‘Prājña’ (intelligential Highest Self) mean Brahman. Thus the Scriptural passages speak of only these three, viz. the Nāḍīs, the Purītat and Brahman, as the places of deep sleep, wherein the Nāḍīs and the Purītat are but merely the entrances (Dvāra-mātram), and Brahman alone is the place of deep sleep. Moreover, the Nāḍīs or Purītat are only the abode of the limiting adjuncts of the Jīva-Self, because, its organs-of-sense abide there. When there is absence of any relation with these limiting adjuncts, nothing can possibly ever be the abode of the Jīva-Self, because being an entity not different from Brahman it is then firmly ensconced in its own greatness. Its (i.e. the Jīva-Self’s) having Brahman as its abode during deep sleep is not spoken of with a view to imply or convey the notion of any difference (between them), such as one of the two i.e. Brahman being the abode and the other i.e. the Jīva-Self being that which abides in such abode, but only in order to convey or imply their absolute identity, because, it is said — “Oh Mild one, it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) then becomes one with ‘Sat’, it is completely merged into itself” (ChanU.6.8.1). By the word ‘Sva’ the Self is referred to, as meaning, that it has attained its own true form, by being in deep sleep. Besides, it is not, that the Jīva-Self is ever not-one-with-Brahman, because its own real nature is imperishable. It is with reference to the Self’s having, as it were, acquired a foreign nature as a result of its contact with limiting adjuncts during the conditions of dreams and wakefulness, that it is said, that, when during deep sleep, these limiting adjuncts are relaxed, it acquires its own true nature. Hence it would not be logical (to say) that during the condition of sleep, it sometimes becomes one with Sat and sometimes not. Besides, even if it is understood that the Jīva-Self’s place of repose is optional, still in all cases, deep sleep as characterized by the cessation of all special cognition, is always the same (i.e. it is not of different kinds). Therefore, it is logical that (the Jīva-Self) which has attained oneness with the ‘Sat’ does not cognize (anything), for, have not the Scriptures said — “Whereby and whom, should one, then, know?” (BrhU.2.4.14). In the case in which the Jīva-Self is understood to sleep in the Nāḍīs or the Purītat, it is not possible to know of any reason why it should not cognize, as it would then be a fit subject of duality (because of its difference with Brahman), because of the Scriptural passage — “Where there is difference as it were, there one cognizes another” (BrhU.4.3.31). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) in the case of such difference (i.e. duality of the Jīva-Self and Brahman), may be, great distance etc., may very well be a reason for such absence of cognition. (We reply) — Oh, it could well be such a reason, provided the Jīva-Self were (understood by us) to be in itself circumscribed or limited, even as Viṣṇu-mitra, who is on a journey and is not able to see his own house, is. It is not possible, that apart from limiting adjuncts, the Jīva-Self has any circumscribed limits as such. If it be said that the reason of this non-cognition by the Jīva-Self is that limiting adjuncts are at a great distance etc., even then it is logical that the Jīva-Self, relieved of its adjuncts, becomes one with ‘Sat’, and hence it is that it does not cognize. Now with regard to this, we do not suggest that the Nāḍīs etc. equally with Brahman are the Self’s place for repose. It is not that the knowledge that the Nāḍīs or Purītat are the Self’s places of repose, has any use in itself, because the Scriptures do not mention that there is any fruit attached to such knowledge, or that it is in any way subsidiary to anything (such as Karma) which has such fruit. We are only claiming to expound, that Brahman which is imperishable, is the Jīva-Self’s place for repose and that knowledge of course has the fruit, viz. the realization that the Jīva-Self is in reality Brahman, and that it is free from the transactions of dreams or wakefulness. Therefore it is the ‘Ātmā’ i.e. the Highest Self that alone is the Jīva-Self’s place of repose. — 7.
[Go top]
Ataḥ: hence; Prabodhaḥ: waking; Asmāt: from this (i.e., Brahman).🔗 Hence, (the Jīva-Self s) awakening (is) from that (Highest Self). — 3.2.8. It is precisely for the reason that the Ātmā (Highest Self) alone is the (Jīva-Self’s) place of repose, that in the Scriptural chapter dealing with the subject of sleep, the instruction given is that the awakening of the Jīva-Self is always from this Ātmā (Highest Self). Thus, for instance, while replying to the question — “From where did this (Jīva-Self) return?” (BrhU.2.1.16), the Scriptures say thus: — “Just as from a fire minute scintillae fly around, even so, do the Prāṇas (come forth) from this Ātmā (Highest Self)” (BrhU.2.1.20). And also — “Having come from the ‘Sat’, they are not aware that they have come from the ‘Sat’” (ChanU.6.10.2). If these places of repose (viz. the Nāḍīs, Purītat and Brahman) were to be understood to be optional, then the Scriptures would have instructed, that it (the Jīva-Self) sometimes wakes up from the Nāḍīs, sometimes from the Purītat and sometimes from the Ātmā (Highest Self). Therefore also, it is the Ātmā (Highest Self) that alone is the (Jīva-Self’s) place of repose. — 8.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Saḥ eva: the selfsame soul (which went to sleep); Tu: but; Karma-anusmṛti-śabda-vidhibhyaḥ: on account of Karma or work, memory, scriptural authority and precept; (Saḥ: he; Eva: only, and no other); Karma: activity, on account of his finishing the action left unfinished; Anusmṛti: remembrance, on account of memory of identity; Śabda: from the Śruti; Vidhibhyaḥ: from the commandments.🔗 It is (understood, that it is but) the same (Jīva-Self) that wakes up, because of (the reasons of) Karma (religious action), remembrance (Anusmṛti), Scriptural word (Śabda) and injunction (Vidhi). — 3.2.9. It is now being considered, whether the Jīva-Self that wakes up again after attaining unity (with Brahman), is the same (Jīva-Self) that has attained unity with the ‘Sat’, or whether it is either the same or some other (Jīva-Self). With regard to that the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that there is no rule as such (with regard to it). Whence is it so? When a drop of water is thrown into a volume of water, it itself becomes (an undistinguishable part of) the volume of water, and it is hardly possible so to manage, that the very same drop of water can be taken out when it is so sought to be taken out. Similarly, in as much as when one (particular Jīva-Self) has gone to sleep and attained unity with the Highest Self and has thus attained serenity, that same Jīva-Self does not then deserve to wake up again. Thus the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) being, (that it must be paid) that it is either the same Jīva-Self, or the Lord himself, or a different Jīva-Self that wakes up, it is said (by the Sūtra-kāra) — It is the same Jīva-Self that has gone into deep sleep and attained blissful unity, that wakes up, and no other. Whence is it so? Because of (the reasons of) religious action, remembrance, Scriptural word, and injunction. (The Bhāṣya-kāra says) — I will now split up these reasons and illustrate. It must necessarily be the same (Jīva-Self) that wakes up, because it is seen that it resumes its unfinished work and does it. For it is seen that a person takes up the unfinished portion of the work which was being done by him the previous day, and finishes it the next day. No one would proceed to finish any work half done by another, because it would be absurd to accept that (Atiprasaṅgāt). Therefore, it is understood that it is the one and the same entity that is the doer of one and the same work, done on the previous and the succeeding day. Hence, (the conclusion is) that the same Jīva-Self wakes up, because assuming some other Jīva-Self to wake up, it would not be reasonably sustainable to hold that the other Jīva-Self could possibly recall what is experienced earlier by the first Jīva-Self, thus — I saw this yesterday. It could not possibly be, that one can recall what another has seen. Assuming another Jīva-Self to have waked up, (in place of the other one that went to sleep), it cannot possibly be imagined that it can have any consciousness or recollection that it is the same Jīva-Self that had gone to sleep, thus — I who have now waked up am the same Jīva-Self that had gone to sleep. From the Scriptural words also it is understood that the same Jīva-Self (that went to sleep) wakes up again. Scriptural passages — such as “He reverts to the waking condition and to the same species, in the reverse way (to that by which he went)” (BrhU.4.3.16); “All creatures who day after day go to the Brahma-Loka but fail to attain it” (ChanU.8.3.2); “Whatever they are here (i.e. in this world), whether they be a tiger or a lion, a wolf or a boar, a worm or a midge, a gnat or a mosquito, that again they become” (ChanU.6.3.9) — which occur in a chapter dealing with the conditions of sleep or wakefulness, could not be properly reconciled on the hypothesis of another Jīva-Self waking up. The same thing is understood from injunctions as to religious actions (Karma) or knowledge (Vidyā), because otherwise such injunctions as to religious action (Karma) or knowledge (Vidyā), would be meaningless. On the hypothesis, that it is some other Jīva-Self (and not the one that sleeps) that wakes up, it would come to mean that each and every one that goes to sleep attains Final Release. Now if it is so, you had better tell us what use that religious action (Karma), the fruit of which is to materialize at some future time, is, and of what possible use can knowledge (Vidyā) be. Besides, on the hypothesis that another Jīva-Self, that has so far been carrying on in another body, wakes up, there would be the predicament of the cessation of its phenomenal existence as that other Jīva-Self, in that other body. It would again be futile to imagine, that one Jīva-Self that went to sleep in its own body, would wake up in another body. What would be the use in imagining that one who goes to sleep while it occupies one body, does not wake up in that very self-same body, but that another Jīva-Self that has gone to sleep while occupying another body, wakes up in the first body? If it is supposed, that one who has attained Final Release, wakes up, then it would mean, that Final Release is but only a temporary one. That a Jīva-Self whose Nescience i.e. ignorance has disappeared (i.e. one who has attained Final Release) should again wake up (in this phenomenal existence) is not reasonably sustainable. This argument will have also refuted (the notion) that may be the Lord may wake up, because, he is eternally free from Nescience. On the hypothesis that a Jīva-Self other than the one that goes to sleep wakes up, it would not be possible to prevent a Jīva-Self’s acquiring the fruit of an act not done by it, as also to prevent an act done by it from being destroyed (without producing its fruit). Therefore, (it necessarily follows) that the same Jīva-Self wakes up, and none other. Now, the argument, viz. that just as it is not possible to take out the very same drop of water, that has been dropped into a big volume of water, even so, it is not possible, that the Jīva-Self which has attained unity with the ‘Sat’, can ever wake up, is being refuted. In the former case, it is perfectly logical, that, in the absence of any means to separate it (i.e. that one particular drop, from the general volume of water), that self-same drop of water cannot be taken out, but here (in the case of the Jīva-Self) the distinction (between the two cases) is that in the case of the Jīva-Self there are means for thus isolating such Jīva-Self, viz., its own actions (Karma) and Nescience (Avidyā). It is seen that though it is not possible for those belonging to our own species (i.e. the humans) to separate milk from water, from a mixture of milk and water, a Haṃsa (a swan?) can do so. Besides, it is not as if an embodied Jīva-Self is an entity separate from the Highest Self, so that it can be separated from the ‘Sat’, like a drop from a volume of water. It has been stressed more than once that it is the ‘Sat’ itself, that, on account of its contact with limiting adjuncts, is spoken of as a Jīva-Self in a metaphorical sense. This being so, while a Jīva-Self continues to be bound up with one particular set of adjuncts, it functions as one particular Jīva-Self, and when it comes to be bound up with another set of adjuncts, it functions as another Jīva-Self. The same set of adjuncts prevails during the conditions of sleep and wakefulness, in accordance with ‘the maxim of the seed and the sprout’ (i.e. as seed in the condition of sleep and like the sprout in the condition of wakefulness), and hence it is logical to say that it is the same Jīva-Self that wakes up (after going into deep sleep). — 9.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Mugdhe: in a swoon; Ardha-sampattiḥ: partial attainment of the state of deep sleep or death; Pariśeṣāt: on account of the remaining, because of excess, as it is a state in addition to all others.🔗 In the case of a person who is in a swoon, there is only half-attained unity (with deep sleep) on account of that being (the only) remaining (alternative). — 3.2.10. People say of one who has swooned away, as having become unconscious. Examining the condition of such a person, it is said — There are only three well-known conditions of a Jīva-Self, viz. the conditions of wakefulness, of dreaming and of deep sleep. The fourth (condition) is (the Jīva-Self’s) passing out of the body. No fifth condition as such, of a Jīva-Self, is known so far as the Scriptures and Smṛtis are concerned. A swoon, therefore, is necessarily one of those four conditions, is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta). Our reply to that is — An unconscious person cannot be said to be in a wakeful condition, for such person does not perceive objects-of-sense with the organs-of-sense. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — May be, he may not be conscious in accordance with the ‘maxim of the maker of an arrow’ (Iṣu-kāra-Nyāya). Just as a maker of arrows, even though he is awake, fails to see any other object-of-sense because his mind is engrossed with arrows, even so, a person who is in a swoon, though awake, does not perceive other objects-of-sense because of his mind being engrossed in the experiencing of pain caused by a blow with a club. (We reply) — No, because of the absence of consciousness. The maker of arrows whose mind is employed (in making arrows), says that he was conscious upto that time only of an arrow, but a person who has swooned and has (subsequently) regained consciousness, says that he was till then drowned in total darkness and that he perceived nothing. In the case of a person who is awake, even though his mind is engrossed in one object, his body is held upright (i.e. properly balanced), while the body of a person that has swooned, drops down to the ground. Therefore such a person is neither awake nor does he experience any dream, because he is incapable of any cognition, nor is he, for the matter of that, even dead, because, his breathing and the warmth of his body, still persist. In the case of a person who is in a swoon, people who are in doubt as to whether he is dead or otherwise, feel the region of his heart to find out if there is any warmth, and feel the region of his nose to find out whether there is any breath. When they find that there is neither breathing nor warmth, they conclude that he is dead and carry him to a forest for cremation. And when they find that he has both breathing and warmth, they conclude that he is not dead, and treat him for bringing him back to consciousness. In as much as he regains consciousness, he no doubt is not dead, because nobody ever returns from Death’s regions (cf., “a country from whose bourne no traveller returns” — Shakespeare). (The opponent of Vedānta says) — May he then be understood to be in deep sleep, because though he is not dead, he yet is unable to cognize anything. (We reply) — No, because there is dissimilarity (as between the two states). A person that has swooned sometimes suspends his breath for quite a long time, his body is in tremors, he has wide staring eyes and a ghastly face, while a person who is merely asleep has a face which is completely in repose, he breathes rhythmically, his eyes are closed, and his body is not in tremors. A person who is in deep sleep, is awakened by being moved by a hand, while one who has swooned away, cannot be awakened even by striking him with a club. There is difference also between the causes which induce sleep and unconsciousness. The cause of unconsciousness is the beating with a club, while sleep is induced by fatigue etc. Besides, people never describe a person that has swooned away as one who is asleep. Therefore we understand that unconsciousness is a condition of semi-attained unity (with deep sleep), since that is the only remaining alternative. He has (on the one hand) attained unity (with deep sleep) in as much as he does not cognize, and (on the other hand) because of other dissimilarities, he is not quite so in unity (with deep sleep). How again (says the opponent of Vedānta), can you describe the condition of a swoon as only semi-attained unity with deep sleep? Have not the Scriptures mentioned about one who is asleep, thus? — “Oh Mild one, he then is in unity with the ‘Sat’” (ChanU.6.8.1); “Wherein a thief ceases to be a thief” (BrhU.4.3.22); “Neither day nor night, nor old age, nor death, nor grief, nor good or evil deeds, transgress this bund (i.e. Paramātmā i.e. the Highest Self)” (ChanU.8.4.1). The acquisition of good or evil deeds by a Jīva-Self is effected by the generation in him of the knowledge of a state of happiness or pain respectively. There is no perception of either pleasure or pain by a Jīva-Self during deep sleep, nor indeed is there any such perception by the Jīva-Self during the condition of a swoon. Therefore, there ought to be complete unity with the Highest Self in the case of a person in a swoon, on account of the cessation of limiting adjuncts, even as it is in the case of a person in deep sleep. The reply is — “We do not mean to say that in the case of a swoon the Jīva-Self is in a condition of semi-unity with Brahman, but we mean that the condition of a swoon is partly like deep sleep and partly like the other condition (i.e. of death). The similarity and dissimilarity of a swoon with sleep has been already indicated. It (a swoon) is the very door of Death. Whenever there is a residue (of the expiation i.e. working out) of Karma in a Jīva-Self, speech and mind return to it and whenever there is no such residue (of expiation i.e. working out) of Karma, Prāṇa (Vital Breath) and warmth depart from it. Therefore those who have realized Brahman consider it to be only a condition of semi-unity (with deep sleep). With regard to the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta) that no fifth condition as such is known, (we reply) — This is no fault. May be, it is not so known because it is rare, but it is well-known in ordinary experience and in the Āyur-Veda (the Veda of the Science of Medicine). That it is not reckoned as a separate fifth condition is because it is understood as being only semi-unity and all this is therefore flawless. — 10.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Na: not; Sthānataḥ: on account of (difference of) place; Api: even; Parasya: of the Highest (i.e., Brahman); Ubhaya-liṅgam: two-fold characteristics; Sarvatra: everywhere; Hi: because.🔗 Even by reason of (difference in) place (Sthāna) (i.e. limiting adjuncts) the transcendent one (i.e. Brahman) cannot be of a two-fold nature (of being both qualified and unqualified Brahman) because everywhere it is taught to be without any attributes (Nir-guṇa). — 3.2.11. The nature of that Brahman which the Jīva-Self attains, on account of the cessation of all limiting adjuncts during deep sleep is now sought to be determined on the authority of the Scriptures. Scriptural passages relating to Brahman, have two sorts of indicatory marks. Thus, there are passages such as “(The Lord whose Self is the Ākāśa) whose handiwork the whole universe is, whose desires are all flawless and whose odours and tastes are all pleasant” (ChanU.3.14.2) etc., which have an indicatory mark of qualified (Sa-guṇa) Brahman, and there are others such as “(Brahman is) neither gross nor subtle, nor short nor long etc.” (BrhU.3.8.8), which have an indicatory mark of unqualified (Nir-guṇa) Brahman. Now when it is being considered, as to whether it should be understood that the Scriptural passages speak of Brahman (being) of both these sorts, or whether of only one of the two, and if only one of the two, whether of qualified (Sa-guṇa) or unqualified (Nir-guṇa) Brahman, and when the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that in as much as Scriptural passages in support of both these indications are available, it should be understood to be of both sorts, (we reply) — That the transcendent Brahman considered by and in itself alone should possess both kinds of indicatory marks, is not reasonably sustainable. It is not possible to understand that, one and the same entity, in itself, is both endowed with specific attributes such as form (Rūpa) etc. and also as being the reverse of that (i.e. being without any attributes), because of the contradiction (involved). (The opponent of Vedānta suggests) — Well, let it then be understood to be (endowed with specific attributes) by reason of a particular local limiting adjunct (such as the earth etc.). (We reply) — Even that is not reasonably sustainable. It is not possible that an entity being of one nature only should have a different characteristic merely because of its being affected by limiting adjuncts. A crystal which in itself is white, is not rendered as being coloured, by its being affected by a limiting adjunct such as red lac or resin (Alaktaka), because the notion about its being coloured is only illusory. Besides limiting adjuncts are brought about by Nescience. Hence, when only one indicatory mark alone out of the two has to be accepted, Brahman should be understood to be devoid of any specific attributes and as not admitting of any such alternative, as being also the reverse of it, because in all Scriptural passages purporting to explain the nature of Brahman, such as “(Brahman is) neither gross nor subtle, without form, and undecaying” (KathU.1.3.15, Muktik. 2.72) etc., the only instruction given is, that Brahman is without any attributes i.e. it is free of any particular attributes. — 11.
[Go top]
Na: not so; Bhedāt: on account of difference (being taught in the scriptures); Iti: thus, as, so, this; Cet: if; Na: not so; Prati-ekam: with reference to each; A-tad-vacanāt: because of the declaration of opposite of that. (A-tad: absence of that; Vacanāt: on account of the statement.)🔗 If it be said that it is not so, (i.e. the transcendent Brahman is not without attributes), because there is difference (we reply) — No, because every such (assertion about difference) is denied. — 3.2.12. (The opponent of Vedānta says — It may even be like this: That, which is said, viz. that Brahman does not admit of any alternative and that it has only a single indicatory mark, and that Brahman has no such double indicatory marks even when considered either by itself alone or as affected by a place i.e. a limiting adjunct (Sthānataḥ), is not reasonably sustainable. Whence is it so? Because of difference. Every Brahmic lore (Vidyā) teaches different forms of Brahman, such as, that Brahman has four feet, or that Brahman has sixteen parts, or that Brahman has the characteristic of being the ‘Vāmanī’ (i.e. being the carrier of or the conferor of fruits of meritorious actions on persons who perform such meritorious actions), or that the triple world forms its body, or as when Brahman is expressed by the name Vaiśvā-nara. Therefore Brahman should be understood to have a qualified (Sa-guṇa) aspect also. But (says the Vedāntin) it has been stated that it is not possible that Brahman can have both these kinds of indicatory marks. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) — Even that does not come in the way, because a difference in Brahman’s form is brought about by limiting adjuncts. Otherwise a Śāstra which speaks of such differences (in the aspects of Brahman) would be without any object (to which such Śāstra applies). We reply — No, because every such statement of such a difference (in the aspect of Brahman) is denied as not being so (in fact) and the Śāstra has uniformly spoken of Brahman as being without any difference (in its aspects), and wherever such a difference is alleged, it has spoken about such difference as being the result of limiting adjuncts, thus — “This lustrous and immortal Puruṣa in relation with the body (Adhyātmam), is but the same as this Ātmā (i.e. the Highest Self)” (BrhU.2.5.1). Hence it is not possible to say that the Śāstra view is that Brahman has any such relation to different aspects, in as much as such difference in aspect is made merely for the purpose of meditation (Upāsanā), and the purport of the Śāstra (i.e. the Scriptures) is that there is no such difference. — 12.
[Go top]
Api: also; Ca: moreover, and; Evam: thus; Eke: some.🔗 Moreover (followers of) one branch (of the Scriptures) declare likewise. — 3.2.13. Moreover followers of one branch of the Scriptures declare the absence of any such difference, by censuring the recognition of differences (such as Brahman being of both kinds, qualified and unqualified) thus — “This can be grasped by the mind alone; here, there are no differences. He who sees here, in this, as one having differences as it were, goes from death to death” (Kaṭha 4.11). Similarly also — “When all this, described as being threefold viz. as the thing experienced, the experiencer (i.e. the Jīva-Self) and as the one who rules and actuates (from within) as Antar-yāmi, is understood as being but Brahman only” (SvetU.1.12), and it is taught in this manner that this entire variety of worldly manifestations (Prapañca) characterized by things experienced, the experiencer, and the internal regulator, has Brahman alone as its only nature. — 13.
[Go top]
(Says the opponent of Vedānta) when Scriptural passages about Brahman, which teach that it both has form and is also formless, are actually there, how is it that it is understood that it is formless only and not that it is otherwise also? The reply to this is —A-rūpavat: without form, formless; Eva: only, indeed, decidedly; Hi: verily, certainly, because; Tat-pradhānatvāt: on account of that being the main purport of scripture. (Tat: of that; Pradhānatvāt: on account of being the chief thing.)🔗 (Brahman) of course is devoid of any form, because, that is the main purport (of the Scriptures). — 3.2.14. Brahman ought only to be understood to be without any form etc. and not as having a form. Whence is it so? Because that is the main purport (of the Scriptures). That, those Scriptural passages such as “Neither gross nor fine, nor short nor long” (BrhU.3.8.8); “(It is) without any sound, touch, form, or decay” (KathU.1.3.15, Muktik. 2.72); “(This) Ākāśa verily is the revealer of names and forms. That, within which these are, is Brahman” (ChanU.8.14.1); “That divine and incorporeal Puruṣa who is both outside and inside and is not subject to be born” (MunU.2.1.2); “That which is this Brahman, which neither is a cause nor an effect, and is without anything inside or outside (of it). This Self which is Brahman, which perceives everything” (BrhU.2.5.19) — have the Brahma-Self, which is without any transmigratory nature i.e. without any extension (Niṣprapañca), and nothing else, as their only purport, has already been established, in “It is Brahman, because (All Vedānta texts) have that connected sequence” (Bra. Su. I. i. 4). Therefore, as expressed in such passages in the Scriptures, Brahman should be understood to be without any form. All other passages which refer to qualified Brahman as having a form, are not passages which display the chief purport. Their purport is to speak of an injunction to meditation, and when there is no conflict, they should be understood as they are stated in the Scriptures. When however there is a conflict, Scriptural passages which disclose the chief purport, have greater force than those which do not disclose such chief purport. This is the ratio decidendi, by means of which, even when Scriptural passages are of both sorts, it is the formless Brahman alone that is understood, and not the other (i.e. qualified Brahman). — 14.
[Go top]
(The opponent of Vedānta here says) — But then, how are passages which speak of qualified Brahman to be construed? To this, the reply is —Prakāśavat: like the light; Ca: and, moreover; A-vaiy-arthyāt: because of not being meaningless.🔗 (It is) as it is in the case of light (viz. that Brahman as it were assumes various forms), in order (that passages referring to qualified Brahman) may not be rendered purposeless. — 3.2.15. Just as the light of the Sun or the Moon, while it occupies the sky, comes into contact with limiting adjuncts such as the little finger etc., and according to as they (i.e. the little finger etc.) are straight or are bent, itself assumes a straight or bent form as it were, similarly, Brahman also, as it comes into contact with limiting adjuncts such as the earth etc., assumes the form of the limiting adjuncts as it were, and thus the Scriptural instruction about Brahman having a particular form for the purpose of meditation, is not contradictory. In this manner, passages dealing with Brahman as being of a particular form are not rendered purposeless. It would not be proper to understand that Vedic passages sometimes have a purpose and sometimes not, because they are all uniformly authoritative. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if it is understood like this, then the previous declaration that even when affected by limiting adjuncts, Brahman is not of two kinds, is contradicted. No (we reply), because it is not reasonably sustainable, that any attribute brought about by the limiting adjuncts as its cause, can be the real attribute of an entity, because limiting adjuncts themselves are brought about by Nescience. That, it is only in the presence of Nescience (Avidyā) which is natural, that ordinary worldly phenomenal life, and conduct in accordance with the Scriptures, becomes possible, has been referred to by us in various places. — 15.
[Go top]
Āha: (the Śruti) declares; Ca: and, moreover; Tad-mātram: that (i.e., intelligent) only.🔗 (The Scriptures) also, have declared (Brahman) to have that only (Tan-mātram i.e. that it has that subtle and primary element, viz. sentiency only). — 3.2.16. The Scriptures also have declared Brahman to be but the supreme spirit having sentiency only, and as being devoid of any form (Rūpa), and as being without any other dissimilar distinguishing characteristic, thus — ‘(Oh Maitreyī), just as a solid block of salt has nothing else outside or inside it but is wholly a solid of saltness, even so, has this Self nothing outside or inside its self and is wholly a solid mass of sentiency” (BrhU.4.5.13), which means that this Self has no form other than that of sentiency, either externally or internally. Sentiency alone is its own constant form. Just as a block of salt has constantly the salty taste inside or outside and no other, even so (is the case of the Self). — 16.
[Go top]
Darśayati: (the scripture or Śruti) shows; Ca: and, also; Atho: thus, moreover (Atha + u); Api: also; Smaryate: the Smṛtis declare or state.🔗 The Scriptures also indicate (so) and then again the Smṛtis also. — 3.2.17. The Scriptures also indicate that Brahman has no other distinctive characteristic, by the denial of any other form (for it), thus — “Hence now the instruction is — (Whatever is said to be Brahman) is not so (i.e. Brahman)” (BrhU.2.3.6); “Other indeed it is than that which is known and not known” (KenU.1.3); “Wherefrom, having failed to attain it, words along with the mind turn back” (TaitU.2.4.1). Scriptures also tell us, how, questioned by Baṣkali, Bādhva explained Brahman to him (i.e. Baṣkali) merely by his silence, thus — “He (i.e. Baṣkali) said, Oh Bādhva, teach me (what Brahman is), but he (Bādhva) remained silent and when he was thus questioned a second and a third time, replied — ‘Indeed, have I told you (by my silence), but of course you do not understood. This Self (Ātmā) is one from which duality has been swept away (Upaśānta).’” Similarly, it is by denying everything else (to be Brahman) that instruction is given in Smṛtis, such as — “I will explain to you that which is the object of knowledge, and having known which, immortality is attained. Brahman which is beginningless and transcendent and that, which is said to be neither Sat nor Asat” (BhG.13.12). Smṛti also says, how, Nārāyaṇa assuming the cosmic form of the universe, spoke to Nārada — “Oh Nārada, when you see me as one endowed with the attributes of all beings, it is only an illusion of my own creation, but you should not understand me to be really so”. — 17.
[Go top]
Ataḥ eva: for this very reason; therefore; Ca: also, and; Upamā: comparison; Sūryaka-ādivat: like the images of the sun and the like.🔗 Hence is (Brahman’s) comparison with a reflection of the sun (in water). — 3.2.18. It is precisely because this Self is of the nature of sentiency and is devoid of any other distinguishing characteristic and is beyond (perception by) speech and mind, and also because instructions about it can only be imparted by the negation of every other entity, that, with reference to its unreal characteristic as caused by limiting adjuncts, a comparison — that it is like the reflection of the sun (in water) — is employed in the Śāstra dealing with Final Release (Mokṣa), thus — “Just as this lustrous sun (Vivasvān) even though one only, yet, having entered different waters, appears to be many, due to (being reflected in) the limiting adjunct viz. water, even so is this Self (Ātmā), which is not subject to birth, made to appear as if it is different because of the limiting adjuncts of many bodies. Similarly this Self (Ātmā) of all beings, one as it is, is, by residing in different beings, seen as if it is one and many, at one and the same time, like the reflections of the moon in water.” — 18.
[Go top]
Here, (the opponent of Vedānta) contends —Ambuvat: like water; A-grahaṇāt: in the absence of perception, because of non-acceptance, because it cannot be accepted, not being experienced; Tu: but; Na: not, no; Tathātvam: that nature, similarity.🔗 As no other distinct positive material similar to water is to he seen (in which Brahman is seen to he reflected, like the sun or the moon in water), it is not like that (and there is no parallelism). — 3.2.19. That Brahman is similar to the sun’s reflection in water, is not reasonably sustainable, because nothing like water is to be seen here. A material entity such as water, is perceived to be distinctly separate and is at a distant place, from the sun etc., and there, the occurrence of a reflection of the sun etc. is feasible. The Self (Ātmā) however is not such a material entity, and being all-pervading and nondifferent from all, the limiting adjuncts cannot be separate from it, or at a place distant from it. Therefore the illustration is not apt. — 19.
[Go top]
The reply to this is —Vṛddhi-hrāsa-bhāktvam: participating in the increase and decrease; Antar-bhāvāt: on account of its being inside; Ubhaya-sāmañjasyāt: on account of the appropriateness in the two cases; Evam: thus. (Vṛddhi: increase; Hrāsa: decrease; Ubhaya: towards both; Sāmañjasyāt: because of the justness, appropriateness.)🔗 Because the Highest Self i.e. Brahman is inside i.e. immanent (in the limiting adjuncts, such as a body etc.) it participates i.e. equally shares in the increase or decrease of the limiting adjuncts, and thus both (i.e. the illustration and that which is illustrated) being compatible, it is like this (i.e. the comparison is apt). — 3.2.20. But this illustration is of course apt, in as much as (similarity to) a particular small extent meant to be spoken of (Vivakṣitāṃśa) is possible. It is not possible for anybody to demonstrate that an illustration and an entity illustrated are completely alike, apart from their being similar to some particular small extent, because were they to be completely alike, their relation, inter se, as an illustration and an entity illustrated, would itself be destroyed. Besides this reference to the illustration of a reflection of the Sun in the water, is not made (by the Sūtra-kāra) out of his own imagination, but, already referred to by the Śāstra as it is, its propriety only is indicated here. Wherein, again (it is asked by the opponent of Vedānta), is the similarity here, which is intended to be stated? The reply is — Its participation or sharing in the increase or decrease (of the limiting adjuncts). The reflection of the Sun in the water increases as the water increases, diminishes as the water diminishes, moves when the water moves, becomes distorted when the water is disturbed, and thus it imitates the conditions of water, but it never is, that the Sun in fact becomes so. Similarly, though the Highest Self i.e. Brahman is not liable to undergo any modification and has a uniform nature in the ultimate sense, still, because it is involved in limiting adjuncts such as a body etc., it, as it were, undergoes increase or decrease which are the properties of the limiting adjuncts. Hence, inasmuch as the illustration and the entity illustrated are both compatible there is no contradiction. — 20.
[Go top]
Darśanāt: as it is found to be so, because it is seen, on account of scriptural declaration; Ca: and, also.🔗 (The illustration is apt) Because the Scriptures also indicate (similarly). — 3.2.21. The Scriptures also indicate the entering of the Highest Brahman into limiting adjuncts such as a body etc., thus — “He made the bodies of bipeds and quadrupeds, and then the Puruṣa himself became a bird (‘Pakṣī’ — the subtle body i.e. Liṅga Śarīra) and entered into the material bodies” (BrhU.2.5.18), and also — “Having entered (the material bodies) as the Jīva-Self” (ChanU.6.3.2). Hence it is proper (to say) — Therefore is the comparison with the reflection of the Sun (in water) apt (Bra. Su. III. ii. 18). Hence it is established that Brahman has only one indicatory mark (of being only unqualified) and it does not admit of any alternatives (of being both qualified and unqualified) and has not the indicatory marks of both kinds, nor an altogether contrary indicatory mark (of the qualified form). Some think that there are two topics (Adhikaraṇas) here. The first one being — whether Brahman is of one nature only and one in which all this variety of worldly manifestations (Prapañca) has ceased to be, or, whether it is of many natures corresponding to the variety of worldly manifestations. And the second one being — that it being firmly established that in Brahman this variety of worldly manifestations has no place and it is of one uniform nature, whether Brahman has the characteristic of ‘Sat’ (Being), or of Knowledge i.e. Sentiency (Bodha), or whether it has both these characteristics. With regard to this we say — Considered in every possible way, it is altogether useless to begin another Adhikaraṇa. If all this endeavour is for the purpose of refuting that the Highest Brahman has several indicatory marks, then, that having been refuted already by the earlier Adhikaraṇa — “Because everywhere etc.” (Bra. Su. III. ii. 11-15), a subsequent Adhikaraṇa from the Sūtra “(It is) as it is in the case of light” (Bra. Su. III. ii. 15-21) would be without any purpose. It is not possible to say that Brahman has only the characteristic of ‘Sat’ (Being) and not the characteristic of Knowledge i.e. Sentiency, as there would result the predicament of the Scriptural passage about its being a mass of Knowledge i.e. Sentiency (Vijñāna-ghana) being rendered purposeless. How can Brahman devoid of any Knowledge i.e. Sentiency be ever taught as being the Self of the sentient Jīva-Self? Nor can it be said that Brahman has the characteristic of Knowledge i.e. Sentiency only and not of ‘Sat’ (Being) as there would result the predicament of the Scriptural passage “It (i.e. Brahman) should be realized as the one that exists” (KathU.2.3.13) being rendered purposeless. Besides how ever can mere Knowledge i.e. Sentiency be conceived as apart from existence? Nor is it possible to say that the latter Adhikaraṇa is meant to establish that Brahman has both the characteristics, as that would contradict what has been already determined earlier. In the case of one who understands Brahman to be Knowledge i.e. Sentiency only, to the exclusion of ‘Being’ (Sat), or to be ‘Being’ (Sat) only, to the exclusion of Knowledge i.e. Sentiency, there would result the predicament of having to understand Brahman as admitting of differences i.e. having a variety of worldly manifestations, which exactly was disproved by the earlier Adhikaraṇa. (If the opponent were to say) that there could not be such a fault because of Scriptural authority, (we reply) — No, because it would not be reasonably sustainable that one entity can ever have more than one nature. If it be said that ‘Being’ (Sat) is the same as Knowledge i.e. Sentiency (Bodha) and Knowledge i.e. Sentiency is the same as ‘Being’ (Sat) and that there could be no mutual exclusion of each from the other, then any doubt, as to whether Brahman has the characteristic of ‘Being’ (Sat) or Knowledge i.e. Sentiency (Bodha), or the characteristics of both Being (Sat), and Knowledge i.e. Sentiency (Bodha), would necessarily be without any foundation or support (i.e. it could not be possible for the opponent of Vedānta to imagine any objection and to establish any conclusion by refuting it, and thus no separate Adhikaraṇa would be necessary). We have on the other hand duly construed the Sūtras as belonging to only one Adhikaraṇa. Besides, when there is a conflict with regard to Scriptural passages, just as when some speak of Brahman as having a form, and the others as Brahman being devoid of any form, and when once it is accepted that Brahman is devoid of any form, it would be absolutely necessary to explain the aim of the other Scriptural passages (claiming Brahman to have various forms). Therefore, it is in that sense, that the Sūtras “(It is) as it is in the case of light” etc. (Bra. Su. III. ii. 15-21) become more intelligible. Again, when it is said, that even those Scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as having various forms, do really have the aim of being ultimately understood as showing that Brahman is devoid of any form, by way of destroying all the variety of worldly manifestations, and that they have no other separate aim, even that does not appear to be correct. How is it so? The variety of worldly manifestations referred to in the chapter dealing with the Vidyā of the Highest Brahman, thus — “This Highest Self (in the form of a Jīva-Self) has ten, hundred horses (i.e. sense-organs) attached to him, the same Highest Self is in the form of ten, a thousand, many and innumerable horses” (BrhU.2.5.19), is of course intended to be ultimately dissolved, because, the topic has been concluded thus — “This is Brahman, which is without cause, without effect, without anything inside or outside (of it)” (BrhU.2.5.19). But it is not logical to understand that the variety of worldly manifestations again, which is referred to in the chapter dealing with deep meditation, such as “He whose structure is the mind, whose body is Prāṇa and whose nature is refulgence” (ChanU.3.14.2), is also intended to be dissolved, because these passages have a direct connection with the injunction for deep meditation (Upāsanā) which is relevant there, such as — “He should make a resolution (Kratu)” (ChanU.3.14.1). And when the Scriptures themselves intend that such kinds of attributes (of Brahman) are for the purpose of deep meditation, it cannot be maintained by way of an implication (Lakṣaṇā) that they are meant for the purpose of their ultimate effacement. If all these (Texts) are to have the common purpose of the ultimate effacement (of the variety of worldly manifestations), the ratio decidendi indicated in Bra. Su. III. ii. 14, viz. — “It is of course devoid of any form because that is the chief purport (of Scriptural passages)”, would have no scope at all. It is also understood according to the Scriptural instruction, that these deep meditations on Brahman as having such forms have fruit, such as, that sometimes it is the destruction of sin, sometimes the attainment of power and sometimes Final Release by stages (Krama-Mukti), and hence it is logical (to understand) that the passages setting out deep meditations and passages purely dealing with Brahman as such, have different meanings and are not reconcilable. Besides (the Vedāntin says further) you (the opponent) have to state in what way you believe that they are reconcilable. If it be said (that they are so reconcilable) because it is perceived that there is but the same one injunction in both these sorts of passages, as there is for instance in the passage about Prayāja (some minor Karma) and Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa, (we reply) — No, because in passages referring to Brahman, there is absence of any injunction. It has already been fully established in Sūtra I. i. 4 (“But it is, that Brahman is to be known from the Scriptures, because the Vedānta texts have that connected sequence”) how passages dealing with Brahman, only culminate in determining an already existing entity, and do not purport to give any injunction. Besides it must be stated (by you — the opponent) as to what kind of activity it is, to which this injunction applies. Whenever an injunction is given to a person, he is enjoined to do a particular thing such as — ‘do this’. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the dissolution of the duality of the variety of worldly manifestations (Dvaita-prapañca) may well be the kind of activity meant by that injunction, because as long as this duality of the variety of worldly manifestations is not dissolved, the knowledge of the truth of Brahman is not attained and hence the duality of the variety of worldly manifestations which is hostile to the knowledge of Brahman has to be first dissolved. Just as a man who is desirous of attaining heaven is advised to perform a sacrifice, similarly one who is desirous of Final Release is advised to dissolve the duality of the variety of worldly manifestations. Just as one desiring to ascertain the truth of the existence of a jar placed in the dark, first removes the darkness which is hostile to such ascertainment, similarly a person wishing to realize the truth about Brahman has first to dissolve this duality of the variety of worldly manifestations which is hostile (to such realization). This variety of worldly manifestations, now, has Brahman as its true nature, while Brahman is not of the nature of the variety of worldly manifestations, and it is by dissolving this variety of worldly manifestations of names and forms that the knowledge of the truth of Brahman is attained. With regard to all this we (the Vedāntins) ask — What exactly is this dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations any way? Is this dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations to be accomplished in the same manner in which the solidity of ghee is dissolved by contact with the heat of fire, or whether, just as, though the moon is but one only, the falsity of seeing more than one moon as a result of Diplopia, is removed (by treatment), this variety of worldly manifestations of names and forms, imposed on Brahman by Nescience, is to be dissolved by means of knowledge? Now, with regard to that, if it be maintained (by the opponent of Vedānta), that this actually existing variety of worldly manifestations of Ādhyātmika nature such as a body etc., and the actually existing variety of external manifestations such as this world etc., have to be dissolved, then, as it would be impossible for a man as such, so to dissolve them, any such instruction to dissolve them would be with regard to something having the nature of an impossibility. And assuming that it is possible for a man to do so, and assuming also that the very first person who has attained Final Release must have already dissolved this earth etc., then this universe must indeed now be devoid of this world etc. (which it actually is not). If it be said that this variety of worldly manifestations superimposed on the one and only one Brahman through Nescience, is to be dissolved by means of knowledge, then it would merely suffice to make a person understand Brahman, by merely indicating it and denying the truth of the variety of worldly manifestations superimposed on it by Nescience, by means of such Scriptural passages as “Brahman is the only one without a second, that is the Truth, the Ātmā, that thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7), and when that is made known, knowledge (Vidyā) would spring up of itself and counteract Nescience, and the variety of worldly manifestations of names and forms would melt away like the variety of worldly manifestations in a dream. But as long as Brahman is not made known (by the Scriptures), even if such exhortations are made a hundred times, thus — ‘Realize Brahman, dissolve this variety of worldly manifestations’, neither is the knowledge of Brahman attained, nor does any dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations ever take place. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) such injunction may well relate to the act of knowing the nature of Brahman or to the dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations, when the Scriptures have once made Brahman known. (We reply) — No, it is merely by making a person realize (on the authority of the Scriptures) that Brahman is devoid of any variety of worldly manifestations, that both these (i.e. the knowledge of Brahman and the dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations) are simultaneously attained. It is merely by displaying the true nature of a rope, that both the knowledge of a rope qua a rope and the dissolution of the snake etc., superimposed on it by Nescience, is simultaneously accomplished. What is done once, is never done again. Now (we ask), does this Jīva-Self which is supposed to be the object of such an injunction, during the Jīva-Self’s condition of phenomenal existence, belong to the phenomenal world, or is it Brahman itself? As regards the first alternative — by the expounding of the truth of Brahman as being an entity devoid of the variety of worldly manifestations, along with the dissolution of the world, the Jīva-Self itself also will have been dissolved, and then, to whom, can this injunction to dissolve the variety of worldly manifestations, be given, and who, by faithfully obeying such an injunction, could you possibly say, would have to attain Final Release? As regards the second alternative, when Brahman has been expounded thus — viz. that Brahman which cannot possibly be the object of an injunction, is itself the real nature of the Jīva-Self, and that the phenomenal condition of the Jīva-Self is caused by Nescience, — then, by reason of the absence of any entity to whom such an injunction can possibly be given, there would be the absence of any such injunction itself. So, words such as “Ātmā should be seen etc.” used in the chapter dealing with Brahma-Vidyā, also would not have the purport of an injunction to realize the truth, but would be for the purpose of bringing a person face to face with the Truth (Tattva) i.e. Brahman. Even in the ordinary world, directions such as ‘see this’, ‘listen to this’ are only meant to imply, that one should give one’s attention (to what is being said), and there is no direct injunction that one should actually attain any knowledge. Even when a person is face to face with any object of knowledge, such knowledge may, or perhaps may not, supervene, and therefore, one who intends to impart such knowledge need only indicate the object of knowledge to him, and when once that is so indicated, knowledge supervenes in proportion to the nature of the object of knowledge (according to whether it is gross or subtle), and in proportion to the capacity of the means of proof. Nor can it be, that a person so enjoined can possibly understand, that a thing known to be of one nature by some particular means of proof, is of another nature, by reason of any such injunction. If a person considering himself to be so enjoined, understands a thing in a different way (than what it actually is), then that would not, in fact, be knowledge as such but merely a mental act, and even if such different knowledge arises of itself, then it can only be of an illusory nature. Knowledge as such, on the other hand, is generated by the means of proof and is faithful to the object (of knowledge) as it is. It can never be produced by even a hundred injunctions, nor can it ever be prevented from arising even by a hundred prohibitions also. It does not depend upon a man, but depends merely on the existing thing itself. Hence also, there is absence of any injunction (as to the knowledge of Brahman). Moreover, were the aim of the Scriptures to be to culminate merely in injunctions only, then, what has so far been understood, viz. that the Jīva-Self is nothing else but Brahman, about which there could be no injunction, would be rendered unauthoritative. Now, if the Śāstra itself were to speak about Brahman as being one which cannot be an object of an injunction, and at the same time, were it to enjoin a person to understand it, then in that case, one and the same Brahma-Śāstra would have a double and a mutually contradictory significance. Now, supposing the Scriptures were to give injunctions only, it would not be possible for anybody to obviate such faults as would necessarily arise, viz., the abandonment of what the Scriptures have declared, and the acceptance of what they have not declared, and it would also mean, that Final Release also, like the fruit of actions, is the fruit of an unseen principle (Adṛṣṭa) and is non-permanent. Hence the passages dealing with Brahman, necessarily aim at the attainment of its knowledge, and do not aim at giving any injunction. Hence, it is not logical to reconcile them by saying that they are uniformly perceived to be giving injunctions only. Besides, assuming that Scriptural passages purport merely to give injunctions, that there is but one uniform injunction in the sentences teaching Brahman as being devoid of the variety of worldly manifestations, and teaching it as being of the nature of the variety of worldly manifestations also, is not established. And when a difference in the injunctions is perceived on the authority of different Scriptural passages, it is not possible to accept that there is only one uniform injunction throughout. In the case of passages dealing with Prayāja and Darśa-Pūrṇa-māsa it is logical to understand, considering the common factor (that one and the same person is competent to perform both), that there is but only one injunction. But there is no such common competency with regard to injunctions about qualified and unqualified Brahman. The attributes of refulgence etc. are not useful for attaining the dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations, nor is the dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations useful in any way to the attribute of refulgence, as they are mutually contradictory. It is not possible to accommodate both the dissolution of the variety of worldly manifestations and the necessity of accepting only a part of the variety of worldly manifestations as true, in one and the same person. Therefore, it is more logical to accept the distinction between instructions into those for qualified, and those for unqualified Brahman, as made by us, as being logically more plausible. — 21.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Prakṛta-etāvattvam: what has been mentioned up to this; Hi: because, for; Pratiṣedhati: denies; Tataḥ: then that, over and above that; Bravīti: declares; Ca: and; Bhūyaḥ: something more. (Prakṛta: mentioned first, previously stated; Etāvattvam: this much.)🔗 (The Scriptural clause) ‘Not so, Not so’, denies that Brahman has such aspects (Etāvattva i.e. that it has aspects and is also aspectless), which is relevant here (Prakṛta), and then the Scriptures again say something more thereafter. — 3.2.22. The Scriptures, after beginning thus — “Two verily are the aspects of Brahman, the corporeal (Mūrta) and the incorporeal (Amūrta) etc.” (BrhU.2.3.1), and then dividing the five great primary elements into two groups (i.e. Earth, Water and Tejas as one group and Vāyu and Ākāśa as the other respectively), and after indicating that which is the essence of the incorporeal aspect and is known by the name of Puruṣa (the Hiraṇya-garbha) as having the form like turmeric (i.e. Māhā-rajana) etc., go on further to say — “Now is there the instruction ‘Not so, Not so’ (Neti Neti), for there is nothing higher than this, that he is thus” (BrhU.2.3.6). With regard to that, we (the opponents of Vedānta) desire to know as to what object is this the denial of. There is nothing here which is seen to be stated specifically, thus — ‘This, is That’ — , which can be intended to be denied. The word ‘So’ (Iti), however, necessarily implies that there is something which is intended to be denied, because the use of the negative in the passage ‘Not so, Not so’ goes with the word ‘So’ (Iti). The word ‘So’ (Iti) which goes with what is in close proximity (with it) and has a function similar to the word ‘Thus’ (Evam), appears to have been used here, just as it is for instance used in the passage “Thus indeed, the teacher has said etc.” (which means that this is what the teacher has already said). According to the chapter, what are proximate here, are the two phenomenal aspects of Brahman (the corporeal and the incorporeal), and that very Brahman, of which these (i.e. the corporeal and incorporeal) are the two aspects. Now, with regard to this (says the opponent) a doubt arises (in our minds) in this way — Whether this denial denies both, viz. these two aspects and that of which they are these two aspects (viz. Brahman), or whether it denies only one (of the two), and if the denial is of one only, then, whether it denies Brahman, and leaves over the two aspects (undenied), or whether, it denies the two aspects and leaves over Brahman (undenied). Here, we suspect, that both these (viz. the two aspects of Brahman, and Brahman itself) are equally relevant to the context, and both are denied. There are two denials here, because the words ‘Not so’ (Neti) are used twice. We feel that by the first, the phenomenal (i.e. the corporeal and the incorporeal) aspects of Brahman are denied, and by the other, Brahman, of which they are the two phenomenal aspects, is denied. Or rather, it is Brahman alone, of which they are the two phenomenal aspects, that is denied, because, in as much as, its existence is beyond comprehension by speech and mind, it (i.e. Brahman) is the one which deserves to be so denied, while the two phenomenal aspects (of Brahman) do not so deserve to be denied, in as much as they are perceivable by such means of proof as direct perception etc. The repetition (of the words ‘Not so’) is with a view to inspire respectful confidence (in the statement denying Brahman). Our (i.e. the Vedāntin’s) reply to this conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is — So far as it goes it would not be reasonably sustainable, that both could be thus denied, because there would be the predicament of (such a conclusion leading to) the doctrine of the void (Śūnya-Vāda i.e. Nihility). It is with reference to some existent entity, that a non-existent entity is here denied, as for instance, when a snake etc. (for which a rope etc. is mistaken), is denied. And this is possible, only if some actually existent entity is left over undenied. Supposing both are denied, what other actually existent entity can possibly be left over (undenied)? And when no entity is left over (undenied), the moment one proceeds to deny any entity, in as much as, any such denial becomes impossible (as no existent entity, with reference to which such entity is sought to be denied as being non-existent, is left over undenied), the entity so sought to be denied (as non-existent) itself attains existence, and thus, the contemplated denial becomes reasonably unsustainable. Nor again is any such denial of Brahman reasonably sustainable, as it would contradict the introductory statement — “I shall speak to you of Brahman” (BrhU.2.1.1, Bālāki to Ajāta-śatru), and also because it would contradict the censure in the passage — “He who understands Brahman as non-existent, himself becomes non-existent” (TaitU.2.6.1), and it would also contradict the definite understanding — “It (i.e. Brahman) is, and it is as such, that it should be understood” (KathU.2.3.13). Also it would cause the predicament of the whole Vedānta being stultified. The statement (of the Scriptures) that Brahman is beyond comprehension by speech and mind, is not meant to imply its' total non-existence. After expounding Brahman in the Vedānta with such great trouble, by means of such Scriptural passages as “One who knows Brahman attains that transcendent one” (TaitU.2.1.1), “Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, and Eternity” (TaitU.2.1.1), no one would seek to imply its non-existence, because, does not the maxim say thus — Better not touch mud at all, and give it a wide berth, than (do so), and then bother about washing it off? The Scriptural passage “From whence, without ever reaching it, speech along with the mind is thrown back” is but a technical manner of expounding it, and it means that, Brahman is beyond (comprehension by) speech and the mind, that it does not fall into the category of any (external phenomenal) object, that it forms the Universal Self, and that it has the nature of being eternally pure, enlightened and free. Therefore, it should be understood that only the two phenomenal aspects of Brahman are here denied, and Brahman itself is left over (undenied). The same is expressed (in the Sūtra) thus — “denies that Brahman has such aspects (Etāvattva i.e. it has aspects and is also aspectless) which is relevant here”. This Scriptural word has denied that particular form of Brahman which is characterized by the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of Brahman, and which thus is circumscribed by a particular limit i.e. extension and which is relevant to the present context. That is what is relevant and has been elaborated upon in the preceding chapter, in its relation to the Divinities (Adhidaivatā) and the body (Adhyātma) as also that which has originated from it, and has the characteristic of impressions (Vāsanās), and which abides in that which is the cause of the incorporeal aspect and is known by the name of Puruṣa, which is the subtle Self (Liṅgātmā) and which is indicated by such illustrations as one having the yellow form i.e. the colour of turmeric etc., because the Puruṣa, the quintessence of the incorporeal aspect, cannot reasonably have any relation with an aspect perceivable by the eye. Thus it is understood that it is these phenomenal aspects of Brahman which are referred to by the word ‘Iti’ which indicates things proximate to it, and is led towards the negative which has the sense of denial. Brahman which has been indicated in the previous chapter, is indicated by the use of the genitive case-ending as the qualifying adjective of the two aspects of Brahman, and not in its principal sense. After these two forms of Brahman are dealt with elaborately, and when there is a desire to know the form of that, of which there are these two aspects, it is stated, “Now then there is the instruction, ‘Not so, not so’” (BrhU.2.3.6), and thus it is determined that in this way, by denying the truth of the imagined aspects of Brahman, the real nature of Brahman is intimated, and this aggregate of all effects which depends upon it, is denied to be true, by the words ‘not so, not so’. It is logical also, that this is a repudiation of all effects as such, by the words ‘not so, not so’ as they are in the ultimate sense non-existent, because of the Scriptural passage, which characterizes them as but a mere expression in speech, and that it is not a repudiation of Brahman, in as much as it is the root (Mūla) of all these imaginings (Kalpanās). No doubt should here be entertained, as to how the Śāstra, having itself first indicated these two aspects of Brahman, viz. the corporeal and the incorporeal, should subsequently repudiate them, because as the maxim says,' it is better not to touch mud at all by giving it a wide berth, than (do so) and then bother about washing it off, because the Śāstra does not indicate the two aspects of Brahman as fit for being expounded, but only incidentally refers to them in as much as they are well-known in the world, as only fit to be repudiated because of their being superimposed on Brahman, and also for the purpose of expounding the true nature of Brahman, and thus, all that is flawless. These two denials according to the number, deny both the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of Brahman, or rather, the first repudiation refers to the group of elements, and the latter one, to the group of impressions. Or again the meaning is, that in as much as ‘not so, not so’ is tautologous, everything whatsoever that is thought of (as existent) does not exist in the real sense. Were the repudiation to be limited to a definite number of phenomenal entities, one would be curious to know, as to what other phenomenal entity, possibly, could be Brahman, if these phenomenal entities are not Brahman. The tautologous statement being there, and as all objects as such, are repudiated by it, it becomes established that Brahman is not of the nature of a phenomenal object, but that it is the Universal Self, and thus in this manner curiosity is satisfied. The conclusion therefore is, that the passage ‘not so, not so’ denies the truth of all phenomenal entities superimposed on Brahman, and Brahman alone is left over (unrepudiated). This is again why the conclusion could only be this, because after the denial (of the corporeal and incorporeal aspects and impressions) the text goes on further to say — “There is another which is beyond (all this)” (BrhU.2.3.6). Now if the denial were to be made to culminate merely in the non-existence of all entities, what else could the text possibly refer to, as being something which is beyond? In this connection the words are to be construed thus: After indicating Brahman by the words ‘not so, not so’ the text explains the instruction thus — What does this ‘not so, not so’ mean? The meaning is, that there is nothing besides this Brahman and hence it is described as ‘not so, not so’, and it does not mean that Brahman itself is non-existent, and this same is indicated to be the transcendent Brahman, which is not denied. When again the words are construed thus — “Beyond this declaration by ‘not so, not so’”, what is meant by that is that there is no further instruction about Brahman than the one expressed by the words ‘not so, not so’, which purport to deny all phenomenal existence. If it is so construed the further Sūtra words — “The Scriptures again say something more thereafter” — should be construed as referring to the name, “The Truth of the Truth (Satyasya Satyam)”, “Prāṇas verily are the truth and this (i.e. Brahman) is the truth of that (Truth)” (BrhU.2.1.20). This becomes intelligible only if the denial stops short of Brahman (i.e. it does not repudiate it), and does not culminate into a mere void or Nihility (Śūnya). Therefore we conclude that the denial stops short of Brahman and does not (by repudiating Brahman) culminate in a mere void or Nihility. — 22.
[Go top]
Tat: that (i.e., Brahman); A-vyaktam: is not manifest; Āha: (so the scripture) says; Hi: for, because.🔗 The Scriptures also declare that it (i.e. Brahman) is unmanifest i.e. unevolved. — 3.2.23. (Asks the opponent of Vedānta) — Now, if this, the Highest transcendent Brahman, other than this whole set of manifold phenomenal manifestations (of it) which have already been repudiated, does exist, why is it then, that it is not perceived? The reply is — Because it is unmanifest i.e. unevolved and unperceivable by the sense-organs, in as much as it is the immediate witness of all that which is visible i.e. knowable. The Scriptures also declare it thus — “It is not perceived by the eye, nor by speech, nor by the other Gods (i.e. sense-organs which make all objects manifest), nor through penance nor good actions” (MunU.3.1.8), “This Self is expressed as not perceivable” (BrhU.3.9.26), “Which is invisible and unperceivable” (MunU.1.1.6), “When this (i.e. this person) reaches the fearless condition of that invisible, incorporeal, unexpoundable, and the one that needs no support (i.e. Brahman)” (TaitU.2.7.1). The Smṛti also says thus — “He is said to be unmanifest i.e. unevolved, unfathomable and unmodifiable” (BhG.2.25). — 23.
[Go top]
Api ca: and moreover; Api ca: in devout meditation; Pratyakṣa-anumānābhyām: from the Śruti and the Smṛti.🔗 Besides (it i.e. Brahman is realized by the Yogins etc.) during the condition of perfect meditation, because the Scriptures and the Smṛtis say so. — 3.2.24. Moreover Yogins do perceive this Self (i.e. Brahman) which is devoid of all phenomenal manifestations and which is unmanifest. ‘Samārādhana’ means the performance of the act of devotion, meditation, and abstract contemplation. How again is it known that the Yogins realize it during such Samārādhana? On the authority of the Scriptures (Pratyakṣa) and the Smṛtis (Anumāna). The Scriptures declare even so, thus — “The Self-born made the sense-organs extrovert i.e. only capable of perceiving outward entities (and not introvert i.e. receptive of the Self within) and hence a man perceives only external objects. May be, a wise man who has become introspective (by closing his eyes in contemplation) and desirous of immortality occasionally sees the innermost Universal Self” (KathU.2.1.1), “With his mind purified by being graced with knowledge, contemplating steadily on the partless Self (Ātmā) he sees him” (MunU.3.1.8). Smṛti also says thus — “Salutation to him (the Īśvara), who has the nature of Yoga, whom, those whose sleep (of the darkness of ignorance) has been dispelled (Vinidras), who have controlled their breathing, who have a contented mind, and who have their sense-organs well controlled, see, while meditating on his bright light”, and also — “The Yogins see him, the Bhagavāna, who is the ancient Lord (of all)”. — 24.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if it is so understood, that there is a relationship as between one who meditates, and one who is the object of such meditation, then it would mean that the Highest Self and the other Self (i.e. the Jīva-Self) are different entities. We reply — No.Prakāśa-ādivat: like light and the like; Ca: also, and; A-vaiśeṣyam: similarity, non-difference, non-distinction; Prakāśaḥ: Brahman; Ca: and; Karmaṇi: in work; Abhyāsāt: on account of repeated mention (in the Śruti).🔗 Just as (in the case of) light etc., there is non-difference (between the Highest Self and the Jīva-Self). (The Ātmā in the form of) Light i.e. Brahman, is so (i.e. appears different) during activity (Karmaṇi). There is (no difference), on account of repeated statements (to that effect, in the Scriptures). — 3.2.25. Just as light, the Ākāśa and the Sun etc., appear as if they have special aspects, i.e. they seem different, because of the actions in the form of such limiting adjuncts as a finger, an earthen pot, or water respectively, but they do not lose their natural non-difference, even so, is this appearance of difference in the Selfs, the result of limiting adjuncts only, when in fact in themselves they are one and the same Highest Self. Similarly the Vedānta texts have oftener than once explained the non-difference between the Jīva-Self and the intelligential Highest Self i.e. Prājna. — 25.
[Go top]
Ataḥ: hence, therefore; An-antena: with the Infinite; Tathā: thus; Hi: because, for; Liṅgam: the indication (of the scriptures).🔗 Hence it is, that (the Jīva-Self becomes one) with the infinite (i.e. Highest Self). Moreover there is indicatory mark to that effect (in the Scriptures). — 3.2.26. Hence it is, that, because of this non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) being natural, and the difference between them being merely due to Nescience, the Jīva-Self becomes one with the infinite, transcendent, intelligential, Highest Self, after destroying Nescience with knowledge. There is an indicatory mark to that effect (in the Scriptures), thus — “He who knows that transcendent Brahman, himself becomes Brahman” (MunU.3.2.9); “Being Brahman in fact, it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) gets absorbed into itself” (BrhU.4.4.6) etc. — 26.
[Go top]
Ubhaya-vyapadeśāt: on account of both being taught; Tu: but; Ahi-kuṇḍalavat: like that between a serpent and its coils. (Ubhaya: both; Vyapadeśāt: on account of the declaration of the scripture; Ahi: serpent; Kuṇḍalavat: like the coils.)🔗 But because of the twofold reference (in the Scriptures) (the relation of the Highest Self with the Jīva-Self) is like (the relation of) a snake to its coils. — 3.2.27. It is with the intention to purify his own view with reference to the relation between what is meditated upon (i.e. Brahman) and the one who so meditates (the Jīva-Self), that the Sūtra-kāra, here, presents another aspect of the same (view). In some places, instruction is given (in the Scriptures) about the difference between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self, to be as that between the one that meditates and one that is meditated upon, and as between the one that sees, and the one that is seen, thus — “Thereafter he (the Jīva-Self) sees Him (i.e. the Highest Brahman), while meditating upon Him (i.e. the Highest Brahman) as being one without any parts” (MunU.3.1.8); in some places, as the one that approaches, and the one that is approached, thus — “He approaches the divine and transcendent Puruṣa who is even beyond the one that is beyond (Parāt para)” (MunU.3.2.8), and in some places, as one who controls, and the one that is controlled thus — “who rules all things, by Himself being inside of them”. In other places, even non-difference between them is indicated, thus — “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7); “I am Brahman” (BrhU.1.4.10); “This your (i.e. the Jīva’s) Self, which is inside everything” (BrhU.3.4.1) and “This is thy Self, the ruler from within, and the immortal” (BrhU.3.7.3). Indications, thus, being of both kinds, if only the indication about the non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) alone is accepted (as being correct as a rule), the other indication (of difference between them) would be without any support. Therefore, inasmuch as indications are either way, the truth is that the relation (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) is similar to the relation as between a snake and its own coils. Just as, as a snake, there is no difference (between it and its coils), but taken separately, as a snake on the one hand, and its coils, hood, and its erect striking posture etc., on the other, there is difference. — 27.
[Go top]
Prakāśa-āśrayavat: like light and its substratum; Vā: or; Tejastvāt: on account of both being luminous.🔗 Or else it is like the light and its source, inasmuch as both are Tejas. — 3.2.28. Or else this should be understood to be similar to light and its source. Just as Sun-light and its basis i.e. source.viz. the Sun are not essentially different inasmuch as both have Tejas in common, but are considered as different, even so, is the case here (i.e. as between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self). — 28.
[Go top]
Pūrvavat: as before; Vā: or.🔗 Or rather (the relationship between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self, is) as has been stated earlier (in Sūtra 25). — 3.2.29. Or rather, this deserves to be even as was stated earlier, viz. that there is no difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self), just as it is in the case of light. For only if it is understood that the bondage (of the Jīva-Self) is the result of Nescience, that it becomes reasonably sustainable that Final Release results from knowledge. If, however, the Jīva-Self is understood to be in bondage in the real sense, and is according to the maxim of the snake and its coils, understood to be only a particular condition of the Highest Self, or, according to the maxim of light and its source, to be only a part of the Highest Self, then, inasmuch as it would not be possible to get rid of such bondage (in the real sense) there would result the predicament of the Mokṣa-Śāstra (the science of Final Release), being rendered unmeaning or worthless. Nor do the Scriptures declare this difference and non-difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) to be both equally true. They indicate ‘non-difference’ as a fact to be expounded, and merely refer to a ‘difference’ conventionally well-known already (as appertaining to the phenomenal condition), only with a desire to explain or establish ‘non-difference’. Hence the conclusion is that there is no difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self), just as it is in the case of light. — 29.
[Go top]
Pratiṣedhāt: on account of denial; Ca: and, moreover.🔗 And (the conclusion is so) also because of the denial. — 3.2.30. This is again why, this alone is the conclusion, because the Scriptures deny that there is any sentient entity as apart from the Highest Self, thus — “Apart from this (Highest Self) there is no other seer” (BrhU.3.7.23) etc. It is understood, that, that alone is the conclusion, because, the Scriptural passages such as “Then the instruction is, ‘not so’, ‘not so’” (BrhU.2.3.6), “That Brahman is without cause, and is not an effect, and has nothing inside or outside (of it)” (BrhU.2.5.19), have denied (the truth of) the existence of this variety of worldly manifestations and have left Brahman only, as the only remaining entity. — 30.
[Go top]
[Go top]
There arises a doubt, because of the conflict of the Scriptural statements, as to whether, there is or is not any other real entity transcending even that Brahman, which, so far, was ascertained (by us) to be an entity that is free from the variety of worldly manifestations. Some Scriptural passages, at the first blush, appear as if they propound, that there is some entity transcending even Brahman, and the following attempt towards a refutation of the same is now begun.Param: greater; Ataḥ: for this, than this (Brahman); Setu-unmāna-sambandha-bheda-vyapadeśebhyaḥ: on account of terms denoting a bridge, measure, connection and difference. (Setu-unmāna-sambandha-bheda-vyapadeśebhyaḥ: a bridge; Unmāna: dimensions; Sambandha: relation; Bheda: difference; Vyapadeśebhyaḥ: from the declarations.)🔗 Because of the reference (in the Scriptures) to a bund (Setu), a limited size (Unmāna), a relation i.e. a connection (Sambandha), and a difference (Bheda), there is some entity even beyond this (viz. the transcendent Brahman). — 3.2.31. (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — Some entity transcending even this Brahman, deserves to be the true entity. Whence is it so? Because of the reference (in the Scriptures) to, a bund, a limited size, a relation, and a difference. The reference to a bund is, thus — “Now that which is this Self is a bund, the sustainer (of the world)” (ChanU.8.4.1), and it describes Brahman which is called the Self, as being the bund. A bund is well-known in the ordinary world, to be a barrage of earth and wood for arresting the flow of water. Here, as the word ‘bund’ is used for the word ‘Self’ (Ātmā), it intimates to us, as the bund in the ordinary world does, the existence of some entity other than the Self which is the bund itself, and also on account of the use of the verb ‘to cross over’, in the Scriptural passage — “Having crossed over beyond this bund (i.e. the Self)” (ChanU.8.4.2). Just as (a man) after crossing a bund in the ordinary world arrives at the sylvan terrain beyond, which by no means is a bund, even so, after crossing over the Self in the form of the bund (he) reaches some entity which is not the Self and is not a bund. The reference to a limited size occurs, thus — “That Brahman has four feet, eight hoofs, and sixteen parts”. It is well-known in the ordinary world, that where there is something which has a definite measurable size, such as ‘This, is so much, and is limited (in size) such as a small coin’ for instance, there always exists something which is different from it (such as a rupee), similarly, it is understood, that as Brahman also has a limited measured size, some entity other than that must necessarily exist. The reference to a ‘relation’ occurs, thus — “Oh mild one, he then becomes one with the ‘Sat’ (the Highest Self)” (ChanU.6.1.1), “The Jīva-Self embraced by the intelligential Highest Self” (BrhU.4.3.21). It is seen, that it is only an entity of a particular definite measured size, that has any relation with a similar entity of a similar measured size, as is for instance, the relation of a man to a city. The Scriptures declare that the Jīva-Selfs, during deep sleep, become connected with Brahman. Hence, it is thus understood, that some other entity, which is beyond even the Highest Brahman and is not measurable, does exist. A reference to a ‘difference’ also conveys the same meaning (to us). The Scriptures after referring to the Lord as being inside the Sun, thus — “Now this aureate Puruṣa that is to be seen in the Sun” (ChanU.1.6.6), again refer separately and differently to the Lord as being inside the eye also, thus — “Now this Puruṣa that is seen in the eye” (ChanU.1.7.5). Then the Scriptures extend the application, mutatis mutandis, of the form etc. of the Lord (in the Sun), to the Lord (in the eye), thus — “The form of this one is the same as the form of the other one, the joints of this one are the same as the joints of the other one, the name of this one is the same as the name of the other one” (ChanU.1.7.5). The Scriptures moreover indicate how the Lordship of both is limited, thus: It speaks of the one, thus — “He becomes the Lord of those who are above this (Sun) and of the desires of the God also, which is its God-hood” (ChanU.1.6.8), and of the other, thus — “He becomes the Lord of those who are below the Sun and of the desires of men also, which is its Godhood” (ChanU.1.7.6), just as (if one were to say) — ‘This is the kingdom of the King of Magadha, and this, of the King of Videha’. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that on account of these references to a bund etc., there is some entity which is even beyond Brahman. — 31.
[Go top]
Thus, we explain —Sāmānyāt: on account of similarity; Tu: but.🔗 But (Brahman is described as a bund) because of the similarity or alikeness of both. — 3.2.32. By the word ‘but’ the conclusion indicated to have been reached (by the opponent of Vedānta) is opposed (by the Sūtra-kāra). Nothing whatsoever, other than Brahman (i.e. anything transcending Brahman), deserves to exist, because of the absence of any means-of-proof (about it). We do not come across any such means-of-proof about the existence of any entity (other than Brahman). It has already been established, that all entities whatsoever that are liable to be created, deserve to have their origin etc. from Brahman, and also, that an effect is non-different from its cause. Moreover, apart from Brahman, no other entity which is not-born (Aja) can possibly exist, inasmuch as it is definitely understood from the Scriptures thus — “Oh Mild one, that Sat (Being) only, without a second, existed in the beginning”, and also because, the declaration (by the Scriptures), that by the knowledge of one (i.e. Brahman) all else becomes known, precludes any assumption of the existence of any entity other than Brahman. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) has it not been said, already that the reference to a ‘bund’ etc. suggests (the existence of) a real entity as apart from the Brahman? We reply — No, so far as the reference to a ‘bund’ is concerned, it is not capable of propounding the existence of any entity as apart from Brahman, because it only says that Ātmā is a ‘bund’ and not that there is any entity beyond it. To this (the opponent of Vedānta says) — Provided nothing transcending Brahman does exist, it is not possible to imagine that the Self (Ātmā) is a bund, therefore, some entity transcending even the transcendent Brahman, has necessarily to be imagined. We reply — It is not logical. To assert or posit the existence of an entity which is not at all known as existing (i.e. is not properly established as existing) is but a mere dogmatic assertion. Besides, merely because the Self (Ātmā) is said to be a bund, if one were to assert or posit the existence of an entity transcending the Self (Ātmā), on the ground of the illustration of an entity popularly known (in this world) such as a bund, one would then even predicate the earthiness and woodenness of the Self (Ātmā), but it would by no means be logical, as it would contradict the Scriptural passage about its being not born (Aja). It is just proper to say that the word ‘bund’ is used for the Self (Ātmā) because of the similarity or alikeness (of the Ātmā and a bund). That the Self (Ātmā) sustains the world and its limits, is the similarity or alikeness it has, to the popularly known bund. Hence, the Self (Ātmā) which is the relevant subject here, is glorified by being designated a ‘bund’ similar to the popularly known bund. The expression ‘having crossed over beyond the bund’ has the meaning of merely reaching it, as the root ‘to cross over’ cannot be understood to mean, crossing over and reaching some entity beyond. Just as when it is said (about a student) that he has crossed over beyond grammar, it only means that he has mastered it and not that he has reached anything beyond it. — 32.
[Go top]
Buddhi-arthaḥ: for the sake of easy comprehension; Pādavat: just like (four) feet.🔗 It is for the sake of comprehension by intelligence (Buddhi) (that Brahman is imagined to have a measure of size), as in the case of a Pāda (i.e. foot or a token coin). — 3.2.33. With regard to what is said (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz., because there is a reference to a limited size, there positively is an entity transcending (Brahman), we say — Even the reference to a limited size has not the object of making the existence of any entity other than Brahman understood (by it). What then, is it meant for? (We say) — (It is meant) for the sake of comprehension by intelligence (Buddhi) i.e. for meditation (Upāsanā), that is all. How ever otherwise, can comprehension by intelligence, of Brahman as having four feet, eight hoofs and sixteen parts, be made steady in Brahman (during the meditation (on Brahman)? Therefore, it is by way of such a modification (of Brahman), that Brahman is merely imagined to have a limited size, because, as people are endowed variously with either dull, or moderate, or sharp intelligence, all are not able to concentrate their intelligence on Brahman, which is eternal and is not subject to modification. This is like the Pāda (i.e. foot or a token coin). Just as the mind and the Ākāśa which are mentioned in the Scriptures as the Ādhyātmika (with reference to the relation of Brahman to Jīva-Self) and the Ādhidaivika (with reference to Deities) symbols of Brahman and have been imagined to have four Pādas (Feet), viz. ‘Speech’ etc. in the case of the mind, and ‘Agni’ etc. in the case of the Ākāśa, for the purpose of meditation, even so, it is in this case. Or else, “as in the case of Pāda” should be understood thus — Just as a Kārṣāpaṇa (i.e. a silver coin such as a Rupee) is supposed to consist of sub-divisions of token coins, for the purpose of securing the ease of transactions, and the meaning is, that just as in the absence of any rule about a measure (Parimāṇa, controlling prices) men generally are not able always to effect transactions of either sale or purchase, with the whole coin, even so it is in this case. — 33.
[Go top]
Sthāna-viśeṣāt: on account of special places; Prakāśa-ādivat: like light and the like.🔗 (Scriptural statements about ‘Relation i.e. connection and difference’ are) because of a particular environment (Sthāna-Viśeṣa), just as (in the case of) light etc. — 3.2.34. Here, in this Sūtra the refutation of both the references about a relation i.e. connection, as well as a difference, is stated. What is stated (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz., that on account of the statements about Relation i.e. connection with, and difference from (Brahman), there must be some entity even transcending Brahman, is not correct, because such references even with regard to only a single entity (such as Brahman) are reasonably sustainable, as depending upon a particular environment. In the case of the reference to Relation i.e. connection, the meaning is as follows: The destruction (Upaśama) of a particular special cognition of difference arising from the contact of the Jīva-Self with special environments in the form of limiting adjuncts such as intelligence (Buddhi) etc., which results from the destruction of that particular limiting adjunct, and is spoken of with reference to that limiting adjunct, is what is metaphorically meant to be the Relation i.e. connection of the Jīva-Self to the Highest Self, and it is not with reference to any limitation of the nature of the Highest Self. Similarly, the reference to ‘difference’ is also a metaphorical statement about a difference in Brahman in connection with limiting adjuncts, and is not in connection with any difference in its nature as such, and that is why the comparison, “it is like the light”, is thus employed, viz. just as the solar and lunar light is really the same light (in essence), but it shows special attributes on account of its contact with limiting adjuncts, so the reference to ‘Relation i.e. connection’ is with regard to the cessation Of limiting adjuncts, and the reference to ‘difference’ is due to the differences in the limiting adjuncts. Or again, it is like the references to ‘Relation i.e. connection’ and ‘difference’, in the case of light, in connection with such limiting adjuncts as a needle, a lasso (Pāśa) or the Ākāśa. — 34.
[Go top]
Upapatteḥ: as it becomes reasonable; Ca: also, and.🔗 And (it is only thus) that it becomes reasonably sustainable. — 3.2.35. And it is only thus and in no other way that a ‘relation i.e. connection’ becomes reasonably sustainable, because the Scriptures declare such a relation with its own nature, thus — “He becomes one with his own Self” (ChanU.6.8.1), as the Self’s own nature is imperishable. A relation, in accordance with the maxim of ‘a citizen and a city’, does not fit in properly. It is precisely because of this obfuscation of the real nature of an entity as caused by Nescience (which is effaced), that the Scriptural passage “He becomes one with his own Self” (ChanU.6.8.1) becomes reasonably sustainable. Similarly, no other kind of ‘difference’ also is possible, on account of the conflict (which such other kind of difference would cause) with the notion of the only one Lord, as is well-known from the Scriptural passages. It is in the same manner also that the Scriptures explain the reference to a difference caused by environment, in the case of the one and only one Ākāśa, thus — “This Ākāśa here, which is outside the Puruṣa” (ChanU.3.12.8); “This Ākāśa here, which is inside the Puruṣa” (ChanU.3.12.8); “This Ākāśa here, which is inside the Hṛdaya” (ChanU.3.12.9). — 35.
[Go top]
Tathā: similarly; Anya-pratiṣedhāt: on account of the express denial of all other things. (Anya: any other, of the other; Pratiṣedhāt: owing to the denial, or prohibition or negation.)🔗 Similarly, on account of the denial of all other (entities). — 3.2.36. Having thus refuted the reasons advanced by the opponent of Vedānta in support of his view, such as the reference to a bund etc., (the Sūtra-kāra) now concludes his own view by (stating) another reason, thus — Similarly on account of the denial (by the Scriptures) of all other entities, it is understood that there does not exist any other entity transcending Brahman. So also, Scriptural passages — such as “He alone is below” (ChanU.7.25.1), “I alone am below” (ChanU.7.25.1), “Ātmā alone is below” (ChanU.2.4.6), “All this is Brahman”, “The Ātmā is all this” (ChanU.7.25.2), “There is no diversity or many-ness here” (BrhU.4.4.19), “Beyond whom nothing else is higher i.e. transcendent”, and “From whom nothing else is lower i.e. smaller” (SvetU.3.9), “That this here, is Brahman, without cause, without effect, without anything inside or outside (of it)” (BrhU.2.5.19) etc. — which recur in the chapter dealing with the self-same Brahman, and which cannot possibly be construed as meaning anything else, preclude (the existence of) any entity other than Brahman. From the Scriptural passage about the Highest Self being inside everything, it is concluded that no other Self is inside the Highest Self (i.e. Brahman). — 36.
[Go top]
Anena: by this; Sarva-gatatvam: all-pervadingness; Āyāma: (regarding Brahman’s) extent; Śabda-ādibhyaḥ: from scriptural statements.🔗 By this (i.e. by all that has gone before), it is established that Brahman is all-pervading. (It is also known) from the statement about (its) extent or expanse (Āyāma). — 3.2.37. By this, i.e. by the refutation (of the argument) about the reference to a bund etc., and also by accepting, that (the existence of) everything else (than Brahman) is denied (by the Scriptures), it is also firmly established that the Highest Self is all-pervading, otherwise, it could not be so established. If the references to a bund etc. are accepted to be in their principal sense it would mean that the Highest Self is limited (in size), because a bund etc. are themselves so limited (in size). Similarly if it is not accepted that the existence of all other entities is denied (by the Scriptures), then inasmuch as such entities would mutually exclude each other, it would mean that the Highest Self also (being an entity) is limited (in size). It is understood from the word Āyāma (extent or expanse) etc., that it is all-pervading. The word Āyāma means expanse. That the Highest Self is all-pervading, is also indicated by the following Scriptural and Smṛti passages, viz. “As much (in size) this Ākāśa is, even so much (in size) is this Ākāśa in the Hṛdaya” (ChanU.8.1.3), “Like the Ākāśa he is all-pervading and eternal”, “He is greater than the heaven’ (ChanU.3.14.3), “Greater than the Ākāśa” (Śata. Bra. 10.6.3.2), “He is eternal, all-pervading, firm and immovable” (BhG.11.24). — 37.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Phalam: the fruit; Ataḥ: from Him only; Upapatteḥ: for that is reasonable.🔗 Because, that fruits (of actions are vouchsafed) by Him (i.e. the Lord), is alone that is reasonably sustainable. — 3.2.38. Another characteristic of the nature of this self-same Brahman, other than its distinctive aspects, by way of its being both the ruler, and the one that is ruled, which is discernible during its phenomenal existence, is now being described. The question to be considered is, whether, the well-known threefold fruits of actions, viz. the desirable, the undesirable and those which are partly desirable and partly undesirable, which all creatures are well-known to be subject to, during their transmigratory mundane existence, result directly from the actions themselves, or whether they are received from the Lord. It is propounded (by the Sūtra-kāra) that these fruits deserve to be received from the Lord. Whence is it so? Because it is reasonably so sustainable. It is reasonably sustainable, that it is He, the entity presiding over everything, which brings about creation, preservation and absorption, and who is well aware of the specific environments and times, that suitably confers such fruits of actions on those who are responsible for such actions. It is not reasonably sustainable, that actions which come to an end every moment, yield their fruits at some future time, because no existence can ever spring from non-existence. It may well be (says the opponent of Vedānta), that an act during its own time and while it is coming to an end, creates a fruit proper to itself, and that the doer of such act experiences the fruit at some future time. That also is not feasible, inasmuch as it is not reasonably sustainable, that any fruit can ever be called a fruit as such, before it is connected with the experiencer of such a fruit. It is precisely at that particular time, during which the fruit, be it pleasure or pain, is being experienced by any Jīva-Self, that, in the ordinary world, it is understood to be such a fruit. In the ordinary world men do not realize pleasure or pain as the fruit (of any action) as long as it is not connected with the Jīva-Self. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) — Oh, all right, let no fruit accrue after the act (as you say), but may be, that fruit may accrue from the ‘Apūrva’ (merit) of actions which itself is the result of such actions, — even that is not reasonably sustainable because ‘Apūrva’ which by itself is non-sentient and inert like wood or earth, and which is not energized into activity by a sentient entity, cannot have any tendency towards activity. Besides there is no means-of-proof as to its existence. If it be said, that a presumption as to the existence of an ‘Apūrva’ is a sine qua non of such fruit, is precisely such means-of-proof, (we reply) — No, inasmuch as the existence of the Lord is firmly established, the presumption of the existence of such an ‘Apūrva’ as a sine qua non, goes by the board. — 38.
[Go top]
Śrutatvāt: because the Śruti so teaches, from the declaration of the Śruti to that effect; Ca: also, and.🔗 And also because of its being declared by the Scriptures. — 3.2.39. It is not merely because it is reasonably sustainable, that we imagine the Lord to be the cause of the fruits (of actions), but because the Scriptures also declare the Lord to be the cause of such fruits. The Scriptural passage “He indeed is the great unborn Self (Ātmā), the one who vouchsafes food and wealth” (BrhU.4.4.24) also declares similarly. — 39.
[Go top]
Dharmam: practice of religious duties, religious merits; Jaiminiḥ: the sage Jaiminiḥ; Ataḥ eva: for the same reasons.🔗 It is on the same grounds however, that Ācārya Jaimini (considers) Dharma (conduct according to Scriptures), as the giver of fruits. — 3.2.40. Ācārya Jaimini however considers Dharma to be the one that vouchsafes fruits, on the very same grounds (viz. Scriptural authority and possibility). This is what the Scriptures declare — “One who has a desire for heaven should sacrifice”. This is a Scriptural injunction, and as some object for the injunction is necessary to be understood, it must be understood that a sacrifice does result in the acquisition of heaven, because were it not to be so, no one would care to engage in a sacrifice, and thus any such instruction would be rendered meaningless. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) this view has already been rejected on the ground, that, as actions come to an end every moment, it is not reasonably sustainable that there could be any fruits (of actions). No (we the Mīmāṃsakas reply) because according to us the Scriptures are authoritative. Once it is granted, that the Scriptures are authoritative, the relation between actions and their fruits, as declared by the Scriptures, should be understood to be so. Action which comes to an end without generating some ‘Apūrva’ cannot possibly grant its fruit at some future time. Hence it is inferred that some such condition (like an ‘Apūrva’) does of course exist, either as some subtle subsequent condition of action, or as some antecedent condition of the fruit. This is how the meaning becomes reasonably sustainable in the way referred to above, but it is not equally reasonably sustainable that the Lord vouchsafes the fruits (of actions). It is not reasonably sustainable that one uniform cause (such as the Lord) can have ununiform different results, and there would also be the predicament of the faults of partiality and cruelty being fastened on to the Lord, and all performance of actions would be rendered unfructuous. Therefore it is from Dharma alone that fruits (of actions) flow. — 40.
[Go top]
Pūrvam: the former, i. e., the Lord as the giver of the fruits of actions; Tu: but; Bādarāyaṇaḥ: Bādarāyaṇa, the framer of the Sūtras (holds); Hetu-vyapadeśāt: on account of His being declared the cause (of the actions themselves).🔗 But the sage Bādarāyaṇa however thinks that the one mentioned earlier (i.e. the Lord) is the cause of the fruits of actions, because He is referred to as the cause (of action i.e. Karma also). — 3.2.41. Ācārya Bādarāyaṇa however considers the Lord referred to earlier, as the cause of the fruits of actions. The word ‘but’ (in the Sūtra) has the effect of refuting the view that fruits result either from actions or from Apūrva. The conclusion is, that it is the Lord alone that vouchsafes fruits of actions, and whether He relies upon actions or ‘Apūrva’, for dealing out such fruits, may be as it may. Whence is it so? Because it is indicated that the Lord is the cause. It is as being the one that deals out the fruit, that the Scriptures refer to the Lord, thus — “He makes that man perform good actions whom he desires to raise up from this world, and makes that other man perpetrate evil actions whom he desires to dump down into the abyss” (Kaush. 3.8). The Smṛti Bhagavad-Gītā, also (in 7.21) says the same thing: “Whatever form (of the deity) the devotee desires to worship through faith, on that very form, I render his faith firm. With such faith the devotee essays to propitiate Him, and thus, as ordained by me, he obtains his desires.” Besides all Vedānta texts declare, that all this creation is brought about by the Lord. That the Lord is the giver of the fruits of action, consists in the fact, that He creates all creatures according to their own actions. Faults, such as, that the creation of manifold different effects by one cause (viz. Brahman) etc. are not reasonably sustainable, do not apply to the Lord, inasmuch as the Lord has regard for the endeavours made (by each man). — 41.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
The true nature of Brahman, the object to be known, has so far been explained. Whether the Vidyās in all the Vedānta texts are different from each other or not, is now being considered. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — But surely, Brahman, the object to be known, has already been determined to be one that is free from all differences of cause or effect (Purvāparādi-bheda-rahitam), and is uniform in essence, like a lump of salt, so, whence can there be any necessity to consider, as to whether the Vidyās are different or non-different from each other? It is not possible to say, that in the Vedānta it is intended to expound, that just as there is a variety of religious actions, there are varieties of Brahman, because there is but one and only one Brahman and it is of one uniform nature. That there could be a variety in the nature of Vidyās in the case of Brahman which is of one uniform nature, is not possible. If an entity is of one nature, and the knowledge of such entity is of a different nature, such knowledge can only be of an illusory nature. Now, again Brahman being but one and one only, if different Vijñānas (i.e. Vidyās or Upāsanās or Cognitions) of it are intended to be expounded by the Vedānta texts, then only one of them could be free from doubt, and the rest would necessarily be doubtful, and thus the predicament of a distrust of the Vedānta texts would result. Therefore it cannot be possible to entertain a doubt as to whether there are differences in the Vidyās relating to Brahman in the Vedānta texts, nor can it be maintained (even if it be so doubted) that because of the uniformity of injunctions, there is non-difference between them, because, the knowledge of Brahman is characterized by the absence of any such injunction about it (unlike the case of Dharma in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). It has already been said by the Ācārya. (i.e. the Sūtra-kāra) — in the Sūtra “But that (Brahman is to be known from the Scriptures) is established, because (all Vedānta texts) have that connected sequence” (Bra. Su. I. i. 4) — that the knowledge of Brahman supervenes, not through passages which purport to give injunctions (to act), but through passages about Brahman which culminate in the realization of Brahman as an entity. So how can any such discussion either about the difference or non-difference (between the Vidyās) be at all started? With regard to this, it is said — This consideration as to whether there is difference or non-difference as between the Vidyās is with reference to the qualified (Sa-guṇa) Brahman or the Prāṇa etc., and hence there is no fault. Here also — like ritualistic actions (Karma) — difference and nondifference as between meditations (Upāsanās) is possible, and, as in the case of actions, meditations also are spoken of as having visible and invisible fruits, and some' are spoken of as having the fruit of Krama-mukti (Final Release by stages) by way of the generation of correct i.e. perfect knowledge, and thus, in the case of meditations, a scope for discussion is possible, viz., as to whether the Vidyās as referred to in different Vedānta texts are or are not different from each other. Now, with regard to that, the possible arguments of the opponents of Vedānta in support of their view are stated, thus: — A designation (Nāman) for instance, is a well-known criterion for determining that there is difference, to wit, as in the case of the ‘Jyotis’ sacrifice etc. (in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). Here also in the various Vedānta texts, different designations for the Vidyās are mentioned, such as Taittīriyaka, Vāja-saneyaka, Kauṭhumaka, Śāṭyāyanaka etc. Similarly, a difference in the form (Rūpa) of Karma, is also calculated to propound a difference in actions (in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) as in “Āmikṣā is for the Viśve-devas (i.e. all the Gods) and Vājina is for the horses”. Here, (in Vedānta) also a difference in form is to be seen, as for instance, the followers of one branch recite a sixth and an entirely different Agni, in the case of the ‘Vidyā of the Five Fires’ (Pañcāgni-Vidyā), while some others recite only five Agnis. Similarly, in the dialogue between the Prāṇas (viz. the Chief Vital Air and other sense-organs) etc., some mention a lesser number, such as, Vāk etc. (and four others only) while some mention a greater number (viz. five). Similarly, that a special attribute (Dharma) is suggestive of a difference in actions, is what is advanced as an argument for a doubt (by the opponent in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā), as for instance, in minor sacrifices (Iṣṭis) called ‘Karīrī’ etc. So, here (in Vedānta) also there is a special attribute, viz. that only the followers of Atharva-Veda are required to perform the ‘Śiro-vrata’ (the ritual of bearing the Agni on the head). Similarly other criteria of ‘difference’ such as ‘Punar-ukti’ (repetition) etc., in so far as they become applicable, should be drawn upon in the case of the various Vedānta texts. Therefore (the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is) — The Vidyās in different Vedānta texts are different from each other. This conclusion, we answer as follows. —Sarva-vedānta-pratyayam: exposition of Brahman in all the Vedānta texts; Codana-ādi-aviśeṣāt: as there is no difference in the injunctions, etc., (i.e., connection, form and name). (Sarva: all; Veda: the Vedas; Anta: the settled conclusion; Pratyayam: the knowledge, realisation; Codana-ādi: or the injunction and others; A-viśeṣāt: as there is no difference.)🔗 The injunctions etc. being common, the Vidyās (i.e. Lores, or Upāsanās or Cognitions) in all Vedānta texts are the same everywhere. — 3.3.1. The Vidyās (Cognitions, which are called by the same name) wherever they happen to be mentioned in the Vedānta texts, are the same everywhere, because the injunctions etc. (as to them) are common. By the word ‘etc.’, the application of all these arguments for establishing ‘non-difference’, referred to in the Sūtra, which states the conclusion, in the Śākhāntara Adhikaraṇa (of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā), is attracted i.e. they should be understood to apply here, viz., such as, connection, nature or form, injunction and special designation. Just as in one and the same Agni-hotra, in spite of differences in the branches (of the Vedas) the injunction as to the performance of ritualistic action (Karma) by a man is the same — viz. “He should offer an oblation” — , similarly, the injunction, both in the case of the Vāja-saneyins and Chando-gas — viz. “He who verily knows the oldest and the Highest” (BrhU.6.1.1) and (ChanU.5.1.1) — is the same. Also the connection of the Vidyā (Cognition) with the fruit, is the same, in the case of both — viz. “He becomes the oldest and the Highest amongst his own people” (BrhU.6.1.1). The nature or form of the Vidyā in both is the same, viz. the true nature of the Prāṇa, which is endowed with the special qualities of being the oldest and the Highest. Just as the materials and the deity (involved in the sacrifice) constitute the nature or form of a sacrifice, so the object to be known (i.e. Brahman) is the nature of the Vidyā, and the Vidyās are coloured by its nature (i.e. of the object to be known). The designation also (in both) is the same — viz. “the Vidyā of the Prāṇas”. Therefore, the Vidyās (Cognitions in all the Vedānta texts are the same everywhere. The same construction should be put upon, in the case of the ‘Vidyā of the Five Fires’, the ‘Vidyā of Vaiśvā-nara’ and the Śāṇḍilya Vidyā’. Such illusory reasons (as are stated by the opponent of Vedānta) for establishing that the Vidyās are different, such as, designation and form etc., have already been refuted in the First Kaṇḍa (i.e. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā), beginning with the Sūtra “There could be no difference based upon name, as the names belong to the Vedas”, or, “the names do not apply to injunctions of acts” (according as the reading of the Sūtra is “Codanābhidhānatvāt” or “Acodanābhidhānatvāt” — Pu. Mīm. II.4.10). — 1.
[Go top]
The Sūtra-kāra here anticipates another possible objection (of the opponent of Vedānta) also, and refutes it, as follows —Bhedāt: on account of difference; Na: not; Iti: as, so, this; Cet: if; Na: no, not; Ekasyām: in the one and the same (Vidyā); Api: also, even.🔗 If it be said, that the Vidyās are different from each other on account of differences (in subsidiary matters, we say) — No, there may be such differences (even in the case of one and the same Vidyā. — 3.3.2. It may well be (says the opponent of Vedānta) that it is not reasonably sustainable, that the Vidyās in all the Vedānta texts are identical, inasmuch as there is difference in subsidiary matters (Guṇas). For instance, the Vāja-saneyins, with reference to the ‘Vidyā of the Five Fires’ mention a sixth Agni, thus — ‘To him the material Agni itself, is the Agni” (BrhU.6.2.14) etc., while the Chando-gas do not mention it (i.e. such sixth Agni), but conclude their Vidyā of Five Fires by the number five only, thus — “So, whosoever knows these five fires in this way” (ChanU.5.10.10). Now, how can it be reasonably sustainable, that the Vidyā of those who include this subsidiary matter and those who do not, can be identical? It is not possible to understand that all the different subsidiary matters can be combined together, as it would contradict the number five. Similarly the Chando-gas (in addition to the Chief Prāṇa) mention four Prāṇas viz. Speech, the Eye, the Ear and the Mind and the Vāja-saneyins mention a fifth also thus — “Semen is the creator (Prajā-pati). He who knows it to be so gets an increase in progeny and animal stock” (BrhU.6.1.6). If it be also said, that on account of the difference caused by the inclusion and exclusion (of the subsidiary matters), there is a difference in the things to be known (viz. the Prāṇas) and because of the difference in the things to be known, there is a difference in Vidyā, just as a difference in the material and the deity (necessary in a sacrifice), causes a difference in the sacrifice, (we reply) — No, in as much as such differences in subsidiary matters, even when the Vidyā is one and the same (in all Vedānta texts) is reasonably sustainable. Even though the sixth material Agni cannot possibly be taken collectively (with the other five fires which are notional) there is no difference in the Vidyās (viz. the Pañcāgni-Vidyās mentioned both in the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka and the Chāndogya), inasmuch as the other five Agnis, such as the heaven etc., are recognizable as the same in both. (For instance) there is no difference in the Atirātra sacrifice, even when the Ṣo-ḍaśi cup is used or when it is not so used. Besides even the Chando-gas do mention a sixth Agni, thus — “Indeed when he has died and departed for the world indicated (by his actions) they take him to the Agni” (ChanU.5.9.2). The Vāja-saneyins however in order to dispel the idea of the sticks of fire-wood (Samidhs) and smoke which follow in the wake of the five notional i.e. imaginary fires, mention thus — “To him, the material Agni is the Agni and the material Samidh is the Samidh” (BrhU.6.2.14), which is but only a reference to something which is usual (Nityānuvāda, and which means that even in the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, the sixth fire is not mentioned for meditation). Even if (it be said) that this Vāda (i.e. reciting in this way) is for the purpose of meditation, still, this subsidiary matter can very well be included even by the Chando-gas also, and no such doubt about any contravention of the number five should be entertained here, inasmuch as, this number five, is only intended to refer to imaginary i.e. notional Agnis (which are well-known to be five) and is but a reference to something which is usual (Nityānuvāda), and has nothing to do i.e. does not go with any injunction (to a meditation). In this manner, it is not contradictory to include the sixth additional Agni elsewhere (where it is not mentioned) in the “Dialogue of the Prāṇas”. No such difference in the Vidyās or the object to be known, should be suspected, merely because of a difference due to a subsidiary matter being included or excluded or also because a particular small portion of the thing to be known is accepted in one Vidyā and is rejected in the other, because the maximum quantum of the thing-to-be-known (Vedya-rāśi), is common i.e. the same in both. Therefore the Vidyās (everywhere) are identical. — 2.
[Go top]
Sva-adhyāyasya: of the study of the Vedas; Tathātvena: on account of being such; Hi: because; Samācāre: in the book named Samācāra containing the rules for the performance of Vedic rites; Adhikārāt: on account of the qualification; Ca: and; Savavat: as in the case of the seven oblations (viz., Saurya, etc.); Ca: and, also; Tad-niyamaḥ: that rule.🔗 (The rite of the holding of the fire on the head) relates to the study of Veda (amongst those who are followers of Atharva-Veda), because (it is so mentioned) in the ‘Samācāra’ and also because of the chapter. The rule is analogous to the libations. — 3.3.3. The objection taken — viz., that inasmuch as in the case of the followers of Atharva-Veda, ‘the ritual of holding of the fire on the head’ is a sina qua non for (learning) the Vidyā, and it is not so necessary in the case of others, therefore there is difference in the Vidyās — is now being answered. This is a feature of the study of Atharva-Veda, and not of the Vidyā. How is it understood to be so? Because the Ārtharvaṇikas mention that it is a feature of the study of Atharva-Veda in the ‘Samācāra’, a book which gives instruction about the Vratas (rituals) to be observed in the study of Veda, and which mentions this ritual as being related to the (Atharva-) Veda. It is also conclusively determined to be such a feature of the study of their own Upaniṣad only (and not of the Vidyā), on account of the word ‘this’ which refers to the qualification (for the study of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad), and the word ‘study’ also, in the passage — “No one who has not performed this ritual, can study this (i.e. the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad)” (MunU.3.2.11). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), as the Muṇḍaka passage “This Brahma-Vidyā should be imparted only to those who have performed the ritual of ‘the holding of the fire on the head’ according to the instruction (Vidhivat)” (MunU.3.2.10) speaks of its (i.e. of the ritual of Śīro-vrata) relation to Brahma-Vidyā, this feature (of Śīro-vrata) would get mixed up (with the other Brahma-Vidyās in the other Vedas) and apply to all Vidyās generally, because, Brahma-Vidyā is the same everywhere. We reply — No, because the word (this) (Etam) in the passage refers only to that which is relevant to the context there (viz., to the Brahma-Vidyā mentioned in the Muṇḍakopaniṣad). As this relevancy of Brahma-Vidyā is with reference to this particular book (i.e. Muṇḍakopaniṣad), therefore this feature (of Śīro-vrata) also relates particularly to that particular book only. That the rule is analogous to the libations (Sava), is an illustration indicated (in support of the argument). Just as, the seven libations — beginning with the libation to the Sun, and ending with the Śataudana libation — , having nothing to do with the three Agnis referred to in the other Vedas, but having a relation with only the one Agni referred to in the Atharva-Veda, are restricted to the followers of Atharva-Veda only, similarly this feature (of Śīro-vrata) related as it is, to the study of the Atharva-Veda by the Ārtharvaṇikas, is restricted to that study only. Therefore also, (the statement) that the Vidyās are identical (everywhere), is flawless. — 3.
[Go top]
Darśayati: (Śruti) shows, instructs; Ca: also.🔗 (The Scriptures) also declare (similarly). — 3.3.4. The Scriptures also declare similarly that the Vidyās (Cognitions) are one and the same in all Vedānta texts, inasmuch as they all give instruction that the object to be known is one and the same, thus — “That abode (i.e. Brahman) about which all the Scriptures speak” (KathU.1.2.15); “So do the Bahv-ṛcas (i.e. Hotṛs, the followers of Ṛg-Veda) consider it (i.e. Brahman) only, in the Mahaty-uktha (Śāstra i.e. collection of glorificatory Sāman hymns), and the Adhvaryus (the officiating priests, who follow the Yajur-Veda) meditate on it (i.e. Brahman) in the Sacrificial Agni, and the Chando-gas in Mahā-vrata (a particular religious act for propitiating Indra)”. Similarly, it is seen that the fear-inspiring nature of the Lord, spoken of in the Kaṭhopaniṣad thus — “The great fear, the uplifted thunder-bolt (Vajra)” (KathU.2.3.2), is referred to in the Taittīriyaka, for the purpose of censuring the viewing of difference (between the Jīva-Self and the Lord), thus — “Whenever he makes even the least little difference about it (Ātmā), then a great fear assails him. That indeed is where, the person, who does not accept the unity (of Jīva-Self and Brahman) but considers them to be different, becomes subject to fear” (TaitU.2.7.1). Similarly the Vaiśvā-nara (the gastric fire) fancifully or notionally conceived to be of the size of a thumb, in the Vāja-saneyaka (i.e. (Bṛhad-āraṇyaka), is accepted in the Chāndogya, as something which is already established, thus — “But, he who worships the Vaiśvā-nara considered in this way to be of the size of a thumb, and as the Abhivimāna Self (Ātmā)” (ChanU.5.18.1). In the same manner, inasmuch as, all Vedānta texts are understood to refer actually to the same matter, such as the Ukthas (Collections of Sāman hymns) etc., mentioned in one place, as being the same in all Vedānta texts, and are accepted in other places for the purpose of devout meditation, so, it is thus proved that the Upāsanās (meditations) in all Vedānta texts are the same everywhere, on the authority of the maxim of “A thing that is often seen everywhere (Prāya-darśana)”. — 4.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Upasaṃḥāraḥ: combination; Artha-abhedāt: as there is no difference in the object of meditation; Vidhi-śeṣavat: like the subsidiary rites of a main sacrifice; Samāne: in the Upāsanās of the same class, in the case of equality, the forms of meditation being the same in effect; Ca: also, and. (Artha: purpose; A-bheda: non-difference; Vidhi: injunctions, of the duties enjoined by the scriptures.)🔗 All the subsidiary matters have to be combined, because there is no difference in their application (Arthābhedāt) as between the Vidyās (Cognitions). This is just like the complementary matters of an injunction which is common. — 3.3.5. This Sūtra states the fruit (Phala, of the discussion above). It having been established that the Vidyās (Cognitions) in all the Vedānta texts are the same everywhere, (it follows that) the subsidiary matters of a Vidyā in one place are to be combined with the subsidiary matters of the same Vidyā in another place, because there is no difference in the fruit of the Vidyās (Cognitions) themselves. The use i.e. the benefit which the subsidiary matters relating to one Vidyā (Cognition) afford to that Vidyā is the same that they afford to another Vidyā, and, as the Vidyā is one and the same in both the places, there is a combination (of the subsidiary matters of both). It is like the complementary matters relating to an injunction (Vidhi-śeṣavat). Just as, in as much as complementary matters of an injunction about the religious rites of Agni-hotra etc. which are one and the same everywhere and not different, all such matters complementary to such an injunction have to be combined, even so it is, in the case of the present Vidyā. When the Vidyās are different from each other, then in as much as the matters of each Vidyā happen to be restricted to each Vidyā itself, and there is absence of any relation as between these Vidyās, such as that of one being the principal and the other being its modification (as there is between the Darśeṣṭi and a Paśu-yāga), no combination of such complementary matters takes place. It is not so, however, when the Vidyās are one and the same. This Sūtra which states the fruit, will be further elaborated (by the Sūtra-kāra), beginning with Sūtra 10 hereafter. — 5.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Anyathātvam: there is difference; Śabdāt: on account of (difference in) texts; Iti: so; Cet: if; Na: not; A-viśeṣāt: on account of non-difference (as regards essentials).🔗 If it be said (that the Udgīṭha Vidyās in Bṛhad-āraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads) are different, because the words of the Scriptures are different, (we the opponents of Vedānta say) — No, because of non-difference (as between them). — 3.3.6. In the Vāja-saneyaka (i.e. Bṛhad-āraṇyaka), beginning with “The deities said — Oh well, we will overcome the demons (interrupting us) in the sacrifice, by means of the Udgīṭha” (BrhU.1.3.1), and proceeding “They said to Vāk (speech), do thou sing for us” (BrhU.1.3.2), and after censuring Vāk (speech) and the other Prāṇas (i.e. sense-organs) as having been annihilated by the evil nature of the Demons, it is then recited, that they had recourse to the Chief Prāṇa, thus — “They said to the Prāṇa of the mouth (Āsanya), do thou sing for us, and the Chief Prāṇa said, may it be so, and sang for them” (BrhU.1.3.7). Similarly, in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad also, beginning with “The deities approached the Udgīṭha, (thinking) that they would defeat them (the demons) with it” (ChanU.1.2.1), and having censured the other Prāṇas (senses) as having been annihilated by the evil nature of the demons, it is similarly recited, that they had recourse to the Chief Prāṇa, thus — “Then they meditated upon the Chief Prāṇa as the Udgīṭha” (ChanU.1.2.7). In both places, it is definitely understood by this glorification of the Chief Prāṇa, that there is an injunction about Prāṇa-Vidyā. Now, a doubt arises here as to whether the Vidyās (Cognitions) in both the places are the same, or whether they are different. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of the Vedānta)? It is, that, on the same argument as before, the Cognitions are one and the same in both places. But (objects the Vedāntin) it is not logical (to say) that the Vidyās (Cognitions) are one and the same, because there is a difference in the introductory passage. The Vāja-saneyins begin in one way and the Chando-gas in another. The Vāja-saneyins mention the Chief Prāṇa as the singer of the Udgīṭha, thus — “Do thou sing for us” (BrhU.1.3.2), while the Chando-gas treat the Chief Prāṇa itself as the Udgīṭha, thus — “They meditated on this, the chief Prāṇa as the Udgīṭha” (ChanU.1.2.7). If, therefore, it be said (by the Vedāntin) as to how the Vidyās (Cognitions) could be one and the same, (we the opponents of Vedānta reply) — “This is no fault. That much peculiarity would not vitiate the unity of the Vidyās (Cognitions), because, it is understood that there is a great deal too much that is common (as between the Prāṇa-Vidyās of both the Vāja-saneyaka and Chāndogya). For instance — Both begin with the fight between the deities and the demons, both speak about overcoming the demons and then both mention the Udgīṭha, and follow it up by the invocation to Vāk (speech) etc., and then after censuring Vāk (speech) etc., both speak about having recourse to the Chief Prāṇa, and both speak about the annihilation of the demons through the strength of the Chief Prāṇa, in a manner similar to the illustration of a stone and a clod of earth, and thus, many such items are understood to be common to both. In the Vāja-saneyaka the Chief Prāṇa and the Udgītha are governed by the same case (Sāmānādhikaraṇya), thus — “He indeed is the Udgīṭha” (BrhU.1.3.23). Therefore, in the Chāndogya also the Chief Prāṇa should be understood metaphorically to be the singer of the Udgīṭha and it should be understood that the Vidyās (Cognitions) are, thus, one and the same. — 6.
[Go top]
Na: not; Vā: certainly; Prakaraṇa-bhedāt: on account of difference in subject matter; Paro'varīyastva-ādivat: even as (the meditation on the Udgīṭha) as the highest and great (Brahman) (is different).🔗 (Vidyās i.e. Cognitions) are not (the same in both the places) because the chapters are different. This is like (the meditation on) the greater than the great (Parovarīyān). — 3.3.7. That the cognitions are one and the same, is not logical, while it is logical, that they are different. Why so? Because of the difference in the chapters (which speak of different subject matters). It is seen that there is here a difference in the introductory part of the chapters. In the Chāndogya, for the matter of that, having in the introductory portion mentioned Oṅ-kāra, which is but a part of the Udgīṭha, as the proper object of meditation as the Udgīṭha, and having explained the special attribute (of Oṅ-kāra) as having the quintessence (of every other essence), thus — “Meditate on the word ‘Om’ as Udgīṭha” (ChanU.1.1.1), and after having again referred to a part of the Udgīṭha in the form of Oṅ-kāra, thus — “Now, verily this is but a further explanation of the same word Om” (ChanU.1.1.10), the Chāndogya, by way of the legend of the Gods and the Demons, says further — “(The Gods) meditated on the Chief Prāṇa in the form of the Udgīṭha” (ChanU.1.2.2Udgīṭha, meditation on the whole Udgīṭha (and not on its part ‘Om’ only) is understood, and the Udgātṛ-Ṛtvij (the chanting priest) is understood to be the meditator, then the introductory passage (which speaks about the meditation on ‘Om’, a part of the Udgīṭha) would thus be contradicted, and the word would have to be understood as a Lakṣaṇa i.e. in its secondary significance. Now, in one and the same sentence, the concluding portion ought to agree with the introductory portion. Therefore, here (in the Chāndogya) the looking upon on Oṅ-kāra, a part of the Udgīṭha, as being of the form of the Chief Prāṇa, is the instruction given. In the Vāja-saneyaka (i.e. Brih.) however, in the absence of any reason for understanding only a part of the Udgīṭha (i.e. Om) by the word ‘Udgīṭha’, meditation on the entire Udgīṭha is intimated. In the Scriptural passage “Do thou sing for us” (BrhU.1.3.2) also, the meditator the Udgātṛ-Ṛtvij is explained to be of the form of the Chief Prāṇa, which is another point of difference (in the Vidyās). That the Chief Prāṇa and the Udgīṭha which are mentioned as having the same case-ending, is for the purpose of expounding, that the Chief Prāṇa which is sought to be represented as the Udgātṛ-Ṛtvij, is the Self of all, and it is not able to show, that the Vidyās are identical. Besides, another disparity consists in this, viz. that by the word ‘Udgīṭha’ the whole Udgīṭha becomes the object of meditation. Nor can the capacity of the Chief Prāṇa as a singer be rejected on the ground of impossibility, inasmuch as, that it has the same capacity of being understood notionally as being the singer, as there is about the Udgīṭha, for the purpose of meditation, has been spoken of by the Scriptures. In as much as, that the Udgātṛ-Ṛtvij may very well sing by virtue of the strength of the Chief Prāṇa, is not impossible, because the Scriptures have therein stated so, in that very manner, thus — “He (the Udgātṛ) sang by means of the Speech and Prāṇa”. Besides, when it is understood that a difference between things is meant to be spoken of, it is not proper to understand that the things are the same, merely because of the similarity of the language of the passages. For instance, in the case of the Abhyudaya passage (i.e. a passage relating to the rising of the moon in the Darśeṣṭi Sacrifice) and in the case of the Paśu-kāma passage (i.e. a passage relating to the desire of a Yajamāna to obtain stocks of cattle), there is the Scriptural passage — “Divide the rice (according to the size of the grains) in three ways. The middle one should be offered as Puro-ḍāśa on eight potsherds, to Agni the conferor (of gifts)”, in which even though the reference is similar, still, because of the difference in the introductory passages, in the Abhyudaya passage it is understood that it (the Puro-ḍāśa) is not to be offered to the deity, and so far as the Paśu-kāma passage is concerned, it is understood to be by way of an injunction for a sacrifice. Similarly, here also there is difference in the Vidyās (Cognitions) on account of a difference in the introductory passages. This is similar to (the meditation on) the greater than the great (the most excellent). Just as, even though there is similarity (of Vidyās in both) about the superimposition of the Highest Self (on the Udgīṭha), meditation on the Udgīṭha characterized by the special feature of being the ‘most excellent’, by such passages as “Ākāśa verily is greater than these (beings), Ākāśa is the last resort” (ChanU.1.9.1), “He is the Udgīṭha, greater than the great, and eternal” (ChanU.9.1.2), is different from the meditation on the Udgīṭha, characterized by the special feature of an ‘aureate beard’ (of the deity) in the Sun and in the eye. Thus, just as special features in different meditations, in even one and the same branch, cannot be combined, similarly they cannot be combined in the case of such meditations in different branches. — 7.
[Go top]
Saṃjñātaḥ: on account of the name (being same); Cet: if; Tat: that; Uktam: has already been answered; Asti: is, exists; Tu: but; Tat: that; Api: even, also.🔗 If it be said that the Vidyā is the same because the name (Udgītha-Vidyā) is the same, it has already been stated (that it cannot be so). Besides there can be one name (for different Vidyās). But (in the absence of a reason for understanding, that the Vidyās are different) when the name is the same, the Vidyās may be one and the same. — 3.3.8. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta), that it is logical that the name being the same the Cognitions are one and the same, and that here the name ‘Udgītha-Vidyā’ occurs in both places, it is not reasonably sustainable. It has been stated in the preceding Sūtra, thus — “The Vidyās are not the same everywhere. It is like (the meditation on) the greater than the great” (Bra. Su. III. iii. 7). That alone (viz. what we the Vedāntins say) is more logical and conforms to the letter of the Scriptures, and that the fact that the name is identical, is (a matter which is) outside the scope of the Scriptures, and the name is used in a secondary sense only, by ordinary men in ordinary parlance, in as much as the mere word ‘Udgīṭha’ is used. Besides, this identity of name viz. ‘Udgītha-Vidyā’ does also exist, even in the case of meditations (on Brahman) as the ‘most excellent’, which are well-known to be different. It is similarly seen, that religious acts such as Agni-hotra and Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa mentioned in the book named Kāṭhaka (of the Kāṭhakas), are mentioned by the same name ‘Kāṭhaka’, even though they are well-known to be different, and even so can it be here also. Where there is no such reason for considering the Vidyās to be different, as for instance in the case of the Saṃvarga-Vidyā etc., identity of the Vidyās (Cognitions) may well occur, because of the identity of names. — 8.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Vyāpteḥ: because (OM) extends (over the whole of the Vedas); Ca: and; Samañjasam: is appropriate, consistent, justifiable.🔗 But, because (the word ‘Om’) is coextensive (with the Vedas), it is perfectly congruous. — 3.3.9. Inasmuch as the Scriptures speak of the words ‘Om’ and Udgīṭha as having the same case-endings, in the passage “(He) should meditate on ‘Om’ (as if) it is ‘Udgīṭha’” (ChanU.1.1.1), and as the various views, viz. that the relation between the two is either of superimposition (Adhyāsa) or ablation (Apavāda), or unity (Ekatva), or of each of them qualifying the other (Viśeṣaṇa), appear to suggest themselves as possible, a consideration arises as to which of these views is the logical one. Adhyāsa (super-imposition) indeed is there, where, as between two entities, while the knowledge about one entity (out of the two), qua that entity, still subsists, the notion of its being another entity is superimposed upon it. The knowledge that the entity, on which the notion of the other entity is super-imposed, is that self-same entity, continues to persist in spite of the fact, that the notion of another entity is super-imposed on it. Just as for instance here, even when the notion of Brahman is superimposed on a name (such as ‘Om’), the knowledge, that the name is a name, does still persist, and is not removed by the notion of Brahman. Or else, just as when an iconic representation (Pratimā) is superimposed with the notion of its being Viṣṇu (incarnate) etc. Similarly here, (it could be understood) that either the notion of ‘Udgīṭha’ is superimposed on the word ‘Om’ or the notion of the name ‘Om’ is superimposed on the word Udgīṭha. Ablation (Apavāda) occurs, where, with regard to an entity, a false notion (of its being some other entity) having already been definitely and successfully super-imposed on it, a correct knowledge of it (that it is the self-same entity), which arises later on, negatives (i.e. ablates) the earlier false notion superimposed on it. Just as, for instance, a notion (entertained by a man) that the aggregate of the body and sense-organs is the Self, disappears (i.e. it is ablated) when the correct knowledge that ‘the Self’ is (in fact) ‘the Self’ (and the body and sense-organs are not the Self) supervenes at some subsequent later stage, by the Scriptural knowledge “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7), or, as for instance, when the confused notion about ‘a direction’ (of the points of a compass), disappears after the correct knowledge about it (dawns on a person). Similarly, here also, the notion that the Udgīṭha’ is ‘Om’ is repelled by the knowledge that it is (in fact) ‘Om’, and the notion that ‘Om’ is ‘Udgīṭha’ is repelled by the knowledge that it is (in fact) the ‘Udgīṭha’. Unity (Ekatva) is, where the words ‘Om’ and ‘Udgīṭha’ do not happen to exceed in extent the meaning of each other, (i.e. that they are co-extensive in their denotation and connotation and mean the same thing). Just as for instance when it is said that a person is either ‘a twice-born’ or a Brāhmaṇa or a ‘God on earth’, (which means one and the same thing). The relation is that of a Viśeṣaṇa i.e. an adjective (to a substantive), when, an occasion to use the word ‘Om’ which coincides with the extent of all the Scriptures (because all Vedas begin with ‘Om’), arises, it is made to culminate in meaning the particular operation, viz. ‘singing’ (Audgātra) (i.e. what the Udgātṛ-Ṛtvij does), just as when some one says — ‘Bring the lotus which is blue’ (where ‘blue’ qualifies ‘the lotus’). Similarly here also, in the passage — “(He) should meditate on ‘Om’ which is of the form of the ‘Udgīṭha’ Thus, when this Sāmānādhikaraṇya passage (i.e. one in which there is a common case-ending) is considered, these various views appear to be possible, and in the absence of any definite determining factor, when the conclusion (of the opponent) is, that it is inconclusive, it is said (by the Sūtra-kāra) — “But because (the word ‘Om’) is co-extensive (with the Vedas), it is perfectly congruous”. The word ‘also’ (Ca) which here stands in the place of the word ‘but’ (Tu), has the effect or result (Prayojana) of rejecting three views. That means that three views (out of the four mentioned above), in as much as they contain a flaw, are rejected, and only the view that ‘one word serves as an adjective qualifying the other’, being flawless, is accepted. With regard to the view of superimposition (Adhyāsa), the notion (of the entity) which is superimposed on another entity, will make the word which stands for the superimposed entity, understood in a secondary (Lakṣaṇā) sense, and some fruit of it will have to be imagined. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that the Scriptural passage “(He) verily becomes the conferor of the thing desired” (ChanU.1.1.7) etc. shows the necessary fruit, (we reply) — No, because that fruit is the result of something else. It is by no means the fruit of the superimposition of the Udgītha (on ‘Om’), but of the sentiment about ‘Om’ being the gratifier of the desire (which is entertained with respect to the word ‘Om’). In the case of ‘ablation’ (Apavāda) also there is a corresponding absence of any fruit (resulting from such ablation). If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that the refutation of the false-knowledge, is such fruit, (we reply) — No, inasmuch as it is not understood to be helpful in any way towards a man’s chief aim. At no time does the knowledge of Oṅ-kāra qua Oṅ-kāra, or the knowledge of Udgītha qua Udgītha, ever disappear. Moreover this passage is not meant to expound the true nature of an entity, but it is intended to be by way of an injunction for meditation. Neither does the view about unity (Ekatva) fit in properly, as in that case, the uttering of two words ‘Om’ and Udgītha (which in the case of Ekatva (Unity) mean the same entity), would be superfluous, because only one word could very well express the desired meaning. It is not known that the word Udgītha is a word used for the word which is expressed by the letter ‘Om’ which is related to the subject of a Hotṛ (i.e. of the Ṛg-Veda) or an Adhvaryu (of the Yajur-Veda). Nor is the word ‘Om’ ever used metaphorically for the whole of the second part of the Sāman-Veda known as the ‘Udgītha’, so that the two words can be synonymous i.e. coextensive in meaning. Therefore, the only remaining alternative, viz. the view that one of the two words (‘Om’ and ‘Udgītha’)' acts as an adjective of the other and (qualifies its meaning) is accepted, because the word ‘Om’ is common to all the Vedas. In order that the letter ‘Om’ which is common to all the Vedas should not happen to be applicable here in that sense, it is here qualified by the word ‘Udgītha’, otherwise, 'how else indeed can the word ‘Om’ be understood to mean a part of Udgītha? (The opponent of Vedānta here retorts) — But even so far as this view is concerned also, secondary meaning would still be there (as the word ‘Om’ has to be understood to mean a part of Udgītha). (We reply) — What you say is correct of course, but even in the case of a secondary meaning, it may either be proximate or distant. In the case of a superimposition, the notion of one entity is superimposed on another and so the secondary meaning is ‘distant’, while in the case of a relationship in which one entity qualifies another, inasmuch as a word meaning the whole entity (Avayavī) is given the meaning of only a part of it (Avayava), the secondary meaning is ‘proximate’. A word which expresses an aggregate of things is also seen to be used for a part of that aggregate, as for instance in the case of cloth or a city. Hence the meaning is that because the words ‘Udgītha’ and ‘Om’ are co-extensive, the word ‘Udgītha’ is here used as an adjective, qualifying the word ‘Om’, which, being thus perfectly congruous, is flawless. — 9.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Sarva-abhedāt: on account of non-difference everywhere; Anyatra: in the other places; Ime: these (qualities are to be inserted).🔗 As there is no difference (in the Prāṇa-Vidyās in different places) (the attributes in one Vidyā are) available elsewhere. — 3.3.10. In the dialogue of the Prāṇas of the Vājis i.e. the Vāja-saneyins, and the Chando-gas, it has been stated that the Prāṇa, which is endowed with the attribute of possessing a superior status etc., is the one to be meditated upon, and Vāk (Speech) etc. are also stated therein as being endowed with the attributes of ‘richness of language’ (Vasiṣṭhatva) etc., and the same qualities of theirs are referred back (by Vāk etc.) as really belonging to Prāṇa, thus — “What in me consists as being endowed with the attribute of ‘Vasiṣṭhatva’, is indeed your (i.e. Prāṇa’s) Vasiṣṭhatva” (BrhU.6.1.14). In the case of the dialogues of Prāṇa of the followers of some other branches such as Kauṣītaki etc., in the passages such as “Now for the determination of the quality of being the Highest” and “These deities who discussed amongst themselves as to who amongst them was the best” (Kaush. 2.9), the superior status of Prāṇa has been stated, but not these attributes of Vasiṣṭhatva etc. So, here the doubt is whether the qualities of Vasiṣṭhatva etc., which are mentioned as being present in one place, are to be understood to be present in other places also. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they are not to be understood to be so present. Whence is it so? Because of the use of the term ‘in this way’ (Evam) in the Scriptures (“Who, in this way, knows the greatness of Prāṇa”). In different places, by the term ‘in this way’ in passages such as “Now, whosoever understands, in this way, by knowing that such superior status abides in the Prāṇa”, the entity to be known is indicated. Moreover the term ‘in this way’ which goes with what is proximate (to it) is not able to intimate the set of attributes of this kind mentioned in other branches (i.e. in Vāja-saneyi and Chāndogya branches). Therefore, the qualities mentioned in each chapter fulfil their purpose there only, i.e. where they occur, and leave no further expectations (of their being applicable elsewhere). This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the reply is — These attributes, viz. richness of language (Vasiṣṭhatva) etc., mentioned in some particular place only, are of course present in other places also (viz. Prāṇa-Vidyās in other places). Whence is it so? Because there is absence of any difference between them (i.e. between all Prāṇa-Vidyās). It is recognized, that because of the similarity of the dialogue, there is the same Prāṇa-Vidyā everywhere. And when there is thus no such difference between the Vidyās, how ever can the attributes mentioned in one place, fail to be present in other places as well? But (says the opponent of Vedānta) we have stated already that the term ‘in this way’, wherever it occurs, intimates separately in each place, each particular set of attributes (mentioned there). To which we reply — Even though the term ‘in this way’ in Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa does not intimate the set of attributes occurring in the Vāja-saneyi Brāhmaṇa, because of want of proximity, still, inasmuch as the Prāṇa-Vidyā is the same, the same set of attributes is of course intimated by the term ‘in this way' in the Vāja-saneyi Brāhmaṇa, and thus the set of attributes (Guṇas), even though restricted to the n on-different Vidyā of some other branch, is not distinguishable from the set of qualities in one’s own branch. Neither is there, even if it be considered to be so, any abandonment of what the Scriptures have stated, nor the assumption of anything not so stated. The attributes mentioned in one branch are of course supposed to be stated in the other, inasmuch as there is absence of any difference in that to which these attributes appertain (viz. the Prāṇa-Vidyā). Deva-datta, who is well-known in his own country, for the attributes of prowess etc., does not cease to have these attributes, merely because he goes to a foreign country and the people there do not have the advantage of having been made aware of these attributes (of his). Just as even there, when they get better acquainted, they do get to know these attributes of Deva-datta, similarly, the attributes in one branch which are the object of meditation there, are present in a different branch also. Therefore, the conclusion is, that attributes which appertain to one and the same principal entity, even when they are mentioned in one place only, are to be understood as applicable to such principal entity; when it occurs elsewhere also. — 10.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Ānanda-ādayaḥ: Bliss and other attributes; Pradhānasya: of the Principal, i.e., the Supreme Self or Brahman.🔗 Attributes (Guṇas) such as bliss etc., which appertain to the chief entity (i.e. Brahman, are to be combined). — 3.3.11. The Scriptures in one place or the other in passages which aim at propounding the nature of Brahman, speak of Brahman here and there as possessing some out of such types of attributes, as of bliss, of being knowledge incarnate, of being all-pervading and of being the Self of all etc. With regard to these, there is a doubt, as to whether, such attributes of Brahman as of bliss etc., wherever they are spoken of by the Scriptures, are to be understood as being only as many as are mentioned in any such particular place, or whether, all of them collectively are to be understood to be available everywhere. Now, the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) being, that they should be understood separately to be only as many as are spoken of in any particular place, it is said (by the Vedāntin) — All the attributes of Brahman i.e. the Chief entity, such as bliss etc., should be understood to belong to it everywhere. Whence is it so? Precisely because of non-difference. Brahman, the entity to which these attributes belong, is one and the same Chief entity everywhere, and it does not differ. Therefore all the attributes of Brahman, are present everywhere collectively, on the strength of the illustration quoted in the previous Adhikaraṇa, viz. about the prowess etc. of Deva-datta. — 11.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if this is so, then all such attributes of Brahman, as its ‘having Joy as its caput’ etc., would also be available everywhere, for even so, the Scriptures in the Taittīriyaka Upaniṣad, after introducing the Self as being of the structure of Joy, mention thus — “Of him, satisfaction is the right wing (Pakṣa), extreme satisfaction is the left wing (Pakṣa), bliss is the Self, and Brahman is the tail, the support” (TaitU.2.5). The reply is: —Priya-śirastva-ādi: qualities like joy being His head, etc.; A-prāptiḥ: are not to be taken everywhere; Upacaya-apacayau: increase and decrease; Hi: be cause; Bhede: (are possible) in difference. (Upacaya: increase; Apacaya: decrease.)🔗 The attributes such as ‘having Joy as the caput’ etc. are not available (everywhere). Augmentation and depletion pertain to only where there is ‘Bheda’ i.e. ‘Dvaita’ (a notion of difference). — 3.3.12. Attributes such as ‘It has Joy as its caput’ etc., mentioned in the Taittīriyaka Upaniṣad, are not available everywhere, inasmuch as, Joy, satisfaction, extreme satisfaction, Bliss etc. are understood to derive augmentation or suffer depletion, relatively with each other, and with reference to the other experiencers. Augmentation and depletion become possible only in the presence of difference (i.e. a sense of duality, understood to exist as between the Highest Self and other Jīva-Selfs), while Brahman as such, is indeed without any duality, according to the Scriptural passages — “One only without a second” (ChanU.6.2.1) etc. Besides, instruction has already been given by us in Brahma-Sūtra I.i.12, that the attributes of ‘having Joy as the caput’ etc. are in fact not the attributes of the Chief entity, Brahman, but of the sheaths (i.e. Kośas in which it happens to be enveloped during phenomenal existence), and besides they are imagined to be so, merely to serve as the means of bringing the Highest Brahman to the mind (of the person who contemplates), and not with a view that they should actually be looked upon as appertaining to the object of meditation, and hence there is thus a greater reason why ‘having Joy as the caput’ etc. are not available everywhere. When the Ācārya (the Sūtra-kāra) predicates characteristics such as ‘Joy is the caput’ to be the attributes of Brahman (when they are not so in fact) and says that they are not available everywhere, he is merely being logical, and the same rule of logic is to be applied to such other characteristics as are mentioned for the purpose of meditation, viz. ‘Samyad-vāma’ (i.e. one having the attribute of being that to which all blessings go), and ‘Satya-Kāma’ (i.e. one having the attribute of having all true desires) etc. When that which is to be meditated upon, viz. Brahman, is one only, and when the difference in the introductory passages argues a difference in the modes of meditation, the characteristics in each different place are not mutually available. Just as two maids simultaneously wait upon one and the same king, one with the royal umbrella, and the other with the fly-whisk, and just as in this case, though the person to be served is one only, there is difference in the mode of service and each such mode is confined to its own proper sphere, even so it is here also. It is in the case of qualified Brahman alone, when duality has practical application, that augmentation and depletion of the attributes becomes reasonably sustainable, and not in the case of unqualified Brahman. Hence attributes such as ‘one whose desires are true’ etc., which are mentioned by the Scriptures in one particular place, do not become available everywhere. — 12.
[Go top]
Itare: other attributes; Tu: but; Artha-sāmānyāt: because of common purport, on account of identity of purport. (Artha: result, object, purport; Sāmānyāt: on account of the equality or sameness.)🔗 But the other (attributes) of Brahman are available everywhere, because the entity (Brahman) is the common purport everywhere. — 3.3.13. Attributes such as ‘Bliss’ etc. spoken of by the Scriptures for the purpose of propounding the nature of Brahman are all available everywhere, in as much as Brahman, the entity of which they are the attributes, and the entity which is to be propounded, is one and the same, and that the attainment of the knowledge of it (i.e. Brahman) is their only fruit, is the difference between them and the other attributes. — 13.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Ādhyānāya: for the sake of meditation; Prayojana-abhāvāt: as there is no use, as there is no other necessity. (Prayojana: of any other purpose; A-bhāvāt: on account of the absence.)🔗 What is mentioned in the passage in Kaṭhopaniṣad (at 1.3.10) is for the purpose of meditation (on the Puruṣa) because of the absence of any fruit (in the case of others). — 3.3.14. The Kāṭhaka, beginning with “Sense-objects transcend the sense-organs, the mind transcends the sense-objects, and intelligence transcends the mind” (KathU.1.3.10), says further — “There is nothing transcending the Puruṣa, that is the terminus ad quern (Kāṣṭhā), the highest shelter or asylum (Parā Gatiḥ)” (KathU.1.3.11). The doubt that arises here, is, whether it is only propounded here that the Puruṣa alone transcends everything else, or whether all these sense-objects etc., do each of them transcend the entity just preceding it in the series. We think (says the opponent of Vedānta) that it is being propounded here, that each succeeding entity in the series transcends the one preceding it. For the Scriptures declare it in that way, thus — ‘This transcends this’, ‘This transcends this’. But (says the Vedāntin), were these entities i.e. sense-objects etc. intended to be propounded as each one of them transcending the one preceding it, it would cause a split in the sentence. (The opponent of Vedānta replies) — This is no fault. It would be reasonably sustainable to understand that there are so many separate sentences. These so many separate sentences may be able to propound as to how so many entities such as sense-objects etc. are each endowed with the quality of transcending (that which is stated earlier) and hence it is propounded, the each one amongst these (several entities) transcends the one that precedes it. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) we say — It is logical to understand that, that the Puruṣa alone transcends all these, is what is propounded and not that each one of these entities transcends the one that precedes it. Whence is it so? Because there is absence of any fruit. It is neither seen nor is it stated by the Scriptures, that as amongst these other entities (excluding the Puruṣa), there is any fruit of the knowledge that each one of these transcends the one preceding it. It is only as regards the Puruṣa, understood as transcending the sense-organs etc., and as transcending this entire set of evils, that a fruit described as ‘the attainment of Mokṣa i.e. Final Release’ is discernible. So say the Scriptures also, thus — “Having reached Him a man is freed from the jaws of death” (KathU.1.3.15). Besides by the term Terminus ad quem which denies that there is anything beyond it, the Scriptures by evincing all due respect to the Puruṣa indicate that the statement about this stream of earlier and later entities in the series, is meant only for the purpose of comprehending Him (i.e. the Puruṣa), thus — “(This is) for the purpose of meditation”, which means for the purpose of the realization of the truth, by prior meditation. It is precisely for this realization that meditation is advised, and not for showing that meditation is the principal thing i.e. an end in itself. — 14.
[Go top]
Ātma-śabdāt: on account of the word ‘Ātmā’; Ca: and.🔗 Also, because of the word ‘Self (Ātmā), (that the series is mentioned for the sake of the Puruṣa). — 3.3.15. This is again why this enumeration of the stream of the sense-organs etc., is for the purpose of the realization of the Puruṣa. Besides, in the Scriptural passage “This Self hidden in all beings, does not manifest itself. It is however perceived by those possessed of a subtle intellect, by their penetrating intelligence” (KathU.1.3.12), the Puruṣa that is relevant (to the topic) is described as being ‘the Self’ (Ātmā). Hence it is understood that it is meant to be stated, as to how the rest (i.e. sense-organs etc.) are not the ‘Self’. The Scriptures indicate how it (i.e. the Self) is difficult of comprehension and is capable of being understood only by those whose understanding is refined. It is for the realization of that ‘Self’ that the passage “The wise man should suppress speech (and speech here is only illustrative and includes all sense-organs) by surrendering it into the mind etc.” (KathU.1.3.13), have prescribed meditation (on the Self). This has already been explained in Bra. Su. I. iv. 1 — “That the one, which is inferred (i.e. Pradhāna), as said by some etc.”. In this manner, it is seen how in various ways the main purport of the Scriptures is the Puruṣa and nothing else. Besides, having stated that “He arrives at his journey’s end which is the Highest seat of Viṣṇu” (KathU.1.3.9), when further there is this curiosity as to what exactly is that Highest seat of Viṣṇu, which is at the end of the journey, it is finally understood, from this enumeration of sense-organs etc., that all this anxious effort is for the purpose of the realization of this Highest seat (of Viṣṇu). — 15.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Ātma-gṛhītiḥ: the Supreme Self is meant; Itaravat: as in other texts (dealing with creation); Uttarāt: because of the subsequent qualification.🔗 The (Highest) Self is to he understood here also, as it is understood elsewhere, because of what follows. — 3.3.16. It is stated in the Aitareyaka, thus: — “In the beginning indeed, this was but the Self alone. Nothing else was then vibrating (with life). He thought, may I create the worlds.” (AitU.1.1). “He created the worlds — the heaven (Ambhas), the universe (Marīci), the mortal world (Mara), the waters (Āpaḥ i.e. Pātāla or the nether world)” (AitU.1.1.02) etc. Now with regard to this a doubt arises, as to whether, here, by the word ‘Self’ the ‘Highest Self’ is meant to be spoken of or some other entity. What then is your (i.e. of the opponent of Vedānta) conclusion? It is, that the ‘Highest Lord’ cannot be meant by the word ‘the Self’ here. Whence is it so? Because of what is seen to be the connected sequence of the sentences. But (says the Vedāntin) the connected sequence of the sentences appears very much to relate to the Highest Self, inasmuch as it is understood that before the genesis, the Self alone was, and because of the statement that the activity of creation (by the Self) was preceded by thought. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — No, because the statement is about the creation of the worlds. If it were to be accepted that the Highest Lord was the creator, then the creation of the elements should have been stated to be the first creation but here the creation of the worlds is stated to be the first. The worlds are but the special combinations of the elements. The Scriptures speak of the heaven (Ambhas) etc. as being the worlds, thus — “This, is Ambhas which is beyond the heavenly world (Diva)” (AitU.1.1.02). It is understood both from the Scriptures and the Smṛtis, that the creation of the worlds was accomplished by some other Lord (Brahma-deva), dependent upon i.e. under the supervision of the ‘Highest Lord’. So says the Scriptural passage — “The Self in the form of the Puruṣa (i.e. Brahma-deva) being one only was alone in the beginning” (BrhU.1.4.1). Smṛti also says thus — “He is the first embodied one and he is called the Puruṣa. He the Brahman (Prajā-pati) was the first creator of all beings, that came into existence.” The Aitareya also in an earlier chapter speaks of this variety of creation as brought about by Prajā-pati, thus — “Now about the creation of semen (Retas). Gods are but the (product of) the semen of Prajā-pati.” It is also seen that the word ‘Self’ is used for him (i.e. the Prajā-pati) thus — “The Self alone, in the form of the Puruṣa, was, in the beginning” (BrhU.1.4.1). It is reasonably sustainable, to understand this — “being one only” — as being so, with reference to his own creation. The act of ‘thinking’ also is reasonably sustainable as being his, because of his being understood to be sentient. Besides, a great deal of special activity, such as — “He brought them a cow, he brought them a horse, he brought them a man, they said etc.”, which is well-known in the case of particular phenomenal embodied individual Selfs, can be understood here, and hence some such particular phenomenal Self such as Brahma-deva may very well be meant here. To this, we reply — ‘It is the Highest Self that is understood here, as is understood elsewhere also.’ Just as in the case of other Scriptural accounts of creation, such as “from the Self the Ākāśa came into being” (TaitU.2.1.1), we understand that the universal Self is meant by the term ‘Self’, or just as in the case of the ordinary use of the word ‘Ātmā’, it is the universal Self that is understood, so can it well be, here also. Where in cases in which along with “The Self alone was all this in the beginning” (BrhU.1.4.1) a qualification ‘in the form of ‘Puruṣa’ etc. is stated by the Scriptures, the particular Self may be understood. Here, however, we find that later on a particularized mention — such as “He thought he would create the worlds”, “He created these worlds” — is stated, which is favourable to the understanding of the Highest Self only. Therefore, it is but logical that it (i.e. the Highest Self) alone should be understood here. — 16.
[Go top]
Anvayāt: because of connection, because of the context; Iti: this, so; Cet: if; Syāt: it might be so; Avadhāraṇāt: on account of the definite statement.🔗 If it be said (that the Highest Self is not to be understood), by reason of the sequence (of the passages, not indicating that way), we reply — It can very well be so, because it is ascertained (to be so). — 3.3.17. What again is said (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz., that looking at the connected sequence of the sentences, the Highest Self is not to be understood, is now to be refuted. With regard to that it is said — It can well be so, because there is a determination to that effect. That the Highest Self should be understood to be meant, can be reasonably sustainable. Whence is it so? Because of such determination. It is only if the Highest Self is understood (here), that the determination, that the Self alone was the one that existed before the genesis, can be said to be plausible, otherwise it would be considered to be unplausible. I can very well construe, that the statement about the creation of the worlds comes but after the creation of the elements well-known to have been mentioned in other Scriptural passages. Just as, for instance, it was construed (by me) that the Scriptural statement “It created the Tejas” comes after the creation of the Ākāśa and the Vāyu as mentioned in other Scriptural passages, even so can it be construed here. When the subject is common, any special particular about such subject, mentioned in one Scriptural passage, has to be combined with the same subject mentioned in the other Scriptural passages. Besides, even this special kind of activity, such as “He brought a cow (for the deity) etc.” (mentioned in connection with the Self here), has also to be understood in consonance with that particular entity ascertained as intended to be mentioned here, because it cannot be maintained that all this story is intended to be told here by the Scriptures, inasmuch as there is absence of any aim (of man being served) in understanding it that way. That, Brahman is the Self (of all), is what is intended to be spoken of here. For instance, after having taught about the creation of the worlds such as heaven etc., as also the creation of the guardians of the worlds such as ‘Agni’ etc., and thereafter, having also given instructions about the creation of the sense-organs, as well as the abode of such sense-organs viz. the body, the Scriptures, after mentioning how that same creator wondering to himself, thus — “How ever can this exist without me?” (AitU.1.3.11), further say that he himself entered this body, thus — “He prised open the sutures (of the head) and entered the body through that opening” (AitU.1.3.12). Again the Scriptures, after having mentioned, as to how (the creator) after having pondered over the activities of the sense-organs, thus — “If speech has spoken, if Prāṇa (Vital Breath) has breathed, (without my help)” (AitU.1.3.11), and having asked himself, thus — “What then am I”? (AitU.1.3.11), state as follows — “Then he saw himself as the Puruṣa, and as Brahman sprawling fully stretched and pervading all over” (AitU.1.3.13), and thus finally arrive at the determination, that it is Brahman, the Self of all. Similarly afterwards, the Scriptures, after enumerating all the different entities, and also the elements, thus — “He is (the Lower) Brahman, He is Indra” (AitU.3.1.3), go on further to determine that Brahman is the Self of all, thus — “All that, is led or guided by intelligence (i.e. Prajñā), all is firmly ensconced in intelligence, this world is led by intelligence, it is supported by intelligence, and that intelligence is Brahman” (AitU.3.1.3). Therefore, that the Highest Self should be understood (to be meant here) is unexceptionable. Another construction (of Sūtras 16 and 17) is as follows: The Scriptures in the Vāja-saneyaka, beginning with the word ‘the Self’, thus — “What is this Self? He is the Puruṣa, that has knowledge as his structure, as amongst the Prāṇas; who is like a shining light inside the Hṛdaya” (BrhU.4.3.7), proceed to propound the same, to be free from all attachments, and to determine that it is the Brahma-Self. They also conclude thus — “He is that great unborn Self, Brahman, Sans-Senility i.e. unaging, Sans-Death, Sans-Destruction, Sans-Fear” (BrhU.4.4.25). The Chāndogya, on the other hand, begins without any reference to the word ‘the Self’, thus — “O Mild one, Sat (being) alone was in the beginning, one without a second” (ChanU.6.2.1), and in the concluding portion (Udarke) teaches its complete identity with the Self, thus — “That is the Self, that thou art (Oh Śveta-ketu)” (ChanU.6.8.7). Now with regard to these statements, a doubt arises thus — Do these Scriptural statements mean one and the same thing or do they not? The conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) is that they do not mean one and the same thing because the Scriptural statements are different. When there is a difference in the structure of the Scriptural statements, it is not logical to understand that they mean one and the same entity, because the understanding of the meaning depends upon the Scriptural statement. It is understood, that because the Vāja-saneyaka begins with the word ‘the Self’ it teaches the essence of the Self itself (i.e. Brahman), while in the Chāndogya which begins in a different way, the teaching is about a different entity. But (says the Vedāntin) we have said that in the case of the Chando-gas also, the conclusion is that the teaching is about the identity of the Self. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — It is true you have said so, but as the conclusion ought to correspond with the introductory statement, it only means, that there, merely the fanciful conception of its identity with the Self, is taught. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the reply is: — Even in the case of the Chando-gas, in the passage “Oh Mild one, Sat (being) alone was in the beginning” (ChanU.6.2.1), it is ‘the Self’ that should be understood, even as, in the case of the Vāja-saneyins, in the passage “What is the Self” etc. (BrhU.4.3.7), it is the Self that is understood. Whence is it so? Because of what follows later on, viz. the teaching about its (i.e. Sat’s) identity with the Self (Sūtra 17). If we the Vedāntins are asked, as to what the refutation of the statement of the opponent of Vedānta — viz. “Because of the connected sequence of the introductory passage and the absence of the mention of the word ‘the Self’ (in the Chāndogya) ‘the Self’ cannot be understood there” — is, we say that ‘the Self’ may well be understood here, because there is such determination (later on). For instance, having stated, that by the knowledge of one, the knowledge of everything else supervenes, in the Scriptural passage “By (the knowledge of) which, that which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not understood becomes understood; that which is not realized becomes realized” (ChanU.6.1.1), the Scriptures in order to establish that, say (further) — “Sat (Being) alone”; — which is possible, only if ‘the Self’ is understood to be meant. Otherwise the Chief Highest Self, not having been realized, the knowledge of everything cannot (be said to) supervene. Besides, the determination, that before creation, one (entity) alone (existed), the reference to the Jīva-Self by the word ‘the Self’, the statement that in the condition of deep sleep it i.e. the Jīva-Self attains its own nature (i.e. the nature of the Self), the frequently reiterated determination “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7) preceded always by a question relating to it, can be possible, only if by all this, it is intended to be propounded that the Sat is identical with the Self; and can never be possible, if only a fanciful conception of such an identity of the Sat with the Self, is meant here. It is not logical to maintain here, that the conclusion must necessarily always correspond with the introductory passage, because the introductory passage here does not refer either to the Self or not-Self, and such an ordinary introductory passage is not contradicted by a special particular mention in the complementary portion, because, it is an ordinary statement (such as that of the mere word ‘Sat’) that creates curiosity about a special particular (entity). The meaning of the word ‘Sat’ (Being) cannot, if properly considered, be other than the principal Self, because, that all the entities other than this Self are unreal, is reasonably sustainable, as has been shown already by words such as ‘Ārambhaṇa’ (making current) etc. Similarly, a difference in Scriptural statements by itself does not necessarily mean a difference in their meaning. It is to be seen that in sentences such as (Āhara Pātram); ‘Bring the pot’ and (Pātram Āhara) ‘the pot, bring (it)’, even though the meaning is the same, there is difference in the construction of the sentences. Therefore, it is thus established that in sentences of this kind, even in spite of the difference in the manner of propounding, there is nondifference in the entity propounded. — 17.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Kārya-ākhyānāt: on account of being a statement of an act (already enjoined by the Smṛti); A-pūrvam: which has not been so enjoined elsewhere.🔗 On account of there being merely a reference to an act of Ācamana (in the form of an injunction which is not possible here) as something which is ‘Apūrva’ (i.e. something which is not stated anywhere before), merely a resolution to provide a garment for Prāṇa is enjoined. — 3.3.18. Both the Chando-gas as well as the Vāja-saneyins recite in their ‘Dialogue of the Prāṇa’ that the food of all creatures right down to the dog etc., is the food of the Prāṇa, and they also mention that Āpaḥ (water) is its garment (i.e. of the Prāṇa). After that the Chando-gas recite thus — “Verily therefore both before and after partaking of food, they wrap water round the Prāṇa as a garment” (ChanU.5.2.2). Vāja-saneyins, on the other hand, recite thus — “Brāhmaṇas learned in Vedas perform Ācamana (sipping water from the palm of the hand, three times, repeating salutations to Keśhava, Nārāyaṇa and Mādhava) while (commencing the) partaking of food and also after the partaking of it, and they consider that they are thus covering the nakedness of Prāṇa” (BrhU.6.1.14), “Therefore, one who knows it (to be so) should perform Ācamana both while (commencing the) partaking of food and also afterwards, and should consider that he is thus covering the nakedness of Prāṇa”. And, as thus both the Ācamana and the imagining of the covering of the nakedness are understood (in that passage), it is being considered, whether both these are enjoined here, or only one of the two, viz. either an Ācamana, or the imagining of the covering of the Prāṇa’s nakedness (with the Ācamana water). What then is your (i.e. of the opponent of Vedānta) conclusion? (It is) that both are enjoined. Whence is it so? Because both are understood (here). Because, as both have not ever been stated before, and as both are thus (of the nature of) quite a new departure (Apūrva), both deserve to have been so enjoined. Or rather (I should think), it is only the Ācamana that is enjoined, because the injunctive case determination is clearly (to be seen) in its case, thus — “Therefore, one who knows it to be so, should perform Ācamana both while commencing and after the partaking of food, and this reference to the covering of nakedness (of Prāṇa) is merely for its glorification (i.e. of the Ācamana)”. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — That an Ācamana is enjoined here, is not reasonably sustainable, because there is here only a reference to an act of Ācamana as is already known before (from the Smṛtis). This Ācamana which is already established by the Smṛtis, as an act to be performed for the purpose of purification, is but merely referred to here. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) — This Scriptural passage may well be the source of that Smṛti? (We reply) — No, because the subject matter (of both) is different. This Smṛti which deals with only a common matter, makes us understand, that an Ācamana which is connected with every man, is for the purpose of purification. The Scriptural passage occurring in the Prāṇa-Vidyā, even if it at all enjoins an Ācamana, may at best do so only in connection with that subject (i.e. Prāṇa-Vidyā). We cannot imagine, that Scriptural and Smṛti passages referring to different subjects, have a relation inter se i.e. between themselves, as that of a source, with something which has that as its source, respectively. It is not possible to accept that a Scriptural passage which has a connection with the Prāṇa-Vidyā would enjoin an Ācamana, as something which is (of the nature of) quite a new departure (an Apūrva) because, an already known Ācamana connected with every man, is well recognizable here. Hence there is no injunction as to both (i.e. the Ācamana and the use of water as a garment of Prāṇa), because assuming both these as being enjoined, there would occur (the fault of) the splitting up of a sentence. Therefore after referring to the Ācamana which has to be performed while partaking of food and afterwards also, as understood already (from the Smṛtis), the Scriptures, by the passage “They consider that they have thus covered the nakedness of the Prāṇa” (BrhU.6.1.14), enjoin a new fanciful conception about covering the nakedness of the Prāṇa, by means of the Ācamana water, in connection with the Prāṇa-Vidyā, as quite (in the nature of) a new departure (Apūrva). It would not be logical to understand this statement about covering the nakedness of Prāṇa, as being in glorification of the Ācamana, inasmuch as, while an Ācamana is not enjoined here, it is clearly discernible, that an injunction as to the fanciful conception of covering the nakedness of Prāṇa, is so enjoined. This being so, the Ācamana cannot be understood to be meant both for the purpose of purification, as well as for serving as a garment (for the Prāṇa), as both are distinctly separate actions. It is thus flawless, because, an Ācamana indeed is but one act, understood as meant for the purification of a man, while to imagine that water used for it serves as a garment in which the Prāṇa is to be clothed, is indeed an altogether different act. Besides, it would not be possible to say, that by the passage “All that is food (for creatures) right down to a horse, a worm, and insects and butterflies, is your food” (BrhU.6.1.14) an injunction is given that food of all sorts should be eaten, inasmuch as there is no Scriptural passage (to that effect), and also as it is not possible. But of course there is an injunction to look upon everything as the food of the Prāṇa, and along with it, in the passage “Āpaḥ (water) is the garment”, while no injunction to perform an Ācamana is given, it stands to reason, that it is enjoined, that the well-known Ācamana water should be looked upon as clothing (for the Prāṇa). One cannot possibly both eat the cake and have it too, i.e. literally, only a half of a murder is not possible (that is one cannot hold that the former sentence does not give an injunction, but the latter does). Besides as the present tense (Vartamānāpadeśa) is used here, viz. ‘They perform an Ācamana’, this Scriptural passage is not capable of expressing an injunction. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the Scriptural words “They consider (that they have thus covered the nakedness of Prāṇa)” also indicate that there is the same present tense. (We reply) — What you say is right of course, but when one (of these two acts) has necessarily to be an object of an injunction, and as the ‘act of clothing’ is referred to, it has been propounded (by us) that the imagining of water as the garment (of Prāṇa), which is never mentioned anywhere before (being an Apūrva i.e. in the nature of quite a new departure), is here enjoined, and not an Ācamana, as it is the same as has been spoken of before. With regard to the statement made (by the opponent of Vedānta), that there is a clear imperative form with respect to an Ācamana, (we say) that it has been answered (by the argument) that the Ācamana is something which has already been referred to before (by the Smṛtis). Hence it is, that, inasmuch as an Ācamana is not an act specially enjoined, the Kāṇvas conclude their recital with “They consider that the nakedness of Prāṇa is thus covered (by the Ācamana water serving as a garment)” only, and do not recite in addition — “Therefore one who knows it to be so etc.”. Therefore even in the recension of the Mādhyaṃ-dinas also, it should be understood, that after merely making a reference to Ācamana, what is enjoined, is the fanciful conception, that such Ācamana water serves the purpose of a garment for the Prāṇa, which is the relevant topic here. Nor is it proper to understand, that in one place the Ācamana is enjoined, and in the other, the fanciful conception that it (the Ācamana water) serves as a garment is enjoined, inasmuch as the trend of the statement that water serves as a garment, is in the same form everywhere, and therefore, it is logical, that there is an injunction, only as to the fanciful conception of (the Ācamana water) being the garment, and not about performing an Ācamana. — 18.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Samāne: in the same Śākhā; Evam: every, (it is) like this; Ca: and, also; A-bhedāt: owing to non-difference.🔗 Because of non-difference (in the object of meditation) there is the same (identity of Vidyās) even in the same (branch). — 3.3.19. It is understood, that in the Agni-rahasya chapter (esoteric teaching about Agni) in the Vāja-saneyi branch, there is a Vidyā known by the name of Śāṇḍilya-Vidyā, wherein, the Scriptures speak about some minor things (Guṇas) thus — “He should meditate on the Self whose structure is the mind, whose body is the Prāṇa and who is of the nature of lustre” etc. In the same branch, in Bṛhad-āraṇyaka again it is thus recited — “That Puruṣa whose structure is the mind and whose nature is lustre, and who is seen to be like a grain of rice or of barley in (the Ākāśa of) the Hṛdaya — He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all and he who rules over whatsoever is (in this universe)” (BrhU.5.6.1). Now there arises a doubt about this — as to whether there is the same identical Vidyā both in the Agni-rahasya and the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, and also a combination of the minor things (Guṇas), or whether, there are two Vidyās and there is no combination of their minor things. What then is your conclusion? (It is) that these Vidyās are different and the minor things of each are detailed for each separately. Whence is it so? Because (otherwise) there would be the predicament of (the fault of) ‘repetition’. Having observed, in the case of the Vidyās in different branches, that the fault of repetition is refuted on the ground of difference between the persons who learn or know these Vidyās, it has been stated, after understanding that the Dialogues of Prāṇas are identical, that surplus minor things in the Vidyā in one place, are to be combined with the minor things mentioned in the same Vidyā in another place where they i.e. such surplus minor things are absent. But in the case of Vidyās of one and the same branch, inasmuch as this fault of repetition is not capable of being refuted, because there is no possibility of difference between persons who either know or learn these Vidyās (as they belong to one and the same branch), the Vidyās in separate places (in one and the same branch) do not deserve to be identical. Nor can any such division as, that, one recital has the meaning of prescribing a Vidyā, and the other recital has the meaning of prescribing the minor things, is possible, as in that case only the mutually exclusive minor things of the Vidyā would have been mentioned in each and not those which are common (to both), but (it is seen that) such common minor things — as for instance (the minor thing) ‘of having the mind as the structure’ — are recited in both. Therefore (we conclude) that there is no reciprocal combination of their minor things. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — Just as there can be identity (of Vidyās) and the combination of minor things, as regards the Vidyās in different branches, even so does it deserve to be, in the case of the Vidyās in one and the same branch also, because of the object of meditation being the same, and we can recognize the same identical Brahman, characterized by the attribute of having mind as its structure etc., as being the object of meditation in both. Besides, the object of meditation is precisely the nature of a Vidyā. We cannot understand that the Vidyās are different when there is non-difference in their nature, nor can the minor things of each be restricted to each separately, when there is non-difference in the Vidyās. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) I have propounded that the Vidyās are different, as otherwise there would be the predicament of (the fault of) repetition. (We reply) — No, because it can be shown that it is reasonably sustainable that the purpose of each is separate. It is reasonably sustainable that one Scriptural statement has the meaning of prescribing the Vidyā, and the other of prescribing the minor things, (because it can be maintained at one and the same time, that there is a unity of Vidyās and there is also the absence of the fault of repetition). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) assuming it to be so, that alone which is not recited in the Agni-rahasya, viz., that he is the ruler (Īśānaḥ) of everything, should have been recited in the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, and what actually has been recited in the Agni-rahasya, viz., that he has the structure of the mind etc., should not have been recited in the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka. (We reply) — This is no fault, because it is precisely on the strength of such a recital, that the Vidyā recited in one place is recognised as being the same Vidyā in the other place. Having established the identity of the remotely situated Śāṇḍilya-Vidyā with the Vidyā in the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka by means of the statement of common minor things, the instruction about the quality of rulership of the Lord (Īśānatva) etc., is understood herein also (i.e. in the Agni-rahasya also). Otherwise, how could it be stated that that minor thing is enjoined in that Vidyā. Besides, when a sentence has attained a purpose as a result of instruction unavailable (Aprāpta) therein, and the portion available (Prāpta) therein can be understood to be reasonably sustainable, even as a reference to something which is already known (Nityānuvāda), it cannot be possible to neglect such recognition, on the strength of such a Nityānuvāda. Therefore, it is reasonably sustainable that even in one and the same branch, there can be identity of Vidyās and the combination of such minor things. — 19.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Sambandhāt: on account of the connection; Evam: thus, like this; Anyatra: in other cases; Api: also.🔗 In other cases also, it is the same (i.e. there is combination), because of the connection (of the minor things with one and the same Vidyā). — 3.3.20. In the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, beginning with “Truth (Satya) is Brahman” (BrhU.5.5.1), and then stating further — “What that truth (i.e. Brahman) is, that he this Sun (Āditya) is, viz., this Puruṣa that is in this sphere (of the Sun), and, this Puruṣa that is in the eye” BrhU.5.5.2), and thereafter having given instruction about the Ādhidaivika (i.e. presided over by deities) and Ādhyātmika (i.e. with reference to the relation between the supreme spirit and the Jīva-Self) special abodes of the very same ‘Satya’ (i.e. Brahman), and having furnished a fanciful body (for the Puruṣa) in the form of some mystic words (Vyāhṛtis, which are imagined to be the limbs of such a body), instruction is given about two esoteric names (for the Puruṣa). The mystic name of the Ādhidaivika Puruṣa is ‘Ahaḥ’, and of the Ādhyātmika Puruṣa is ‘Aham’. Now, with regard to this, a doubt arises, thus — Are the two mystic names to be used indiscriminately in the case of both, or whether they are to be used separately, one for the Ādhidaivika Puruṣa and the other for the Ādhyātmika Puruṣa? (The view of the opponent of Vedānta) is stated by the present Sūtra itself. Just as in the case of the Śāṇḍilya-Vidyās which are recited separately in different places, a combination of the minor things (of the Vidyās in both the places) is spoken of, so should it similarly be, in the case of the present nature, because they (the minor things) relate to one and the same Vidyā. It is but the same ‘Satya-Vidyā’ that is studied here, in its Ādhidaivika and Ādhyātmika Puruṣa aspects, because of the nondifference in the introductory portion, and the mutually connected recitals about the Ādhidaivika and the Ādhyātmika Puruṣas. How ever can a minor thing obtaining in one (Vidyā) not be available in the very same Vidyā (even though it happens to be mentioned in another place)? A particular code of conduct enjoined (on a student) with reference to the preceptor, is equally observable, whether the preceptor happens to be in a town or in a forest. Therefore both these mystic names become available in both these Vidyās. — 20.
[Go top]
The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being this, its refutation is as follows: —Na: not, not so; Vā: or, but; Viśeṣāt: because of difference. (Na vā: rather not.)🔗 Or rather, both (the mystic names) are not (available in both the places) because of a peculiarity. — 3.3.21. Or, rather, both (the mystic names) are not available in both the places. Whence is it so? Because of the mention of the peculiarity of their having a relation with two different places of meditations (Upāsanās). The meaning is that, because they are each firmly attached to a particular place of meditation. In what way is this attachment to a particular place only? It is replied — The Scriptures by referring to the Ādhidaivika Puruṣa, thus — “This Puruṣa who is in this sphere (of the Sun)” (BrhU.5.3.3), mention his mystic name as ‘‘Ahaḥ’, and by referring to the Ādhyātmika Puruṣa, thus — “This Puruṣa who is in the right eye” (BrhU.5.5.4), mention its mystic name as ‘Aham’. Now this pronoun ‘his’ (Tasya) governs what is proximate to it, therefore, (it must be understood that) these two mystic names are taught as being dependent, each upon a particular abode only (i.e. the sun and the eye respectively). So, how can they then be available in both the places? But (says the opponent of Vedānta) in as much as two abodes of one and the same ‘Satya’ (i.e. Brahman) are mentioned here, these Ādhidaivika and Ādhyātmika Puruṣas are of course identical. (We reply) — What you say is of course true, but in as much as the instruction given about the mystic names is with reference to particular conditions (of Brahman), it deserves to have these mystic names understood to be applicable in these respective particular conditions only. There is of course this illustration, viz., that in spite of the preceptor qua the preceptor being of the same constant nature, the manner in which he is to be served by his students while he happens to be seated, differs from the manner of serving him when he is standing, and vice versa. The illustration given by the opponent, however, is not a proper illustration, because the nature of the preceptor is constant, both when he is in the town and in the forest, and there is no particular difference caused in the service of the preceptor whether he be in the town or in the forest. Therefore (the conclusion is that) the mystic names are restricted, each to its own proper place. — 21.
[Go top]
Darśayati: (Śruti) shows, indicates, declares; Ca: also, and.🔗 The Scriptures also say so, by the indicatory mark viz. an extended application (Atideśa). — 3.3.22. Besides there is an indicatory mark (for holding) that the attributes of such a nature i.e. which are connected with a particular condition, are restricted, each to its proper place, thus — “The form (of him) here, is the same as there, those which are hoofs (or joints) here, are the hoofs (or joints) there, the name here, the name there” (ChanU.1.7.5). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) how does it become an indicatory mark? The reply is — Seeing that the attributes have become different because of the different places such as the Sun and the eye, and which therefore cannot be combined, the Scriptures have applied the attributes of the Puruṣa in the Sun, to the Puruṣa in the eye, by an extended application (Atideśa), thus — “Of him there, is the same form (as here)” (ChanU.1.7.5). Therefore, the conclusion is that these mystic names are restricted, each to its proper place. — 22.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Sambhṛti: supporting the world; Dyu-vyāpti: pervading the sky; Api: also; Ca: and; Ataḥ: for the same reason (as in the previous Sūtra). (Dyu: the sky, all the space, heaven).🔗 Also (minor things such as) the wielding of exalted powers, and pervading the heaven, (about the Vibhūtis i.e. exulted manifestations of Brahman) are not combined, because of the same reason. — 3.3.23. In the Khila chapters (i.e. chapters which do not contain injunctions or prohibitions of any sort) of the followers of the Rāṇāyanīya branch (of the Sāman-Veda), exalted aspects of Brahman such as ‘the wielding of super-human powers’ and ‘pervading the heaven’, are recited thus — “Brahman has assumed great exalted powers (such as for instance the power to create the Ākāśa etc.), and that in the beginning, the Highest Brahman stretched itself all over the heaven”, and in their Upaniṣad also, Brahma-Vidyās such as the Śāṇḍilya-Vidyā, etc. are recited. So, when there is a doubt as to whether or not, in these Brahma-Vidyās, these exalted superhuman aspects of power are to be combined, and when the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that on account of their being related to Brahman, they are to be combined, the Ācārya replies — Superhuman exalted aspects such as ‘the wielding of exalted powers’ and ‘pervading of the heaven’, should not be combined with the Śāṇḍilya-Vidyā, precisely because of the same reason, viz. that they are related to a special abode. For even so, in the Śāṇḍilya-Vidyā, it is mentioned that Brahman has the Hṛdaya as its abode, thus — “This my Self is in the Hṛdaya” (ChanU.3.14.3). Similarly also, in the Dahara-Vidyā, thus — “There is a small lotus-like palace, and in it there is the small Ākāśa” (ChanU.8.1.1). In the Upakosala-Vidyā it is mentioned that the eye is the abode of Brahman, thus — “This Puruṣa that is seen to be in the eye” (ChanU.4.15.1). It is thus understood, that there is in each of these Vidyās an Ādhyātmika abode (of Brahman), viz. a body. How can then the exalted aspects of Brahman of the Ādhidaivika nature be available in these Vidyās? But (says the opponent of Vedānta) even in them the Scriptures speak of Ādhidaivika exalted aspects of Brahman, thus — “Greater than the heaven, and greater than these worlds” (ChanU.3.14.3), “He verily is Bhāmanī (the bringer of light) and shines in all the worlds” (ChanU.4.15.4), “As is the extent of this Ākāśa, even so is the extent of this Ākāśa in the Hṛdaya, both the heaven and the earth are accommodated in it” (ChanU.8.3.1)” etc. There also are other Brahma-Vidyās not containing any special abodes, such as “(Brahman) having sixteen parts”. (We reply) — What you say is true of course, but there is a special peculiarity which furnishes the reason why minor things, such as ‘the wielding of superhuman exalted powers’, are not to be combined. It is logical, in the case of Vidyās in places separated from each other but recognized as identical, because of the mention of common minor things, that qualities mentioned in places separated from each other should be combined. But minor things such as ‘the welding of exalted powers’ and minor things such as ‘having mind as its structure’ etc., mentioned in Śāṇḍilya-Vidyā sentences, being mutually incompatible in their nature, are not capable of establishing identity of Vidyās occurring in places separated from them. It cannot be merely on account of such minor things being related to Brahman, that recognition of the identity of Vidyās with Vidyās in places separated from them, can be established, because such recognition is possible, even where there actually is a difference in the Vidyās. It is a settled conclusion, that though Brahman is one only, it is meditated upon in many ways, because of difference in the exalted aspects of Brahman, like the difference observed in the case of ‘greater than the great’ etc. (in Sūtra 7, supra, even though the Udgītha everywhere is but one only). Therefore attributes such as ‘powers of an exalted nature’ cannot be combined with the Śāṇḍilya-Vidyā etc. — 23.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Puruṣa-vidyāyām iva: as in the Puruṣa-Vidyā (of the Chandogya); Ca: and; Itareṣām: of the others; An-āmnānāt: because of not being mentioned (in the Taittirīya).🔗 Because there is no Scriptural statement in the other Vidyās (such as in the Taittīriyaka Puruṣa-Vidyā) (of observances) as in the Puruṣa-Vidyā (of Chāndogya) (there is no combination of the observances). — 3.3.24. A Vidyā called Puruṣa-Vidyā is mentioned in the Rahasya-Brāhmaṇa (Chāndogya) of the Tāṇḍīs and Paiṅgīs (who both are Sāman-Vedīs). There the Puruṣa (man) is notionally conceived to be (of the nature of) a sacrifice. Dividing a man’s span of life (of 116 years) into three periods (of 24, 44 and 48), they are conceived to be the three Savanas (Ritualistic actions of purificatory bathing), hunger etc. are conceived to be the ‘Dīkṣā’ (initiation) etc. Some other Dharmas (observances) such as the invocation of blessings and the incantation of Mantras, are also understood to have been mentioned therein. The Taittirīyakas also imagine a Puruṣa-Sacrifice in one Anuvāka, thus — “Of the Sacrifice of him who knows it to be so, the Self is the Yajamāna (Sacrificing host), faith (Śraddhā) is his consort etc.” (Tait. Ara. 10.64, Nara. 30). Now with regard to this, there is a doubt, viz., whether the Dharmas of the Puruṣa-Sacrifice spoken of elsewhere, are or are not to be combined with the Dharmas of the Taittīriyakas. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being, that as there is the common feature viz. the Puruṣa-Sacrifice (in both), there should be a combination of the Dharmas of the other Puruṣa-Sacrifice, with the Dharmas of the Taittīriyaka Puruṣa-Sacrifice, (we reply) — They should not be so combined. Why so? Because there is absence of recognition of the form (of the Puruṣa-Sacrifice of the Chāndogya), in the Taittīriyaka. The same is expressed by the Ācārya — “As is the Scriptural statement in Puruṣa-Vidyā (of the followers of one branch viz. the Tāṇḍīs and Paiṅgīs), so it is not, in the case of others i.e. the Taittīriyakas”. In their case (i.e. in the case of the Taittīriyakas) the fanciful conception of the sacrifice is different from that of the others (viz. the Tāṇḍīs and the Paiṅgīs) by reason of the mention of a different series, thus — the wife (of the sacrificing host) (Śraddhā), the sacrificing host (Yajamāna), the Veda, the altar (Vedī), the bundle of sacrificial grass (Barhi), the sacrificial post (Yūpa), the ghee (Ājya), the animal to be sacrificed (Paśu), the officiating priest (Ṛtvij), etc., which is not mentioned in the Chāndogya. The fanciful conception of the Savana (ritualistic action of purificatory bathings) also, is different there, from that of the other (i.e. the Chāndogya), viz., “The morning, noon and evening (Karmas i.e. bathings)” (Nara. 80). The little similarity in both — such as Death which is the ‘Avabhṛtha’ (the final bath at the conclusion of a sacrifice) being fancifully imagined as Death — being a very small one, it is discounted by the substantial volume of differences, and it is unable to establish such recognition. Besides in the Taittīriyaka, the Scriptures do not speak of the Puruṣa (the man) himself as the sacrifice (as in the Chāndogya). The genitive cases in “Of the Sacrifice of one, who knows” are not Samānādhikaraṇa (i.e. coordinate) genitives and do not mean ‘the knower who himself is the sacrifice’. A Puruṣa (man) cannot possibly be the sacrifice in the principal sense of the term. They are Vyadhikaraṇa i.e. (non-coordinate) genitives, meaning thus — ‘Of the sacrifice performed by one, who knows thus’. A Puruṣa of course has a direct connection with a sacrifice, in the principal sense. As far as is feasible, the principal meaning should be understood and not the secondary meaning. The sentence “The Self (the sentient Puruṣa) who is the sacrificing host”, which speaks of the host-ship of the Puruṣa itself, indicates his connection with the sacrifice, in a noncoordinating genitive significance. Moreover, “(Of the sacrifice) of one who knows it to be so” being only a reference to a sacrifice, a thing already established, if any one would understand the Puruṣa (man) himself to be the sacrifice and the Self as the sacrificing host, there would be a split of the sentence (by his doing so i.e. one sentence would have a double meaning). Besides (the Scriptures) having first taught the Vidyā of the Self along with Sannyāsa (the renunciation of the world, the 4th Āśrama), when we see the mention of “Of him who knows it to be so” as a chapter following it in a regular sequence, we understand it to be merely a passage complementary of the earlier statement, and not as an independent Scriptural statement. Similarly, we understand that there is but only one fruit of both the Anuvākas, viz., “He acquires the greatness of Brahman” (Nara. 80). In the case of the Scriptural statements about the Puruṣa-Vidyā of others (i.e. of the Chando-gas), there are no such passages complementary of any earlier passages. And they have as their fruit, an increase in the span of life, mentioned thus — “He who knows it to be so, lives for a hundred and sixteen years”. Therefore Dharmas such as these blessings and Mantras etc., taught in other branches, are not available in the Taittīriyaka. — 24.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Vedha-ādi: piercing etc.; Artha-bhedāt: because they have a different meaning.🔗 Because, Mantras such as ‘wounding etc have a different meaning (they have no connection with the Vidyās). — 3.3.25. In the Scriptures, there is a mention of a Mantra (incantation) in the beginning of the Upaniṣads of the Ārtharvaṇikas, as follows: — “Having wounded (the body of my enemy) all over, having wounded the Hṛdaya, and the blood-vessels, and the head, may he (my enemy) be also drawn and quartered in three ways”. In that of the Tāṇḍīs (there is a Mantra) thus — “O Lord the Sun, may you bring forth a sacrifice” (i.e. cause me to make a sacrifice). In that of the Śāṭyāyanins again, thus — “(Oh Indra), white is thy steed and verdant green and dark blue art thou”. And again in that of the Kaṭhas and the Taittirīyas, thus — “May the Sun be propitious to us, and also Varuṇa” (TaitU.1.1.1). But in the Upaniṣad of the Vāja-saneyins a Pravargya-Brāhmaṇa (i.e. one in which Pravargya, a particular Karma in a sacrifice is considered) is recited, thus — “The Gods verily sat down to (perform) a Satra (a sacrifice)”. And in that of the Kauṣitakins also, there is an Agni-ṣṭoma-Brāhmaṇa passage — “Brahman, indeed, is Agni-ṣṭoma, Brahman itself is that day (of the Sacrifice), they attain Brahman through Brahman, those who perform the sacrifice on that day attain immortality”. It is now being considered whether all such Mantras as “wounding etc.” and actions such as Pravargya etc., are or are not to be combined with the Vidyās. How then does it strike us? (The opponent of Vedānta says) — (We think) that they should be combined with the Vidyās. Whence is it so? Because they are recited in proximity to the Upaniṣads which mainly deal with Vidyās. But (says the Vedāntin) we do not find any injunction as to their use in the Vidyās. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — It is right, but even though we do not find it to be so, we would infer to that effect, on the strength of their proximity (to the Vidyās). When proximity is thus suggestive of a purpose, it would not be logical to reject it capriciously. But (says the Vedāntin) we do not see that the Mantras have any the least force with respect to the Vidyās. How ever can we understand, that actions such as Pravargya etc. employed only for some other purpose, have any application to Vidyās? (The opponent of Vedānta replies) — This is no fault, because, inasmuch as Hṛdaya etc. are mentioned therein, it is possible to imagine, that they do have some force in regard to the Vidyās. Hṛdaya etc. are often taught as serving as abodes etc. in meditations, and that way, it would be reasonably sustainable, that Mantras such as ‘Having wounded the Hṛdaya’ may serve as matters subsidiary to meditations, for we do see such Mantras used even in meditation, thus — “I will attain the earth by this, by this, by this” (ChanU.3.15.3). Similarly actions such as ‘Pravargya’ etc., employed as they are elsewhere, can without impropriety, be employed in Vidyās, even as the ‘Bṛhas-pati-Sava’ (a sacrifice to be performed by one who wishes to be a teacher), though employed elsewhere, is employed in the Vājapeya sacrifice also. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — There is no combination of these (Mantras) in the Vidyās. Whence is it so? Because of ‘wounding etc.’ being different things. The things mentioned in the Mantras “Having wounded the Hṛdaya” etc., viz., the wounding of Hṛdaya etc., are different and are entirely unconnected with the Vidyās as known in the Upaniṣads, and so they have no power to connect themselves with the Vidyās. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) we have already propounded that as the word ‘the Hṛdaya’ has been employed in meditation also, they do have, in that way, a connection with a meditation. (We reply) — No, we could, provided the word Hṛdaya alone were to be mentioned (in the Mantra), somehow construe that it would be so, but this Mantra does not mean a Hṛdaya only. The whole meaning of the Mantra, viz. “Having wounded the Hṛdaya, having wounded the blood-vessels”, does not have any connection with the Vidyās. Its meaning has a relation with the subject of magic spells (Abhicārika-viṣayaḥ), therefore, the Mantra “Having wounded (the body) all over etc.” has a connection with some act relating to some sort of magical spells for malevolent purposes. Similarly the Mantra “O Lord the Sun, may you bring forth a sacrifice” has a connection with some sacrificial act, because of the indicatory mark, viz. the bringing forth of a sacrifice. What particular connection it has, has to be determined by some other means-of-proof. Similarly, in the case of other Mantras also, even though they happen to be recited in the Rahasya portion, they have to be construed as having a relation with, and being employed for, some other purpose, on the strength of some indicatory mark, or some other authority or some other means-of-proof, and cannot be understood as being complementary to a Vidyā, merely on the ground of proximity. It has already been stated in the first Tantra (i.e. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) that mere proximity (Sannidhi) is a weaker means-of-proof as compared with a Scriptural passage, by the Sūtra — “When there is a conflict (between the Scriptures) as between the Scriptural word, the indicatory mark, the sentence, the chapter, the place and the name, every succeeding member (in this series of Pramāṇas) is weaker than the one which comes earlier” (Jai. Su. 3.3.13). Similarly, that, actions such as ‘Pravargya’ etc. which are employed elsewhere, can be complementary to Vidyās, is not reasonably sustainable. There is nothing in common between these (actions) and the Vidyās. So far as the Bṛhas-pati-Sava is concerned, it is clearly enjoined in addition to Vājapeya sacrifice, thus — “Having performed the Vājapeya Sacrifice, he should perform the Bṛhas-pati-Sava”. Besides, this single Pravargya, enjoined but once only, and employed in one place, on a stronger means-of-proof (Pramāṇa) does not deserve to be employed elsewhere also, on the strength of a weaker means-of-proof. It would be so possible, only if no special distinction as between means-of-proof can be observed, but it is not possible not to understand the particular distinction between a strong and a weak means-of-proof, because, that one (of the two) is stronger or weaker than the other, is itself the special distinction between them. Therefore, Mantras or actions of these sorts should never be understood to be complementary to a Vidyā, merely because they are recited in proximity (to the Vidyā). One should satisfy oneself, that they are recited in proximity with each other, because, that both should be employed while in a forest, is an observance (Dharma) common to them both. — 25.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Hānau: where only the getting rid (of good and evil) is mentioned; Tu: but; Upāyana-śabda-śeṣatvāt: on account of the word ‘acceptance’ being supplementary to the word ‘getting rid’; Kuśācchanda-stuti-upagānavat: like Kusa-sticks, metres, praises and hymns; Tat: that; Uktam: has been stated (by Jaimini). (Upāyana: acceptance; Śabda: on account of the statement of the word; Śeṣatvāt: on account of being supplementary to.)🔗 But, where the ‘discarding’ (of good and evil deeds is mentioned) ‘receiving’ of them by others has to be understood), because ‘receiving’ is complementary to the Scriptural word (discarding), as (for instance) in the case of Kuśas, metres, glorification and the chanting (of Mantras). That has been stated (by Jaimini in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). — 3.3.26. There is a Scriptural passage of the Tāṇḍins, thus — “Having shaken off demerit even as a horse shakes off his hair, being freed (from ignorance) even as the moon escapes from the mouth of Rāhu, and having shaken off the body, I, i.e. the Self, that have fulfilled everything that has to be done (Kṛtātmā), attain the eternal (Akṛta) Brahma-world” (ChanU.8.13.1). Similarly in the Scriptural passage of the Ārtharvaṇikas — “Similarly the knowing one, freed from (the limiting adjuncts of) names and forms, attains the transcendent and heavenly Puruṣa” (MunU.3.2.8). Similarly the Śāṭyāyanins recite — “His sons receive his property, his friends his good deeds, and his foes his evil deeds”. Similarly the Kauṣitakins — “He shakes off his good and evil deeds, his beloved caste-people receive his good deeds, and those who are disliked by him, receive his evil deeds” (Kaush. 1.4). Thus, in one place the Scriptures speak about the discarding of good and evil deeds, in some other place they speak of the ‘receiving’ of them in parts by people who are dear to him and by those who are not so dear, while in still some other Scriptural passage, they speak of both the discarding and the receiving, and thus, when both these (i.e. discarding and receiving) are spoken of, there is nothing further to be said about it. Where again only the receiving is spoken of but not the discarding, such ‘discarding’ of course is necessarily implied, inasmuch as when one’s good and evil deeds are received by another, their discarding (by that one) is of course necessary (by implication). Where, however, the Scriptures speak of ‘discarding’ only and not of ‘receiving’, and when it is considered as to whether (in such a case) the ‘receiving’ necessarily takes place or not, (the opponent of Vedānta) concludes — ‘receiving’ does not take place, as it is not stated by the Scriptures, and also because, when the Scriptures declare so in another branch, it has reference to another Vidyā (of qualified Brahman viz. of Sa-guṇa-Brahma-Vidyā). Besides, the ‘discarding’ of good and evil deeds is made by one person himself, while the ‘receiving’ is done by another, and when a connection between such ‘discarding’ (by one) and ‘receiving’ (by another) is not necessarily inevitable, why should ‘discarding’ necessarily imply the ‘receiving’ also? Therefore, ‘receiving’ does not take place wherever ‘discarding’ only is present. That being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), it is recited “even when discarding (alone is mentioned, receiving has to be understood)”. Even when the Scriptures speak only of ‘discarding’, ‘receiving’ also deserves to be implied, because, it is complementary to ‘discarding’, and in the Kauṣītaki-Rahasya, the word ‘receiving’ is understood to be complementary to the word ‘discarding’. Therefore, in other places also, even when the Scriptures speak merely of ‘discarding’, the word ‘receiving’ necessarily follows (after it). With regard to the argument (of the opponent of Vedānta) that inasmuch as the Scriptures are silent about it, and as that (i.e. receiving) is observed in some other Vidyās, and (as between discarding and receiving) there is no necessarily inevitable relation, it is not necessarily implied: it is replied — This sort of restricting a thing only to the place wherein it is detailed (i.e. that it thus has its Vyavasthā) would be justified, where, anything which has to be done (i.e. some action), is mentioned in one place (in the Scriptures) and it is sought to be carried over (i.e. made applicable) in some other place, but here, neither the ‘discarding’ nor the ‘receiving’ is mentioned as something to be performed (as an act), but they are mentioned only in glorification of the Vidyā. Such indeed (it is meant) is the blessedness of Vidyā, that it is through its power, that such wise-man’s good or evil deeds, which constitute the cause of his transmigratory existence (as a man, living in this world), are shaken off and they then enter into his friends and foes respectively. The recital being thus, for glorification, and as ‘receiving’ takes place only after ‘discarding’, it is considered that wherever there is a mention of ‘discarding’ only in the Scriptures, ‘receiving’ inevitably follows in its wake, and thus the best glorification of Vidyā is secured. It is well-known that depending on one explanatory passage (Artha-vāda) another explanatory passage is brought into operation, as for instance in the case of the passage — “Beginning with this (world), the Sun (Āditya-Loka) is the twenty-first” (ChanU.2.10.5) etc. How ever can we speak of the Sun (Āditya-Loka) as being the twenty-first here, except only by the application of another explanatory passage as follows — “There are twelve months, five seasons, three worlds, and the Sun which is the twenty-first” (ChanU.2.10.5)? Similarly, in the passage, viz. “The two ‘Tri-ṣṭubh’ metres are for the purpose of equipment with the sense-organs”, the necessity of another explanatory passage, viz. “Tri-ṣṭubh verily is the sense-organ”, is evident. The question about ‘receiving' being thus merely for the glorification of Vidyā, the doubt as to how the good and bad deeds of one (man) can possibly be received by another, may not be needlessly emphasized and elaborated upon. The reference (by the Sūtra-kāra) to the word ‘word’ (Śabda) in the Sūtra “The ‘receiving’ is complementary to the Scriptural word (discarding)”, suggests that the word ‘receiving’ which necessarily follows the word ‘discarding’ should be understood to be just for the glorification (of the Vidyā). Had the Sūtra-kāra intended to state that there should be a combination of subsidiary matters, he would have merely spoken of ‘a thing to be received’ as a thing to be taken for granted after ‘the thing to be discarded’ is discarded. This Sūtra is meant for demonstrating the combination of glorifications only incidentally to his desire to consider the combination of attributes. The sentence “Like Kuśas (small wooden sticks for counting the number of hymns sung by the Udgātṛ), metres, glorification, and chanting (of the words in the hymns)” is by way of employing a simile. When in the Mantra of the Bhāllavīs, viz. “Oh Kuśas, you are fashioned from trees, do you protect me”, the Scriptures (only in a general way) mention that Kuśas are fashioned out of trees, and as there is a special mention by the Śāṭyāyanins, that they are made of an Udumbara tree, we know that they are so made from Udumbara wood. Or when, in the absence of any special rule, the predicament is as to which metres as between God’s metres and Asura’s metres are recited first and which (are recited) afterwards, it is understood from the Scriptural statement of the Paiṅgīs, viz. “God’s metres come first”, that God’s metres have such precedence. Again when in the absence of any special direction in the case of some (followers of some branch) the question arises as to when the Ṣo-ḍaśi-Stotra (Panegyric on the Ṣo-ḍaśi cup used in sacrifices for drinking Soma) should be sung, it is from the Scriptural statement in the Ṛg-Veda, viz. “About the time of Sun-rise”, that the particular time (for such singing) is determined. Or just as when some (Scriptural statements) speak of the chanting (of hymns) in a general way, thus — ‘the Ṛtvijaḥ sing’, while the Bhāllavins recite a special particular (viz. that the Adhvaryus do not sing), it is that (i.e. the special recital of the Bhāllavins) that determines, as to who amongst the sacrificial priests are to sing and who are not. The meaning is, that just as in the case of Kuśas etc., they have a connection with a special particular in another Scriptural statement, similarly ‘discarding’ also has a connection with ‘receiving’, and if one were not to accept the special rule in a particular Scriptural statement, as being applicable in the case of another Scriptural statement, an ‘option’ would occur everywhere. But wherever it is possible (to determine a thing positively), it is not logical to have recourse to an ‘option’. All this has already been explained in the Dvā-daśa-lakṣaṇī (of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā 10.8.15), thus — “Api tu Vākyaśeṣatvāditaraparyudāsaḥ syat pratiṣedhe vikalpaḥ syāt”. Or else, these Scriptural statements about this ‘shaking off (by a person who has attained knowledge)’ by this Sūtra, should be construed in the following way. (The question is) whether this statement about ‘shaking off’ purports to speak about the ‘shaking off’ i.e. discarding of the good or evil (deeds), or whether it purports to speak of some other thing. With regard to this, it can be stated (as on behalf of the opponent of Vedānta) thus — ‘Discarding’ cannot mean ‘Shaking off’, because according to Smṛti, the root ‘Dhu’ (धुञ्) means ‘fluttering’, as is seen from the use of the verb, in the case of the movement of the tips of a flag in the wind, in the passage “The tips of the flag are fluttering”. Thereafter, having stated (the further argument of the opponent of Vedānta), viz. that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds is caused by the obstruction to their fruition for some time, it should be refuted (by the Vedāntin) as follows: The word fluttering should be understood to be synonymous with the word ‘discarding’, because the word ‘receiving’ is complementary to it. The ‘receiving’, of good or evil deeds which belong to one but are not discarded by him, by another, is not possible. And even if the ‘receiving’ of the good or evil deeds of one by another is not properly possible, yet because it has been so stated (by the Scriptures) and also with a view to the following of that meaning, it is possible to determine, that discarding indeed is but ‘fluttering’ only. Now the Scriptural statement about ‘receiving’ in proximity to ‘shaking off’ occurs in a particular place only (viz. the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad), still — as in the case of Kuśas, metres, glorification, and chanting — its application is induced in the other cases, on account of the Scriptural statement about ‘shaking off’, and it furnishes itself as a criterion for determining (the meaning). Because, the fluttering of good or evil deeds in the principal sense of the term — like the fluttering of the tips of a flag — is not possible, inasmuch as it is not a material substance (Dravya). The horse, while he throws off the dust as he shakes his hair, drops his hair also (along with the dust) and the Scriptural Brāhmaṇa passage is — “Having shaken off demerit, even as a horse shakes off his hair”. As verbs often have many meanings, no contradiction with the Smṛti (Smaraṇa-virodhaḥ) is involved. The passage “This has been stated” (in the Sūtra) has already been explained. — 26.
[Go top]
[Go top]
It is just (about the time of attaining the future life i.e. just about the time of death) at the time of going out of the body (that a man discards his good or bad deeds) because there is nothing (for him) either to attain or to overcome (on the way).Sāmparāye: at the time of death; Tartavya-abhāvāt: there being nothing to be attained (Taritavya); Tathā: in this way, so; Hi: because, for; Anye: others.🔗 Others (i.e. other texts) also (say) the same. — 3.3.27. The Kauṣitakins, in the Paryaṅka-Vidyā (the Lore of the Couch), speak about the separation between a man and his good or evil deeds, when he is midway to Brahman seated on the couch, beginning with “Having arrived at the Deva-yāna path he reaches the Agni-world” (Kaush. 1.3), and then declaring — “He reaches the river Virajā which he crosses by only his mind, shakes off his good and evil deeds” (Kaush. 1.4). Now when the question is, whether as stated in the Scriptures this separation (between himself and his deeds) should, as stated by the Scriptures, be understood as taking place during the journey, or at the time of going away from the body, and the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta being, that as the Scriptures are authoritative, it is necessary to understand it as taking place according to the Scriptural statement, (the Sūtra-kāra) says — “At the time of going out of the body (i.e. while dying)”. It is understood that it is while attaining the future life, i.e. while departing from or leaving the body, that, as a result of the power of knowledge, this discarding of good or evil deeds takes place. He states the cause as well, viz. that because there is nothing to be attained or overcome (by such person, on the way). The wise man who has started upon giving up his body i.e. who is dying and attaining Brahman as a result of his knowledge, has nothing to gain either from his good or evil deeds, in between, so that it should have to be imagined that they (i.e. good or bad deeds) subsist undestroyed for some moments (after death supervenes). Besides, inasmuch as good or evil deeds have a fruit which is antagonistic to (the fruit of) Vidyā, and their destruction takes place through the power of Vidyā, it deserves to occur just when the Vidyā is about to fructify. Therefore, (it must be understood) that even though this destruction of good or evil deeds occurs earlier, it is only stated (here) later on. Even so, do the followers of other branches, such as the Tāṇḍins and Śāṭyāyanins, speak about this discarding of good or evil deeds during an earlier stage, thus — “Having shaken off demerit even as a horse shakes off his hair” (ChanU.8.13.1) and “His sons receive his property, his friends his good deeds, his foes his evil deeds”. — 27.
[Go top]
Chandatah: according to his liking; Ubhaya-avirodhāt: on account of there being harmony between the two. (Ubhaya: of either; A-virodhāt: there being no contradiction.)🔗 (As the cause of the destruction of good and evil deeds, is the attempt which a person makes by properly controlled effort, according to rules) and as such an attempt according to his own desire is not possible, (while on the way, therefore, that such destruction takes place just about the time of death, is reasonably sustainable), because considered either way, there is no contradiction. — 3.3.28. If it be understood in the case of one who has gone out of the body and has started on the Deva-yāna path, that the destruction of the good and evil deeds takes place midway, then the making of a wilful effort, of the nature of self-restraint, regulated conduct and the pursuit of knowledge by a man, not being reasonably sustainable while on the way, after the body has fallen (i.e. after the Self has gone out of it), such destruction of the good and evil deeds, of which such wilful effort is the cause, midway, would not be reasonably sustainable. Now, as a man’s making such wilful effort is possible only earlier, while he is living and while he is in the stage of an aspirant, and as this discarding of the good and evil deeds, depends upon such previous wilful effort, it should be understood that such discarding of good and evil deeds due to such wilful effort is necessarily before death. It is only thus that the relation of the cause (i.e. wilful effort) and its effect (i.e. destruction), and the reconcilement of the Scriptural passages of the Tāṇḍins and the Śāṭyāyanins, become reasonably sustainable. — 28.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Gateḥ: of the journey of the soul (after death), along the path of the gods; Arthavatvam: utility; Ubhayathā: in two ways; Anyathā: otherwise; Hi: for, certainly; Virodhaḥ: contradiction.🔗 Transition or evolving (Gati) must be understood to have a meaning in two ways (i.e. it must be interpreted in two ways), otherwise a contradiction (would take place). — 3.3.29. The Scriptures, in some places (where they refer to the Vidyā of qualified Brahman) mention the Deva-yāna path, in proximity to the discarding of merit and demerit, and do not do so in others (where the Vidyās of unqualified Brahman are mentioned). So a doubt here arises as to whether, the Deva-yāna path becomes available regularly after the discarding of merit and demerit, or whether it becomes available in parts (Vibhāgena) i.e. becomes available in some cases and does not become available in other cases. The conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta) being, that just as the Scriptures speak of ‘receiving’ as following regularly after ‘discarding’ (of the good and evil deeds), even so, the Deva-yāna Path also, deserves to be available (after such discarding), regularly, (we reply) — the availability of the use of the Deva-yāna Path deserves to be considered in two ways, i.e. in some cases it is available, and in some other cases it is not, and it does not follow regularly, because, if it were to be accepted as being regularly available, a contradiction would take place. In Scriptural statements, such as “Having discarded merit and demerit, (the Self) uncontaminated by any impurity, attains likeness i.e. unity with the transcendent (Brahman)” (MunU.3.1.3), any transition or evolution which requires one to arrive at one place from another (i.e. implies movement), would be contradictory. How can any one who is uncontaminated by any impurity (Nirañjanaḥ), and who does not go anywhere (Agantā), be understood to go from one place to another? The likeness i.e. highest unity with the transcendent (Brahman) is what is to be attained, and it does not depend upon starting (from one place) and reaching any other place, and therefore, we are of opinion, that under such circumstances a journey (along the Deva-yāna Path) is meaningless. – 29.
[Go top]
Upapannaḥ: is reasonable; Tal-lakṣaṇa-artha-upalabdheḥ: for the characteristics which render such journey possible are seen; Lokavat: as is seen in the world, as is the ordinary experience. (Tat: that; Lakṣaṇa: mark, characteristic features; Artha: object; Upalabdheḥ: being known, on account of the obtaining.)🔗 This availability (of the twofold division into justification for or against a journey along the Deva-yāna Path) is reasonably sustainable, because things which constitute the cause of such journey along such a path, are discernible. It is similar to what is experienced in the ordinary world. — 3.3.30. This possibility either way, viz. that this journey along the Deva-yāna Path has meaning i.e. justification in one way and not so in another, is reasonably sustainable, because, things which constitute the cause of such a journey, are to be seen. That such a journey has meaning i.e. justification, is discernible in the case of meditations on qualified Brahman as in the Paryaṅka-Vidyā, wherein ‘ascending the couch, having conversation with Brahman which is seated on the couch, and the experiencing of particular special smells etc., which depend upon (the Jīva-Self) arriving at a different place’ are mentioned in the Scriptures. Experience of any such nature, however, is absent in the case of perfect knowledge. In the case of those, who have understood that there is perfect unity of the Jīva-Self (with Brahman) and who have had all their desires already fulfilled, and the seeds of whose sufferings have all been completely burnt out here in this world, and who do not have to expect anything else but the destruction of the whole quantum of actions, the experiencing of the fruits of which has already started, such journey or movement (along the Deva-yāna Path) is meaningless. A division in this manner (into the justification or otherwise for a journey) is just similar to what is seen in the ordinary world. Just as in the ordinary world, a road which takes you from one place to another, is necessary for reaching another city, but it is not necessary in the case of the attainment of good health, even so it is, in this case. We will again propound the subject of the division (of the justification or otherwise for a journey along the Deva-yāna Path) with greater clarity in the fourth Adhyāya. — 30.
[Go top]
[Go top]
A-niyamaḥ: (there is) no restriction; Sarvāsām: of all; Avirodhaḥ: there is no contradiction; Śabda-anumānābhyām: as is seen from Śruti and Smṛti. (Śabdaḥ: the word, i.e., the revealed scripture or Śruti; Anumāna: inference or Smṛti.)🔗 There is absence of any rule (restricting the journey along the Deva-yāna Path, only to those Vidyās in which it is mentioned), and it is available in all Vidyās (about qualified Brahman). No contradiction is involved according to the Scriptures and Smṛtis. — 3.3.31. That a journey along the Deva-yāna Path is appropriate in Vidyās dealing with qualified Brahman but not in Vidyās dealing with the unqualified Highest Self, has been stated already. But even in the case of Vidyās dealing with qualified Brahman, the Scriptures refer to such journey (along the Deva-yāna Path) in some Vidyās only, such as the Paryaṅka-Vidyā, the Upakosala-Vidyā, the Pañcāgni-Vidyā and the Dahara-Vidyā, but not in others, such as the Madhu-Vidyā, the Śāṇḍilya-Vidyā, the Ṣoḍaśa-kala-Vidyā and the Vaiśvā-nara-Vidyā. Now, with regard to this, a doubt arises, whether this journey (along the Deva-yāna Path) is restricted to only those Vidyās in which it is mentioned by the Scriptures, or whether, it relates to all the Vidyās of such kind, irrespective of any such restrictive rule. What then is the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that such journey (along the Deva-yāna Path) as a rule occurs only where it is mentioned, because, the chapter (dealing with that subject) regulates it. If such journey (along the Deva-yāna Path) mentioned by the Scriptures in one Vidyā were to be extended to any other Vidyā, the authoritativeness of the Scriptures would thus be stultified, because, in that case, there would be the predicament, that everything would mean everything else (Sarvasya sarvārthatvāt). Besides, the journey along “the light (Jyotis) etc.” of the Deva-yāna Path, which is mentioned by the Scriptures in the Upakosala-Vidyā is also mentioned in the Pañcāgni-Vidyā, and such repetition (of the mention of a journey along the Deva-yāna Path in the Pañcāgni-Vidyā) would be meaningless if such journey were to be applicable to all Vidyās. Therefore, such journey is restricted (to those Vidyās only where it is specifically mentioned). This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the Sūtra-kāra says: — The journey (along the Deva-yāna Path) is not so restricted. This journey deserves to be applicable to all Vidyās dealing with qualified Brahman, which have the attainment of the world of Brahman (Brahma-Loka) as their fruit. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been stated (by me), that if it were to be understood, that there is no such restrictive rule, it would contradict the chapter (dealing with these Vidyās). (We reply) — The meaning is, that there is no such contradiction, because of the word and the inference, i.e. the Scriptures and the Smṛtis. The Scriptures do declare as much. It is understood from the Scriptural passage “Those who know it to be so” (ChanU.5.10.1), which leads those who study the Pañcāgni-Vidyā to the Deva-yāna Path, and also leads those who study other Vidyās (in which such Deva-yāna Path is not mentioned) such as “Those who meditate (on Brahman) with faith and austerities” ( 5.10.1 ?), to a path similar to the path of those who study the Pañcāgni-Vidyā. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) how is it known that those who study such other Vidyās also journey along the Deva-yāna Path? Inasmuch as faith and austerity alone are mentioned here, it must be understood that it is only those who meditate on Brahman with faith and austerity who have this path laid down for them. (We reply) — This is no fault. Those who meditate on Brahman with faith and austerity alone, do not obtain this journey along the Deva-yāna Path, without the help of knowledge, because another Scriptural passage says — “It is through knowledge, that they ascend to that (place) from where all desires have turned back, the Dakṣiṇas (those skilled in Vedic rituals only) do not go that way, nor even those who practise austerities but who are ignorant. Meditation on Brahman with faith and austerities here, means the other Vidyās (wherein such journey is not mentioned). The Vāja-saneyins moreover recite in the Pañcāgni-Vidyā Chapter, thus — “Those who know it to be so and those who meditate on Brahman i.e. Satya (the Truth) with faith” (BrhU.6.2.15), which should be explained, as meaning those, who full of faith meditate on Satya i.e. Brahman, because the word Satya is often used as meaning Brahman. As, by “Those who know it to be so”, only those who know the Pañcāgni-Vidyā are understood, therefore, it is logical that by “Those who in the forest etc.” those who know the other Vidyās should be understood. Now, the Scriptural passage “Now, those who do not know these two Paths (i.e. Deva-yāna and Pitṛ-yāṇa) become worms, butterflies and snakes etc.” (BrhU.6.2.16), which intimates (to us) the miserable fall of those who miss these two Paths, informs (us) thereby, that those (who study the Vidyās in which this Deva-yāna Path is either mentioned or not mentioned) have to take a journey along these Deva-yāna or Pitṛ-yāṇa Paths, and Vidyā being common here, it is understood that those who possess the knowledge of other Vidyās (which are silent as to the Deva-yāna Path) also attain the Deva-yāna Path. The Smṛti also says — “The bright and the dark journeys are the eternal paths of this world. Going by one (i.e. the Deva-yāna) one does not return and going by the other (i.e. the Pitṛ-yāṇa) one returns again to this world” (BhG.8.26). The argument that the mention of the Deva-yāna Path once in the Upakosala-Vidyā and again in the Pañcāgni-Vidyā (is repetition), (is answered by saying that) in both the places it is so mentioned for the purpose of meditation only. Therefore, there is no such rule (restricting the journey along Deva-yāna Path to only those Vidyās in which it is specifically mentioned). — 31.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Yāvad-adhikaram: so long as the striving, the mission is not fulfilled; Avasthitiḥ: (there is corporeal) existence; Ādhikārikānām: of those who have a mission in life to fulfil. (Yāvad: as long as; Adhikāram: mission, purpose to be fulfilled.)🔗 Those who have a certain duty of office to perform, continue (in. their physical body) as long as duty of the office lasts. — 3.3.32. It is now being considered, whether, in the case of a person who has realized Brahman, another physical body is or is not created for him, after his original body has fallen. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) a doubt, as to whether, after true i.e. perfect knowledge, the means of Final Release (Mokṣa), is attained, such Final Release takes place or not, is not reasonably sustainable. When the means of cooking have become available, a doubt as to whether cooked rice can or cannot be got ready, cannot be possible, nor whether the diner would or would not be satisfied. But (we reply), such an inquiry is of course reasonably sustainable, because it is seen from History and from the Purāṇas, that even from amongst these who have realized Brahman, some acquire other bodies. For instance, the Smṛti says that Apāntaratama, a Vedic scholar and an ancient sage, was, as directed by Viṣṇu, reborn as Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana, at the junction of the Dvā-pāra and Kali Yugas. Similarly, Vasiṣṭha the mind-born son of Brahmā as he was, having lost his original body through the curse of Nimi, was reborn of Maitrā-Varuṇa at the behest of Brahmā. Scriptures similarly speak of the rebirth of Bhṛgu and others, also the mind-born sons of Brahmā, during the sacrifice of Varuṇa. Sanat-kumāra also, another mind-born son of Brahmā, was reborn as Skanda, because of the boon he had himself conferred on Rudra. Similarly the Smṛtis speak of many such acquisitions of other bodies for some reason or other, in the case of Dakṣa and Nārada etc. And the Scriptures also in Mantras and Artha-Vādas, speak of such things. Some amongst them are said to acquire another body after their original body has fallen, while some, even when their original body still continues, are said to assume several bodies simultaneously, through their own lordly powers of Yoga. Smṛtis speak of their being adepts in the full meaning of the Scriptures. Seeing therefore, that in as much as they (i.e. these sages etc.) acquire other bodies, a conclusion is inevitably arrived at that the knowledge of Brahman is on the one hand the cause of Final Release, and that on the other hand it is not so. The Sūtra-kāra therefore says — No, because these Apāntaratama and others who happen to be appointed to their particular offices, which constitute the cause of the preservation of the world through the promulgation of the Vedas, continue to be in their own bodies as long as such special office of theirs lasts. Just as the Bhagavān Sun, having exercised the powers of his office, over the world for a thousand Yugas, at the end, experiences complete isolation (Kaivalya) i.e. Final Release which is free from the diurnal rising and setting, as stated by the Scriptures, thus — “Having risen upwards from there (in the form of Brahman), he neither rises nor sets, but continues to be all alone by himself in himself” (ChanU.3.11.1), or just as, some people of the present time who have realized Brahman, experience Final Release, after the enjoyment of the fruits of their actions which have started fruition is exhausted, because the Scriptures have declared — “He is delayed only until he is relieved of his body and then he attains Final Release” (ChanU.6.14.2). That, Apāntaratama etc., Lords though they are and appointed though they are to their offices by the Highest Lord, and even though they possess correct i.e. perfect knowledge which is the means of Final Release, have to continue in their bodies as long as their duty lasts, because their actions have not yet been exhausted, and that they obtain Final Release when such actions get exhausted, is not contradictory. They (these Lords), while they are ridding themselves of the quantum of their actions which has once started fructifying, and migrating from one body to another, as from one house to another, with perfect liberty, and creating new bodies with the material of the body and sense-organs at their command, occupy such bodies, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of discharging the duties of their office, albeit with the consciousness (of their having the nature of Brahman) unobliterated. It cannot be said that they remember only their births (and not their individuality), because it is well-known from the Smṛtis that they are known to be the self-same persons. Smṛti also states, how Sulabhā, a great scholar of Brahman, (Brahma-vādinī), desirous of having disputations with Janaka, leaving her own body, entered the body of Janaka, and after having had a discussion with him, again returned to her own body. If, after actions which have once started (bearing fruit) have been used up, other actions were to spring up and cause the starting up of another body, then other actions whose seeds have not yet been burnt out may as well spring up too, and in such a case, may be, a doubt may legitimately arise, as to whether Brahma-Vidyā sometimes is, and at other times is not, the cause of Mokṣa, but such a doubt is not logical, because it is well-known from the Scriptures and the Smṛtis, that perfect knowledge (Jñāna) has the effect of burning up the seeds of actions. The Scriptures for instance say — “The knots of the Hṛdaya (in the form of impressions) are cut asunder and all doubts are resolved and all his actions are exhausted, when the one that is both the cause and the effect viz. Parāvara (i.e. Brahman) is realized” (Mund 2.2.8); “When memory (that I myself am Brahman) returns, all knots are resolved” (ChanU.7.26.2) etc. The Smṛti also says — “Oh Arjuna, just as a well-lighted fire consumes all fuel and reduces it to ashes, even so does the fire of perfect knowledge reduce all actions to ashes” (BhG.4.37). Just as seeds which have once been consumed by fire do not ever again sprout up, even so the Self does not again suffer the afflictions which have once been consumed by perfect knowledge. It is not reasonably sustainable, that when once the afflictions caused by Nescience are consumed, the quantum of actions which is the seed of afflictions, should get burnt out only in one part, while another part of it should sprout up. It is never seen, that a seed of rice which is burnt up by fire, ever sprouts up in one part of it. The quantum of actions which has started fructifying, is ultimately dissipated, even as. an arrow that is once shot, comes to rest after its force (momentum) is expended, because, as stated by the Scriptures — “He is delayed only so long etc.” (ChanU.6.14.2), a man has to wait only till his body falls. Hence those who have been appointed to such offices continue to exist as long as their duty of office lasts. Moreover, it cannot be said that the fruit of perfect knowledge is not uniform everywhere, because the Scriptures declare that all without exception, attain Mokṣa on the realization of knowledge, thus — “Those from amongst the Gods that realized the Truth, themselves became the Truth, and the same was the case with the sages and men” (BrhU.1.4.10). May be, there are some great sages who have succumbed to the temptation of worldly powers etc. resulting from other knowledges, and it is reasonably sustainable, that subsequently, on realizing that their power has been exhausted, they become dejected, and steadfastly pinning their faith on the knowledge of the Highest Self, thus attain Final Release (Kaivalya), because the Smṛti says thus — When the great deluge comes on and the Para i.e. Brahman gets destroyed, all these, their minds chastened, enter into the Highest Brahman. The fruit of perfect knowledge being patent, any doubt about missing the fruit of such perfect knowledge cannot be reasonably sustainable. The fruits of actions, however, viz. the heaven etc., not being based on experience, a doubt, as to whether they are or are not possible, would be justified, but the fruit of perfect knowledge is based on experience, because the Scriptures declare “That Brahman, which is immediate and is directly experienced” (BrhU.3.4.1), and give instruction about it, as being an entity firmly established, thus — “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7). It is not possible to construe that the passage “That thou art” means, that one would become so after death. For another Scriptural passage — “The Sage Vāma-deva visualizing himself as Brahman, understood that he himself was Manu and the Sun” (BrhU.1.4.10) — shows that the fruit of perfect knowledge, viz. the union with the Universal Self, springs up the very moment true knowledge supervenes. Therefore, the attainment of Mokṣa is the invariable and uniform fruit, which, a person who has attained perfect knowledge, without exception, obtains. — 32.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Akṣara-dhiyam: of the meditation of negative attributes belonging to the Imperishable; Tu: but, indeed; Avarodhaḥ: combination; Sāmānya-tad-bhāvābhyām: because of the similarity (of denying Brahman through denials) and the object (viz., Imperishable Brahman) being the same; Aupasadavat: as in the case of the Upasad (offering) like the hymn or the Mantra in connection with the Upasada rite; Tat: that; Uktam: has been explained (by Jaimini in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā).🔗 Conceptions about the Imperishable one (‘Akṣara’ i.e. Brahman) (which are expressed in the form of negations) are to be included (everywhere) because of similarity (of the definition) and also because the Object representing these negative conceptions (i.e. the Akṣara-Brahman) is the same. It is like the Aupasada (Upasada-Iṣṭi). That has been stated (by Jaimini, in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). — 3.3.33. In the Vāja-saneyaka it is stated thus — “This verily, Oh Gārgi, is the Imperishable one (i.e. Brahman) of which the Brāhmaṇas (those who have realized Brahman) speak, and which is neither gross, nor atomic, nor short, nor long, nor red, nor oily etc.” (BrhU.3.8.8). Then in the Ātharvaṇa it is stated — “Now about the highest i.e. Para (Vidyā) by which this Imperishable one is understood, and which is that which cannot be seen or comprehended and is without any origin (i.e. cause) or attribute” (MunU.1.1.5). Similarly, elsewhere in some places also, this Imperishable Highest Brahman is spoken of by the Scriptures by way of negating some special characteristic (about it). Therein in some places, Brahman in the form of the Imperishable, is described by way of the denial of some particular characteristics, other than those mentioned in some of the other various places. With regard to all these knowledges, by way of the denials of some one or other particular characteristic in some one place or other, when there is a doubt as to whether all such negative conceptions are restricted to the various places where they are mentioned or should be understood as obtaining everywhere, and the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they should be restricted, each to the particular place where it is mentioned, we say — All special negative conceptions about the Imperishable one (Brahman) should all be understood as obtaining everywhere, because the Imperishable (Brahman) is common to all and the definitions are similar The manner of expounding Brahman which is of a nature involving denial of every special conception, is common everywhere. The same identical Brahman is understood to be propounded everywhere, so why should such negative conceptions (about Brahman) referred to in one place, not be available in other places? It has been so explained in the Sūtra “Bliss etc. belong to the principal one (i.e. Brahman)” (Bra. Su. III. iii. 11). The distinction between the two is that, special characteristics of a positive injunctional nature were considered there (i.e. in Bra. Su. III. iii. 11), while negative conceptions are considered here. This distinction between these two kinds of considerations (Cintābhedaḥ) is with a view to secure a detailed elaborate treatment (of Brahman). That, it is like the Aupasada i.e. the Upasada sacrifice (Iṣṭi), is the illustration in point. Just as in the Ahīna Sacrifice of Jamad-agni (a sacrifice which lasts for more than one day), wherein an Upasada Puro-ḍāśa (offering) is enjoined, the incantations (Mantras) along with which these Puro-ḍāśas are offered, viz., “Oh Agni, may thou protect the sacrifice etc.” (Tan. Brah. 21.10.11), are connected with the Adhvaryu (sacrificial priest representing the Yajur-Veda), even though the incantations have their origin in the Sāman-Veda of the Udgātṛ (i.e. the chanting priest), because it is the Adhvaryu who is supposed to offer such Puro-ḍāśa, and also because subsidiary matters go with the principal matter, similarly, the meaning is, that here also, inasmuch as, all these special negative conceptions about the Imperishable one (i.e. Brahman), wherever they may occur, go with the Imperishable one (i.e. Brahman), and because they all relate to it. This has been stated in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, thus — “Guṇa-mukhya-vyatikrame tad-arthatvān mukhyena Veda-saṃyogaḥ” (Jai. Su. 3.3.9). — 33.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Iyat: so much only, this much; Āmananāt: on account of being mentioned in the scripture.🔗 Because mention is made (by the Scriptures) that it (i.e. the nature of the Vidyā) has this particular limit (the same one Vidyā is mentioned). — 3.3.34. In the chapter dealing with the Adhyātma aspect (i.e. the relation of the Jīva-Self to the Highest Self) the Ārtharvaṇikas and the Śvetāśvataras recite the Mantras — “Two birds, close companions and friends, attach themselves to a common tree. One of them eats the sweet Pippala fruit, while the other does not partake of it, but merely keeps looking on” (MunU.3.1.1). Similarly, the Kaṭhas recite — “Drinking the fruit of one’s own good actions in this world, the two (i.e. the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self) having entered the cave which is at the highest peak (viz. intelligence i.e. Buddhi, the highest in a body), and who are, as stated by those who have realized Brahman, to be like sunshine and shadow (i.e. opposed to each other in attributes), and similarly by the Pañcāgnis (i.e. house-holders who have kept the five fires), i.e. Tri-ṇāciketas (i.e. who have kindled the three Naciketas fires” (KathU.1.3.1). The doubt that arises here is, whether these two (Mantras) form identical or separate Vidyās. What then is your conclusion? (The opponent of Vedānta says) — It is that they form separate Vidyās. Whence is it so? Because a distinction (between them) is discernible. In the Mantras “Two birds etc.”, one is seen to be the experiencer and the other to be the abstainer, while in the other Mantra “Drinking the fruit etc.”, both are seen to be equally the experiences, and the nature of that which is to be known being thus different (in each), the Vidyās are separate. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), it is replied, that there is identity of the Vidyās. Whence is it so? Because in both these Mantras the nature of that which is to be known, is mentioned as being non-different, circumscribed by a limit, and endowed with duality. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the difference in their nature has been indicated (by me). (We reply) — No, both these Mantras propound the one Lord (Parameśvara) only, having the Jīva-Self as its second (Jīva-dvitīya), and not different entities. In the Mantra “Two birds etc.”, by “the other one does not partake of it but merely keeps looking on”, the Highest Self (Paramātmā) which is beyond any sensation of hunger etc., is referred to. In the complementary passage also the same (Paramātmā) appears to be referred to, thus — “When he sees the other one, the Lord, approached in different ways (i.e. by the paths of Karma and Yoga), and knows (all this world) as his greatness” (SvetU.4.7). In the Mantra “Drinking etc.”, when it is the Jīva-Self that is meant to be the one that drinks, the Highest Self, also, inasmuch as it is always in association with it, and even though it is beyond any sensation of hunger etc., is metaphorically referred to also as drinking with it, on the analogy of the ‘maxim of the Umbrella’. Of course this is a chapter dealing with the Highest Self, inasmuch as it begins with the verse “Other than the doing of meritorious actions i.e. Dharma and unmeritorious actions i.e. Adharma” (KathU.1.2.14), and the complementary passage here, also refers to the same subject, thus — “Who is the bund (of security) for those who engage themselves in sacrifices, the imperishable Brahman, and one that is the transcendent” (KathU.1.3.2). The same has been dealt with in detail in “The two Selfs that have entered the cave” (Bra. Su. I.ii.ll). Therefore, there is no difference in the Vidyās, and there is thus an identity of Vidyās (in both). Besides when these three Mantras of the Scriptures are carefully interpreted, it is understood, that they all contain the Vidyā of the Highest Self, and the reference to the Jīva-Self is in fact made, not with a desire to speak about it as a different entity as such, but with a view to speak of its being identical with the Highest Self. It has already been mentioned (by us) that there is no scope for any consideration as to whether there is any difference or otherwise, so far as the Vidyā of the Highest Self is concerned. The present Sūtra (Yoga) is merely by way of a detailed elaborate treatment (of the subject). Therefore also, the extra characteristics (in one place) are to be combined (in all places). — 34.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Antarā: as being innermost of all, inside, the status of being the inmost; Bhūta-grāmavat: as in the case of the aggregate of the elements; Sva-ātmanaḥ: of one’s own self.🔗 As the same Universal Highest Self is taught to be the innermost of all, as in the case of the aggregate of elements (Bhūta-grāmavat), even so, as that very same one’s own Self is the entity to be known (in the Uṣasta and Kahola Brāhmaṇas, the Vidyās are identical). — 3.3.35. With respect to the questions of Uṣasta and Kahola, the Vāja-saneyins mention the same question, twice consecutively, thus — “(Tell me about) that which immediately and directly is Brahman, and which is the innermost Self of all” (BrhU.3.4.1 and 3.5.1). With regard to that, the doubt is whether the Vidyās in the same sentence used twice here are but one and the same Vidyā or whether they are two separate Vidyās. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they are two separate Vidyās, on the strength of the same sentence which is repeated twice. Otherwise, assuming that nothing more nor less is meant (in the two sentences), a mention of it twice would be meaningless. So, just as on account of repetition, religious actions are construed to be separate (according to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā), even so, inasmuch as there is repetition here, the Vidyās are separate. That being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the reply is — As the same universal Highest Self (Svātmā) is stated to be inside all, in a general and common way, there is unity of Vidyās. The question asked and the reply given, refer in a common way to one and the same one’s own Self which is said to be inside all. Two Selfs cannot possibly be the innermost Selfs, in one and the same body. Therefore, the statement about being the innermost of all, can be proper or cogent in the case of only one ‘Self’, and another ‘Self’ cannot possibly be an entity innermost of all, even as it is in the case of the aggregate of elements. Just as in the case of a body (which is) an aggregate of five elements, Āpaḥ (water) is inside the Pṛthivī (earth), and Tejas is inside the Āpaḥ, in a relative sense, but this being inside relatively, cannot be ‘inside all’ in the principal sense, even so it is in this case. Or else it may be understood, that the words “like the aggregate of elements” are mentioned (in the Sūtra) as an illustration from another Scriptural passage. The meaning is, that just as in the Mantra “There is one and only one God, hidden in the aggregate of elements, he is all-pervading, and is the Self of all” (SvetU.6.11), only one Universal Highest Self is spoken of as being inside the aggregate of elements, even so it is, in the case of these Brāhmaṇa passages. Therefore, as the entity to be known is but one only, the Vidyās are identical. — 35.
[Go top]
Anyathā: otherwise; Bheda-anupapattih: the repetition cannot be accounted for, no justification for the variety in the wording of the two replies; Iti: so, this; Cet: if; Na: no, not so; Upadeśa-antaravat: as will be seen from other teachings, as in the teaching of another Vidyā, mode of meditation, namely the Satya Vidyā in the Chandogya. (Bheda: difference; An-upapattiḥ: not obtaining.)🔗 If it be said (that unless the Vidyās are understood to be separate), the two identical but separate statements are not reasonably sustainable, (we reply) — No, because it is only like (the repetition in) another Scriptural instruction. — 3.3.36. The objection taken (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz., that unless the Vidyās are understood to be separate, the two identical but separate Scriptural statements are not reasonably sustainable, has to be refuted. With regard to that, we reply — This is no fault, because it becomes reasonably sustainable, as it is in the case of (similar repetitions in) another Scriptural instruction (about the same one thing). Just as in the sixth chapter of the Upaniṣad of the Tāṇḍins (i.e. Chāndogya), even though the Scriptural instruction “That is the Self, that thou art, Oh Śveta-keto” (ChanU.6.8.7) is repeated nine times, the Vidyā does not thereby become separate, even so, will it be, in this case also. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — How is it that the Vidyās do not become separate, even though Scriptural instruction is given nine times? (We reply) — Because we understand from the introductory and the concluding portions, that they mean the same one entity, inasmuch as the Scriptures refer to the same one entity again and again, as the entity to be propounded, in the passage “May the Bhagavān be pleased to teach me (the same Brahman) once again” (ChanU.6.5.4), and because, it is in this way that by the removal of every fresh doubt, Scriptural instruction given more than once is made reasonably sustainable. Similarly, here also, inasmuch as there is no difference in the nature of the question, and the concluding portion, “Every thing else than this is perishable” (BrhU.1.1.1, 3.5.1), also is identical, it appears that the introductory and the concluding portions refer to the same one entity. Kahola who uses the word ‘eva’ in the second question, thus — “That very (entity) again which immediately and directly is Brahman” (BrhU.3.5.1), shows that the same entity referred to (by Uṣasta) in the previous question, viz. “that which immediately and directly is Brahman”, is brought forward in the later question (of Kahola). In the former Brāhmaṇa passage, the existence of the Self as apart from the body and the sense-organs is stated, while in the latter, the same Self is referred to as the one which is beyond the attributes of transmigratory condition such as hunger etc. (see Su. 34). In this way, it becomes reasonably sustainable that the same entity is meant. Therefore, the Vidyā is the same (in both these Brāhmaṇas). — 36.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Vyatihāraḥ: exchange; reciprocity (of meditation); Viśiṃṣanti: (the scriptures) explain clearly, distinguish; Hi: because, for; Itaravat: as in other cases.🔗 There is reciprocal interchange of (meditations). The Scriptural recensions (of both) also state distinctly to that effect. It is as in the case of other (attributes). — 3.3.37. The Scriptural statement of the Aitareyas, with reference to the Puruṣa in the Sun, is like this — “That which I am, He is, and what He is, I am”, while the Jābālas mention this way — “Oh great divinity, thou indeed art myself arid I verily am thou”. Now the question here is, whether reciprocal interchange of meditations of both these kinds are to be made here, or meditation of only one kind is to be made. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that meditation of only one kind is to be made. Beyond meditating upon the oneness of the Jīva-Self and the Lord, nothing else is to be meditated upon here. Now, if it be specially meditated upon, that the transmigratory Jīva-Self is the Lord, and the Lord is the transmigratory Jīva-Self, then, in meditating that the transmigratory Jīva-Self is the Lord, the status of the transmigratory Jīva-Self would of course be enhanced, but on the other hand, in meditating that the Lord is the transmigratory Jīva-Self, the status of the Lord would be lowered. Therefore, meditation ought to be only of one nature (i.e. one-sided) only and (it should be understood) that the Scriptural statement in a reciprocal manner both ways is for the purpose of strengthening the unity of both. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the reply is — The statement about the reciprocal interchange of meditation, is merely for meditation. Just as in the case of the other attributes, i.e. just as other attributes such as ‘being the Self of all’ etc. are mentioned by the Scriptures for meditation, even so, here, the Scriptures have stated in both ways, viz. “Thou art myself and I am thou”, and such statement would have meaning only if the meditations are meant to be reciprocally interchanged, as otherwise this special mention of meditation both ways would be meaningless, because meditation in one way only would suffice. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) I have stated that if it were to be imagined that the Scriptural statement speaks of reciprocal interchange, then, as in that case the. transmigratory Jīva-Self will have to be considered to be the deity and the deity to be the transmigratory Jīva-Self, and thus there would be a lowering of the status (of the Lord). We reply — This is no fault, because in this way, it is precisely the unity (of the transmigratory Jīva-Self and the deity) that would thus happen to be meditated upon. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) in that case the predicament of the very same strengthening of the unity (already referred to by me) would occur. (We reply) — We are not in this way seeking to avoid the strengthening of the unity, but we wish to propound only this much, by depending upon the authoritativeness of Scriptural statements, that, meditations of both these kinds should be made by reciprocal interchange and not of one kind only. No doubt, it would virtually (Phalataḥ) result in strengthening the unity. It is just this way. Though the instruction, about the Lord’s having the attribute ‘of possessing desires that are always true’, is for the purpose of meditation only, still it also does establish the existence of the Lord as endowed with such an attribute. Therefore, this reciprocal interchange (of meditation) should be made, and such meditation deserves to be combined in the case of other similar Vidyās. — 37.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Sā eva: the same (Satya Vidyā); Hi: because; Satya-ādayaḥ: (attributes like) Satya etc.🔗 (In both the places viz. in the 4th and the 5th Kaṇḍikas of the 5th Adhyāya of Bṛhad-āraṇyaka) the same (Satya-Vidyā is mentioned) and, therefore, (attributes such as) Satya etc. (ought to be combined). — 3.3.38. In the Vāja-saneyaka after enjoining the Satya-Vidyā comprising of the meditation on the name ‘Satya’ with its component letters Sa (स), Ta (त), Ya (य), the first and the third representing Truth, and the middle one representing ‘untruth’ held fast between them) by the Scriptural passage — “He who knows that all-pervading, worshipworthy (Yakṣa), first-born Satya i.e. Brahman (the Hiraṇya-garbha)” (BrhU.5.4.1), it is later on mentioned thus — “That which is that Satya, is the Āditya, he, who is the Puruṣa in the sphere (of the Sun), and he, who is also the Puruṣa in the right eye” BrhU.5.5.2). Now with respect to this, a doubt arises, as to whether these are two different Satya-Vidyās or whether they both are but one and the same Vidyā. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that they are two Vidyās, because they have been connected with separate fruits or results, viz. with “He conquers these worlds” (BrhU.5.4.1) in the former sentence, and with “He destroys and casts off all sin” (BrhU.5.5.3, 4) in the latter one, while the bringing forward of the relevant Satya (in the former sentence), into the latter one, is, because, the object of meditation (viz. Hiraṇya-garbha) is one and the same (in both the Vidyās). The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being to this effect, we reply — There is but one Satya-Vidyā (in both the places). Whence is it so? Because, in the passage “What that is, is that Satya” BrhU.5.5.2), what was relevant in the former is brought forward into the latter. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been said (by me) already that even when the Vidyās are separate, this bringing forward of the thing relevant in the former, into the latter one, is reasonably sustainable. (We reply) — It is not so. Of course, it may well be so, where, because of some other patent reason a difference in the Vidyās is perceived. But here in this case, where both these (views) are possible, precisely because of the bringing forward of the former “What that is, is that Satya” later on, by the passage “What that is, is that Satya”, it is determined that there is unity of Vidyās here, because the same Satya connected with the earlier Vidyā is brought forward in the later Vidyā. With respect to the argument (of the opponent of Vedānta) that as a separate fruit is stated by the Scriptures, the Vidyās are separate, we reply — that the Scriptural statement about the other fruit or result, being only in glorification of the instruction about another subsidiary matter, viz., that its esoteric names are ‘‘Ahaḥ’ and ‘Aham’, there is no fault. Besides, if the fruits or results have to be imagined from the Artha-vāda passages only, and, if there is unity of Vidyās, the several fruits or results stated by the Scriptures to be the fruits or results of the several parts (Avayavas) of such Vidyā, (have to be combined into one fruit or result of the whole Vidyā (i.e. the Avayavī), and therefore, inasmuch as one Satya-Vidyā alone is mentioned here by the Scriptures as being endowed with particular different special features, all attributes, such as Satya etc., have to be combined in the single act (of meditation). Some others, however, holding that this Vāja-saneyaka passage, which relates to the subject of the Puruṣa in the eye and the Sun, is the same that is mentioned in the Chāndogya passages, “Now, this aureate Puruṣa that is seen to be in the Sun” and “and now this Puruṣa that is seen in the eye”, and holding that this Vidyā relating to the Puruṣa in the Sun and in the eye (in the two places) is but one and the same Vidyā in both the places, consider, that the attributes occurring in the Vāja-saneyaka Vidyā viz. “Satya etc.” are to be combined with these mentioned in the Vidyā of the Chando-gas. But it does not appear to be proper to think so, because the Vidyā in the Chāndogya appears to relate to the Jyoti-ṣṭoma ritual belonging to the Udgītha (the religious ritual of the singing by the Udgātṛ, a Sāman-Veda priest, in the Jyoti-ṣṭoma). Because indicatory marks relating to a religious Karma are present there, in the beginning, the middle and the end, as for instance, “This (Earth) indeed is Ṛk and the Agni is the Sāman” in the beginning, “A Ṛk and the Sāman are the singers and therefore, it is the Udgītha” (ChanU.1.6.8) in the middle, and “He who, knowing thus, sings the Sāman” (ChanU.1.7.9), in the concluding portion, while there is no such indicatory mark relating to Karma, in the Vāja-saneyaka. Hence, inasmuch as there is difference in the Vidyās, due to the difference in the introductory portion (Prakrama), that the attributes (of these Vidyās) are restricted to only where they are mentioned, is logical. — 38.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Kāma-ādi: (Satya-saṅkalpa-ādi) (True) desire etc.; Itaratra: in the other, elsewhere, in the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad; Tatra: there, in the Chandogya Upaniṣad; Ca: also; Āyatana-ādibhyaḥ: on account of the abode etc.🔗 (Attributes such as) (true) desires etc. (in one place, are to be combined) elsewhere and vice versa, because of (the similarity of) the abode etc. — 3.3.39. The Chando-gas beginning thus — “Now the lotus-like small palace that is in this body (i.e. Brahma-pura, lit., the city of Brahman) and the small Ākāśa that is within it” (ChanU.8.1.1), recite — “This Self which is without sin, and is unaging and undying and is sans-grief, sans-hunger, and sans-thirst, and is the one, whose desires are true, and whose resolutions are true” (ChanU.8.1.5). Similarly the Vāja-saneyins recite — “Verily that great Self, that is unborn and is one that alone amongst the Prāṇas (i.e. sense-organs) has the structure of knowledge (Vijñānamaya). (Who is) the ruler of all, and sleeps in the Ākāśa of the Hṛdaya” (BrhU.4.4.22). Now, the doubt here being, as to whether there is unity of Vidyās here, and a mutual combination of attributes, (the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is) that there is unity of Vidyā. With regard to that it is said — “(attributes such as) desires etc.”. The meaning is — “true desires etc.”, just as Deva-datta is called Datta, and Satya-bhāmā is called Bhāmā (for short). Such set of attributes of the Ākāśa of the Hṛdaya, as having true desires (Satya-kāmatva) etc., observed (by us) in the Chāndogya, combine with “This great unborn Self” in the Vāja-saneyaka, and the “rulership over all etc.” observed in the Vāja-saneyaka, also combine with “This Self that is without Sin etc.” in the Chāndogya. Whence is it so? Because, “the abode etc.” is common to both. The same common abode, viz. the Hṛdaya, the same Lord who is the common subject to be known, and the same common characteristic of being a ‘bund’ (Setu) calculated to protect the worlds from promiscuity, and so many other such common characteristics are observed. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) as between them, we observe particular differences also. For instance in the Chāndogya, the attributes belong to the Ākāśa of the Hṛdaya, while in the Vāja-saneyaka they belong to Brahman which is the support of that Ākāśa. We reply — No, because in Brahma-Sūtra I. iii. 14, it has been established that the word Ākāśa in the Chāndogya means Brahman. This however is the particular difference here. In the Chāndogya the Vidyā of qualified Brahman is taught, because the passage “Now, those who having realized the Self and its true desires, here during life, depart from this body” speaks of the Self, as also of the desires, as the things to be known. In the Vāja-saneyaka, however, the instruction is about the unqualified transcendent Brahman, as is evident from the coordination of the question and the reply, “Now after this, tell me about (that which leads to) Final Release” (BrhU.4.3.14) and “This Puruṣa is unattached” (BrhU.4.3.15) respectively. In the Vāja-saneyaka the set of attributes such as being the ruler etc., is stated for the purpose of the glorification of the Self, and, afterwards by the concluding portion “That Ātmā which is (negatively) described as ‘not so’, ‘not so’” etc., it is the unqualified Brahman that is spoken of. As however the qualified Brahman is (essentially) the same as the unqualified Brahman, it should be understood that the combining of the attributes as stated in the Sūtra, is merely for the purpose of illustrating the exalted stature of Brahman and not for the purpose of contemplation. — 39.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Ādarāt: on account of the respect shown; A-lopaḥ: there can be no omission.🔗 Because of the deference (shown by the Scriptures) the Agni-hotra (to the Prāṇa), is not to be dropped. — 3.3.40. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, referring to Vaiśvā-nara-Vidyā the Scriptures declare thus — “That the food (Bhakta) that comes in first is for the Sacrifice. The oblation that he offers first, he should offer, saying ‘To the Prāṇa, Svāhā’” (ChanU.5.19.1). Five such oblations to the Prāṇa are enjoined therein, and the word Agni-hotra is afterwards applied to them, thus — “One who knows it to be so and performs the Agni-hotra” (ChanU.5.24.2) and “Just as hungry children sit round their mother, even so, all creatures sit round the Agni-hotra” (ChanU.5.24.5). With regard to that the following consideration arises, viz., whether, when no dinner is taken, this Agni-hotra is to be dropped, or whether it is not to be so dropped. Because the Scriptures speak about the connection (of the Agni-hotra) with the food that comes in — “as that food etc. that comes in first”, and as such coming in of the food is for the purpose of dining, (it would appear that) when such a meal is missed, the Agni-hotra to the Prāṇa also is dropped. This being the conclusion arrived at, (the opponent of Vedānta) says, that it, rather, is not so dropped. Why? Because of the deference (shown by the Scriptures). For, even so, is the Scriptural statement of the Jābālas in the Vaiśvā-nara-Vidyā thus — “He (the performer of Agni-hotra) should dine (i.e. give five oblations to the Prāṇa), before his guest (dines)”. The Scriptural passage “It verily is, as if a man without himself offering an oblation (in an Agni-hotra), performs the Agni-hotra for another”, which, after having censured that dining by the guest first, purports to give precedence to the dining by the host (Svāmi i.e. Yajamāna) and thus shows deference to the Agni-hotra of the Prāṇa. And they consider, that when the Scriptures do not countenance such conceding of precedence to the guest in the matter of dining, much less then would they tolerate the dropping out of the Agni-hotra altogether. But (says the Vedāntin) it has been shown, that, as it has a connection with the food that comes in first for the dinner, when the dinner is not taken, the Agni-hotra also is not performed. (The opponent of Vedānta) says — No, because that passage purports to prescribe a particular kind of material for the Agni-hotra. As, in the case of the ordinary Agni-hotra, materials such as milk etc. are prescribed, and inasmuch as the word Agni-hotra occurs here also, therefore, on the analogy of the ‘Ayana’ (a Sacrifice which lasts for a year) of the Kauṇḍa-pāyins (i.e. those, who in a sacrifice drink Soma from a pot called Kuṇḍa), when such duty is to be performed, the Scriptural passage “That food which comes in first etc.” is meant to enjoin a particular kind of subsidiary matter relating to a particular kind of food. Therefore the conclusion arrived at (by me) is that even though a subsidiary matter (as for instance food for a dinner) is absent, the principal matter (viz. the Agni-hotra) is not dropped. Even though dinner is not taken, Prāṇa-Agni-hotra should be performed just the same, with some material which is not incompatible, such as water, or any other material, on the analogy of the ‘maxim of furnishing a substitute (Pratinidhi-Nyāya). — 40.
[Go top]
The Sūtra-kāra replies —Upasthite: being present, being near, when food is served; Ataḥ: from that, on that account; Tad-vacanāt: for so (the Śruti) declares.🔗 When dinner is ready, (Prāṇa-Agni-hotra should be performed with that i.e. with the food available) because the Scriptures have mentioned to that effect. — 3.3.41. When dinner is ready, Prāṇa-Agni-hotra should be performed with that i.e. with that very same food which becomes available first. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures have said so, thus — “That food which comes in first is fit for the purpose of offering as an oblation (Homīya) in a sacrifice” (ChanU.5.19.1). By referring to food which has become available first (i.e. which is ready at hand) as a thing already established, the Scriptures prescribe that the oblations to the Prāṇa should be accomplished with material which is meant for another purpose (viz. a dinner). How can these oblations which by themselves do not possess a characteristic of enjoining anything, be themselves able to suggest the substitution of any other material (to be used as oblations), when such a dinner itself is dropped? Besides, no features of an ordinary Agni-hotra are available here. In the Ayana of Kauṇḍa-pāyins the word Agni-hotra, occurring in the injunctional clause “He performs Agni-hotra for a month”, may well be construed as enjoining an ordinary Agni-hotra, and hence it would be logical that subsidiary features of such an ordinary Agni-hotra, may well become available in that case, whereas, in the present case (of a Prāṇa-Agni-hotra) the word Agni-hotra which occurs in an Artha-vāda passage, does not deserve to enjoin a similar ordinary Agni-hotra, because if it were to be understood that features of such an Agni-hotra do become available here, such other subsidiary features as the kindling of a fire etc., also, may become equally available here, which of course is not possible. The kindling of a fire is for the purpose of its acting as the base for the sacrificial oblations. This (i.e. Prāṇa-Agni-hotra) Sacrifice is not meant to be made into a fire, as in that case there would be the predicament of the destruction of the oblations which are meant to be eaten (by the sacrificer), and also because of their relation to the material made ready for a dinner, this offering of the oblation (in the Prāṇa-Agni-hotra) is necessarily to be offered in the mouth (Āsye). The Jābāla Scriptural statement “He should dine before the guest (dines)” shows the accomplishment of the offering of oblations as being made in the mouth only. That is why here also, the Scriptures indicate that the subsidiary parts of the Agni-hotra are to be fancifully imagined, thus — “That the chest is the Vedi (altar), the hairs are the Sacrificial grass, the Hṛdaya is the Gārha-patya fire, the mind is the Anvāhārya-pacana fire, and the mouth is the Āhavanīya fire” (ChanU.5.18.2). The Scriptural statement about the Vedi (altar) here, should be understood to mean the ‘Sthaṇḍila’ (i.e. a piece of ground, levelled as a square, and prepared for a sacrifice, because, in an Agni-hotra in the principal sense, there is no Vedi), and the subsidiary matters of an Agni-hotra are only to be fancifully imagined. And as this Prāṇa-Agni-hotra is connected with a dinner which is taken at a particular stated time (i.e. noon and evening) it has no connection with the time of an ordinary Agni-hotra (i.e. early morning and night). The other features of an ordinary Agni-hotra such as the saying of prayers (‘Upasthāna’) etc. also would be contradicted here in some way or other. Therefore, these five oblations connected with Mantras, materials, and Deities, are to be offered when a dinner is ready. The statement showing deference, is for prescribing precedence to the host for dinner, (before the guest). This Scriptural passage cannot bear the burden of any more meaning (“Nahyasti vacansyātibhāraḥ”). It is not possible to indicate by that sentence, that the Prāṇa-Agni-hotra has to be invariably performed (whether there be any dinner or otherwise). Therefore, (it is concluded that) when a dinner is missed the Prāṇa-Agni-hotra is also dropped. — 41.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tad-nirdhāraṇa-aniyamaḥ: no rule, about the inviolability of that; Tad-dṛṣṭiḥ: that being seen (from the Śruti); Pṛthak: separate; Hi: because; A-pratibandhaḥ: non-obstruction; Phalam: fruit, reward, result.🔗 As regards the relation of specific determinations (Nirdhāraṇā) about meditations i.e. Upāsanās (with religious actions), there is no rule, because, it is so seen (from the Scriptures). Besides there is a separate fruit (for these meditations) viz. the nonobstruction (of the fruit of the sacrificial act). — 3.3.42. (In the Scriptures) there are some Cognitions i.e. Vidyās connected with matters subsidiary to religious acts (such as sacrifices), as for instance — “He should meditate on the imperishable (Om) which is the Udgītha” (ChanU.1.1.1). We will now consider whether they (i.e. such meditations) are connected with such religious acts (i.e. sacrifices) permanently, just as for instance, the Palāśa wood ladle (used for offering ghee in sacrificial fire) is, to a sacrificial act, or whether they are not so permanently connected, just as the milkpail (Go-dohana, used optionally in a sacrifice for carrying water, according to whether the sacrificer’s aim is or is not the acquisition of cattle), for instance, is not. What then, is the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that they are permanently connected. Whence is it so? Because they are accepted to be so i.e. included in Scriptural statements about the ritualistic forms of sacrifices (Prayoga-vacana). Even though these (meditations) are not mentioned by starting a specific chapter about them, yet, inasmuch as, they are connected with sacrifices through the Udgītha etc., they do connect themselves with the statements about other ritualistic forms (of sacrifices) as subsidiary matters, quite in the same way, as other subsidiary matters (such as the Palāśa-wood ladle etc.) are connected. So far as the fruits of such meditations, mentioned by the Scriptures in passages in their own context, viz. “He verily becomes the conferor of all desires” (ChanU.1.1.7) etc., are concerned, inasmuch as, that statement is merely an Artha-vāda passage, because of its being mentioned in the form of the present tense (and not in an injunctional form), similar to the Scriptural statement — “One who hears no evil”, and because of their not having the object of mentioning a fruit principally, therefore, just as passages, such as “He whose sacrificial ladle is of Palāśa wood does not hear of any evil”, which are not mentioned in any chapter, become permanently connected with a sacrificial act, by way of the sacrificial ladle, as if they are recited in such a chapter, even so, these meditations on the Udgītha etc. also, are permanently connected (with a sacrificial act). This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — “As regards the relation of these specific determinations about meditations such as on Udgīṭha etc. (with religious actions) there is no rule”. These particular specific determinations about the nature of matters subsidiary to religious actions, such as Udgīṭha etc. — viz. ‘that the Udgītha is the best of all essences’, ‘a fulfiller of desires’, ‘a conferor of desires’, ‘he is the Sun etc.’ — cannot possibly belong to sacrificial actions permanently. Whence is it so? Because it is seen to be so (from the Scriptures). Because the Scriptures indicate, that they are not so connected permanently, thus — “By means of that (the imperishable ‘Om’), both those who know it to be so, and those who do not, perform actions” (ChanU.1.1.10), which shows, that it is permissible, even to those who are ignorant, to perform such religious actions as sacrifices. The Prastotṛ and others (priests at a sacrifice) even when they are devoid of any knowledge of the deities of the Prastāva etc. are observed to undertake the performance of sacrifices, as is seen in the Scriptural passages — “Oh Prastotṛ, if without knowing the deity appropriate to a Prastāva, you perform the Prastāva, or chant Sāma Ṛks or recite the Pratihāra etc.” (ChanU.1.1.9–11)”. Besides, it is observed that such Cognitions i.e. Vidyās which are subsidiary to religious acts, have a fruit of their own, different from the fruit of these religious acts, such as, the non-obstruction of the resulting of fruits of actions, i.e. its abundance, i.e. some special excellence, thus — “By means of that (imperishable ‘Om’) both those who know it to be so, and those who do not, perform actions. Actions performed by those who know (Vidyayā) and actions performed by those who are ignorant (Avidyayā) are however different from each other and whatever he does equipped with knowledge, faith and esoteric meditation, has greater power” (ChanU.1.1.10). Now because in the sentence “Actions performed by those who have knowledge and by those who are ignorant, are but different from each other (Nānā tu)”, the actions of those who know and those who know not, are made out to be separate from each other, and also because of the use of the “Tarap” termination (of the comparative degree of comparison) in the word ‘of greater power’ (Vīryavattara), it is understood that the actions, even of those who are ignorant, do of course have some power after all. And this becomes reasonably sustainable, only if the Cognitions i.e. Vidyās are not permanently connected with religious actions. If it be supposed, that the connection of a Vidyā with religious actions is permanent, then how can it be understood that action performed without knowledge is powerful (at least to some extent)? It stands well established that it is only when all the subsidiary matters are combined with an action, that such action can (possibly) be powerful. Moreover in the case of meditations in which the idea of different worlds is superimposed on the Sāmās (Loka-sāmādiṣu), each separate meditation has its own separate and different fruit, as for instance — “To Him the worlds above and below become competent (to afford experience)” (ChanU.2.2.3) etc., and it is not logical, to understand this Scriptural statement about the fruit, as being merely an Artha-vāda passage (i.e. merely glorificatory), because in that case, it would inevitably have to be understood to be a Guṇa-vāda (i.e. a passage stating a secondary matter only), but as the Scriptures speak about a fruit, it is reasonably sustainable that they are to be understood in the principal sense (Mukhya-vāda). In the case of specific particular actions such as Prayāja etc. (i.e. actions subsidiary to a sacrifice), they being necessary for a sacrifice which expects all subsidiary actions to be duly performed for its own proper fulfilment (Iti-kartavyatā-kāṅkṣasya), it is logical that the Scriptural statement about their fruit is but an Artha-vāda (i.e. it is merely in glorification of the Prayāja). The same is true of such statements as the one about the sacrificial ladle being made of Palāśa wood etc., which are mentioned without beginning any special chapter about them. It is not possible to imagine that things, such as the ladle being of Palāśa wood, which in themselves do not possess the nature of actions, (and which are only casually stated without beginning any special chapter about them), can have any relation to any fruit, unless they depend upon something else. So far however as (the use of) the milk-pail (Go-dohana) etc. is concerned, inasmuch as they have the advantage of depending upon the carrying of water which is necessary (for a sacrifice), a statement as to its fruit is reasonably sustainable. Similarly, in the case of the fact of its being made out of Bilva-wood, being connected with a sacrificial post (Yūpa), a statement as to its fruit also is reasonably sustainable. But here, there is no such other thing present, on which the fact (viz., being made of Palāśa wood) can depend. If, that sentence having stated the thing desired to be stated, viz., the fact of being made of Palāśa wood, as being dependent on a sacrificial ladle, it were to be also supposed that the sentence equally desires to express an injunction about a fruit also, then there would be (the fault of) the splitting up of a sentence. Now, meditations connected with Udgīṭha etc., being of the nature of action, any particular injunction with regard to that, being reasonably sustainable, a statement as to the fruit thereof is not contradictory. Therefore, it should be understood, that, just as the milk-pail (Go-dohana) etc., connected though they are with a sacrifice, yet, inasmuch as they have a separate fruit of their own, their connection with a sacrifice is not permanent, similarly, it is the same in the case of meditations connected with the Udgīṭha. That is precisely why the author of the Kalpa-Sūtras has not included these meditations in the category of actions. — 42.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Pradānavat: as in the case of the offerings of the ‘Pradāna, oblation’; Eva: exactly; Tat: that; Uktam: has been stated.🔗 This is similar to the Pradāna (i.e. offering of the Puro-ḍāśas). This has been mentioned (by Jaimini in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). — 3.3.43. In the Vāja-saneyaka passage “Speech (Vāk) vowed that it would continue speaking” (BrhU.1.5.21), it has been definitely ascertained that so far as Ādhyātmika entities such as speech etc. are concerned, Prāṇa is the most eminent, and so far as the Ādhidaivika entities such as Agni etc. are concerned, Vāyu is the most eminent. Similarly in the Chāndogya passage, “Vāyu verily is the general absorber” (ChanU.4.3.1), it has been definitely ascertained that as regards the Ādhidaivika entities, Vāyu is the general absorber of all entities, and in the passage “Prāṇa verily is the general absorber” (ChanU.4.3.2), it has been definitely ascertained that as regards the Ādhyātmika entities, Prāṇa is the general absorber of speech etc. Now, a doubt here arises as to whether these Vāyu and Prāṇa are to be understood to be separate entities, or whether they are to be understood to be one and the same entity. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that, because they do not differ in their essential nature, they are not different. There being no difference in their essential nature, it is not logical to meditate upon them separately. Besides the Scriptures also indicate, how the Ādhyātmika and Ādhidaivika entities are non-different in their essential nature, in the passage, thus — “Agni became speech and entered the mouth” (AitU.1.2.4), and afterwards they indicate by the passage “All these are all alike and eternal” (BrhU.1.5.13), that the exalted Ādhidaivika entity (Vāyu) is but the Self of the Ādhyātmika entity viz. Prāṇa. Similarly, in other places also it has been indicated generally that there is no difference in the essential nature of the Ādhyātmika and Ādhidaivika entities, while in one place the Scriptures specifically indicate how the Vāyu and the Prāṇa are one and the same, by the passage, “That which is Prāṇa is but Vāyu”. Similarly in the Vāja-saneyaka Brāhmaṇa cited in illustration, in the concluding verse, viz. “From where the sun rises” (BrhU.1.5.23), the Scriptures conclude, with a reference to the same Prāṇa, in the passage “That it rises from the Prāṇa and also sets in it” (BrhU.1.5.23), and thus indicate how it is one and the same. The Scriptures further confirm the same by concluding (the Brāhmaṇa) with that one Prāṇa-Vrata (an observance), by the passage — “Therefore, he should observe only one Vrata (observance), he should exercise the Prāṇa and the Apāna” (BrhU.1.5.23). Similarly in the Chāndogya also it is conveyed by the passage “Prajā-pati, the protector of the world and the sole God (running like the thread, as the Self, through all entities) i.e. as the Sūtrātmā of the great-souled four (the deities Agni, Sun, Moon, and Water on the one hand, and speech, eye, ear and mind, on the other)”, how the same entity (Vāyu) is the absorber of all, and it does not state that there is one absorber of the one quartette and another absorber of the other. Therefore, the meditations on Vāyu and Prāṇa should be understood to be non-separate. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — “That Vāyu and Prāṇa should be meditated upon as separate (entities)”. Whence is it so? Because of the instruction in the Scriptures that they are separate (entities). This instruction about the separate division of the Adhyātma and the Adhidaiva, is for the purpose of meditation and it would be meaningless, if the meditations were to be non-separate. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been said, that, because of non-difference in their essential natures, there is no separate meditation. (We reply) — This is no fault, because even though there is no such essential difference, still it is reasonably sustainable to understand, that the meditations are separate, because of the separate instructions to that effect, due to the different conditions (of Prāṇa and Vāyu). Even though the suggestion in the concluding verse is reasonably sustainable as purporting to state, that there is non-difference in the essential nature (of Prāṇa and Vāyu), still, it has no power to nullify the distinction between them as separate objects of meditation as stated earlier, and also, because of their being treated as ‘the standard of comparison’ (Upamāna) and ‘the thing compared’ (Upameya), in the Scriptural passage — “Just as this Prāṇa is the middle one as amongst the Prāṇas even so is Vāyu amongst the deities” (BrhU.1.5.22). By this the Prāṇa-Vrata also should be understood as explained. The words ‘that one only’ (Eva ca), in the Scriptural passage “The Vrata (observance) is but that one only” (BrhU.1.5.23), is for the purpose of conveying, that by rejecting the Vāk-Vrata etc., the Prāṇa-Vrata should be understood to be the only Vrata to be performed, because, the Scriptures have declared that the Vrata of speech etc. has been shattered, by the passage “Death in the form of fatigue has overcome them” (BrhU.1.5.21), and the Scriptures do not mean that the Vāyu-Vrata should be rejected, because, by beginning with the passage “Now the consideration of the Vratas” (BrhU.1.5.21), they have ultimately determined, that both Vāyu and Prāṇa equally, are entities whose Vratas have not been shattered. Again after declaring that “Only one Vrata should be observed” (BrhU.1.5.23), and then declaring its fruit to be “reaching union with Vāyu”, by the passage “By that he obtains a body like that of the Deity (Sāyujya) and the same world as that of the Deity (Sa-lokatā)” (BrhU.1.5.23), the Scriptures indicate that the Vāyu-Vrata is not given up. Now, by the word ‘Deity’ here, Vāyu ought to be understood, because the person meditating has the aim of reaching the condition of the limitless nature of the indeterminate Self (Brahman) and also because it is observed earlier that “This Deity, Vāyu, is a Deity that never sets (i.e. it is indestructible)” (BrhU.1.5.22). Similarly, the Scriptures indicate by showing the difference (between Vāyu and Prāṇa) in the passage “Vāyu as amongst the Deities and Prāṇa as amongst the sense-organs, are verily the two general absorbers” (ChanU.4.3.4), and conclude by showing difference between them thus — “They (i.e. Vāyu along with Agni, Sun, Moon, and Water) are one quintette, and these (i.e. Prāṇa along with speech, eye, ear and mind) are the other quintette, which together make the Kṛta”. Therefore, the meditations are also separate, as in the case of ‘Pradāna’ (the offering of the Puro-ḍāśas). Just as in the Triple-Puro-ḍāśa-Iṣṭi referred to in the Scriptural passage “A Puro-ḍāśa on eleven potsherds to King Indra” (where the opponent in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā maintains that the Hotṛ priest offers all the Puro-ḍāśas simultaneously, so that they may not be rendered infructuous, because if only one out of the three Puro-ḍāśas is offered to one Deity, the remaining two Puro-ḍāśas become as if they are the leavings of the first), and when the doubt is, as to whether they should be offered simultaneously or not, the conclusion (arrived at there) is, that because of difference in the attributes of the Deities, viz. the different aspects of Indra, and because of the fact that the attributes of rulership (Rājatva) etc. are different, an exchange of the Mantras such as the Ājyā and the Anuvākya in each successive offering, is enjoined, and also because the Deities are separate, therefore, according to the Scriptural enumeration (Nyāsa) the offerings also are separate and distinct, similarly, even in spite of the non-difference in the essential nature of Vāyu and Prāṇa, as the Deity meditated upon is different, the meditations also are different. In this way, even though the entity to be meditated upon is the same, inasmuch as each particular portion of it (Aṃśa) to be meditated upon, is different, the meditations also are separate. The same has been mentioned (in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) in the Saṅkarṣa Kaṇḍa, thus — “The Deities are separate because they are recognized as being separate (Nānā vā Devatā pṛthak-jñānāt)”. There, however, the sacrifices become different because the Deities and the materials of sacrifice are separate, while here, there is no such difference in the Vidyās, because of the introductory and the concluding portions, and it is understood, that only one Vidyā is enjoined both in the Adhyātma and Adhidaiva teachings. Even though the Vidyā is one, because of the difference in the Adhyātma and Adhidaiva entities, the activity i.e. Karma is different, just as the same Agni-hotra, by reason of the difference in the time (of its performance), viz. in the morning and in the evening, is each individually a different act of Agni-hotra. It is by bearing this in mind, that the Sūtra-kāra has stated in the Sūtra that it is like the offering i.e. Pradāna (in the Puro-ḍāśa Iṣṭi). — 43.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Liṅga-bhūyastvāt: because of an abundance of distinguishing marks; Tat: that, the distinguishing mark; Hi: because; Balīyaḥ: is stronger; Tat: that; Api: also.🔗 Because of a profusion of indicatory marks (these conceptual i.e. notional Agnis which represent the various modes of the mind, are Vidyās and are not related to actions). Also that i.e. an indicatory mark has greater force (than the Prakaraṇa i.e. chapter) is explained in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). — 3.3.44. In the Agni-rahasya of the Vāja-saneyins, in the Brāhmaṇa passage “Indeed in the beginning this ‘Sat’ (being) was not existing”, with reference to the mind it is recited — “It saw the thirty-six thousand Agnis belonging to its own Self, which were of the structure of the mind and were built up by it” etc. Similarly, the Scriptures speak of different conceptual Agnis built up respectively by speech, Prāṇa, eye, ear, action and fire. The doubt that arises with regard to them, is whether these Agnis, i.e. the Agnis built up by the mind etc., are related to action (Kriyā) and are subservient to it, or whether they are independent and are merely of the nature of a Vidyā. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being, that they are related to action, because of the chapter (Prakaraṇa), it is stated (in the above Sūtra) that because of the profusion of indicatory marks, it is understood, that they are independent. Many an indicatory mark is to be seen here in this Brāhmaṇa passage, which strengthens the conclusion, that they are merely of the nature of a Vidyā, viz., such indicatory marks, as for instance, “These Agnis are the handiwork of whatever these beings conceive mentally” and “All these beings, even while they sleep, do constantly keep building up these Agnis for him who knows this to be so”. That indicatory mark is, of course, greater in force than the chapter (Prakaraṇa). The same has been stated in the previous Kaṇḍa i.e. the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (Jaimini Sūtra 3.3.13) — “Śruti-liṅga-vākya-prakaraṇa-sthāna-samākhyānām samavāye pāradaurbalyamarthaviprakarṣāt”. — 44.
[Go top]
Pūrva-vikalpaḥ: an alternative form of the already mentioned first; Prakaraṇāt: on account of the context, as can be understood from the subject matter of the chapter; Syāt: there may be, ought to be; Kriyā mānasavat: ceremonial act, like the act of meditation, like the imaginary drink, as in the case of mental operation in the soma-sacrifice.🔗 Because of the chapter i.e. Prakaraṇa, (these conceptual Agnis) are but only a variation in form of the preceding one (i.e. fire built up in a brick Kuṇḍa). They may well be action (Karma), as in the case of the conceptual cup (Mānasa). — 3.3.45. (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — That these Agnis are independent and are not complementary to any other thing (like an action), is not logical. The chapter (Prakaraṇa) being one that relates to the actually kindled material Agni referred to earlier, the present instruction is merely about a special alternative form of that actual Agni, and it is not an independent Agni. But (says the Vedāntin) an indicatory mark has greater force than a chapter (Prakaraṇa). (The opponent of Vedānta says — That it is so is of course true, but an indicatory mark of this present, kind cannot have greater force than the chapter (Prakaraṇa). Inasmuch as it is in the nature of a glorification of the conceptual Agni (because it occurs in an obviously Artha-vāda passage), it is indicatory of some other matter. Any thing which is indicatory of some other matter, is, when such other matter is not available, reasonably sustainable even as a Guṇa-vāda, and as such it is unable to affect the subject matter of a chapter (Prakaraṇa). Therefore, even though these Agnis are conceptual, they are subservient to action, even as in the case of the conceptual cup, i.e. a Mānasa. Just as in the case of the tenth day of the Daśa-rātra sacrifice which is known by the name Avivākya, the sea, which is fancifully conceived to be Soma, is taken up by means of the Earth conceived as a cup, for (being offered to) the deity Prajā-pati, and the taking up of the cup, standing it up in its proper place, and the offering of Soma as an oblation to the sacrificial fire (Homa), the taking up of the remaining Soma, and the mutual invitation by the sacrificial priests to each other (to partake of the Soma), and the drinking of it, are all mentioned to be merely conceptual. The meaning is, that just as this Mānasa is a conceptual cup, and becomes subservient to action (because the chapter relates to action), even so does this particular conceptual Agni also (relate to action). — 45.
[Go top]
Atideśāt: on account of the extension (of the attributes of the first to these fires); Ca: and.🔗 Also because of the extended application by analogy (Atideśa). — 3.3.46. The extended application by analogy (of the actually kindled fire) to these conceptual Agnis, further strengthens (the conclusion), that these Agnis are subservient to action (Karma), thus — “These thirty-six thousand Agnis are so many Suns”. Each one of them is quite as much as the previously mentioned (actually kindled) Agni. Now an extended application by analogy is possible, only when there is commonness (between them). (The Scriptures) by extending the application by analogy (Atideśa) of this Agni built up in bricks for religious actions, to the conceptual Agnis, indicate, that these conceptual Agnis also are subservient to action (Karma). — 46.
[Go top]
Vidyā: Vidyā, form of meditation or worship, Knowledge; Eva: alone, indeed; Tu: verily, undoubtedly, but; Nirdhāraṇāt: because the Śruti asserts it.🔗 But (says the Vedāntin), (these conceptual Agnis) are but a Vidyā only (and they are not subservient to action) because of such determination (by the Scriptures). — 3.3.47. The word ‘but’ refutes the view (of the opponent of Vedānta). These Agnis built up by the mind etc. are of the nature of a Vidyā and are independent and are not subservient to action. The Scriptures have determined it to be so, thus — “These Agnis are such, as are built up by Vidyā alone, (and are not actual), and, they are built up by Vidyā for one who knows this to be so”. — 47.
[Go top]
Darśanāt: it being seen in the scriptures, because it is clearly stated in Śruti, because (of the indicatory marks) seen; Ca: and.🔗 Also because it is seen (from the Scriptures). — 3.3.48. Moreover, an indicatory mark showing the independent nature of these (conceptual) Agnis is to be seen. It has been shown earlier, thus — “Because of the profuse indicatory marks (in Bra. Su. III. iii. 44)”. — 48.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) even an indicatory mark, without more, i.e. without any other thing being available, is unable to establish any thing, and therefore, ignoring such indicatory mark, it was determined on the strength of the chapter (Prakaraṇa) that the Agnis were subservient to action. This is answered as follows:Śruti-ādi-baliyastvāt: on account of the greater force of the Śruti etc.; Ca: and; Na: no, cannot; Bādhaḥ: refutation.🔗 The conclusion (that these conceptual Agnis are independent and not subservient to action) is not affected, because of the Scriptures etc. being more authoritative (than the Prakaraṇa). — 3.3.49. The view that these conceptual Agnis are independent, should not be allowed to be affected, by concluding that by reason of the authority of the Chapter, they are subservient to action. It has already been established by the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtra about the Scriptures and indicatory marks (Pu.-Mi. III. 3.14) that the Scriptures (Śruti) and indicatory marks (Liṅga) and a sentence (Vākya) are of greater force than the Chapter (Prakaraṇa). In the present case they are seen to establish the view that these conceptual Agnis are independent. How is it so? Because, in the first place the Scriptures declare, thus — “It is Vidyā only that kindles these Agnis”. Similarly the indicatory mark also is, that “All creatures at all times, and even while they are asleep, keep on kindling these conceptual Agnis”. There also is a passage — “In the case of those who know it to be so, it is by Vidyā only that they are so kindled”. The Scriptural passage determining that the Agnis are kindled by Vidyā only, would be contradicted, if it were to be understood that these Agnis are subservient to action. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) this determinate conclusion may merely purport to imply the absence of any extraneous means (of kindling these Agnis). (We reply) — No, because in that case the Final determination would be superfluous, inasmuch as, were it to have such a purport, that (i.e. the determination that no extraneous means are required) will have been accomplished merely by describing their nature of being built up by Vidyā only. That such Agnis are kindled without any extraneous means is their very nature, and even though they are so kindled without any extraneous means, such determination may well be understood to have the purpose of removing a possible doubt, that like the conceptual cup (Mānasa), they also may be subservient to action. Similarly, the continuousness observed in the Scriptural passage “In the case of one who knows it to be so, all beings at all times keep on kindling up such conceptual Agnis, be he sleeping or be he awake”, is possible only on the supposition that such Agnis are independent (and not subservient to action). Just as in the conceptual Agni-hotra of the nature of speech or of the Prāṇa, the Scriptures, after mentioning “He makes an oblation of Prāṇa into Speech, and of Speech into the Prāṇa” (Kaush. 2.5), mention further, thus — “Be he awake or be he asleep, he keeps on offering such countless and immortal oblations continuously” (Kaush. 2.5), even so it is (here). Now assuming these Agnis as being subservient to action, inasmuch as such action is of but a small duration, it cannot be properly imagined that such conceptual Agnis are constantly employed (in action). It would also not be logical to say, that this (indicatory mark) is merely of the nature of an Artha-vāda. Wherever there is a distinct imperative and injunctional indicatory mark etc. it would be logical to understand that the mere mention of anything (without any injunction) is of the nature of an Artha-vāda. But, here inasmuch as a clear injunction is not available it is necessary to imagine an injunction about acquiring knowledge, merely from the mention of an Artha-vāda passage. It is possible to imagine the passage as it occurs, and as the continuous (kindling of Agni) is to be seen here, it has to be imagined only in that manner. From that, the independence of these (Agnis) is established by means of their own power. The passage “Whatsoever these beings mentally imagine, that is the handiwork of these Agnis” is also thus explained. Similarly the sentence which speaks of a relation of (these Agnis) to a particular (knowing) individual, by the words “In the case of one who knows it to be so”, militates against the possibility of any connection (of these Agnis) with a sacrifice (Kratu). Therefore, the conclusion is, that the view that these Agnis are independent (and not subservient to action) is the stronger one, and preferable (to the view that they are subservient to action). — 49.
[Go top]
Anubandha-ādibhyaḥ: from the connection and so on; Prajñā-antara-pṛthaktvavat: even as the other Vidyās are separate; Dṛṣṭaḥ: (it is) seen; Ca: and; Tat: that; Uktam: is stated (in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā by Jaimini).🔗 On account of the relationship (Anubandha) etc. (the conceptual Agnis are independent) like other Vidyās which are (considered to be) separate. It is seen (that other similar matters are so taken away from a chapter). It has also been mentioned (by Jaimini in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). — 3.3.50. This is again why, notwithstanding the chapter (Prakaraṇa), conceptual Agnis such as these built up by the mind, should be understood to be independent, inasmuch as the Scriptures bind up the modes of the mind etc., with the subordinate parts of (a sacrificial) action thus — These (Agnis) are to be established mentally, built up mentally, the sacrificial cups (Mānasa) are to be taken up mentally, the Udgātṛs (Priests who sing) have to sing their glory mentally, the Hotṛs (Priests who sacrifice) etc. have to recite them mentally, what-so-ever action (Karma) is sacrificial action and is performed in a sacrifice (for the sake of a Puruṣa) is all to be done mentally in respect of these mental i.e. conceptual and mentally built up Agnis. This relationship has conceptual exaltation (Sampat) only, as its fruit. The subordinate parts of action being actual, they ought not to be desired to be obtained by conceptual exaltation (Sampadā). No doubt should be entertained, that like meditations such as the Udgīṭha, the meditations on them (i.e. these Agnis) are subservient to action, as being related to the subordinate parts of actions, because, the Scriptural passages about them are dissimilar in their nature. The Scriptures do not mention here that any particular subordinate part of action should be selected, and any particular stated thing — such as, this — should be superimposed on it. They merely select the thirty-six thousand modes of the mind, and imagine them to be the Agnis, and imagine the sacrificial cups etc., as is imagined in a Puruṣa sacrifice (i.e. where the notion of a sacrifice is superimposed on a man) etc. It should be understood that this number of the Agnis being seen to correspond to the days of a man’s life-span, they are superimposed on the modes of the mind which are connected with the days in a man’s life. It is thus, that by reason of such a relation, the Agnis so built up mentally etc. are independent (and are not subservient to action). The word ‘etc.’ should, so far as is possible, be understood to include an extended application (Atideśa) etc. also. Similarly, by the Scriptural passage “Each of these (conceptual Agnis) is quite as much (powerful) as this earlier one (i.e. the actual material Agni used in actual Karma)”, the Scriptures, by such extended application of the greatness of the actual Agnis to such conceptual Agnis, thereby indicate their contempt for mere ritualistic action as such. Even if these conceptual Agnis be supposed to have such connection with actual action, it would not be possible to maintain that the former (i.e. conceptual Agnis) can be used optionally in place of the latter (i.e. the actually built up Agnis). The former i.e. the conceptual Agnis cannot possibly be able to render any service in actual action, in a way in which such service is rendered by such properly built up material Agni such as the Āhavanīya etc. The argument (of the opponent of Vedānta), that the extended application (Atideśa) strengthens the conclusion, that such conceptual Agnis are subservient to action, inasmuch as such extended application becomes possible only when there is something common (between two things), is, so far as our view is concerned, answered by the statement, that such extended application is equally possible here, inasmuch as both (the actual and the conceptual Agnis) have the nature of being an Agni, common to both of them, because even such conceptual Agnis, albeit conceptual, are Agnis after all. Besides, authorities such as the Scriptures etc., have also been adduced. In this way, on account of such reasons as ‘relation’ etc., these conceptual Agnis are independent, even as other Vidyās which are separate are independent. For instance, Vidyās such as the Śāṇḍilya-Vidyā and others have each their own particular relation and are independent (of action). It is also seen from the Scriptures that the ‘Aveṣṭi’ (an Iṣṭi i.e. a minor sacrificial action) which originally is recited in the chapter about the Rāja-sūya Sacrifice, is taken away from that chapter (and used elsewhere) because it has relation with the three Varṇas (castes), while the Rāja-sūya Sacrifice being a King’s sacrifice is confined to the Kṣatriya caste (Varṇa) alone. This has already been mentioned in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Jaimini Sūtra 11.4.7 to 11. — 50.
[Go top]
Na: not; Sāmānyād api: in spite of the resemblance, because of commonness, on the ground of their resemblance to sacrificial fire; Upalabdheḥ: for it is seen; Mṛtyuvat: just as in the case of death; Na hi loka-āpattiḥ: for the world does not become (fire on account of certain resemblances).🔗 Not even on the ground of similarity of features (with the ‘Mānasa’ Cup, can these conceptual Agnis be subservient to action) because it is perceived (that they are useful to a man i.e. Puruṣa). This is as it is in the case of ‘death’. Nor does the heavenly world attain the condition of Agni. — 3.3.51. Now the claim (of the opponent of Vedānta) — that it is just as it is in the case of the Mānasa Cup (i.e. the conceptual Agnis are subservient to action) — is here refuted. It is not conceivable even on the ground of having similarity of features with the Mānasa Cup, that these conceptual Agnis are subservient to action, because, on account of such reasons as Scriptural declarations, it is understood that they are useful only to the aim of man (Puruṣārtha). It could not be, that it is never possible, that an entity cannot have anything in common with any other entity (because even the most dissimilar entities have at least ‘the attribute of being an entity’, common to them), and the innate dissimilarity (between two entities) can never be thus obliterated simply on that account. This is similar to the case of ‘death’. Even though the word ‘death’ is used equally in the case of Agni and the Puruṣa in the sphere of the Sun, as for instance in the Scriptural passages — “He that is in this sphere (of the Sun) is but this Death (Yama) only” and “Agni, indeed, is Death (Yama)” (BrhU.3.2.10), there is no predicament of complete similarity as between these two and Death (Yama), or, just as in the Scriptural passage “Oh Gautama, this (heavenly) world, indeed, is Agni, and the Sun is its fuel (Samidh)”, even though there are such common features as ‘fuel etc.’, the heavenly world never really is transformed into the condition of the material Agni, even so, it is here. — 51.
[Go top]
Pareṇa: from the subsequent (Brāhmaṇa), by the subsequent expression, by the statements immediately following; Ca: and; Śabdasya: of Śruti, of the text, of the word; Tād-vidhyam: the fact of being such; Bhūyastvāt: because of abundance; Tu: but; Anubandhaḥ: connection.🔗 By the subsequent (Brāhmaṇa passage as well as the preceding one) also, (it is understood) that the Scriptures purport to enjoin (the Vidyā), and the relation (of the actual Agni with the Vidyā) is due to the profusion (of the subordinate parts of Agni). — 3.3.52. Even in the subsequent proximate Brāhmaṇa — “This world, indeed, is the built up Agni”, it is observed that the aim of the Scriptures is the enjoining of the Vidyā, and it does not aim at the giving of any injunction with regard to any purely subsidiary part of action. Even there the same is implied from the Scriptures which censure ‘mere action’ and glorify the Vidyā, in the Śloka — “It is by Vidyā that they ascend to that stage from where all desires are rolled back. Performers of mere ritualistic action (Dakṣiṇāḥ) do not go there nor do the ignorant ascetics.” Similarly, even in the preceding Brāhmaṇa, viz. “This sphere that fiercely shines”, it is the Vidyā that appears to be the chief thing and not mere action, as the Brāhmaṇa concludes by stating the fruit of the Vidyā only, thus — “He becomes immortal, Death becomes his own self”, and in common with it, the same is the case here. In this Vidyā very many subordinate parts of the actual Agni are to be imagined and for that reason the Vidyā is made to connect with the sacrifice, and not because it is subservient to action. Therefore, the conclusion thus established is that these conceptual Agnis are of the nature of a mere Vidyā. — 52.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Eke: some (maintain the non-existence); Ātmanaḥ: of a separate self (besides the body); Śarīre: in the body; Bhāvāt: because of existence.🔗 Some (deny the existence) of the Jīva-Self i.e. the Ātmā, (as apart from the body) because (as they say), it exists only when a body exists. — 3.3.53. Now here the existence of the Jīva-Self i.e. the Ātmā as apart from the body is being justified, in order to establish its competency for suffering bondage or attaining Final Release. Were the Jīva-Self as apart from the body, not in fact to exist, injunctions (for actions) having the fruit of the acquisition of the heavenly world could not be reasonably sustainable, and (under such circumstances) how can anybody possibly be taught the Brahma-hood of the Jīva-Self? But (says the opponent of Vedānta), in the first Pāda of the Chief Śāstra (Pu.-Mi. 1.15) mention has been made of the existence of the Jīva-Self as apart from the body, as (an entity) capable of i.e. fit for experiencing the fruit as stated by the Śāstra. (We reply) — No doubt it is so stated there by its commentator (Śabara-svāmī) but there is no Sūtra there (by Jaimini), relating specifically to the existence of the Jīva-Self. Here, however, the compiler of the Sūtras (Bādarāyaṇa) has himself established its existence by first raising a doubt as to its existence. It is from here that Ācārya Śabara-svāmī has borrowed it, and referred to it in the Pramāṇa-Lakṣaṇa (Chapter in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā dealing with the characteristics of the means-of-proof such as the Scriptures and the Smṛtis). It is to this again that Bhagavān Upavarṣa has referred, when the necessity of discussing the existence of the Jīva-Self arose in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, by saying that he would speak about it in the Śārīraka. Now here, when the meditations (Upāsanās) having injunctions as their authority are being considered, the existence of the Jīva-Self is being discussed as being complementary to the entire Śāstra. In the former topic of discussion (Adhikaraṇa) it has been described, as to how the conceptual Agnis are for the chief aim of the Puruṣa, by determining, that some matters can be taken apart from the chapter (Prakaraṇa), and it is now, when it has become necessary to explain, as to what that Puruṣa is, for whom these conceptual Agnis are meant, that the existence of the Jīva-Self as apart from the body is spoken of. This is the first Sūtra that has the purpose of stating the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta), for, it is by the refutation of such a preliminary objection, that a firm conviction as to the statement intended to be made (by the Vedāntin), is generated, in accordance with the maxim of ‘making an iron pile firm by digging it (deep into the earth)’. As regards this (Topic), some, to wit, the Lokāyatikas (Materialists), who consider the body itself to be the Jīva-Self, and that any Jīva-Self as such as apart from the body does not exist, and who also hold, that sentiency (Caitanya) which is not perceived to exist in this external world etc., taken both singly or collectively (Samasta-vyasteṣu), may yet possibly exist when the elements transform themselves into the form of a body, and say, that sentiency like some intoxicating power, results from those elements, and that a Puruṣa is merely a body possessed of such sentiency, and that there is no Jīva-Self as such as apart from the body, capable of proceeding to the heavenly world or capable of obtaining Final Release, and by whom sentiency is generated in the body. They understand that the body itself is the sentient Jīva-Self, and give a reason for it (as is stated in the Sūtra above), viz., that the Jīva-Self exists only when a body exists. That which exists only when something exists, and does not exist when such other thing does not exist, is understood to be the attribute of such other thing, just as heat and light are the attributes of fire. Prāṇa, movement, sentiency, memory etc. understood to be the attributes of the Jīva-Self by the advocates of the Ātmā, but which are perceivable only in a body and not as the attributes of anything as apart from the body, thus deserve to be merely the attributes of the body, as long as the existence of an entity endowed with such attributes such as the Jīva-Self is not established. Therefore the Jīva-Self is not something which is different from the body. — 53.
[Go top]
This being the conclusion (of the materialist), we reply: —Vyatirekaḥ: separation; Tad-bhāva-abhāvitvāt: for (consciousness) does not exist even when there is the body; Na: not (so); Tu: but; Upalabdhivat: as in the case of knowledge or cognition.🔗 But it is not (so). (The Jīva-Self) is something apart (from a body), because (the attributes of the Jīva-Self) do not exist even when it (i.e. the body) exists. It is, as it is in the case of perception. — 3.3.54. It is not (as asserted by the opponent of Vedānta) that there is no Jīva-Self as such as apart from the body. It does deserve to exist separately from the body, because, the attributes (of the Jīva-Self) do not exist, even when the body exists. If it be held (as is held by the opponent of Vedānta) that the attributes of the Ātmā are but merely the attributes of the body (because they exist when the body exists), then why could it not be held by him (equally justifiably) that these attributes are not the attributes of the body, because they are not seen to exist, even when a body still exists? Besides, the attributes (of the Ātmā) are dissimilar to the attributes of the body. Form (Rūpa) etc., which are the attributes of a body, continue to exist as long as a body exists, but vital breath and movement etc. are absent in the Death-condition, even though (in that death-condition) the body does still exist. Besides as long as the body exists, the attributes of the body are perceivable by others also, but not so the attributes of the Ātmā, such as sentiency, memory etc. Besides as long as the body exists, it is possible to ascertain the existence of these attributes (of the Ātmā) conclusively, as long as life exists, but it is not possible to ascertain their non-existence conclusively, after the body has ceased to exist, because may be (for aught we know) the attributes may well continue to exist in the Ātmā, even when perchance the body has fallen, the Ātmā having transmigrated into another body. The view of the opponent (of Vedānta) thus stands refuted merely by the raising of a doubt (about its validity, because in the absence of definite proof, his view, at best is but a mere hypothesis). The opponent (of Vedānta) may well be counter-questioned as to what he considers to be the nature of this ‘sentiency’ which he prefers wishfully to hold as originating from the elements. The materialist does not recognize any entity (Tattva) as such, other than this quartette of elements (Earth, Water, Tejas, and Vāyu). Now if it be said (by the opponent) that the perception of the elements and their products, itself is ‘sentiency’, then inasmuch as they (i.e. the elements) are but the objects of such sentiency, sentiency cannot possibly be their attribute, because action by an entity on itself, is contradictory, as for instance, fire which is hot, cannot burn itself, nor can an actor (acrobat), be he ever so well trained, be able to ride on his own shoulder. If sentiency be the attribute of elements and their products, they cannot be made the objects of such sentiency, nor can form (Rūpa) etc., make form etc. themselves or the form of any external and internal (bodily) elements and their products, their objects. Hence, inasmuch as we do in fact understand the existence of the perception of elements and their products, we must necessarily understand the separateness of such perception from such elements and their products. Now the Ātmā as we understand it, is of the nature of being perceivable, and hence of course, this Ātmā is an entity apart from the body. Now this perception being of a uniform nature, the Ātmā is eternal, because even under circumstances of a different condition (such as a dream-condition) it recognizes itself as the perceiver, thus — ‘It is I that saw this’, and besides it is only thus that Smṛtis etc. become reasonably sustainable. The argument advanced (by the opponent of Vedānta) that because the attributes (of the Ātmā) exist only when a body exists and therefore ‘Perception’ is the attribute of the body, is refuted in the manner described (above). Besides, because, perception (of objects) takes place only when auxiliary implements such as a lamp etc. are available, and as it does not take place in the absence of such auxiliary implements, it cannot, merely on that ground, become the property of a lamp etc. In the same manner, because, perception takes place when a body exists and does not take place when a body does not exist, it does not thereby deserve to be the property of the body. Because, it is reasonably sustainable that like the lamp etc., a body is merely useful as an auxiliary implement. Nor is it that a body is invariably necessary in the matter of perception, because when during dream-condition the body has absolutely no movement, a variety of perceptions is observable. Therefore, (the view) that the Self as apart from a body, does exist, is clearly flawless. — 54.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Aṅga-avabaddhaḥ: (Upāsanās) connected parts (of sacrificial acts); Tu: but; Na: not; Śākhāsu: to (particular) Śākhās; Hi: because; Prati-vedam: in each Veda, according to the Veda.🔗 But (injunctions about meditations) connected with subordinate parts (of sacrificial acts such as the Udgīṭha Karma) are not (restricted) to the particular branches (of the Vedas, in which they occur, but because the meditations are identical), they are available in each Veda. — 3.3.55. This incidental digression (about the Jīva-Self) is now finished and we will now revert to the discussion relevant (to the Pāda). The doubt that arises here is, as to whether, injunctions to meditations connected with Vidyās such as the Udgīṭha etc., prescribed in the different branches of each Veda, such as “One should meditate on ‘Om’ which is the Udgīṭha” (ChanU.1.1.1), “One should meditate on the Sāman of five kinds, as so many different worlds” (ChanU.2.2.1), “Verily, what people speak about as Uktha (viz. Śāstra i.e. a collection of Mantras sung by the Ṛtvijaḥ during a sacrifice) is but this earth” (Ait. Ar. 2.1.2), “This built up fire indeed is the world (Loka)” (Śata. Bra. 10.5.4.1), are applicable only to the Udgīṭha of the particular branch in which they are mentioned, or whether they are applicable in all the various branches. This doubt has been so stated on the assumption, that inasmuch as the accents (Svaras) in each branch are different, the Udgīṭhas in each branch also are different. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that these injunctions to meditation relate to the Udgīṭha of each individual branch separately. Whence is it so? Because of proximity (Sannidhāna). Because, when it is only generally prescribed that the Udgīṭha should be meditated upon, there naturally is a desire to know as to what particular Udgīṭha is meant, and such desire etc. is subsequently satisfied by the proximate special direction in each individual branch, and also because there is no reason for transgressing that (special direction) and accepting the special direction in another branch. Therefore, the meditation on the Udgīṭha in each branch is confined to that branch alone. This being the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta), the Sūtra-kāra replies — “But (injunctions about meditations) connected with the subordinate parts etc.”. The word ‘but’ in the Sūtra refutes the view (of the opponent of Vedānta). These (meditations) are not confined, each to its own individual branch only, but are available in all branches. Whence is it so? Because of the absence of any special distinction in the Scriptural statements about the Udgīṭha. If it be supposed that the meditation mentioned in each branch is confined to that branch alone, and the general Scriptural statement “Let one meditate on the Udgīṭha”, which does not purport to express any particularization, is made to indicate any such particularization on the ground of proximity, the Scriptural statement would thus be contradicted. This would not be logical, because a ‘Scriptural statement’ has greater force than mere ‘proximity (Sannidhāna)’. Besides, it is not that a Vidyā can have a general application would not be reasonably sustainable. Hence, notwithstanding differences in accents, inasmuch as the Udgīṭha is one and the same everywhere, the injunctions must be understood to be applicable to all the branches generally. — 55.
[Go top]
Mantra-ādivat: like Mantras, etc.; Vā: or else; A-virodhaḥ: there is no contradiction.🔗 Or rather, as in the case of Mantras etc., there is no contradiction here. — 3.3.56. Or rather, no such contradiction should be doubted here, viz. as to how an injunction about the Udgīṭha Vidyā prescribed in one branch can at all be available for the Udgīṭha Vidyā etc. of another branch, because, it is reasonably sustainable, that, as in the case of Mantras etc. there can be no contradiction here. For it is seen that Mantras, actions and subsidiary parts (Guṇas) which occur in one branch, are made applicable in another branch also. (For instance) even in the case of the followers of that particular branch, in which the Mantra recited in another branch during the taking up of the stone (for pounding rice etc.) — viz. “Thou art the Kuṭaru” — is not mentioned, its application in their branch is observed, thus — “He takes up the stone (accompanying such act by reciting) ‘Thou art the Kukkuṭa or thou art the Kuṭaru’ Similarly in the case of those (for instance the Maitrāyaṇis) in whose case Prayājas (Sacrificing of Samidhs) are not prescribed, an injunction with regard to this subsidiary item of such a Prayāja is given, thus — “Verily the seasons are the Prayājas and they should be offered in one and the same place”. (Here the word ‘seasons’ which indicates the number of the Prayājas and ‘the offering of them in one and the same place’ are subsidiary actions i.e. Karmāṅgas.) Similarly also in the case of those, in whose branch, a Mantra giving instruction about the kind of animal to be sacrificed, such as “A he-goat should be sacrificed to Agni and Soma”, is not mentioned, a Mantra indicative of that (recited by the Adhvaryu) is observed thus — “(Oh Hotṛ), recite the Anuvākya for the offering of the fat of the pericardium of a he-goat”. Similarly, it is observed that the Mantra “Oh Agni, promote the Hotra and the Sacrifice”, which occurs in one Veda, is accepted in another Veda. Similarly, also the hymn (Sūkta) “He (Indra), as soon as he was born, became capable of being thoughtful”, recited in the Veda of the Śataudana (i.e. followers of Ṛg-Veda), is observed by the followers of Yajur-Veda by the Mantra “For the Adhvaryu, the Sajanīya hymn (in which the words ‘Sajanāsa Indraḥ’ occur, is to be recited)”. Therefore, just as the subordinate parts of a sacrificial act on which the Vidyās depend, are observed to be accepted everywhere, even so, the Vidyās which depend upon such subordinate parts, are accepted everywhere, and hence there is no contradiction (involved). — 56.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Bhūmnaḥ: on the entire form; Kratuvat: as in the case of sacrifice; Jyāyastvam: prominence, pre-eminence, importance; Tathā: so; Hi: because, for, as; Darśayati: (the Śruti) shows.🔗 There is top-ranking eminence (Jyāyastva) of Bhūmā (i.e. Cosmic Self) (as the object of meditation), as it is, in the case of a Kratu (Sacrifice), for the Scriptures also indicate so. — 3.3.57. In the legend beginning with “Oh Prācīna-śāla Aupamanyava” (ChanU.5.11.1), the Scriptures speak of meditation on the Vaiśvā-nara (the Cosmic Self) in its individual (Vyasta) and collective (Samasta) aspect. Meditation on the individual aspect of it is as follows: — “Oh Aupamanyava (asked Aśva-pati Kaikeya), ‘On whom dost thou meditate as the Self?’ He replied, ‘Oh respected King, it is on the heaven (that I meditate)’. Aśva-pati said, ‘Verily that Self on which you meditate and which is called the Sutejā (the brightly shining Self) is the Vaiśvā-nara Self’.” (ChanU.5.12.1). Similarly, meditation on the collective aspect is as follows — “Of this Vaiśvā-nara Self, the caput is Sutejā, the eye is Viśva-rūpa, the Prāṇa is the Prithag-vartmā Self, the torso is Bahula, Rayi (wealth) is the bladder, the feet are this Earth” (ChanU.5.18.2). Now, with regard to this, the doubt arises, as to whether the meditation (on Vaiśvā-nara) shall be both ways i.e. individually and collectively, or collectively only. What then is the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta)? It is that meditation should be separate on every separate part, because in the case of every part (Avayava) viz. “Sutejā” etc. the predicate ‘thou meditatest’ is used by the Scriptures, and also because the Scriptures speak of different fruits of such meditations, thus — “In your family a progressively intensive pressing out of the Soma juice (for Soma-Yāga) is seen” (which means that your family is extremely religious) (ChanU.5.12.1). With regard to that, it is said (by the Vedāntin) — It appears that this sentence purports to speak of the top-ranking eminence of the Cosmic Self, Vaiśvā-nara, the aggregate of all limbs (such as the caput, the eye etc.), and not of the meditation on every individual part of it also. It is, as it is, in the case of a sacrifice (Kratu). It is just as it is, in a sacrifice such as the Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa, etc., viz. that the collective performance of the principal part along with the subsidiary part is intended to be spoken of, and not of the individual parts such as the Prayājas etc. separately, nor of the principal part along with only one such subsidiary part. (Here the opponent of Vedānta says) — Whence is it so understood? (We reply) — because, the Cosmic Self (Bhūmā) alone is of top-ranking eminence. Even so it is understood that the Bhūmā i.e. Cosmic Self is of top-ranking eminence, because it is understood that the Scriptural statements have been reconciled as having that one uniform meaning. By viewing the earlier and the later portion, it is understood that this sentence, one as it is, is with respect to the Vaiśvā-nara Vidyā. Because it is so said (by the Scriptures). The Scriptures, beginning with (the statement) ‘the six sages’, beginning with ‘Prāchīna-śāla’, etc., and including Uddālaka at the end, being unable to attain a firm understanding faith (Pariniṣṭhā) in the Vaiśvā-nara Vidyā, state that they approached Aśva-pati Kaikeya, and later on, state, that the sages spoke of the heaven etc. individually, as being the object of meditation of each sage respectively, and still later on, speak of heaven etc. as being only the caput etc. of Vaiśvā-nara, thus — “(He said) — this is merely the caput of the Self” (ChanU.5.12.2). They also censure meditation on individual parts (by putting in the mouth of Aśva-pati-Kaikeya), thus — “Had you not approached me (for instruction), your head would have dropped off”. Again, rejecting meditation on each individual part, and approving of the meditation on the collective aspect, the Scriptures indicate how the fruit is dependent only upon the Cosmic Self (Bhūmā), thus — “Who eats food (by residing) in all the worlds, in all beings, and in all the Selfs” (ChanU.5.18.1). Individual fruits with respect to Sutejā etc. individually mentioned by the Scriptures, should be understood as meaning that the fruits of the meditations on individual parts should be pooled together as the one single fruit of the meditation on the principal entity (i.e. Bhūmā, the Cosmic Self). Similarly, the Scriptural statement with regard to each individual part, by the use of the predicate ‘thou meditatest’ is also for the purpose of referring to the opinion of each individual sage only, and not for the purpose of enjoining meditation on each individual part. Therefore, (the conclusion is, that) the view about the combined meditation on the Bhūmā, the Cosmic Self, is the better one. Some are of opinion that by using the word ‘better’ and establishing, that the view about the meditation in the aggregate form is the better one, the Sūtra-kāra looks upon with some approval at least on the view about the meditation on individual parts also. But, this is not logical, because when it is understood that reconcilement of different Scriptural statements is possible, it is not logical to think that one sentence has two different meanings, and also because, (if so understood) the censure expressed by the sentence “your head would have dropped off” would be contradicted. Besides when meditation on the aggregate aspect is clearly to be understood from the concluding portion, it is not justifiable (for the opponent of Vedānta) to speak about the meditation on the aggregate aspect as being conspicuous by its absence, in the Scriptural statement, while stating his (i.e. the opponent’s) own view. Even the statement in the Sūtra about ‘the top-ranking eminence’ (Jyāyastva) in the Sūtra is also reasonably sustainable as meaning ‘authoritative’. — 57.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Nānā: different, various; Śabda-ādi-bhedāt: on account of difference of names of words, etc. (Bhedāt: due to variety.)🔗 (The Vidyās mentioned by the Scriptures in different places) are separate, because the words etc. are different. — 3.3.58. It has been said in the foregoing Adhikaraṇa that notwithstanding that the Scriptures speak of different fruits of Sutejā etc., collective meditation (on the Cosmic Self) is better and greater. This may create a notion that it is also taught that other meditations (Upāsanās) mentioned in different Scriptural statements are also to be combined together. Besides, it cannot be possible to understand the Vidyās to be separate, when there is no difference in the object of such Vidyās. The object to be known constitutes the nature of Vidyās, even as the materials to be used as offerings, and the deities (of a sacrifice), constitute the nature of a sacrifice. Now it is understood here, that even though there are separate Scriptural statements, the entity to be known (by the Vidyā) is but one and the same, viz. the Lord, as in “He has the mind as his structure and the Prāṇa as his body” (ChanU.3.14.2), “Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman” (ChanU.4.10.5), “He whose wishes are true and whose purposes are true” (ChanU.8.1.15) etc. Similarly also in “Prāṇa alone is, Prāṇa verily is the absorber” (ChanU.4.3.3), “Prāṇa verily is the seniormost and the best” (ChanU.7.15.1) etc. Because the entity to be known is one and the same, therefore, the Vidyās are identical. In this view, the separateness of Scriptural statements is not purposeless, inasmuch as each Scriptural statement refers to different attributes (i.e. Guṇas) (of the same entity), therefore, in order that the Vidyā may be complete in itself, the various different natures belonging to one and the same object of knowledge, should, even though prescribed separately in our and the opponent’s branches of Scriptural statements, be combined together. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), it is stated — the Vidyās are separate etc. Even though there is no difference in the object to be known, Vidyās of this kind deserve to be separate. Whence is it so? Because the words etc. are different. There is such difference in the words, as for instance — “He knows”, “He should meditate”, “He should resolve” etc. (ChanU.3.14.1). Earlier (in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) difference in words is understood to be a reason for considering ritualistic acts as separate (Pu.-Mi. 2.2.1). By the expression “etc.” (in the Sūtra) it is implied that the attributes (i.e. Guṇas of the Vidyās) should, as far as it would be possible, be understood as furnishing reasons for considering the Vidyās as separate. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the words “He knows” etc., signify a difference in words only, and not a difference in their meaning also, as is indicated by the words “He sacrifices” etc., because all these words have no difference as between themselves, and uniformly mean the same thing viz. the activity or mode of the mind, and there is no possibility of their having any other meaning. How can then a difference in words cause a difference in Vidyās? (We reply) — This is no fault. Because, even though as meaning an activity or mode of the mind there is no difference (between them), still, when a difference in the object of knowledge, resulting from a difference in connection, is present, separateness of the Vidyās (from each other) becomes reasonably sustainable. Even though the object of meditation, viz. the Lord, is one and the same (in all the Vidyās), the Scriptures mention in each chapter, mutually exclusive and different attributes i.e. Guṇas (of the Lord). Similarly, even though the Prāṇa as the object of meditation is without any difference, and is but one and the same everywhere, still, as on account of the difference in connection, one attribute is to be meditated upon in one meditation, and another, in another, and as there is thus a difference in the object of knowledge, it is understood that the Vidyās are separate. It is not possible to maintain here, that one enjoins a Vidyā and the other enjoins the attributes i.e. Guṇas only, because of the absence of any cause for such determination. And as in each chapter there are many attributes i.e. Guṇas. that it should enjoin attributes i.e. Guṇas relating to a Vidyā which has already been established elsewhere, is not reasonably sustainable. As far as the (opponent’s) view is concerned, attributes such as ‘His having true desires etc.’, being common to all, do not deserve to be mentioned more than once. Besides as each chapter separately mentions, how one who desires a particular thing should meditate on this, and how one who desires some other thing should meditate on some other thing, and as it is understood therefrom that they (the Upāsanās) do not need to borrow anything from each other, these chapters are not reconcilable. Nor, as in the case of the Vaiśvā-nara Vidyā, is there any other injunction for knowing these meditations as combined into one composite meditation, on the strength of which, these separate meditations on parts, occurring in each chapter, should attain reconcilement. Besides, if it were to be understood unrestrictedly (Niraṅkuśatvena) on the ground of the object of knowledge of all Vidyās being one and the same, that there is unity of Vidyās, an impossible combination of all attributes (Guṇas) wherever they may occur, will have to be understood. Therefore, it is very properly said (by the Sūtra-kāra) that the meditations are separate by reason of the words being different. It should be understood, that it is subject to this, i.e. by assuming this Adhikaraṇa as established, that the opening Sūtra of this Pāda is stated in the form in which it is stated. — 58.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Vikalpaḥ: option; Viśiṣṭa-phalatvāt: on account of (all Vidyās) having the same result.🔗 Option (about the Vidyās is available) because the fruit (of all) is not special in each Vidyā, (i.e. it is the same in the case of all Vidyās). — 3.3.59. It being (thus) established that the Vidyās are separate, it is now being considered whether one can collectively perform all these, or optionally any one of them, as one pleases, or whether one can as a rule, exercise an option with regard to them. So far as this is concerned the separateness of these Vidyās having been established, there is no reason for a rule that they should all be collectively performed (by one man). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), separate as such sacrifices as the Agni-hotra and the Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa etc. are, it is seen that there is a rule that they are all to be collectively performed (by one man). (We reply) — This is no fault, because (in their case), a Scriptural statement about their regular performance, is the reason (for their collective performance by one man), while there is no such Scriptural statement with regard to these (Vidyās), and therefore there is neither a rule requiring their regular performance collectively (by one man), nor a rule necessarily prescribing an option as to their performance. Competency of a man for (the performance of) one Vidyā does not prevent his competency as to the performance of another Vidyā. Therefore according to the only remaining alternative the performance of all collectively (by one man) or any one of the Vidyās as desired, optionally, enures. But as the fruit of all these (Vidyās) is the same, it is logical that there should be an option with regard to them. For Scriptural statements, such as “He has mind as his structure and Prāṇa as his body” (ChanU.3.14.2), “Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman” (ChanU.4.10.5), “He whose wishes are true and whose resolutions are true” (ChanU.8.1.5), are all uniformly observed to have the attainment of the Lord as their fruit. (The opponent of Vedānta replies) — This is no fault, because it is observed that religious actions, the means of the attainment of heaven etc., which have a common fruit, are performed as one desires. Hence the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being that the Vidyās may be performed just as one pleases, it is replied (by the Vedāntin) that they deserve to have an option and not that they must all be combined. Whence is it so? Because the fruit (of all) is the same, viz., the actual realization of the object of meditation. When the object of meditation, such as the Lord, is actually realized by one Vidyā, the other is rendered purposeless. Besides (such a view) involves the non-possibility (of such realization). The view that all Vidyās may be collectively performed (by one man) for actual realization, would cause distraction of the mind. The Scriptures indicate that the fruit of a Vidyā is secured by the actual realization (of the Lord), thus — “He who has realized (the object of meditation) and who has no doubt left (realizes Brahman)” (BrhU.3.14.4), “Having attained Godhood, he becomes absorbed in the Godhead” (BrhU.4.1.2) etc. Similarly, the Smṛti passage “who is always imbued with that faith” (BhG.8.6) etc. Therefore, one should choose one out of the several Vidyās which have all one common fruit and perform it with undivided attention, till such fruit is obtained by the actual realization of the object of meditation, (is the conclusion). — 59.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Kāmyāḥ: Vidyās adopted for some sensuous desires; Tu: but; Yathā-kāmam: according to one’s desire or liking; Samuccīyeran: may be combined; Na: not; Vā: or; Pūrva: the former; Hetu: reason; A-bhāvāt: on account of the absence of.🔗 Vidyās for the attainment of desires (Kāmyāḥ), may, as desired, be collectively performed (by one man) or not, because there is absence of any reason, as was available (in the previous Sūtra). — 3.3.60. This Sūtra mentions an illustration of a Vidyā which is the converse of those whose fruit is one and the same (as stated in the previous Sūtra). In these Vidyās which are performed with a view to particular desires, as for instance, thus — “He who knows this Vāyu as being the offspring of the direction, does not have to bemoan the loss of a son” (ChanU.3.15.2), “He who meditates on the names (such as Ṛg-Veda etc.) as Brahman, is able to roam about at will, quite up to that extent as the extent upto which the Names i.e. the Vedas go” etc. (ChanU.7.1.5), — and which like sacrificial action, encompass their fruit by means of the unseen principle (Adṛṣṭa), there is no expectancy of direct realization (of Brahman). And they can either be all combined or not, as desired because any such reason, as that the fruit is one and the same, is absent. — 60.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Aṅgeṣu: with regard (to meditations) connected with members (of sacrificial acts); Yathā-āśraya-bhāvaḥ: it is as with (members) with which they are connected.🔗 Vidyās connected with parts of sacrificial action are on a par with that which is the support on which they rest. — 3.3.61. When a doubt, exists, as to whether, Vidyās which depend upon subsidiary parts of sacrificial action, such as the Udgīṭha, and which are mentioned in the three Vedas, should all be necessarily performed collectively, or just according to one’s wish, the Sūtra-kāra says that they are on a par with that which is their support (Āśraya) and on which they depend. Just as Scriptural hymns or Ṛks (Stotras), on which these Vidyās depend, are all taken collectively (for the purpose of a sacrifice) even so should the Vidyās depending on them (be collectively performed) because all the Vidyās depend upon their support. — 61.
[Go top]
Śiṣṭeḥ: from the injunction of the Śruti; Ca: and.🔗 Also because of the instructions (about the Vidyās). — 3.3.62. Just as Scriptural hymns or Ṛks etc. which are the support of the Vidyās, are taught in the Vedas, even so, is the instruction with regard to the Vidyās which depend on them. The meaning is, that there is no difference as such, made by the Scriptural instructions, between the several subsidiary parts of action (Karma) and the Vidyās (Upāsanās). — 62.
[Go top]
Samāhārāt: on account of the rectification.🔗 On account of (the indicatory mark viz.) the rectification (of flaws). — 3.3.63. The Scriptural statement “It is from the seat of the priest who presides at the Sacrifices (Hotṛ) (i.e. by virtue of the work done by him), that any defect (i.e. mistakes in accents etc.) in the singing (of Sāman by the Udgātṛ) is automatically cured” (ChanU.1.5.5) intimates, how, by virtue of the knowledge, that the Praṇava (i.e. the syllable ‘Om’) and the Udgīṭha are one and the same, the defect caused by a mistake of the Udgātṛ (the Sāman-chanting priest) in chanting, is automatically cured by the work of the Hotṛ, and this indicatory mark suggests that inasmuch as a Vidyā mentioned in one Veda has a common relation with another mentioned in another Veda the meditations (i.e. the Pratyayas) occurring in all the Vedas have to be combined. — 63.
[Go top]
Guṇa-sādhāraṇya-śruteḥ: from the Śruti declaring the feature of ‘OM’ as being common to all the Vedas; Ca: and.🔗 And also because of the Scriptural statement about the attributes (of the Vidyās) being common (the Vidyās are taken collectively). — 3.3.64. The Scriptures mention how the Oṅ-kāra, which is an attribute (Guṇa) i.e. the support of the Vidyā, is common to all the three Vedas, thus — “It is by that (i.e. the Syllable ‘Om’) that the Vidyās of the three kinds (characterized by Ṛg-Veda etc. and by the religious sacrificial acts enjoined by them) begin, thus — He the Adhvaryu gives order after saying ‘Om’, by saying ‘Om’ the Hotṛ priest recites, and by saying ‘Om’ the Udgātṛ priest sings” (ChanU.1.1.9). Hence it is, that the support viz. ‘Om’ constitutes an indicatory mark about the Vidyās being common to all the three Vedas (and they have to be taken collectively). Or the Sūtra is explained as follows: — Were the Udgīṭha etc. which constitute the nature of the sacrificial acts not to be common to all sacrificial acts, the Vidyās which depend on them, also would not be common. But Scriptural passages intimate, by means of the terms used in the performance of acts which cover all subsidiary parts, that the Udgīṭha etc. are common to all sacrificial acts, and hence, that, inasmuch as the support is common, the Vidyās also are taken collectively (is our conclusion). — 64.
[Go top]
Na: not; Vā: rather; Tat-saha-bhāva-aśruteḥ: their correlation not being mentioned by the Śruti. (Tat: their; Saha-bhāva: about being together; A-śruteḥ: because there is no such injunction in Śruti).🔗 Or rather not (i.e. meditations do not go with the sacrificial acts on which they depend) because of the non-existence of any Scriptural passage (to that effect). — 3.3.65. The words “or rather not” refute the view (of the opponent of Vedānta). Meditations which are dependent (on subsidiary sacrificial actions) do not go together with the subsidiary parts on which they depend. Whence is it so? Because of the non-existence of any Scriptural passage (to that effect). Just as the subsidiary sacrificial acts prescribed in the trio of Vedas and the Scriptural hymns etc. are seen to go together, as for instance in — “Having taken the pot in the hand or having taken up the Sacrificial ladle, he recites the hymn i.e. Stotra, and after reciting it, says — Oh Prastotṛ, do thou sing the Sāman, Oh Hotṛ, sacrifice this”, similarly there is no such Scriptural passage about the going together of the meditations. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the text prescribing the performance may as well establish their going together. We reply — No, because the meditations subserve the purpose of a man, while the text about the performance, may, if at all, establish the going together of the Udgītha etc., which subserve the purpose of a sacrifice. It has already been mentioned by us, that meditations such as Udgītha etc., even though they depend upon a sacrifice, may, like the milk-pail, subserve the purpose of a man, as in Br. Su. III. iii. 42. This precisely is the special difference depending upon instruction, as between subsidiary acts of a sacrifice and the meditations which depend upon such acts, viz., that while one subserves the purpose of a sacrifice, the other subserves the purpose of a man. The two indicatory marks (referred to in Sūtras 63 and 64 above) cannot be a reason for the going together of the meditations, because they cannot be construed as having any Scriptural statement, or a logical reason, as the basis for it. Now, it cannot be supposed that because all the dependent things are included in any performance (of a sacrificial act), they also include all the meditations which depend on them, because meditations are not employed for that purpose. Meditations even though they depend upon some support, may at the most, not exist when their supports do not exist, but it is not that they deserve to go together with that which forms their support. The reason is, that the Scriptures have not mentioned anything to that effect. Therefore, meditations should be performed, just as one pleases. — 65.
[Go top]
Darśanāt: because the Śruti says so, shows it from Śruti; Ca: and, also.🔗 And also because it is so indicated by the Scriptures. — 3.3.66. The Scriptures mention, how meditations do not go together (with sacrificial subordinate acts) thus — “Verily the Brahman priest (the master of ceremonies) who knows it to be so, protects the sacrifice, the host (in a sacrifice), and all the Ṛtvijaḥ” (ChanU.4.7.10). Now if all meditations were intended to be combined, then in that case as every body (amongst the priests) would be understood to be knowing every such meditation, the Scriptures could not have stated that the Brahman priest who knows it to be so, is the protector of all the rest. Therefore, (the conclusion is that) meditations should be combined together or an option about them should be understood, just as one would wish. — 66.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
The Sūtra-kāra, now starting on the inquiry as to whether the Upanishadic knowledge of the ‘Self’ is connected with religious action (Karma), through a person competent to perform such religious action, or whether it constitutes an altogether independent means of the attainment of the chief aim of man, begins (this Sūtra) by stating the conclusion itself, thus —Puruṣa-arthaḥ: purpose of man, object of human pursuit, here the chief object, i.e., salvation; Ataḥ: from this, from Brahma Vidyā; Śabdāt: from the scriptures, because the scriptures state so, from Śruti; Iti: so thus (says), this is the opinion of; Bādarāyaṇaḥ: the sage Bādarāyaṇa, (holds).🔗 Bādarāyaṇa (is of opinion) that according to (the authority of) the Scriptures, the chief aim of man (i.e. Final Release, is attained) through this (i.e. the knowledge of the Self). — 3.4.1. The chief aim of man is (attained) through this (i.e. the knowledge of the Self). Ācārya Bādarāyaṇa considers that it is through this altogether independent knowledge of the ‘Self’ prescribed in the Vedānta (texts) that the chief aim of man is attained. How is it so understood? The Sūtra-kāra replies by beginning thus — It is so understood on the authority of the Scriptural statements of such kind as “One who knows the Self transcends grief” (ChanU.7.1.3), “He who knows that transcendent Brahman, himself becomes Brahman” (Mund 3.2.9), “One who knows the Brahma-Self attains transcendent Brahman” (TaitU.2.1.1), “It is the one (who is blessed) with a teacher that knows (Brahman); He needs but wait only till he is relieved (of the body) and (when he is so relieved) he directly attains (Brahman)” (ChanU.6.14.2). Again beginning thus — “This Self which is free from sin”, the Scriptures further declare — “He who has searched for and understood that Self obtains all the worlds and ail desires” (ChanU.8.7.1). Similarly, Scriptural statements beginning with “It is the Self, Oh, Maitreyī, that should be seen" (BrhU.4.5.6). The Scriptures by the passage “Such indeed, Oh Maitreyī, is the measure of immortality” (BrhU.4.5.15) declare, how the knowledge (of the Self) alone is the means of attaining the chief aim of man. — 1.
[Go top]
x Here some opponent says —Śeṣatvāt: because of being supplementary (to sacrificial acts); Pusuṣa-artha-vādaḥ: are mere praise or the agent; Yathā: as; Anyeṣu: in other cases; Iti: thus (says); Jaiminiḥ: Jaimini (holds).🔗 Jaimini is of opinion that the Scriptural statement about the chief aim of man, is, as in other cases, of the nature of an Artha-vāda only, because (the Jīva-Self) is in a subservient relation (to religious actions). — 3.4.2. Jaimini considers that in as much as the Jīva-Self, by way of being an agent (Kartā), is in a subservient relation to religious action, the knowledge of the Self also, like such things as the action of the sprinkling of rice with water (Vrīhi-prokṣaṇa) etc., has through such things necessarily a connection with religious action, and the Scriptural statement about the fruit of such knowledge of the Self, also is an Artha-vāda, even as, such other Scriptural statements, about the fruit of the materials (used in a Sacrifice) and about acts such as the refinement (Saṃskāra) of the materials, as, “He whose sacrificial ladle is of Palāśa wood, does not hear any evil (about himself)”. “When he anoints his eye, he thereby avoids the evil eye of his enemy (lit., a Nephew)” and “The Prayāja and Anuyāja oblations offered by him serve as an armour for the Sacrifice as also for the sacrificer, so that his enemies may be confounded”, are but an Artha-vāda only (i.e. they are in glorification of the material, deity and action respectively). (But, says the Vedāntin) — How can this knowledge of the Self, which is taught (in the Scriptures) without starting any specific chapter about it, be said to enter into any connection with a sacrificial act, in the absence of any such reason or other as a specific chapter about it? If it be said (by you, the opponent of Vedānta), that it is understood from a Scriptural passage (such as) “He who knows Brahman, transcends grief”, that such knowledge (of the Self) is connected with a sacrificial act through the agent (i.e. the sacrificer), we reply — No, because, it is not reasonably sustainable that the knowledge (of the Self) can be understood to be so connected with a sacrificial act through the agent by means of the Scriptural passage, because such knowledge (of the Self i.e. Brahman) cannot be employed in a sacrificial act. Now, instruction about such things, given without beginning any special chapter mentioning such things, may be imagined to have such a connection with religious actions, on the authority of a Scriptural passage, by way of such things having an invariable connection with religious action (such as a ‘Parṇamayī Juhū’ i.e. a sacrificial ladle of Palāśa wood has, with a sacrifice), but an agent is a variable intermediary, being common both to worldly as well as religious acts, and therefore it is not established that such knowledge (of the Self) has any such connection with a sacrificial act. (This argument of the Vedāntin, the opponent of Vedānta counters thus) — No, because the knowledge, that the Self is an entity different from the body, is not useful anywhere, except in a religious act. The knowledge that the Self is different from the body, cannot be of any use in a worldly act, because, in all such cases it is reasonably sustainable, that motivation towards any such worldly action depends upon a fruit that is patent. In the case of Scriptural religious actions, however, which bear fruit at some later time, i.e. after death (lit., after the body falls), that there can possibly be any activity in the absence of the knowledge that the Self is different from the body, is not reasonably sustainable, and thus the knowledge. that the ‘Self’ is different from the body, has application precisely in such a case. But (says the Vedāntin) inasmuch as, such adjectives of quality, as, that the ‘Self’ is free from sin, are employed (in the case of the Self), the doctrine of Upanishadic knowledge, that the Self is not of a transmigratory nature, cannot be subservient to any tendency (for any action). (The opponent of Vedānta says) — No, the Scriptural instruction viz. that the Ātmā should be seen, is precisely with respect to that very transmigratory Self, as is suggested by the terms ‘dear’ etc., while the adjective of quality that it is free from sin may well be in glorification of the Jīva-Self. But (says the Vedāntin) that the Upaniṣads profess to teach that this superior (Adhikam) and non-transmigratory Brahman is indeed the cause of the world, and that that alone constitutes the real nature of the transmigratory Jīva-Self, has been established (by us) in several different places. Of course it is so established, but it is with a view to strengthen the same conclusion, in a way similar to the digging in of a pile (into the earth) to make it more firm, that objections to that are first raised, for the consideration of it by way of the fruit of such knowledge of the Self (viz. whether it is the means of the attainment of the chief aim of man viz. Final Release i.e. Mokṣa, or whether it is only like the fruit of Sacrifices), and they are then refuted. — 2.
[Go top]
Ācāra-darśanāt: because of the conduct found (from the scriptures).🔗 Because such conduct of life (of persons who have acquired knowledge of Brahman, but who still perform religious acts) is discernible. — 3.4.3. Passages such as “Janaka, the Videha King, performed a sacrifice characterized by munificent presents (to officiating priests)” and “Oh venerable Sirs, I am about to perform a sacrifice”, referring to statements about those who have realized Brahman, even when they purport to speak of something else (viz. the propounding of Brahma-Vidyā), are still indicative of being supplementary to action. Similarly, seeing that the Scriptures indicate that Uddālaka and others imparted instruction to their sons etc., it is understood that they are connected with the particular order of the life of a householder. Now, if it be (understood) that the chief aim of man is achieved only through the knowledge (of the Self), why would such persons perform actions (sacrifices etc.), involving such strenuous work? Because, is there not the maxim (Nyāya) — why would a person go to a mountain (for honey), if honey be available near at hand (Arke)? — 3.
[Go top]
Tat: that, that knowledge is subsidiary and supplementary to sacrifice; Śruteḥ: from Śruti, because the scriptures directly declare.🔗 Because, there is a Scriptural statement to the effect (that by the mere knowledge of the Self the chief aim is not attained). — 3.4.4. The Scriptural passage “That which he does with knowledge, faith, and meditation becomes more powerful” (ChanU.1.1.10), which directly declares that knowledge is subservient to religious action, shows that mere knowledge (Vidyā) alone is not the means of attaining the chief aim of man. — 4.
[Go top]
Sam-anu-ārambhaṇāt: because of the accompanying together, as they jointly follow the sacrificer to produce their effects on account of their taking hold together or being together.🔗 Also because (of the Scriptural statement that) they (i.e. knowledge and religious action) go together (after him who goes to the other world) and cooperate in starting the manifestation of their fruits (which shows that knowledge i.e. Vidyā alone is not the cause of the attainment of the chief aim of man). — 3.4.5. The Scriptural passage — “Knowledge and religious actions together go along with the Jīva-Self (when it departs from the body)” (BrhU.4.4.2), which declares that both knowledge (Vidyā) and religious actions together cooperate in starting the manifestation of their fruit, shows that mere knowledge is not the cause of the chief aim of man. — 5.
[Go top]
Tadvataḥ: for such (as know the purport of the Vedas); Vidhānāt: because (the scriptures) enjoin (work).🔗 Also because the Scriptures prescribe (religious action) to those who understand the meaning of the Vedas, (Knowledge i.e. Vidyā is not an independent cause of the attainment of the chief aim of man). — 3.4.6. Scriptural passages such as “He who after studying the Vedas at the preceptor’s house, during the time spared after performing all his duties towards his preceptor as prescribed (by the Smṛtis), and after returning from his preceptor’s place (after completing his studies), studies the Scriptural texts in his own family, in a pure place” (ChanU.8.15.1), show, that he who has understood the meaning of the Vedas, is competent to perform religious actions. Hence also, knowledge (of Brahman) itself independently does not constitute a means of attaining the fruit (of Final Release). But (says the Vedāntin), here, by the words ‘after studying the Scriptures’, the Scriptures merely speak about the reading or reciting of the Vedas, and not the understanding of their meaning. (We reply) — This is no fault, because (according to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) as the study of the Vedas has a patent use, it is well established that such study of the Vedas extends upto the complete understanding (comprehension) of their meaning. — 6.
[Go top]
Niyamāt: on account of prescribed rules, because of compulsory injunction; Ca: also, and.🔗 Also because of (the mention of) definite rules (Vidyā is subservient to religious action). — 3.4.7. “One should desire to live for a hundred years doing religious acts. It is in this way alone that action would not affect you (who have this form of man) and in no other way than this” (IsU.2). “What is known as Agni-hotra is a sacrificial act which has to be performed upto old age or death and a man is relieved of it only by old age or death.” Definite rules such as these show that knowledge is complementary to action (because, there would not be any such rules, if a person were to be able to get rid of Karma on attaining knowledge). — 7.
[Go top]
This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the Sūtra-kāra refutes it (as follows): —Adhika-upadeśāt: because (the sriptures) teach (the Supreme Self to be) something over and above; Tu: but; Bādarāyaṇasya: of Bādarāyaṇa; Evam: thus, such (is the opinion); Tad-darśanāt: for that is seen (from the scriptures). (Adhika: Supreme Being, more different; Upadeśāt: from the statement in Śruti, owing to the teaching about.)🔗 But, because the Scriptural instruction is about one, (who is) even greater (than the Jīva-Self), it shows that Bādarāyaṇa’s view is proper i.e. correct. The Scriptures also declare so. — 3.4.8. The view (of the opponent of Vedānta) is refuted by the word but (Tu). The claim (made by the opponent of Vedānta) viz., that because knowledge (of the Self i.e. Brahman) is subservient (to religious action), it is but an Artha-vāda (Bra. Su. III. iv. 2), is not reasonably sustainable. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures teach about one who is even greater (than the Jīva-Self). If the Vedānta texts were to give instruction, only about the transmigratory Jīva-Self as being embodied and as one that is an agent and an experiencer, also as being different from the body, then, in the manner described, the Scriptural statements about the fruit (i.e. the chief aim of man viz. Final Release) would be of the nature of an Artha-vāda. The Vedānta texts however teach about one who is even greater than the Jīva-Self, viz., the non-transmigratory Highest Lord, (who is) free from the nature of being either an agent or a transmigratory being and is characterized by the nature of being free from all sin, as an entity fit to be known. The Sūtra-kāra will hereafter (in Bra. Su. III. iv. 16) say that the knowledge of that (Brahman) not only does not stimulate any action, but on the contrary, uproots all actions as such. Thus the view of Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa, viz., that through the knowledge of Brahman, a man’s chief aim of life (i.e. Final Release) is attained (stated in Brahma-Sūtra III. iv. 1), still holds good and valid, and is not disturbed by any fallacious views, such as, that knowledge is subservient or complementary to religious action. Even so do the Scriptural statements indicate the Lord, the Highest Self, to be greater than the Jīva-Self, thus — “One who is omniscient and knows all” (MunU.1.1.9), “It is through the terror of it that the wind blows etc.” (TaitU.2.8.1), “A great terror, a raised thunderbolt” (KathU.2.3.2), “It is at the command of this Imperishable one, On Gārgi etc.” (BrhU.3.8.9), “It thought, may I be many, may I bring forth. It created Tejas” (ChanU.6.2.3), etc. Now, the reference to that transmigratory Jīva-Self suggested by the word ‘dear’ (Priya) etc. which is brought forward (by the opponent) as the one to be known, by beginning with passages, such as “It is for the pleasure of the Self that everything becomes dear. The Self, Oh Maitreyī, should be seen” (BrhU.2.4.5), “He who breathes by means of the Prāṇa (the Vital breath) is exactly your own Self, which is inside everything” (BrhU.3.4.1), “This person that is seen in the eye” (ChanU.8.7.4), and which are afterwards followed up thus — “I shall again explain Him to you” (ChanU.8.9.3) etc., and when, by reason of the complementary passages, such as “That which is the Ṛg-Veda etc. is but the divine afflatus of this great being” (BrhU.2.4.10), “He who transcends hunger and thirst, sorrow and confusion, old age and death” (BrhU.3.5.1); “Having attained the transcendent light, manifests itself in its own form, He is the Puruṣa (par excellence)” (ChanU.8.12.3), a desire to speak about something even greater than the Jīva-Self is clearly discernible there, it is understood that all that is with a view to speak of and emphasize the absolute nondifference (between the Jīva-Self and Brahman), and hence there is no contradiction. The Highest Lord is but the real nature of the embodied Jīva-Self, while the Highest Self’s condition as the embodied Jīva-Self is merely caused by limiting adjuncts, on the authority of Scriptural statements such as “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7), “There is no seer other than this” (BrhU.3.8.11). We have already described all this at great length in appropriate places before. — 8.
[Go top]
Tulyam: the same, similar, equal; Tu: but; Darśanam: declaration of the Śruti.🔗 But Scriptural declarations (about the conduct of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahman) equally (support the opposite view). — 3.4.9. With respect to the view (of the opponent of Vedānta), that because, (in the case of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahman) conduct of life as declared by the Scriptures is seen i.e. they are seen to perform religious acts, therefore, knowledge is subservient to religious action, (we reply), that Scriptural declarations about such conduct of life, are equally in support of the view that knowledge is not subservient to religious action. To that very effect is the Scriptural declaration — “The sage Kāvaṣeya (the son of Kavaṣā) who had understood that (i.e. Brahman), said, why need I study the Vedas and why need I perform sacrifices? The ancient sages who had understood that (i.e. Brahman) never performed the Agni-hotra”. “Knowing this Self (i.e. Brahman) the Brāhmaṇas, having discarded their innate desire for progeny (sons), wealth and the (acquisition of the) worlds, thereafter lead a life of mendicancy” (BrhU.3.5.1). It is to be seen (from the Scriptures) that Yājña-valkya and others who had realized Brahman did not bank on religious actions (such as sacrifices etc.), thus — “He (Yājña-valkya) having said (to his wife Maitreyī), ‘my dear, verily that much (i.e. the knowledge that the Ātmā is the only one reality), is the means of immortality’ renounced the world (and became a Sannyāsin)”. Besides, the indicatory mark (about knowledge being subservient to religious actions) as seen (by the opponent of Vedānta) in the passage “Oh, venerable sirs, I am about to perform a sacrifice”, occurs in the Vaiśvā-nara Vidyā. Now, it is possible that in the case of a Vidyā dealing with qualified Brahman i.e. Brahman under the influence of limiting adjuncts, knowledge and religious actions may well go together. But (claims the Vedāntin), even there knowledge is not subservient to action (as such people may engage in action for Loka-saṅgraha, i.e. for inducing people towards religious action), because there is no chapter (in the Scriptures) etc. about it. — 9.
[Go top]
With regard to the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta on the ground) that “There is a Scriptural statement about it” (Bra. Su. III. iv. 4), we reply: —A-sārvatrikī: not universal, not applicable everywhere.🔗 (The Scriptural statement) is not, of universal application. — 3.4.10. The Scriptural statement “That which he does with knowledge etc.” (ChanU.1.1.10) is not applicable to all Vidyās, because it has connection with that particular Vidyā which is relevant (to the context where it occurs) viz. the Udgīṭha Vidyā — “You should contemplate on the letter (Om) which is the Udgīṭha” (ChanU.1.1.1). — 10.
[Go top]
Vibhāgaḥ: (there is) division of knowledge and work; Śatavat: as in the case of a hundred (divided between two persons).🔗 There is a splitting up (as between knowledge and religious actions) as between a hundred (things, divided between two persons). — 3.4.11. The argument (of the opponent of Vedānta in III. iv. 5 above), viz., that the Scriptural statement “Knowledge and religious action together go along with the Jīva-Self (when it departs from the body at the time of death)” (BrhU.4.4.2) is an indicatory mark about Vidyā not being independent, is answered thus — It should be understood that there is a splitting up here, thus, viz. Vidyā accompanies one Puruṣa (at the death of a person who has attained knowledge) and religious action accompanies another Puruṣa (an ignorant person who dies). It is, as it is in the case of a hundred (things). Just as, when it is said that that a hundred (things) should be given to these (two persons), they (things) are divided fifty-fifty, and a moiety is given to one and the other moiety is given to another. Besides this statement about ‘going along with’ has no reference to one who is desirous of liberation (from worldly bondage), because the concluding Scriptural statement — “This much about a person who has desires (Kāmayamānaḥ)” (BrhU.4.4.6) — has reference to the transmigratory Jīva-Self. And the distinctly separate statement — “Now about (one) who has no desires (Akāmayamānaḥ)” (BrhU.4.4.6) — is separately stated with reference to one who is desirous of Final Release. Now the Vidyā contemplated in the case of one who is in the transmigratory condition is understood to be what is Scripturally enjoined and prohibited (i.e. Karma — and not the knowledge of the Self i.e. Ātmā-Vidyā) as there is absence of any special reason (why a particular Vidyā should be understood). ‘Action’ (referred to here) also means that which is enjoined and that which is prohibited, and only refers to ‘action’ which is already established elsewhere. This being so, the Scriptural statement about knowledge and action together going along (with the Jīva-Self, after death) may also be understood as not contemplating any such division between knowledge and action. — 11.
[Go top]
With regard to the argument, that Scriptures prescribe religious action to such only as understand the meaning of the Vedas (in Bra. Su. III. iv. 6), the reply given is thus: —Adhyayana-mātravataḥ: of one who has merely read the Vedas.🔗 It is only to him who has merely recited the Scriptures i.e. ‘Adhyayana-mātravataḥ’ (that engaging in religious action is prescribed). — 3.4.12. Because, in the Scriptural statement “Having studied the Vedas at the preceptor’s house” (ChanU.8.15.1), it is merely the reciting (of the Vedas) that is referred to, we conclude that it is only with respect to those who have but only recited the Scriptures (without understanding their meaning) that there is an injunction about religious action. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) — If it is so, then incompetency for the performance of religious action would result for the want of the knowledge of the Scriptures. (We reply) — This is no fault, because we do not deny that the knowledge of religious action resulting from the reciting (of the Vedas) is attained by one who has recited the Vedas and that he attains competency for performing religious actions, but we wish to propound only this much, that, as the Upanishadic knowledge of the Self, is understood to have a fruit of its own independently, it cannot become the cause for the conferment of competency for religious actions. Just as the knowledge of one sacrifice is not necessary for performing another sacrifice, even so should this be looked upon. — 12.
[Go top]
With regard to what is said (by the opponent of Vedānta) — viz., Also because definite rules (are prescribed) (Bra. Su. III. iv. 7) — we reply: —Na: not, compulsion does not apply; A-viśeṣāt: on account of the absence of any specification, because there is no special mention.🔗 No, because there is no (mention of) special qualification. — 3.4.13. There is nothing specifically mentioned in the Scriptural statement “Performing religious actions here (in this world) one should desire to live to be a hundred” (IsU.2) to understand any such rule that such a person should be possessed of knowledge. The rule is enjoined (by the Scriptures) without any special qualification attaching. — 13.
[Go top]
Stutaye: for the purpose of glorification (of knowledge); Anumatiḥ: permission; Vā: or, rather.🔗 Or else the consent (accorded for the performance of religious action) is for the purpose of glorification (of Vidyā). — 3.4.14. The Scriptural passage “Performing religious actions here (in this world) etc.” (IsU.2) can have another interpretation as follows: — Even though on the strength of the chapter (Prakaraṇa) it is only one who possesses knowledge, that has any connection with the word ‘doing’, still it should be understood that this permission to perform religious action is for the glorification of the knowledge (of the Self). The Sūtra-kāra will later on say — “Religious action does not affect you, who have the nature of a man” (IsU.2). By this is meant — Even if a person who has knowledge (of the Self) performs religious actions right throughout his life, such action does not affect him, because of the potency of knowledge, and in this manner, knowledge (of the Self) is thus glorified. — 14.
[Go top]
Kāma-kāreṇa: according to their own liking; Ca: and; Eke: some.🔗 Also, some others by their wilful unrestrained conduct of life (show their contempt for religious actions). — 3.4.15. Besides, some men having actually experienced the fruit of the knowledge (of Brahman), and solely depending upon the fruit of such knowledge actually experienced by them, say that they have no use for any such other means of attaining other fruits, such as progeny etc. There is a Scriptural statement in the Vāja-saneyi branch, about wilful conduct of life, thus — “Realizing this (Brahman) the sages of old did not have any desire for progeny. Said they — what use have we, who have this Self (Ātmā) and this Loka as the fruit (for ourselves), for progeny?” (BrhU.4.4.22). We have said more than once, how the fruit of the knowledge (of the Self) is based on simultaneous actual experience, and is not, like the fruit of religious actions, something which results at some future time. Hence also, it is, that knowledge of the Self (Vidyā) is not subservient to action, nor is it possible to accept the Scriptural statement about the fruit of the knowledge (of the Self), as not being so, (i.e. as being an Artha-vāda only). — 15.
[Go top]
Upamardam: complete destruction, putting an end to all actions; Ca: and.🔗 Moreover (the Scriptures state that there is) destruction (of the means which confer competency for religious action). — 3.4.16. Moreover the Scriptures mention that there is destruction (Upamarda), of the inherent nature (Sva-rūpa) of this entire apparent worldly manifestation (Prapañca) which is brought about by Nescience, which is characterized by actions (such as sacrifices), materials (of such sacrifices), and fruits of sacrifices, and which are the means by which competency for religious actions is conferred through (the acquisition of) the power of Vidyā, thus — “But when to him (the knower of Brahman) every thing has become but the Self only, then what should one see, and by what, and what should one smell, and by what?” (BrhU.2.4.14) etc. Now, in the case (of the opinion) of him who would insist on maintaining that the knowledge of the Self resulting from Vedānta must necessarily precede the attainment of competency for religious actions, that very competency for religious actions itself would undergo complete destruction. Therefore, also, knowledge (of the Self) is independent (and is not subservient to religious actions). — 16.
[Go top]
Ūrdhva-retassu: to those who observe perpetual celibacy, in those stages of life where the sexual energy has an upward flow; Ca: and; Śabde: in the Śruti; Hi: because.🔗 Knowledge (i.e. Vidyā of the Self, is prescribed) for those who have entered the order (Āśrama) of those who observe continence (i.e. Sannyāsins). (This order of life) is referred to in the Scriptures. — 3.4.17. The Scriptures mention knowledge (i.e. Vidyā of the Self) in connection with the order of those who observe continence (i.e. the Sannyāsins). That, in that order (of Sannyāsins), knowledge (i.e. Vidyā of the Self) can be subservient to religious actions is not reasonably sustainable, in as much as religious action is contra-indicated i.e. totally absent in that order. The Sannyāsins do not perform such Scriptural religious actions as the Agni-hotra etc. (If the opponent of Vedānta also says that) the order of the Sannyāsins is not referred to in the Scriptures, (we reply) that, that argument also is not so, (i.e. cannot be available to the opponent), because such order is mentioned in the Scriptures, thus — “(There are) three branches of Dharma” (ChanU.2.23.1); “Those who meditate with faith and austerity in the forest” (ChanU.5.10.1); “Those who practise faith and penance in the forest” (MunU.1.2.11); “Aspiring for that very world (Loka), Sannyāsins become such Sannyāsins” (BrhU.4.4.22); “One may become a Sannyāsin (i.e. renounce the world) even from the order of Brahma-carya (the celibate life of a student) directly (i.e. skipping the two intermediate orders of the house-holders (Gṛha-sthāśrama) and of those who sojourn in the forest (Vāna-prasthāśrama))” (Jābāla. 4). Besides, the Scriptures as well as the Smṛtis countenance, that both those who have entered and those who have not entered the order of householders, and those who have paid and those who have not paid the three debts (due to the Gods, the Ṛṣis and the manes), can equally join the order of those who observe continence. Therefore also knowledge (i.e. Vidyā of the Self) is independent (and not subservient to religious action). — 17.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Parā-marśam: a passing allusion, mere reference; Jaiminiḥ: Jaimini; A-codanā: there is no clear injunction; Ca: and; Apavadati: condemns; Hi: because, clearly, certainly.🔗 Jaimini thinks that there is only just a reference (to orders of life i.e. Sannyāsa etc.) here, which is no injunction. The Scriptures also censure (these orders of life). — 3.4.18. Ācārya Jaimini considers, that the Scriptural statement “(There are) three branches of Dharma” (ChanU.2.23.1) which has been cited (by the Vedāntin) to establish the existence of the order of Sannyāsins, is not able to establish it, because, he considers that here there is only a reference to other orders of life (Āśramas) but no injunction (about them). Here, there is no word signifying any injunction, such as a verb in an imperative tense etc., and it is perceived that each of these (Scriptural statements) has a different meaning. So far as the Scriptural statements viz. “(There are) three branches of Dharma: sacrifice, study of the Scriptures, and charity, form the first (branch), penance is the second (branch), and a student-bachelor, residing at the house of the preceptor, where (i.e. in the preceptor’s house), the student-bachelor wears himself out, is the third (branch); and that all these obtain the world of the righteous”, are concerned, the Scriptures after first making a reference to this, and mentioning that the fruit of these orders is but only a limited fruit, thereafter glorify the condition of complete ensconcement-in-Brahman (Brahma-saṃsthatā) as having the limitless fruit, thus — “One who is firmly ensconced-in-Brahman attains immortality” (ChanU.2.23.1). But (argues the Vedāntin), even such mere reference, does of course establish (the existence of) these orders. (The Mīmāṃsaka replies) — No doubt it does so establish, but this knowledge is derived from the Smṛtis and customary conduct, and not directly from the Scriptures. Hence when they are in conflict with the Scriptures, they would either become unfit for acceptance, or as pertaining to those that are not competent (to perform religious actions). But (says the Vedāntin) the order of householdership is referred to along with the order of the Sannyāsins, thus — viz., that sacrifice, study of the Scriptures and charity is the first branch etc. (The Mīmāṃsaka says) — That is true of course, but as only the householder is enjoined to perform Agni-hotra etc., his existence is well established by (other) Scriptural statements. Hence, this reference in this passage is in glorification only, and not by way of any injunction. Besides a direct Scriptural statement censures these other orders, thus — “He who abandons Sacrificial fire (i.e. gives up householdership and takes up other orders of life) becomes as it were, a murderer of the Gods”; “After having brought money (the fee), dear to the preceptor, you should not snap up the thread of progeny” (TaitU.1.11.1); “A sonless person does not attain (any) world, (and) even the beasts are aware of it”. Similarly the Scriptural statements — “Those who meditate with faith and penance, in the forest” (ChanU.5.10.1); and “Those who reside in the forest practising penance and faith” (MunU.1.2.11) — are but instructions about the Deva-yāna Path (because the Scriptures, in the next sentence after this, speak about those persons going to the Arci i.e. the Deva-yāna Path) and not an instruction about any other order of life. In such statements as — “Penance is the second” etc., it is doubtful if a mention of some other order of life is intended. Similarly the Scriptural passage, “It is with a desire to attain that very world (Loka), that those who accept Sannyāsa, do so”, is not an injunction to take to Sannyāsa, but is merely in glorification of the Ātmā-Loka. But (says the Vedāntin), in the Jābāla Scriptural statement “One may accept Sannyāsa even directly from student-bachelorship”, there is a clear injunction about Sannyāsa. (The Mīmāṃsaka replies) — It is no doubt true, but it should be understood that this present discussion is carried on without reference to that Scriptural statement. — 18.
[Go top]
Anuṣṭheyam: should be practised; Bādarāyanaḥ: Bādarāyana, the author of the Sūtras; Sāmya-śruteḥ: for the scriptural text refers equally to all the four Āśramas.🔗 Bādarāyaṇa (is of opinion that) the other orders of life (Āśramas) also must he duly observed, because of similar indications in Scriptural statements. — 3.4.19. Ācārya Bādarāyaṇa considers that the other orders of life also are to be observed, because there are Scriptural statements (about them) in the Vedas. Bādarāyaṇa who considers, that like the order of householdership, even the other orders of life also, ought to be observed, even though one may not wish to do so, thereby refutes the view (of Jaimini), viz. that inasmuch as Agni-hotra etc. (which pertain to the order of householdership), have to be compulsorily performed, and as the other orders of life are inconsistent to it, they are to be observed by those who are not competent (to perform Agni-hotra etc.). Whence is it so? Because of similar indications in Scriptural statements. “(There are) three branches of Dharma” (ChanU.2.23.1), is a Scriptural statement which refers to the other orders of life, quite as much as it refers to the order of householdership. It should be understood, that just as the order of householdership prescribed by other Scriptural statements is referred to here, even so are the other orders of life also, just as ‘Nivīta’ (wearing the sacred thread hanging from the neck only) and Prācīnāvīta (wearing the sacred thread hanging from the right shoulder and going under the left hand) which are referred to in a different injunctional Śāstra, are understood to be referred to in a passage which enjoins ‘Upavīta’ (wearing the sacred thread hanging from the left shoulder and going under the right hand). Therefore, the order of householdership and the other orders of life are equally necessarily to be observed. Similarly, in the Scriptural passage, “Wishing for this very Ātmā-Loka, it is, that the Sannyāsins become Sannyāsins” (BrhU.4.4.22), the order of Sannyāsa is referred to, along with the studying of the Vedas. And again in the Scriptural passage “Those who meditate with faith and with penance in the forest” (ChanU.5.10.1), the Vāna-prastha order of life is referred to, along with Pañcāgni-Vidyā (the Vidyā of Five Fires). Now, as regards the objection (by the opponent of Vedānta) that in the Scriptural passage, “Penance is the second (order of the life)” (ChanU.2.23.1) etc., the mention of the other orders of life is ambiguous, (we reply) — This is no fault, because therein a means of proof (Pramāṇa) for the determination of that is clearly present. In the passage “(There are) three branches of Dharma” (ChanU.2.23.1), it is declared that there is a trio of Dharma-branches. Many religious observances such as sacrifices etc. having different origins cannot be included in this trio (of Dharma-branches) unless they are connected with some order of life out of the trio. Now, by the order of householdership which has sacrifice etc. as an indicatory mark, one branch of Dharma is thus indicated. The term ‘student-bachelor’ is a clear indication of an order of life. So by the term ‘Penance’, then, what branch of Dharma, other than the order of life in which penance (i.e. Sannyāsa) is the principal item, can be understood? By the indicatory mark in the passage, “Those who in the forest” (ChanU.5.10.1), and by the terms ‘faith’ and ‘penance’, an order of life is clearly understood. Therefore, even if there be only a reference (to other orders of life), it is established that they have necessarily to be practised. — 19.
[Go top]
Vidhiḥ: injunction; Vā: or rather; Dhāraṇavat: as in the case of carrying (of the sacrificial wood).🔗 Or else (this passage may be understood to be) an injunction (for other orders of life) as in the case of the holding (of the Samidhs i.e. fire-sticks). — 3.4.20. Or else (this passage may be understood to be) an injunction for the other orders of life, and not merely a reference to them. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if it is understood to be a passage indicating an injunction, it would contradict the realization of the unanimity of view which is understood here, inasmuch as, the three branches of Dharma have the world of the righteous as their fruit, and the state of having a steadfast ideal of being ensconced-in-Brahman has immortality as its fruit. (We reply) — It is of course true, but the realization of the unanimity of view which is there, should be abandoned and it should be understood that there is an injunction here, because of there being a mention of an extraordinary thing unheard of before (Apūrva), and also because no other injunction is seen to be mentioned (in the Scriptures), and in as much as other orders of life are to be clearly understood here, it is not reasonably sustainable, that a unanimity of view should be understood, by considering the passage to be a Guṇa-vāda (a kind of Artha-vāda). This is like the holding (of the fire-sticks i.e. Samidhs). Just as, in the Scriptural passage “He should approach, holding the fire-sticks below (the Haviḥ i.e. an oblation), the fire-sticks are held above when the oblation is meant for the Gods”, even when a unanimity (Eka-vākyatā) about holding the fire-sticks under (the oblation) exists, it is understood that there is an injunction here for holding the fire-sticks above (the oblation) when it is meant for the Gods, because of its being an extraordinary thing. The same is stated (by Jaimini) in the Śeṣa-Lakṣaṇa (the third chapter of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) thus — “But holding the fire-sticks above the oblation is an injunction because of the extraordinary nature (of the statement)”. Similarly, here, the Scriptural statement which only refers to an order of life, is understood to be an injunction. Even though this is but a reference only to other orders of life, still on the strength of the glorification, the statement “Having a steadfast ideal of being ensconced-in-Brahman” should necessarily be understood to be something which is enjoined. Now, it has to be considered, whether this (being firmly ensconced-in-Brahman) is meant for any order of life out of these four orders of life (as desired), or for the order of the Sannyāsin (Parivrājaka) only. If it be supposed, that when all the orders of life down to that of the student-bachelorship are referred to, the Parivrājaka also is necessarily supposed to be so referred to along with the rest, then the fact is that all the four orders of life are equally commonly referred to, and as the person who has the steadfast ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahman cannot possibly not belong to some such order of life, a person having such a steadfast ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahman will necessarily have to belong to some one of these four orders of life. And if it be supposed that the Parivrājaka is not understood to be referred to along with the other orders of life, then the Parivrājaka thus would be the only one who remains to be so referred to, and it would mean that he would necessarily be the one who has the steadfast ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahman. Here, some (are of opinion) that a Parivrājaka also is referred to by the word ‘Penance’ which (term) indicates a Vaikhānasa (one of the four kinds of the Vāna-prastha order of life), but that is not logical. As far as it is possible, the Parivrājaka does not deserve to be understood by the word ‘Penance’ which particularly signifies the Vāna-prastha. It is logical to understand, that just as here the ‘householder’ and the ‘student-bachelor’ have been definitely referred to by their own special attributes, even so the mendicants (Bhikṣus) and the ‘Vaikhānasas’ (hermits) also are similarly referred to by their special attributes. The word ‘Penance’ is a special attribute of Vāna-prasthas, because of their chief characteristic of mortification of the body, for which the word ‘Penance’ is used by custom. The attribute of the mendicant (Sannyāsin) characterized by the control of the sense-organs, is certainly not understood by the word ‘Penance’. It is not logical (to suppose) that the orders of life which are known to be four, can be referred to by only three terms. Besides there is an indication of distinction here, thus — These three attain the world of the righteous, and the other one (i.e. the Parivrājaka Sannyāsin) attains immortality. This indication of distinction is possible, only if there is a distinction (between the Vaikhānasa and the Bhikṣu). It can never be, that while both Deva-datta and Yajña-datta are dull of intellect, one of the two is highly intellectual, but it can very well be, that while both Deva-datta and Yajña-datta are dull of intellect, Viṣṇu-mitra is highly intellectual. Therefore these first three orders of life are of those who attain the world of the righteous, and the Parivrājaka, the only one left over, is the one who attains immortality. (The opponent of Vedānta says), how can the expression “A person having a steadfast ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahman”, which in its current etymological derivation is applicable to all (orders of life, as they can equally have that ideal), be restricted only to the Parivrājaka? If it be allowed its customary meaning, viz. immortality, then, being attainable by merely (belonging to) an order of life, there would be the predicament of knowledge being rendered purposeless. (We reply) — Being ensconced-in-Brahman means merging in Brahman, and being ensconced in it, is spoken of as having a firm stability in it, and being of the nature of having no other extraneous operational activity. That is not possible in the case of the other three orders of life, because failure to perform the religious duties prescribed for one’s own order of life is understood to result in sin, according to the Scriptural statements. In the case of a Parivrājaka, however, inasmuch as he happens to have renounced all religious actions, sin as caused by the failure to perform religious actions, is not possible (in his case), while the duty of being peaceful and of exercising control over the sense-organs (far from being opposed to the condition of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahman) is, on the other hand, rather helpful to it. The state of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahman, as supported by his duty of maintaining the condition of being peaceful and in the proper control of his senses, is the only duty prescribed in his order of life, while sacrifices etc. are of the others, and their failure in these actions amounts to sin. Of similar import are Scriptural statements such as “Renunciation is Brahman, Brahman is the Highest, the Highest is Brahman, these penances etc. are lower (in value) and renunciation excels them” (Nara. 78), “Yatis (anchorites) who have determined well the meaning of the knowledge of Vedānta, and who by renunciation have become pure, (and obtained Final Release)” (MunU.3.2.6; Nara. 12.3.1; KaivU.3). The Smṛti also, by saying thus — “Having minds fixed in it and serving it with all their heart” (BhG.5.17) etc., indicates how a person having the ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahman has no religious duty to perform. Therefore, (in the case of a Parivrājaka), such fault, as, that he would attain immortality merely by belonging to that order of life, and that knowledge would be rendered purposeless, cannot occur. Therefore, even though, here in this passage, there is a reference to other orders of life, that order of life, viz., of being a Parivrājaka and having the characteristic of having the ideal of being firmly ensconced-in-Brahman, is available all the same. The Ācārya has discussed this subject without reference to the Jābāla Scriptural statement which gives injunctions about the other orders of life. Of course there is a direct Scriptural statement enjoining the other orders of life, thus — “Completing student-bachelorship, he should become a householder, and after that he should become a hermit, and after that a Parivrājaka, or if he so chooses, he may become a Parivrājaka directly after finishing student-bachelorship, or after householdership, or after being a hermit” (Jābāla. 4). It cannot be argued, that this Scriptural statement relates to one who is not competent (to perform religious action), because of the absence of any special Scriptural statement therein, and because there is a separate statement with regard to those who are incompetent (to perform religious actions), thus — “Whether he be one, who has undertaken a vow or one who has not, whether he be an acolyte (a Snātaka) or a householder, or whether he has given up keeping a sacrificial fire or whether he is not competent to keep such fire” (Jābāla 4). Besides, a Parivrājaka’s order of life, being helpful to the attainment of the ripe knowledge of Brahman, it cannot be said to be available for those who are incompetent to perform religious actions. The same is indicated in the Scriptural statement — “The mendicant with colourless (i.e. white) vestures, clean shaven, without a wife, clear, not disloyal and living on alms, is fit to attain Brahma-hood” (Jābāla 5). Therefore, it is proved that there is such an order of life as that of those who observe continence (i.e. Sannyāsins) and as knowledge (of Brahman) is spoken of in their connection, it i.e. knowledge (Vidyā) is independent (and not subservient to religious action). — 20.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Stuti-mātram: mere praise; Upādānāt: on account of their reference (to parts of sacrificial acts); Iti: thus, so; Cet: if; Na: not so; A-pūrvatvāt: on account of its newness. (Iti cet: if it be said).🔗 If it be said (that Scriptural statements such as those about Udgīṭha etc.) are merely in glorification, because of their being accepted (as subordinate parts of sacrificial acts, we say), — No, because of (the statements) being extraordinary. — 3.4.21. When, with regard to Scriptural passages such as “This Udgīṭha is the quintessence of essences, is the highest, is fit for the topmost rank, and is the eighth (essence)” (ChanU.1.1.3), “This (world) itself is the Ṛk, this Agni is the Sāman” (ChanU.1.6), “This brick-built fire is indeed this world” (ChanU.1.6.1), “That the Earth is the Uktha (collection of hymns)”, a doubt arises as to whether they are in glorification of the Udgīṭha, or are by way of an injunction to meditation, and if it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that it is logical that they are for the purpose of the glorification of the Udgīṭha, inasmuch as they are accepted by the Scriptures to be with reference to the Udgīṭha etc., which are the subordinate parts of religious acts (such as Sacrifices), similar to such Scriptural statements as — “This Earth is the sacrificial ladle, the Sun is the tortoise (the form of the fire altar), the heavenly world is the Āhavanīya (fire)” etc., which are, for the purpose of glorification of the ladle (Juhū) etc., the Sūtra-kāra replies — No. It is not logical that the purpose of these Scriptural passages should be mere glorification; because of their being of an extraordinary nature (Apūrvatvāt). It is only if these Scriptural passages (are understood to) mean an injunction, that they can properly be said to be of an extraordinary nature, and if the passages are considered to be merely in glorification, then they would be meaningless, because a glorificatory passage comes into use as such, only when it can be construed to be a passage complementary to a passage which prescribes an injunction, as stated in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (1.2.7), thus — “Being in syntactical relation of unity with an injunction, they are for the glorification of an injunction (Vidhinā tu eka-vākyatvāt stuty-arthena vidhīnaṃ syuḥ)”. But these glorificatory passages mentioned in a place different from that in which the Udgīṭha is mentioned, would be meaningless, inasmuch as they fail to be passages complementary to Udgīṭha passages. As regards the Scriptural passage “This (earth) is the Ṛk etc.”, as it is mentioned in proximity to an injunctional passage, it is different from the present passage. Therefore (the conclusion is that) Scriptural passages of this type are meant by way of an injunction. — 21.
[Go top]
Bhāva-śabdāt: from words indicative of existence of injunction in Śruti; Ca: and, also, moreover.🔗 Also, because of words having an injunctional meaning (Bhāva-śabdāt). — 3.4.22. The Scriptures recite words indicating clear injunctions in passages such as “He should meditate on the Udgīṭha” (ChanU.1.1.1), “He should meditate on Sāman” (ChanU.2.2.1), “He should know himself to be the Uktha”, which, were they to be considered to be meant merely in glorification, would be purposeless. Similarly even those who are learned in Nyāya, consider, that expressions such as “should do”, “should be done”, “must be done”, “may become”, and the fifth “they will become”, occurring in all the Vedic texts, are definitely indicative of an injunction and they consider ‘Liṇg’ (technical expression in Pāṇini’s grammar) etc. to mean an injunction. Besides in every chapter fruits are mentioned by the Scriptures, such as “He verily becomes the fulfiller of desires” (ChanU.1.1.7), “He (the meditator on Udgīṭha) is able to obtain his desires by singing Sāman hymns” (ChanU.1.7.9), “The worlds (in their ascending and descending order) serve him” (ChanU.2.2.3). Therefore also, Scriptural passages such as Udgītha etc. purport to enjoin meditation. — 22.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Pāriplava-arthāḥ: for the purpose of Pāriplavas (common legend tellings prescribed as part of a ritual); Iti: so; Cet: if; Na: not so; Viśeṣitatvāt: because of specification, on account of (certain stories alone) being specified. (Iti cet: if it be said.)🔗 If it be said (that the legends mentioned in the Upaniṣads) are for the purpose of Pāri-plava, (we say) — No, because of specification i.e. because only particular specific legends (are so intended). — 3.4.23. In the case of certain legends mentioned in the Vedānta, as for instance — “Now, Yājña-valkya had two wives, Maitreyī and Kātyāyanī” (BrhU.4.5.1), “Pratardana, the son of Divo-dāsa arrived at the favourite abode of Indra” (Kaush. 3.8), “There once lived a king named Jāna-śruti the great-grandson (of Jana-śruta), who donated (wealth) with faith (Śraddhā-deyaḥ), and who was a generous giver (Bahu-dāyī), and kept an open house (Bahu-pākyaḥ — lit., who got a large quantity of food cooked for guests)”, the doubt arises, whether their purpose is Pāri-plava (recitation of certain legends before a king engaged in a Horse-sacrifice) or for the purpose of making the Vidyās, in proximity with which such legends are mentioned, understood. (The conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is) that these Scriptural legends are for the purpose of Pāri-plava, inasmuch as, they are legends quite as much as legends which are ordinarily recited, and because there is a Scriptural injunction that such legends should be so recited as Pāri-plava. Hence, if it be said, that the principal aim of Vedānta texts would not be ‘knowledge’ (Vidyā), because, like Mantras they are complementary portions (of sacrificial acts), (we reply) — It is not so, because there is specification. It is in connection with the passage — “Pāri-plava should be recited”, that, only certain specific legends such as “The king Manu, the son of Vivasvat” etc. are mentioned there. If by the Scriptural statement all legends (in the Upaniṣads) in general were to be understood (as meant for Pāri-plava) because of these particular legends being similar to legends generally, their special specification by the Scriptures would be meaningless. Hence these Scriptural legends are not for the purpose of Pāri-plava. — 23.
[Go top]
Tathā: so, similarly; Ca: and; Eka-vākyatā-upabandhāt: being connected as one whole. (Eka-vakyatā: unity of construction or of statements or that of sense; Upabandhāt: because of connection.)🔗 And, thus, because of being connected with syntactical unity (the legends are meant for the proximate Vidyās). — 3.4.24. It is logical, that inasmuch as these legends are not meant for the purpose of Pāri-plava, they should be understood as being useful for the propounding of the Vidyās proximate to them, because there is a connection of syntactical unity (between them and the Vidyās). For it is seen that there is such unity with the proximate Vidyās, in that they are useful for creating a taste (for the Vidyās), and for their easy comprehension. Besides in the Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa, for instance, it is seen, that there is such syntactical unity with the Vidyā which begins with the Scriptural passage — “Oh Maitreyī, the Self indeed should be seen” (BrhU.4.5.6). In the legend of Pratardana also (such syntactical unity is to be seen) with the Vidyā passage beginning with “I am Prāṇa the intellegential Self”, and in the legend of Jāna-śruti with the Vidyā passage — “Vāyu indeed is the absorber” (ChanU.4.3.1). It is just as it is in the case of the legends mentioned in Scriptural texts with reference to religious actions, such as “He gouged out his own pericardium” etc., which have the purpose of the glorification of the proximate injunction (according to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). Therefore the legends are not meant for Pāri-plava. — 24.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Ataḥ eva: therefore, only, for this reason only; Ca: and, also; Agni: fire; Indhana-ādi: fire-wood, and so on, kindling fire and performing sacrifices, etc.; An-apekṣa: no need, has not to be depended upon. (Agni-indhana-ādi-anapekṣa: no necessity of lighting fires, etc.)🔗 Hence, because of this also, it is, that there is no need of ‘lighting a fire’ etc. (for Vidyās). — 3.4.25. The words ‘because of this’ (Ata eva) are used here, because it is possible to connect them with the distant Sūtra “The chief aim of man (i.e. Final Release is attained) through this” (Bra. Su. III. iv. 1). It is because a Vidyā is the means of (the attainment of) the chief aim (of man), that religious duties connected with the various orders of life, such as ‘lighting up of a fire’, are not required by the Vidyā (of the knowledge of the Self) for generating for itself such knowledge of the Self. The Sūtra-kāra thus sums up the ‘fruit’ of the first Adhikaraṇa, with the intention of saying something in addition. — 25.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Sarva-apekṣā: there is the necessity of all works; Ca: and; Yajna-ādi-śruteḥ: for the scriptures prescribe sacrifices, etc., (as means to knowledge); Aśvavat: like a horse, as in the case of the horse.🔗 Because of the Scriptural mention of sacrifices etc. (as the means of the knowledge of the Self) performance of all religious actions is necessary. It is, as it is in the case of a horse. — 3.4.26. It is now being considered, whether knowledge (Vidyā of the Self) does not at all need the performance of religious actions, or whether there is some such need after all. With regard to it, the conclusion already arrived at (by the preceding Sūtra) being, that knowledge of the Self has absolutely no need at all of religious actions pertaining to the different orders of life, such as the ‘lighting up of a fire’, for its own generation, it is said, that there is such need of all such religious actions pertaining to all the orders of life (Āśramas). Therefore the Sūtra-kāra says: — Knowledge (of the Self) does of course need all the religious actions pertaining to the various orders of life, and it is not that it does not need them at all. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the statement that religious actions pertaining to the orders of life, are, at one and the same time, both needed and not so needed, is contradictory. (We reply) — No, knowledge (of the Self) when once it is generated, needs nothing whatsoever, for the attainment of its fruit (i.e. Final Release), but so far as its own generation is concerned, it does so need (the performance of religious actions). Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statement about sacrifices etc. For so goes the Scriptural statement — “The Brāhmaṇas desire to realize the Self by means of the recitation of the Scriptures (Vedānuvacana), sacrifices, charities, and fasting or living only on what they casually get as food (Anāśakena)” (BrhU.4.4.22), and it indicates, that sacrifices etc. are the means of the attainment of the knowledge (of the Self). Now the determination that these (sacrifices etc.) are such means, results from their connection with the desire to know. As, in the Scriptural statement “That which is called a sacrifice is but a life of bachelorship” (ChanU.8.5.1), the life of bachelorship which is the means of knowledge (Vidyā) is mentioned along with sacrifices, therefore, that sacrifices etc. also are such means, is suggested thereby. The Scriptural statements, such as “I shall now briefly tell you about that ultimate goal, about which all the Vedas speak, which is proclaimed by all penances, and with a desire for which a bachelor’s life is led (by men)” (KathU.1.2.15), suggest, that religious actions which pertain to the orders of life, are the means of the attainment of knowledge (Vidyā of the Self). So says the Smṛti also, thus — “Religious actions cook up or digest uncleanliness, and knowledge (of the Self) is the Highest goal”. Knowledge supervenes from actions, after such actions have purified uncleanliness etc. The statement, “It is, as it is, in the case of a horse” is just an apt illustration. Just as, a horse, considering his dignity, is not employed for the dragging of a plough, but is used for a chariot, even so religious actions are not needed by the knowledge (of the Self) for the attainment of its own result (viz. Final Release), but they are needed by the knowledge (of the Self) for its own generation. — 26.
[Go top]
Śama-dama-ādi-upetaḥ syāt: one must possess serenity, self-control and the like; Tathāpi: still, all the same, even if it be so; Tu: verily; Tad-vidheḥ: as they are enjoined; Tad-aṅgatayā: on account of their being a part, as helps to knowledge; Teṣām: their; Avaśya-anuṣṭheyatvāt: because it being necessary to be practised. (A-vaśya: necessarily; Anuṣṭheyatvāt: because they must be practised.)🔗 Even though it be so, (a person desirous of Final Release) must be equipped with calmness and control over the sense-organs, and because, as subsidiary parts of knowledge they are helpful to it, there is an injunction about them, and they have therefore to be necessarily observed. — 3.4.27. Even if one (i.e. some opponent of Vedānta) were to think, that it is not logical to consider sacrifices etc. to be the means of attaining knowledge (of the Self), because of the absence of an injunction about them, and because the Scriptural statement of the type of “They desire to know (Brahman) by means of sacrifice” is of the nature of an Anuvāda (i.e. mere reference to something known already), and is of the nature of being a eulogy of knowledge, and is not of the nature of an injunction for sacrifice, and that in as much as the knowledge (of the Self) is so blessed, people desire to acquire it by means of sacrifices etc., we reply — A person desirous of the knowledge (of the Self) must be one who is equipped with calmness and control over his sense-organs, because, they are said to be the means of knowledge, according to the Scriptural statement “Therefore, one who knows it to be so, sees the Self, in the Self itself, by becoming calm, subdued, satisfied, patient and collected” (BrhU.4.4.23), and also because, what is so enjoined (by the Scriptures) has necessarily to be followed. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) even here, it is seen that in the Scriptural passage “A man by becoming equipped with calmness and control over the sense-organs, sees” (BrhU.4.4.23), the present tense is used, and there is no injunction as such. Not so, we reply, because it is understood that there is an injunction, as, by the word ‘therefore’ a eulogy of what is relevant here is understood. Besides in the Scriptural text of the Mādhyan-dinas, a clear injunction is indicated by the expression “He should see”. Therefore even though sacrifices etc. may not be needed, calmness etc. are. Besides even sacrifices etc. are needed, because of the Scriptural statement itself about such sacrifices. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has already been stated that in the passage “Desire to know by sacrifices” no injunction is discernible. (We reply) — It is true that it is so said, but as its connection with the desire to know is of an extraordinary nature (Apūrva), an injunction has to be understood. It is not as if this connection between sacrifices etc. and ‘the desire to know’ is something which has been established already, so that it could be said to be merely an Anuvāda i.e. that it is merely repeated here. Scriptural passages such as “Therefore, Pūṣan (i.e. the Sun) who is sans-teeth receives a well-mascerated (portion of the oblation)”, even though (they are) not of the nature of a Scriptural injunction, still, on account of being considered to be injunctional because of an extraordinary feature about them, a discussion about them is started in the first Tantra (i.e. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā III. 3.34) thus — “It is understood that in the case of Vikṛtis (Iṣṭis based on the Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa Iṣṭi) the oblation to Pūṣan is well-mascerated”. Even so it has been stated in Sūtra 20 of the present Pāda. It has been explained in the Smṛtis such as Bhagavad-gītā that sacrifices performed without keeping an eye on the fruit, become the means of the attainment of the knowledge (of the Self) for him who desires Final Release. Therefore religious actions such as sacrifices etc., as also calmness and the control over sense-organs as prescribed for the different orders of life, are all to be considered as necessary for the generation of knowledge. Even then, it should be well understood with due discrimination, that as between them (i.e. Sacrifices etc. and calmness and control over sense-organs), in the expression “One who knows it to be so”, because of their connection with knowledge, calmness and control over the sense-organs are the proximate i.e. inward means of the knowledge (of the Self), while sacrifices etc., because of their being connected with the desire of a man who knows thus, are the external means. — 27.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Sarva-anna-anumatiḥ: permission to take all sorts of food; Ca: only; Prāṇa-atyaye: when life is in danger; Tad-darśanāt: because the Śruti declares that.🔗 There is liberty to eat food of all sorts only when otherwise there is possibility of death, because the Scriptures have said so. — 3.4.28. In the dialogue of the Prāṇas of the Chando-gas’ branch of the Scriptures, there is a passage, thus — “Nothing is not food to a person, who knows it to be so (i.e. that he — the Prāṇa of all beings — is the eater of all kinds of food)” (ChanU.5.2.1). Similarly, there is a passage of the Vāja-saneyins, thus — “In his case he eats nothing that is not eatable, nothing that is not eatable is accepted by him” (BrhU.6.1.14). What is meant is, that in his case every thing is food fit to be eaten. When therefore the doubt is, whether this liberty about all sorts of food, is enjoined as being a subordinate part, i.e. a means of Vidyā, like calmness etc., or whether it is mentioned by way of eulogy, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that it is an injunction. For in this manner, this teaching promotes a special tendency (and thus being an extraordinary thing (Apūrva) must be understood to be an injunction). Therefore, being in proximity to a Vidyā it is a subordinate part of the Vidyā, and being such a subordinate part, the abrogation of the general rule is indicated by it. But (says the Vedāntin) — If it is understood to be so, the Śāstra dealing with what should and should not be eaten, is contradicted. (The opponent of Vedānta) replies — This is no fault, because, there being a relation as between a general rule and a special exception here, such contradiction of the Śāstra is reasonably sustainable. Just as the general rule against the killing of any living being is contradicted by an injunction for the sacrificial slaughter of an animal, or just as in the case of the Vāma-devyā-Vidyā, the Scriptural passage “No woman who makes an approach, should be jilted, because that is a special observance (Vrata)” (ChanU.2.13.2), which while speaking specially about not avoiding any such woman, contradicts the general Śāstra which deals with the division of women, into those who should be accepted for cohabitation and those who should not be so accepted, even so, by this passage, which permits food of all kinds in connection with the Prāṇa-Vidyā, the Śāstra dealing with the division between food that can be eaten and food that cannot be eaten, may well be contradicted. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we say — Such permission to eat all sorts of food is not enjoined by this. No word enjoining anything is to be seen here, because, in the passage “Nothing is not food to a person who knows it to be so” there is a present tense form (Vartamānāpadeśa). When the realization of an injunction is absent, it is not possible to wishfully construe an injunction (in the passage) having the nature of promoting a special tendency (allowing any kind of food). Besides, it is after mentioning that the limit of the food of Prāṇa extends in range right down to the limit of a dog etc., that, it is said — “To him who knows it to be so, there is nothing that is not food.” It is also not possible for a human body to consume food right down to the limit of a dog etc., while it is quite possible to consider all this as the food of the Prāṇa. Therefore, this is but an Artha-vāda only, having the purpose of a eulogy of the food of the Prāṇa, and not an injunction permitting all sorts of foods. That is indicated by the Sūtra — “There is liberty to eat food of all sorts when there is a possibility of a danger to life (lit., possibility of Prāṇas departing)”. This means, that it is only when life is endangered, or in cases of such an extreme calamity, that all food is permitted to be eaten, because it is so seen from the Scriptures. Even so, the Scriptures speak of a tendency on the part of the sage Cākrāyaṇa, while he was in a condition of extreme calamity, to eat food which is forbidden, in the Brāhmaṇa passage — “When the province of Kuru was devastated by a hail-storm (or by an invasion by red locusts)” (ChanU.1.10.1) etc. The sage Cākrāyaṇa while he was in such an extremity partook of Kulmāṣas half eaten by an elephant-driver, but refused water (offered by him) as having the fault of being a sort of his leavings. And he stated the reason to be as follows — “Verily I could not have lived if I had not eaten these (Kulmāṣas). I can get water to drink anywhere I may desire” (ChanU.1.10.4). The Scriptures also state, that again the next day, he partook of the same stale leavings of himself and another (his wife). That the Scriptures, by mentioning this eating of the already twice tasted stale food, purpose to indicate its meaning, that in such a predicament as a danger to life, it is permissible to eat food which is forbidden, in order to sustain oneself, while under comfortable and safe conditions, even those who possess knowledge, should not do so, is understood from Cākrāyaṇa’s rejection of the water. Therefore, the Scriptural passage “In the case of one who knows it to be so” (ChanU.5.2.1) etc. is an Artha-vāda passage. — 28.
[Go top]
A-bādhāt: because of a non-contradiction, as there is no contrary statement anywhere in Śruti; Ca: and, also, moreover, on account of non-sublation.🔗 Also because in this way (the Śāstra) is not contradicted (the present sentence is an Artha-vāda passage). — 3.4.29. It is only when it is (understood to be) so, that the Śāstra which purports to discriminate between that which can be eaten and that which cannot be eaten, by such a passage as “When the food is pure, then the mind becomes pure”, that the Śāstra will not happen to be contradicted. — 29.
[Go top]
Api: also; Ca: moreover; Smaryate: the Smṛti says so, it is seen in the Smṛtis, it is prescribed by Smṛti.🔗 Besides, Smṛti also says so. — 3.4.30. Moreover the Smṛtis also, both with regard to those who know and those who do not know, say without any distinction as to when all sorts of food may be eaten, thus — “That a person, who when his life is in danger partakes of food obtained by him from wheresoever, is not contaminated by sin, even as a lotus leaf is not contaminated by water”. In the same way, by passages such as “A Brāhmaṇa must not drink liquor”, “Hot liquor should be poured down the throat of a Brāhmaṇa who drinks spirits”, “Those who drink liquor become worms, because of drinking what is forbidden”, the Smṛti speaks of what, not being food, should be avoided. — 30.
[Go top]
Śabdaḥ: the scriptural passage; Ca: and; Ataḥ: hence; A-kāma-kāre: to prevent undue license, prohibiting license, as to non-proceeding according to liking.🔗 Thus also the Scriptural statement prohibiting unrestricted conduct (would be justified). — 3.4.31. There is a Scriptural passage in Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā which denounces food that cannot be eaten, and which aims at persuading a man against indulging in unrestricted conduct thus — “Therefore, a Brāhmaṇa should not drink spirituous liquors etc.”. This passage becomes all the more reasonably sustainable, when the passage “Nothing is not food to one who knows it to be so” is understood to be an Artha-vāda. Therefore, passages such as these are Artha-Vādas and not injunction. — 31.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Vihitatvāt: because they are enjoined; Ca: and; Āśrama-karma: duties of the Āśrama, or order of life; Api: also.🔗 Religious duties pertaining to the orders of life, inasmuch as they are prescribed (by the Scriptures) are to be performed, (even by those who do not desire Final Release). — 3.4.32. It has been determined in Bra. Su. III. iv. 26 (performance of all religious duties is needed), that religious duties which pertain to the orders of life, are the means of attaining knowledge (of the Self). Now it is being considered whether they are to be performed by one who is merely attached to his own order of life without caring for attaining knowledge, and who does not desire Final Release, or that he need not perform them. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta is) — inasmuch as, by the Scriptural passage “That which the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by the reciting of the Vedas” (BrhU.4.4.22), such religious duties of the orders of life are prescribed as being the means of (attaining) knowledge, (it follows) that they are not to be performed by those who desire to attain a different fruit, but do not desire to acquire knowledge (of the Self). And that if they have to be performed by such a person also, then they could not be the means of attaining such knowledge, because of the contradiction (involved) as between a connection with religious actions (Karma) which is at once both permanent and non-permanent. To that, the reply given is — These permanent religious duties have necessarily to be performed even by one who is merely attached to an order of life and does not desire to attain Final Release, because, they are enjoined by such Scriptural passages as — “He must perform the Agni-hotra as long as he continues to live”. Indeed it is not (even if it is understood to be so) that the Scriptural passage would thereby have to bear the burden of a meaning which it cannot well bear. — 32.
[Go top]
With regard to the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta) that, if so, religious duties would not be the means of (acquiring) knowledge, the reply is: —Saha-kāritvena: as, an auxiliary, on account of cooperativeness, as means to knowledge; Ca: and.🔗 And also because of their being (mentioned as being) co-operators (in the attainment of knowledge). — 3.4.33. These (religious duties) would be co-operators in the attainment of knowledge, because they are prescribed to be so by the Scriptures, thus — “That, the Brāhmaṇas desire to know, by the reciting of Vedas etc.”. That has been explained by Sūtra 26 above, viz. “There is need of all religious actions, because of the Scriptural statement about sacrifices etc. It is, as it is, in the case of a horse.” Now, it should not be considered, that the Scriptural statement about the duties pertaining to the orders of life being cooperators, is with regard to the fruit of knowledge (i.e. Final Release), just as the Prayājas (are with regard to the fruit of Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa), because knowledge (of the Self) cannot be the subject of an injunction, and also because the fruit of the knowledge of the Self (i.e. Final Release) is not something which has to be brought about by any means. Such means as Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa etc. which are characterized by injunction, may require other cooperating means (as a help), inasmuch as they aim at such fruit as the heaven, but knowledge does not (require any such co-operative means). The same has been said in the Sūtra “Hence there is no need of the lighting of Agni” (Bra. Su. III. iv. 25). Therefore, the statement about religious duties being co-operators is only with reference to their being the means of the bringing about of knowledge. In this case, no doubt should be entertained about any contradiction as between permanent and non-permanent connection with religious actions (Karma), because there may well be differences in connection even when there is no difference in religious actions. The connection implied by the statement about (Agni-hotra) having to be performed as long as life lasts is a permanent connection, and knowledge (of the Self) is not its fruit. The other connection implied in the passage “That, the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by reciting the Vedas” is a non-permanent one, the fruit of which is the knowledge (of the Self). Just as in the case of a Khadira sacrificial post (fashioned out of Khadira wood), it is connected with a sacrifice in a permanent connection, while with reference to a particular purpose of a man (such as, the attainment of strength i.e. Vīrya, which may or may not be desired by a man) its connection is non-permanent, even so it is here. — 33.
[Go top]
Sarvathā: in all cases, in every respect, under any circumstance; Api: also; Te eva: the same duties (have to be performed); Ubhaya-liṅgāt: because of the twofold inferential signs. (Te: they, the sacrificial works; Eva: certainly.)🔗 Considered both ways, these very same (religious duties are meant to be performed), because of the indicatory marks being both ways. — 3.4.34. Considered in every way, whether the view be about religious duties as pertaining to the orders of life, or the view be of their being co-operators in (the acquisition) of knowledge (of the Self), these very same religious duties such as Agni-hotra etc., have to be performed. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), by determining ‘that these same’ (religious duties have to be performed), what does the Ācārya seek to refute? We reply, that he seeks to refute the doubt about these religious duties being different (from those mentioned in the Karma-Kaṇḍa). No such difference in the religious duties is meant here, as is meant in the case of the minor Sacrifice (Ayana) of the Kauṇḍa-pāyins, by (the injunction) “He performs Agni-hotra for a month”, where, a religious duty different from that in the case of the ordinary Agni-hotra, is meant to be mentioned. Whence is it so? Because of the indicatory marks of both kinds, i.e. the indicatory marks both in the Scriptures and the Smṛtis. As for the Scriptural indicatory mark, the passage “That, the Brāhmaṇas desire to know, by the reciting of the Vedas” (BrhU.4.4.22), which enjoins (a person in) sacrifices etc., that is something which is already established, and is something, the nature of which is already known to be the means, with reference to this “desire to know”, and it does not evolve, as the expression “he sacrifices” etc. does, a new and extraordinary form of these (sacrifices). The Smṛti indicatory mark “Whosoever performs religious duties without any desire for their fruit” (BhG.6.1) shows that the same religious duty, as is already known to be such a duty, has to be performed for the generation of the knowledge (of the Self). Similarly, the purificatory rites referred to in the Smṛti passage “One who has gone through the forty-eight purificatory rites”, being well-known in connection with Vedic religious actions, are the same as are meant by the Smṛtis, in connection with the generation of the knowledge (of the Self) in a person, who has gone through such rites. Therefore, this determination of non-difference (as between religious duties) is quite proper. — 34.
[Go top]
An-abhibhavam: not being overpowered; Ca: and; Darśayati: the scripture shows, the Śrutis declare.🔗 The Scriptures also indicate (that persons who perform, religious duties) are not overcome by torments (such as passions etc.). — 3.4.35. Another indicatory mark, which goes to strengthen the conclusion about religious duties being the co-operators (in the acquisition of the knowledge of the Self), and which shows, how a person who is equipped with such means as Brahma-carya etc. is not overcome by such torments as passions etc., is stated by the Scriptures, thus — “This Self (i.e. the knowledge of the Self) which a person acquires by means of Brahma-carya etc., is not destroyed” (ChanU.8.5.3). Hence, it is definitely concluded that religious duties such as sacrifices etc., besides pertaining to an order of life, are also co-operators (in the acquisition of the knowledge of the Self). — 35.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Antarā: (persons standing) in between (two Āśramas); Ca: and; Api tu: also; Tad-dṛṣṭeḥ: such cases being seen, (as it is seen in Śruti, because it is so seen).🔗 Those who are in between (i.e. are neither here nor there) (are also competent to acquire knowledge), because it is seen to be so (from the Scriptures). — 3.4.36. When the doubt is, as to whether, widowers etc. and those who are not able to take up any one of these orders of life, because they do not possess the means such as wealth or materials etc., are competent to acquire knowledge (of the Self), or whether, they are not, the conclusion (of the opponent of the Vedānta) is that they are not so competent, because it is definitely ascertained that religious duties pertaining to an order of life (Āśrama) are the means of (acquiring) knowledge (of the Self) and also because they are not possible (in their case). To that the Sūtra-kāra replies — One who is in between, and is living out of the orders of life, is also competent to acquire knowledge (of the Self). Whence is it so? Because it is so seen from the Scriptures. It is seen from the Scriptures that individuals such as Raikva, Vācaknavī (Gārgī) etc. who were similarly circumstanced had acquired the knowledge (of the Self). (ChanU.4.1 and BrhU.3.6.8
[Go top]
Api: also, too; Ca: moreover, and; Smaryate: is stated in Smṛti, the Smṛti records such cases.🔗 Smṛti also has stated similarly. — 3.4.37. That, Saṃvarta (a Smṛti-kāra) and others who did not care to perform the religious duties of an order of life, and went about in the nude, became great Yogins in spite of that, is testified by History. — 37.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the instances stated from the Scriptures and the Smṛtis are but mere indicatory marks, but what is the conclusion arrived at (from them)? The Sūtra-kāra states the conclusion, thus —Viśeṣa: special; Anugrahaḥ: favour; Ca: and. (Viśeṣa-anugrahaḥ: special advantage, advantage or favour accruing from extraordinary good works done in the previous life.)🔗 (Widowers etc. also) because of their special acts are vouchsafed this favour. — 3.4.38. It is possible that in the case of widowers etc. this favour viz. the knowledge (of the Self) is vouchsafed to them as the result of some special acts of theirs, such as Japa (Prayer), fasts, worship of deities etc. which are not opposed to their condition (i.e. not belonging to any order of life as widowers etc.) and which any man merely as a man can perform. For so says the Smṛti — “There is no doubt that a Brāhmaṇa by mere prayers becomes equipped (with the knowledge of the Self), whether he performs anything else or does not, and he is called a learned Brāhmaṇa (Maitra)” (Manu. Sam. II. 87), and it indicates, that though the performance of the duties of an order of life is not possible (in such a man’s case), still he is competent to engage himself in prayer. Such favour is certainly possible, as a result of the performance of the religious duties pertaining to an order of life during a former life, for the Smṛti by the passage “And being thus equipped (with knowledge) after successive births, he attains the highest goal” (Br. G. 6.45), indicates, that particular special impressions (Saṃskāras) stored up during previous births do vouchsafe the knowledge (of the Self). Knowledge of the Self has its own directly visible fruit and by the mere absence of any obstruction, it confers competency on an aspirant, for listening etc. (to a discourse on the Self etc.). Therefore such competency even in a widower etc. is not contradictory. — 38.
[Go top]
Ataḥ: from this, than this, than the intermediate state mentioned above; Tu: but; Itarat: the other, the state belonging to a prescribed order of life; Jyāyaḥ: better, superior; Liṅgāt: because of the indicatory marks, from such indications in the scripture, from indication, signs, inferences; Ca: and.🔗 But the other (means, of the knowledge of the Self) is better, because of the indicatory marks. — 3.4.39. To belong to some one or other order of life is a better means of the knowledge of the Self, than the condition of being neither here nor there (i.e. lit., being suspended in mid-air), because it is seen to be so from the Scriptures and Smṛtis. The Scriptural indicatory mark is — “By it (i.e. by the Deva-yāna Path) goes the bright one the knower of Brahman, and the doer of meritorious acts” (BrhU.4.4.9). A twice-born should not remain unattached to some one or other, order of life, even for a day. If he does so remain for a year, he should perform the ‘Kṛcchra’ purificatory rite, is another indicatory mark.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tad-bhūtasya: of one who has become that, for one who has attained that (highest Āśrama); Tu: but; Na: no; A-tad-bhāvaḥ: lapse from that stage, falling away from that; Jaimineḥ: according to Jaimini, of Jaimini (is this opinion); Api: also, even; Niyama-atad-rūpa-abhāvebhyaḥ: on account of the restrictions prohibiting such reversion. (Niyamāt: because of the strict rule; A-tad-rūpa-abhāvebhyaḥ: because there is no statement permitting it, and because it is against custom; A-bhāvebhyaḥ: because of the absence of that.)🔗 For one who has become that (i.e. become a Sannyāsin) there is no becoming-not-that (Atad-bhāva), because of the rule (against becoming-not-that) and the absence (of statements) about that. Even Jaimini (is of the same opinion). — 3.4.40. It has been established that there is an order of life of Sannyāsins. There is a doubt as to whether, having once entered that order of life, there can be defection from it or not. (The conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta) is that there may be such defection, either by reason of a desire to perform the duties of a former order of life properly, or through passion etc., because of the absence of any special reason against, such defection. To this conclusion the reply is: — For one who has become so, i.e. for one who has become a Sannyāsin and a celibate, there never is any becoming-not-that i.e. there can be no defection from that. Whence is it so? Because of a rule, and the absence of any such defection. For instance, a rule in Scriptural passages such as “One who continues to wear himself out at the house of his preceptor”, “The dictum of the Śāstra (Padam) is that he should go to a forest, and the esoteric meaning (Upaniṣad) of it is that he should never turn back”, “After being permitted by the Ācārya, he should, as enjoined (by the Scriptures), live in one of the four orders of life, until he is relieved of his body (i.e. till he dies)”, indicates, that there can be no such defection. While there are Scriptural statements of the nature of an ascending order, such as “Having finished his Brahma-carya-ship, he should become a householder” (Jābāla. 4), “He may become a Sannyāsin straight away from Brahma-carya-ship”, there are no statements of the nature of any such descending order, nor are there any instances of respectable people ever having behaved in such manner. That, there may well be such a descent (from a higher order of life) with a view to perform the duties of a former order of life properly, is not so, because the Smṛti says — “The performance of the duties of one’s own order of life, be they ever so badly performed, is preferable to the better performance of the duties of any other order of life” (BhG.3.35), and also because it is conformable to logic. The duty to which one is enjoined, is alone one’s duty and not any other which one is able to discharge better, because the nature of duty has a Scriptural injunction as its characteristic. There could be no defection through passion etc., for a Śāstra which lays down rules, is mightier than that. By the word ‘even’ in “even Jaimini”, it is meant to be taught (by the Sūtra-kāra), with a view to strengthen his own opinion, viz. that there is a concensus of opinion between Jaimini (a Mīmāṃsaka) and Bādarāyaṇa (an Advaitin) in that matter. — 40.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Na: not; Ca: and; Adhikārikam: (expiation) mentioned in the chapter that deals with the qualification; Api: also, even; Patana-anumānāt: because of a fall (in his case) is inferred from the Smṛti; Tad-a-yogāt: because of its (of the expiatory ceremony) inefficiency in his case.🔗 Also expiatory rite referred to in Adhikāra-Lakṣaṇa (Pu.-Mi. VI) is not available (to a Brahma-cāri of the Naiṣṭhika order) because of the inference that his fall from such order of life, is irrevocable and because such Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri has no connection with that expiatory rite. — 3.4.41. (The question crops up) whether, if a Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri (i.e. one who holds bachelorhood for life, as the steadfast ideal) has committed an act of incontinence i.e. unchastity through mistake, the expiatory rite “A Brahma-cāri who has committed an act of incontinence should sacrifice a donkey to the deity Nirṛti” is available to him, or whether it is not. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that it is not available to him. Even though in the Adhikāra-Lakṣaṇa an expiatory rite has been mentioned (Jaimini Su. 6.8.21), still a Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri does not deserve to avail himself of it. What is the reason? Because, the Smṛti says, that his fall, once he falls, is irrevocable, thus — “For one who having once for all accepted Naiṣṭhika Brahma-carya, falls from it, I see no expiatory rite by which such moral-suicide (the slayer of his own Ātmā) can purify himself, because it is not reasonably sustainable, that a person who is once decapitated can even again become whole and entire”. In the case of an Upakurvāṇa Brahma-cāri (i.e. a student Brahma-cāri who later intends to be a householder), such expiatory rite is available because the Smṛti does not refer to a similar irrevocability from a fall of such Upakurvāṇa Brahma-cāri. — 41.
[Go top]
Upapūrvam: (Upapūrvaka-pātakam, Upapātakam) a minor sin; Api tu: but, however; Eke: some (say); Bhāvam: possibility of expiation; Aśanavat: as in the eating (prohibited food); Tat: this; Uktam: is explained (in Pūrva-mīmāṃsā).🔗 Some, however, consider (the lapse of even a Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri also) as a minor sin, (and consider that an expiatory rite) is available to him. This is similar to the eating (of forbidden food). The same has been mentioned (by Jaimini). — 3.4.42. But some Ācāryas consider it (i.e. such a lapse) to be but a minor sin (Upapātaka). The lapse of a Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri, elsewhere than with the wife of a teacher, does not amount to a grave sin, because it is not mentioned amongst the grave sins, such as that (of spoiling) the bed of a teacher, and therefore they consider an expiatory rite as much available to a Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri as to an Upakurvāṇa, because celibacy is common both to the Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri and the Upakurvāṇa and the lapse of both is also similar. This is like the eating (of food that is taboo). It is similar to a breach of the observance by a Brahma-cāri by his drinking liquor and eating meat, and his purifying himself by (the performance of) an expiatory rite. In the case of those who hold that no expiatory rite is available (to a Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri), there is no original Scriptural authority (in favour of their view), while those who hold that such expiatory rite is available to them, have the general authority, viz. “a Brahma-cāri who commits the sin of incontinence etc.”, (in their favour). Therefore, it is sounder logic to hold that such an expiatory rite is available to them. The same has been stated in the Pramāṇa Lakṣaṇa (in Pu.-Mi. I. 3. 89), which means that when an option between two contradictory things is observed, that which has Scriptural authority should be accepted. Therefore, the Smṛti passage which denies such expiatory rite (to a Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri) should be explained as being conducive to the stimulation of the greatest effort by a Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri in keeping his vow (of celibacy). Similarly, in the case of mendicants and Vaikhānasas also, the same expiatory rites should be held available, such as — “A Vāna-prastha committing a breach of the observance of his order, should perform a ‘Kṛcchra’ for twelve days, and help grow a coupe of grass.” A mendicant (Bhikṣu) also should do the same as a Vāna-prastha, barring the cultivating of Soma, in addition to the duties of his own Śāstras. — 42.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Bahiḥ: outside; Tu: but; Ubhayathā: in either case, whether it be a grave sin or a minor sin; Api: also, even; Smṛteḥ: on account of the statement of the Smṛti, from the Smṛti; Ācārāt: from custom; Ca: and.🔗 But, all the same (those Sannyāsins and celibates who have broken the vow) are to be kept out (i.e. excommunicated) both because of the Scriptures and the accepted rules of conduct. — 3.4.43. Whatever the nature of the lapse of the Sannyāsins from their order of life may be, viz. whether it be a minor or a grave sin, in both cases they ought to be excommunicated by respectable persons, because of the Smṛti passages involving great censure (of such lapse), such as: — “For him, who after entering the order of Naiṣṭhika Brahma-cāri, lapses from it, I do not know of any expiatory rite, which could purify this moral-suicide”, and “Whoever touches a Brāhmaṇa who, having entered on an order of life, has lapsed from it, or who has been excommunicated, or one who is hanged, or bitten by worms, should perform the Cāndrāyaṇa expiatory rite”. Also because that is the recognized etiquette of a respectable person. Respectable persons do not perform a sacrifice with, or study with, or enter into matrimonial relations etc. with, them. — 43.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Svāminah: of the master, of the sacrificer or Yajamāna; Phala-śruteḥ: from the declaration in Śruti of the results; Iti: so, thus; Ātreyaḥ: the sage Ātreya (holds).🔗 That the performer (of meditations, which form subsidiary parts of religious actions such as Sacrifices) is the Yajamāna (the sacrificing host) only, because the Scriptures speak of a fruit, (is the opinion) of Ātreya. — 3.4.44. With regard to meditations which form subsidiary parts (of sacrifices etc.), a doubt crops up, as to whether they are acts to be performed by the Yajamāna or the Ṛtvij (sacrificial priest). What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is that they are the job of the Yajamāna. Whence is it so? By reason of the fruit, as mentioned by the Scriptures. The fruit as mentioned by the Scriptures is — “There is rain for him, and he causes rain (for others) who mediates on rain as the five-fold Sāman” (ChanU.2.3.2). And it is logical to understand that this fruit goes to the Yajamāna, because, competency to perform the whole sacrifice including the subordinate parts (of it) is conferred on him, and it is he alone, on whom such competency is conferred, that is entitled to it (i.e. the fruit). That this fruit (of the meditation) is obtained by the Yajamāna is known from such Scriptural statements, as — “It rains for him who meditates etc.”. But (says the Vedāntin) it is seen (from the Scriptures) that the Ṛtvij also obtains the fruit, thus — “Whatever he (the Ṛtvij) desires for himself or for the Yajamāna, he obtains, by singing (Sāman) for it” (BrhU.1.3.28). (The opponent of Vedānta says) — No, because the present Scriptural statement is by way of an exception. Therefore Ācārya Ātreya considers, that it is on the Yajamāna, that the performance of these meditations from which fruit results, rests. — 44.
[Go top]
Ārtvijyam: the duty of the Ṛtvik (priest); Iti: thus; Auḍulomiḥ: the sage Auḍulomi (thinks); Tasmai: for that; Hi: because; Parikrīyate: he is paid.🔗 Auḍulomi (is of opinion) that it is the Ṛtvij’s job, because he is retained for it (for special fee). — 3.4.45. It is not, that these meditations are acts to be performed by the Yajamāna. Ācārya Auḍulomi considers that they are the Ṛtvij’s job. What is the reason (for such a view)? Because the Yajamāna specially retains the Ṛtvij for the whole religious performance including the subsidiary parts and meditations such as the Udgīṭha, because it is the duty of him on whom competency is conferred. Therefore, on the analogy of the rule with respect to the Go-dohana (milk-pail), they are to be performed by the Ṛtvij. For even so do the Scriptures indicate, viz. that it is the Ṛtvij who is the performer of the Vidyā, thus: — “Baka Dālbhya knew it (i.e. the Udgīṭha). He became the singer for the Naimiṣeyas, (the Yajamānas of the sacrifice)” (ChanU.1.2.13). As regards the argument, that the Scriptures declare that the fruit goes to the agent, i.e. the Ṛtvij, the reply is — This is no fault. Because, barring an exceptional statement, the connection of the Ṛtvijaḥ with the fruit cannot be reasonably sustainable, because whatsoever he does is for another (i.e. the Yajamāna). — 45.
[Go top]
Śruteḥ: from the Śruti; Ca: and.🔗 Also because of the Scriptural statement. — 3.4.46. There are the following Scriptural statements — “He said, whatever blessings the Ṛtvij invokes in a sacrifice, he invokes for the Yajamāna”, “Therefore the Udgātṛ who knows it to be so, should ask — For what object of your desire shall I sing?” (ChanU.1.7.8–9). These passages indicate, that the fruit of the Vidyā (Vijñāna) of which the Ṛtvij is the agent, goes to the Yajamāna. Therefore, it is thus established that the performance of the meditations which form the subordinate parts (of a sacrifice) is the Ṛtvij’s job. — 46.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Saha-kāri-antara-vidhiḥ: a separate auxiliary injunction; Pakṣeṇa: as an alternative; Tṛtīyam: the third; Tadvataḥ: for one who possesses it, (i.e., knowledge); Vidhi-ādivat: just as in the case of injunctions and the like.🔗 In the alternative, there is an injunction about a third co-operating item (over and above Bālya and Pāṇḍitya), for one who is like that (i.e. one who possesses ordinary knowledge, and in whom the notion of duality still persists). This is like injunctions etc. — 3.4.47. The Bṛhad-āraṇyaka passage says as follows — “Therefore a Brāhmaṇa (a knower of Brahman) after having acquired scholarship, should try to live by means of (that strength which comes from) knowledge, and after having known all about this strength and scholarship (such a one) then (becomes) a Muni (ascetic), and after having known all about non-ascetic and ascetic condition (Amauna and Mauna), he becomes a Brāhmaṇa (knower of Brahman)” (BrhU.3.5.1). A doubt which arises here is whether there is or there is not an injunction given here, about the state of Muni-hood. The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that there is no such injunction. The injunction (in the passage) comes to an end with the words — “He should live by means of strength”. In the passage “Now after that a Muni”, no verb in an imperative sense indicating any such injunction, is to be seen. Therefore, it is logical to understand the passage as an Anuvāda (a mere reference to something already established before). (If it be asked), whence is such a conclusion arrived at, (the reply is) the word ‘ascetic’ and ‘scholar’ signify knowledge, and the sentence “having attained scholarship” necessarily leads to the condition of an ascetic. Besides, the sentence “Having acquired knowledge of non-asceticism and asceticism, he becomes a Brāhmaṇa” does not purport to give any injunction to attain knowledge of Brahman, because that is already implied (by the term Brāhmaṇa). Therefore, just as “Then (he becomes) a knower of Brahman” is merely by way of eulogy, even so the passage “Then (he becomes) an ascetic” also deserves to be similar (in nature), because the reference in both the cases is similar. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) we reply: — There is an injunction with regard to some other thing which is an auxiliary (in the acquisition of knowledge). We should consider it as an injunction about the ascetic condition, which is an auxiliary to knowledge, in the same way in which ‘strength (which comes) from knowledge’ and ‘scholarship’ are understood to be injunctions, because of their being Apūrva i.e. an extraordinary thing unheard of before. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been mentioned (by us) that the condition of an ascetic is already understood from the condition of scholarship. (We reply) — This is no fault because the word ‘ascetic’ (Muni) implies a preponderance of knowledge, and it is etymologically derivable from ‘Manana’ (Cogitation) as “A Muni through Manana (Cogitation)”, and also because it is seen to have been used in “I am the Vyāsa amongst the Munis” (BhG.10.37). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), in the Scriptural passage “Householdership, studentship at a teacher’s place, Muni-ship and Vāna-prastha-ship”, the word ‘Muni’ is used as a synonym for the highest order of life (i.e. of a Sannyāsin). (We reply) — No, because it is seen to have a different meaning also, as in the passage “Vālmīki the best amongst Munis” (even though Vālmīki was not a Sannyāsin). Because there, the state of a Muni is mentioned in proximity to the other orders of life, the highest order of life is to be understood by the word ‘Muni’ as being the only thing which has remained to be mentioned, and because the highest order of life (i.e. that of a Sannyāsin) is mainly distinguished by pre-eminence of knowledge as the principal feature there. Therefore, the state of a Muni as characterized by a preponderance of knowledge is enjoined here, as the third thing, with reference to (the other two states of) ‘strength (which comes from) knowledge’ and ‘scholarship’. With regard to the objection that the injunctional part (of the sentence) ends with the condition of strength (which comes from knowledge), it has to be understood, from the fact that the state of a Muni is an extraordinary thing (unheard of before), that an injunction is meant, viz. that he should be a Muni. Besides as the condition of a Muni is indicated to be something that has to be acquired (by a man), it has to be understood that like ‘strength (which comes) from knowledge’ and ‘scholarship’, it is something which is fit to be enjoined. By the words “for one who is like that”, one who has knowledge and is therefore a Sannyāsin, is to be understood. How is it known that it is an indication of one who has knowledge or of one who is a Sannyāsin? Because, from the sentence “Having thus known the Self, and having given up all desire about sons etc. they adopt a mendicant’s career”, it is understood that the subject of the chapter relates to that. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if a person is possessed of knowledge, its preponderance (in him) necessarily follows, and if so, of what use then is any such injunction? The Sūtra says — “In the alternative”, and that means, that when, because of the predominance of seeing things as different (through Nescience), knowledge is not fully acquired, then in that case an injunction to this effect is to be understood — “In the case of an injunction etc.”. Just as in the case of an injunction such as “One who desires for the heavenly worlds should perform Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa” injunction is also impliedly given with regard to such subsidiary parts as the lighting up of a sacrificial fire etc. as an auxiliary, even so, what is meant is that though the sentence about Vidyā (knowledge) is not mainly of an injunctional nature, an injunction is enjoined (there). — 47.
[Go top]
When the order of life of the Sannyāsin, characterized by ‘strength (which comes) from knowledge’, and as having the authority of the Scriptures, is there, why do the Scriptures then in the Chāndogya conclude by mentioning the order of the life of a householder, thus — “After having finished his studies (at the house of the preceptor) and then by becoming a householder” (ChanU.8.15.1)? (The opponent of Vedānta thinks) — By concluding that way, the Scriptures thus show respect to that order of life (and show indirectly that the order of life of the Sannyāsin is not of much importance). The Sūtra-kāra replies —Kṛtsna-bhāvāt: on account of the householder’s life including all; Tu: verily; Gṛhiṇā: by a householder, with the householder; Upasaṃhāraḥ: the conclusion, the goal, salvation, (the Chapter) ends. (Kṛtsna: of all (duties); Bhāvāt: owing to the existence; Gṛhiṇā upasaṃhāraḥ: conclusion with the case of the householder.)🔗 But it is because (a householder) has to perform religious duties fully i.e. comprehensively, that the Scriptures conclude with the order of life of a householder. — 3.4.48. The word ‘but’ in the Sūtra indicates that there is something which is special (about the order of life of a householder), viz., that the householder has to perform all religious duties fully i.e. comprehensively, is particularized here. Because the Scriptures have enjoined on him many religious duties of a very exacting nature as pertaining to his order of life, such as sacrifices etc., as also, as far as possible, religious duties of other orders of life also, such as Ahiṃsā (abstention from killing or giving pain in thought, deed and action) and control (over the sense-organs), therefore, there is nothing contradictory in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad concluding with the householder’s order of life. — 48.
[Go top]
Maunavat: just as silence, like constant meditation, like the state of a Muni (Sannyāsī); Itareṣām: of the others, of the other orders of life; Api: even, also; Upadeśāt: because of scriptural injunction.🔗 Also, because, like the Muni’s (i.e. ascetic’s) order of life, the Scriptures also give instructions about others (i.e. other orders of life) also. — 3.4.49. Just as the order of life of an ascetic, and that of the householder, have the authority of the Scriptures, even so, residence at the house of a preceptor (i.e. the order of Brahma-carya), and the order of a Vāna-prastha also (have similar Scriptural authority). For a Scriptural statement (to that effect) has already been cited before, thus — “Penance with austerity is the second, and a Brahma-cāri residing at the house of a preceptor is the third” (ChanU.2.23.1). Therefore, inasmuch as all the four orders of life have been mentioned (by the Scriptures), there is an option either of belonging to any of them singly or to all of them successively (as one pleases). The word “others (i.e. other orders of life)” (used in the Sūtra, even though only two orders of life are mentioned there), should be understood to have been so used with reference to the various minor sub-divisions of the same two orders of life, or with reference to the mutual distinction as between the many who practise (these orders of life). — 49.
[Go top]
[Go top]
An-āviṣkurvan: without manifesting himself; Anvayāt: according to the context.🔗 (The Ascetic should conduct himself) without making himself manifest, because it is only when construed thus, (that the passage can have a proper sequence). — 3.4.50. The Scriptures declare that one should behave with strength (which comes) from knowledge (Bālya), thus — “The knower of Brahman, after attaining scholarship should conduct himself with the strength (which comes) from knowledge” (BrhU.3.5.1). Now, the word Bālya being there, as formed by applying the Taddhita suffix to the word ‘Bāla’, and as meaning the condition of a child, or childish actions, and it being impossible to attain the childlike condition as characterized by a particular age, at will, a doubt (arises), as to whether, it means the juvenile propensity to perform the excretory functions of urinating and defoecating, wherever a child pleases, or whether it means the condition of internal purity and innocence, and the undeveloped condition of organs (which have not yet started to function), or whether merely a childlike freedom from hypocrisy and arrogance etc. is meant. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that it is logical to understand by ‘Bālya’ the behaviour characterized by eating and speaking as one pleases and exercising the excretory functions of urination and defoecation anywhere — which is its better known meaning. But (says the Vedāntin) it would not be logical, to accept unrestricted behaviour as the meaning of the word, as it would cause one to be liable to the fault of losing one’s caste (i.e. becoming a Patita) etc. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — No, because just as on the strength of the Scriptural statement about the killing of animals (in a sacrifice, no sin attaches), even so, the liability of sin attaching to such person is obviated. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the reply of the Vedāntin is: — No, because it is possible to construe the Scriptural statement in another way. When it is possible to accept another meaning of the word ‘Bālya’ which would not be contradictory, it would not be logical to accept a meaning which would contradict another Scriptural injunction, because, an injunction with regard to a subordinate matter is given, only with a view to support the principal injunction. So far as the Yatis (ascetics) are concerned, attainment of knowledge is meant to be their principal pursuit, which pursuit is not possible, in case, all the ways of a child are accepted in toto (as the pattern of behaviour, by the Yatis). Therefore only the special inward condition of a child, such as the absence of a functional ability in a child, is to be understood by the word ‘Bālya’ here. That is why the Sūtra-kāra states (in the Sūtra) — “Not making himself manifest” etc., i.e. without proclaiming himself by parading his knowledge, studies and religiosity (before others), and he should be free from hypocrisy and arrogance, just as a child that has not yet acquired his functional activity, has no desire to manifest itself to others. It is only thus, that the construction of the sentence, in such a way as to supplement the principal meaning, becomes reasonably sustainable. The same has been stated by Smṛti-kāras, thus — “He is a Brāhmaṇa, whom nobody knows either as noble-born or low-born, nor ignorant or learned, nor of good conduct or of bad conduct. The one who knows, should perform his religious duty unostentatiously, and should go about incognito. He should go about in the world as if he is unobservant, ignorant and, dumb”. Also, without exhibiting any outward indicatory mark (of his real nature) and in an unostentatious manner etc. — 50.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Aihikam: in this life; Api: even; A-prastuta-pratibandhe: in the absence of an obstruction to it (the means adopted); Tad-darśanāt: as it is seen in Śruti. (A-prastuta: not being present; Pratibandhe: obstruction; Tat: that; Darśanāt: being declared by the scriptures.)🔗 In the absence of any impediment (to the means of attaining knowledge such as hearing, cogitating’ etc., it may be generated) even during this birth, because it is so seen (from the Scriptures). — 3.4.51. Beginning with the Sūtra “There is need of all, such as sacrifices etc. It is, as it is, in the case of a horse” (Br. Su. Ill. iv. 26), the higher and lower means of knowledge have so far been determined. Now it is being considered, whether knowledge, the fruit of such means, when it comes, does so during this very birth or it may do so even during the next birth. What then is your (i.e. of the opponent of Vedānta) conclusion? It is, that it comes during this very birth. What is the reason? Knowledge is preceded by the previous ‘hearing etc.’ (of the Scriptures). Nobody is induced to ‘hear etc.’ with an aim that knowledge should come during the next birth, but is always induced to do so with the aim that it should come here and now in this birth. Sacrifices etc. also generate knowledge by way of ‘hearing etc.’, because knowledge is generated through the means of right knowledge. Therefore, it is only during this birth that knowledge comes. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — Knowledge is generated during this very birth, provided there is no impediment to the means of attaining knowledge. By this is meant, that when the means of knowledge, while they are operating, have no impediment, caused by some other action ripe for fruition, knowledge is generated even here in this world, but when such an impediment is caused to them, then (knowledge is generated) in the next birth. Such ripening of actions (for fruition) takes place when the environment and causes present themselves. It is not possible to regulate that the same time, environment and causes which cause one action to ripen, would also cause another action to ripen, because actions can have fruits contradictory to each other. The Śāstra merely concludes by saying, that a particular action will have a particular fruit, but does not mention any specific time, environment or cause (for it). As a result of the peculiar strength of the means, some supersensuous power manifests itself in the case of some actions, while in the case of some other actions it stands arrested. Inasmuch as intentions are uncontrolled, it cannot be that a man cannot have any such general intention as that knowledge may be generated in him either in this life or in the next, just as it pleases. Similarly even though knowledge is generated by ‘hearing etc.’, it is so generated only when the impediment to it is removed. The Scriptures also indicate the inscrutability of the Self (Ātmā), thus — “He, who is not obtainable by many, even for hearing, He, who is not known even by many who hear about Him, wonderful is the one, who speaks about Him, skilful is he, who finds Him, and wonderful is he, who instructed by skilful teachers, knows Him” (KathU.1.2.7). The Scriptures, which declare that Vāma-deva attained Brahma-hood even while he was in the embryonic stage, show that through means accumulated in the previous life, knowledge is attained during the next birth. Smṛti also says, how, Bhagavān Vāsu-deva questioned by Arjuna, thus — “Oh Kṛṣṇa, to what end does that one go, who has not attained perfection?” (BhG.6.37), replied — “Oh son, nobody who has performed meritorious actions ever goes to a bad end” (BhG.6.40), and further, having spoken about the attainment of the world of the blessed by such a man, he says that such man is reborn in a good family, and then goes on further to say that “There (i.e. in the next birth) he comes into contact with the knowledge gained during the previous body” (BhG.6.43), and ultimately concludes by indicating, thus — “Having attained perfection through many such births, he at last attains the Highest goal” (BhG.6.45). Hence it is thus established that knowledge is generated in this birth or in the next, depending upon the measure in which impediment is removed. — 51.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Evam: thus, like this; Mukti-phala-aniyamaḥ: there is no rule with respect to the final emancipation, the fruit (of knowledge); Tad-avasthā-avadhṛteḥ: on account of the assertions by the Śruti as to that condition. (Mukti: salvation; Phala: fruit; A-niyamaḥ: there is no rule; Tat: that; Avasthā: condition; Avadhṛteḥ: because the Śruti has ascertained so.)🔗 With regard to the fruit of Final Release, there is no rule (as there is, in the case of knowledge), because the condition of Final Release has been definitely ascertained (by the Scriptures). — 3.4.52. The Sūtra-kāra, after raising a doubt, viz. that, as in the case of an aspirant for Final Release who depends upon knowledge as the means (of attaining it), it is seen that there is a rule as to a peculiarity in respect of knowledge, and that it fructifies in the present or in the next birth, depending upon the relative strength of the means, even so, there may well be a rule about such peculiarity in the nature of the fruit of Final Release, resulting from higher or lower means, says, that there is no such rule with regard to this fruit viz. Final Release. There should, in fact, never be a doubt with regard to the existence of any such rule about any special kind of Final Release. Whence is it so? Because, that condition (of Final Release) has been definitely ascertained. All Vedānta texts understand this condition of Final Release to be of one uniform nature. Brahman itself is this condition of Final Release, and there is no possibility of Brahman ever being of many sorts, because according to the Scriptural statements, it is understood to have only one kind of indicatory mark, as is to be seen in Scriptural passages such as — “It is neither gross nor subtle” (BrhU.3.8.8); “That Self (which can be described as being), not so, not so” (BrhU.3.9.26); “Where one sees nothing else” (ChanU.7.24.1); “That immortal Brahman is right in front” (MunU.2.2.11); “This every thing is that Self” (BrhU.2.4.6); “This great unborn Self, sans-decay, sans-death, sans-destruction. and sans-fear, is indeed Brahman” (BrhU.4.4.25); “When every conceivable thing is but this Self, then who can see whom and by what?” (BrhU.4.5.15) etc. Besides, the means of knowledge, on account of their varying strength, may well create some such peculiarity in their own fruit i.e. ‘knowledge’, but never in the case of the fruit of knowledge i.e. Final Release. We have often said, that it is not something, which has to be attained, because of its nature of always being ready and in existence and being something which is realized through knowledge. For the matter of that, even in the case of knowledge, that there is no such difference in it, as (for instance) its being good or bad, is reasonably sustainable, because were ‘knowledge’ to be inferior it would not be knowledge at all, inasmuch as knowledge always is the most superior thing. Therefore, there may, at the most, if at all, be a difference in the length of time after which it is generated viz. immediately or after a long time. But no such difference is possible in the matter of Final Release. Besides in as much as there is absence of any such difference even in the case of knowledge, there is a similar absence of any rule, as to its fruit also, as there is in the case of fruits of religious actions. There is no difference in the case of knowledge which is the means of Final Release, as there is }n the case of religious actions. In the case of Vidyās (Lores or Cognitions or Meditations) dealing with Qualified Brahman, as for instance — “It has mind as its structure, it has Prāṇa as its body” (ChanU.3.14.2) etc., as the possibility of a difference due to an increase or decrease of Guṇas is reasonably sustainable, a rule as to the difference in the fruit is also reasonably sustainable, as it is, in the case of fruits of actions. The following is the Scriptural indicatory mark about it — “According as they try to propitiate Him, they become”. It is not so, however, in the case of Vidyās about Unqualified Brahman. Similar also is the Smṛti statement — “There is nothing such as a higher goal (in the case of a Vidyā of Unqualified Brahman). It is only when it is a Vidyā of Qualified Brahman, that differences are spoken of”. The repetition of the passage “That condition has been ascertained by the Scriptures” in the Sūtra, indicates the end of the Adhyāya. — 52.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
In the third Adhyāya consideration was mostly given to the higher (Para) and lower (Apara) Vidyās, with reference to the means (of acquiring them). Now, here in the fourth (Adhyāya) consideration will be given to the fruit (Phala, of the Vidyās). May be, as occasion may arise, some other things also will be considered. To begin with, however, in (i.e. by means of) the next few Adhikaraṇas we would continue the consideration of those means (of acquiring knowledge) which still have remained (to be fully considered). A doubt arises with regard to the following Scriptural statements —Āvṛttiḥ: repetition, practice of meditation on Brahman (is necessary); A-sakṛt: not only once, many times, repeatedly; Upadeśāt: because of instruction by the scriptures.🔗 Repetition (of the mental act of acquiring knowledge i.e. Jñāna-kriyā is necessary), because, (the Scriptures have) more than once given such instruction. — 4.1.1. “Oh Maitreyī, verily the Self should be seen, heard, cogitated upon and constantly meditated upon” (BrhU.4.5.6), “Let the mentally well-poised intelligent man (Dhīra) attain knowledge by knowing Him (the Ātmā)” (BrhU.4.4.21), “That is to be sought for, that is to be desired to be understood” (ChanU.8.7.1) — viz., as to whether there should be only a single mental act or whether there should be a repetition (of such a mental act). What then is the conclusion arrived at (by the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that, like ‘Prayāja’ (some particular act performed only once during the sacrifice) there should be only one such mental act, because in that way the purpose of the Śāstra will have been adequately served, and any such repetition (of it) which is not enjoined by the Scriptures, would be tantamount to going counter to the Śāstra. But (says the Vedāntin) several instructions of the Scriptures have been mentioned in illustrations such as — “(That the Self) should be seen, heard, cogitated upon and meditated upon”. (The opponent of Vedānta says’) — Even so, such repetition may be made as instructed by the Scriptures, by hearing once, thinking once, cogitating upon once, and meditating upon once, but not more than that, and of course, where instruction (to do a thing) is given by the Scriptures only once, as in “Let him understand or let him meditate upon”, there should be no such repetition. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply: — This act (of acquiring knowledge) ought to be repeated. Whence is it so? Because of several instructions. Such instruction (about repetition) more than once as “(That the Self) should be seen, heard, cogitated upon and meditated upon”, suggests the repetition of the act of acquiring knowledge. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) we have explained that as instructed by the Scriptures, we should repeat the mental act once, but never more than that. (We reply) — No, because they (i.e. such mental acts) are meant ultimately to culminate in the intuitive realization (of Brahman). It is only when they so culminate in such intuitive realization (of Brahman) by such repeated hearing etc. that they have their tangible fruit, just as the threshing of rice (which has its husk on it) has its culmination in the dehusking of such rice grains. Besides ‘cogitation and meditation’ are said to imply action in which this aspect of repetition (Āvṛtti-guṇa) is implicit. For instance in ordinary life when we say (that a man worships his preceptor or his king, we understand that it means that he serves his preceptor or his king with continued unswerving loyalty (Tāt-paryeṇa). Similarly it is only when a Proṣita-nāthā wife (a grass widow i.e. a wife whose husband has gone away on business) constantly remembers her absent husband and is eager to meet him, that we speak of her (i.e. such traveller’s wife) that she has no other thought but that of thinking constantly and wistfully remembering her absent husband. It is seen that the terms ‘he should know’, ‘he should meditate’ are used in Vedānta texts without any distinction i.e. as synonymous. In some places a Scriptural statement begins with the term ‘let him know’, and concludes with ‘let him meditate upon’, as for instance in — “He who knows in the same manner in which he (Raikva) knows it (earns the same fruit which Raikva earned). It is of him that I have spoken (to you)” (ChanU.4.1.4) and “Oh Bhagavān, teach me about the deity on which you meditate” (ChanU.5.2.2). Elsewhere, the Scriptures begin with ‘meditating’ and conclude with ‘knowing’ as for instance in — “Meditate on the mind as Brahman” (ChanU.3.18.1) and “He who knows it to be so, shines and radiates with the heat of his fame, success, and strength, obtained through the knowledge of Brahman” (ChanU.3.18.3). Thus, it is established, that repetition is necessary even when instruction is given only once, while several instructions of course suggest repetition (of such mental acts). — 1.
[Go top]
Liṅgāt: because of the indicatory mark or sign; Ca: and.🔗 Also, because of the indicatory mark (the necessity of repetition is understood). — 4.1.2. A Scriptural indicatory mark also, makes the repetition of the mental act of acquiring knowledge, understood. Thus, with reference to the Udgīṭha Vidyā, after having censured meditation on “Āditya as the Udgīṭha” (ChanU.1.5.1), as involving the fault of having the fruit of being blessed with a single son only, and enjoining the Vidyā of of the rays, thus — “Do thou meditate on the rays” (ChanU.1.5.2), for the sake of obtaining many sons, the Scriptures indicate the enjoining of the repetition of the mental act of meditation as something already well established. Therefore in common with it, such repetition of the mental acts of acquiring knowledge is established in the case of all mental acts. The opponent of Vedānta here says — “May, such repetition of the mental act, well be, in the case of those mental acts of meditation whose fruit is capable of being achieved, because of the possibility of a superiority of fruit being achieved thereby, but what good can there be of such repetition of a mental act with respect to the Highest Brahman, which culminates in (the realization of) the transcendent Brahman, which has the nature of being eternally pure, enlightened and free, and which is the Self of all? If it be said (by the Vedāntin), that the realization of Brahman as the Self of all can take place by only one such act of hearing, is not reasonably sustainable, and hence I hold that repetition of it is understandable, (we, the opponents of Vedānta, reply) — No, because it is not reasonably sustainable (that such realization would necessarily take place) even by such repetition. If the passage “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7) heard only once does not create such realization, what hope is there that even a repetition of such a passage would create such realization? If it be said (by the Vedāntin) that a passage merely by itself may not be able to cause this entity to be realized and hence a passage which depends on reasoning to help it, may cause the realization of Brahman as the Self (of all), we, (the opponents of Vedānta) reply, even then such repetition is purposeless, because even mere reasoning, operating but once only, may cause its own object to be realized. It may even be like this (says the Vedāntin), viz. that reason and the (Scriptural) passage, together, may effect only a general, and not a special, kind of knowledge (of an entity). For instance, from a sentence such as ‘I have pain in my chest’, and the symptom of the tremor of limbs, a man may merely understand the existence of such pain (in the man who says so, only in a general way) but he cannot experience such pain, in that special manner in which the sufferer of such pain himself actually experiences it. If it be said (by the Vedāntin) that it is such special realization which removes ignorance (i.e. Nescience), and hence it is, that repetition is necessary for that purpose, (the opponent of Vedānta says) — No. Even if such repetition is made more than once, there is no possibility of such special realization. If such special realization does not result by the application of the Śāstra and reasoning, once, it cannot be so realized, even if they are employed even a hundred times. Therefore, whether a special or a general realization is sought to be propounded by means of the Śāstra and by reasoning, in either case, inasmuch as they would accomplish their work by one such operation of themselves (i.e. of the Śāstra and reasoning) repetition would have no use. Besides it is not possible to determine that the Śāstra and reasoning employed but once only, can never as a rule produce such experience, because of the varying intelligences of those who have to experience such a realization. There may well be such use for repetition, where, in the ordinary world, in the case of a thing consisting of many parts, and possessing general and special characteristics, one part of such a thing may be understood by one such act of careful intentness of attention, and another part by another such act of careful intentness of attention, as for instance, in the case of the understanding of a lengthy chapter of the same lesson, but no such repetition is needed for the generation of the right knowledge of Brahman, which is devoid of any such ordinary or special characteristics of any kind, and which has sentiency alone as its Self. To this conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), it is said, that repetition may well be purposeless in the case of one, who, when the passage “That thou art” is addressed to him only once, is able to realize that Brahman is the Self (of all), but to one who is not so able to realize, repetition is useful. For instance, in the Chāndogya, when instructed (by the preceptor), thus — “Oh Śveta-ketu, that thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7), and on his being asked again and again thus — “The Bhagavān should again explain it to me” (ChanU.6.8.7), the preceptor after having removed every such cause of doubt one by one, again and again instructs Śveta-ketu thus — ‘Oh Śveta-ketu, that thou art’. That is why we have given this Scriptural illustration, thus — “Ātmā verily should be heard, cogitated upon, and meditated upon” (BrhU.4.5.6). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), if the passage “That thou art”, heard but once only, is unable to make one realize that which it means, then it certainly would not be able to do so even when it is repeated. (We reply) — This is no fault, for, indeed, when a thing (such as repetition) is seen to be useful how can it be said that it is not reasonably sustainable? It is indeed seen, that those who are able to understand the meaning of a sentence but vaguely by hearing it once only, are able to understand its meaning correctly, by a progressive removal of misconceptions (as to its meaning), by repetition. Besides, the sentence “That thou art” speaks of the entity denoted by the word ‘thou’ as being identical with the entity denoted by the word ‘That’. And it is by the word ‘That’ (Tat), that Brahman, the ‘Sat’, and the seer, is said to be the cause of the origin of this world, as is well-known from the Scriptural passages such as — “Brahman is truth and knowledge, and is eternal” (TaitU.2.1.1), “Brahman which is knowledge and bliss” (BrhU.3.9.28), “Unseen but seeing, unknown but knowing etc.” (BrhU.3.8.11), “Not subject to birth, not subject to old age, not subject to death, neither gross nor subtle, nor short nor long” (BrhU.3.8.8) etc. There, by the words ‘not subject to birth etc.’, birth and such other phases of existence are denied, by the words ‘neither gross etc.’, such properties of matter as grossness etc. are denied, and by the words ‘knowledge etc.’ Brahman’s being the light of sentiency is spoken of. The entity ‘That’ (Tat) called Brahman, which is devoid of all the attributes of a transitory mundane existence, and which is capable of being realized, is well-known to those who are well-versed in Vedānta. Similarly, they also know that the entity indicated by the word ‘Thou’ (Tvam) is the Universal Highest Self (Pratyag-ātmā), the hearer, and the one which beginning with the body is understood to be the innermost Self of all and is ultimately determined to be of the nature of sentiency (Caitanya-Sva-rūpa). Now, in the case of those whose comprehension of the meaning of these two terms is obstructed, i.e. coloured by ignorance, doubt, and confusion, the sentence “That thou art” is unable to generate appropriate knowledge of what these words mean, because, the knowledge of the meaning of all the words (of a sentence), is a pre-requisite for the knowledge of the meaning of such a sentence, and hence in their case, the repetition of the study of Scriptural passages and reasoning, which results in the proper discrimination of the words, is necessary. Even though, the Self which is to be realized, does not consist of any parts as such, still the nature of consisting of such parts as are characterized by a body, the sense-organs, mind, intelligence, objects of sense, and the property of reacting to pleasure and pain, is superimposed on it, and in such a case, inasmuch as one mental act of intentness of attention removes the misconception about one such part, and another such mental act of intentness of attention removes the misconception about another such part, and so on, it is but proper that in such a case, realization comes about by progressive stages, but even that is but only a penultimate condition of the actual realization of the Self. But such clever minds, as are not subject to any such impediments of the nature of ignorance, doubt, and confusion, as to the meaning of words, are able to understand the meaning of the passage “That thou art” even though it is mentioned but once only, and hence in their case it is but proper, that repetition has no purpose, and the realization of the Self, effected once for all, removes all ignorance, and no such order of progressive realization need be understood (to be necessary). But if it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) — Forsooth, it would be proper if anybody were to realize the Self in this way, but (on the other hand) that the Self is subject to pain, is very forcibly experienced (by men), and no one ever experiences the complete absence of pain etc., (we reply) — No, because it is reasonably sustainable, that just as the conception by the Self, that it possesses a body of its own, is false, even so the conception of it being subject to pain etc. also, is due to a similar false conception, for it is seen that when a body is actually cut or burnt, an erroneous conception such as ‘I am being cut and I am being burnt’ does in fact take place. Similarly when entities, more external to the Self (than the body), such as a son or a friend, are being afflicted with pain, a similar false superimposition, viz. that it is ‘I’, i.e., the Self, that is being afflicted with pain, is to be seen. Even so there may be an erroneous misconception of pain etc., similar to the misconception of possessing a body. Because pain etc., like the body etc., are experienced as being distinctly separate from sentiency, as they are not experienced during deep sleep. The Scriptures on the other hand declare that sentiency is experienced even during deep sleep, thus — “Verily while that which he does not see (with his eyes) he verily does see, though he does not see” (BrhU.4.3.23). Therefore, the realization of the Self, is the realization that ‘I am the Self’, characterized only by sentiency and freedom from all pain as such. For him, who actually experiences the Self in this manner, there is nothing left to be done. The same is expressed in the Scriptural passage “What use is progeny to us, to whom the Self only is but the (heavenly) world?” (BrhU.4.4.22), which indicates that for a man who knows the Self, nothing is left to be done. So says the Smṛti also, thus — “One who is delighted in the Self, is satiated with the Self and is content in the same, has nothing left for him to do” (BhG.3.17). In the case of those to whom such realization does not come readily, repetition is understood to be necessary for such realization. Even in the case of a man who has understood the meaning of the passage ‘That thou art’, the Scriptures do not seek to distract such a person away from the meaning of the passage, and induce him towards practising repetition. No one gets one’s daughter married (with a mental reservation) for the purpose of doing violence to the bridegroom (at some future time). Even in the case of a man who considers himself to be enjoined by the Scriptures to such repetition, a conception contrary to that of the conception of Brahman, such as that ‘I am the doer, I have got to do this’, is invariably generated. He who is intellectually dull and, therefore, misses the meaning of the sentence because its meaning does not flash on him, deserves to be firmly grounded into the meaning of the sentence, by such means as repetition etc. Therefore, it is thus established that even in matters relating to the realization of Brahman, repetition of the instruction which is the means to such realization of knowledge, is necessary. — 2.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Ātmā iti: as the Self; Tu: but; Upagacchanti: acknowledge, approach, realise; Grāhayanti: teach, make others comprehend, instruct; Ca: also.🔗 (The Scriptures understand) that Īśvara i.e. Brahman is the Jīva-Self (Ātmā) and they (i.e. Scriptures) also cause it to be so understood. — 4.1.3. The Sūtra-kāra is now considering whether the Highest Self whose special attributes are described by the Śāstra, should be understood to be the ‘I’ or it should be understood as being some thing other than ‘I’. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — When the Scriptures mention the word ‘Self’ in connection with the innermost Universal Self, whence can such a doubt arise? It is said (by the Sūtra-kāra) — Were there to be a possibility of non-difference between the Jīva-Self and the Lord, then alone, it is thought, that the word ‘Jīva-Self’ could be understood in its principal sense, otherwise it will have to be understood in its secondary sense. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is that it can’t be understood to be the ‘I’. It is not possible to understood Him, who possesses the nature of being free from sinfulness i.e. the Highest Lord, as one having a contrary nature (i.e. that of the embodied Jīva-Self), nor can he, that has such contrary nature, be considered to be one who possesses the nature of being free from sinfulness (i.e. that of the Highest Lord). The Highest Lord has the nature.of being free from sinfulness and the embodied Jīva-Self has a nature contrary to that. Now, if the Highest Lord were to be considered to be a transmigratory Jīva-Self, there would be the predicament of the non-existence of the Highest Lord himself thus resulting, and thereby the Śāstra would become meaningless. Again, if the transmigratory Jīva-Self were to be the Lord (i.e. Īśvara) there would be the absence of a person competent (to study the Vedānta Śāstra) and thus the Śāstra would equally again be rendered meaningless, and besides there would be a contradiction of such means-of-proof as direct perception etc. (as it is known by everybody that the Jīva-Self is not the Lord). If it be said (by the Vedāntin), that different as they are, complete identity between them ought to be understood on the authority of the Śāstra, in the same way in which a symbol and Viṣṇu etc. are looked upon as being identical, (we the opponents of Vedānta say), well may it be so if you so prefer it, but do not seek to land us into an admission, that the Lord is the Self of the transmigratory being i.e. the Jīva-Self in the principal sense of the term. To this, we reply — The Highest Lord should of course be understood to be the Ātmā (Jīva-Self), for even so do the Jābālas, in the chapter dealing with the Highest Lord, understood the Lord to be the Ātmā (Jīva-Self) thus — “Thou art indeed I, Oh blessed deity, and I indeed, am Thou”. Similarly Scriptural passages such as “I am Brahman” also should be looked upon as considering (the Highest Lord) as the Self. Vedānta texts such as “This your Self which is inside all” (BrhU.3.4.1), “This your Self which is the ruler within and is immortal” (BrhU.3.7.3), “That is the truth, that is the Self, that thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7), make us understand the Lord to be the Ātmā (i.e. the Jīva-Self). What is mentioned (by the opponent of Vedānta), viz., that it can be understood by these sentences, on the strength of a similar reasoning about a symbol being Viṣṇu, that the symbol (Pratīka) should be understood to be Brahman, is not logical, because there would thus be the predicament of these passages having to be understood in a secondary sense. Besides (it would not be proper), because here the syntactical form of the sentences of the Scriptures is dissimilar. Where, the Scriptures mean, that a symbol should be superimposed with the notion of a particular thing, there is only a unilateral statement, as for instance in the passages — “The mind is Brahman” (ChanU.3.18.1), “The Āditya is Brahman” (ChanU.3.19.1). Here however the Scriptures declare thus — “Thou art I, and I am Thou”, and hence, as here, the form of the Scriptural statement is different from the Scriptural statement about the symbol, it is understood that there is non-difference (between the embodied Jīva-Self and Brahman). Besides, the Scriptures have censured the looking upon of entities as being different. For instance, Scriptural passages, such as “The man who meditates upon a deity as an entity different from himself, really does not understand (the Truth)” (BrhU.1.4.10), “One who here perceives entities as being different from each other, only goes from death to death” (BrhU.4.4.19), “Everything forsakes him who considers all entities as being different from the Self” (BrhU.4.5.7), have censured the understanding of such difference (in entities). As regards the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta), that it is not possible for entities having opposite natures to be the Self of each other (i.e. to be mutually identical), (we reply) — This is no fault, because it is reasonably sustainable, that the notion of their possessing natures opposed to each other, is illusory. As regards the statement that there would be the predicament of the non-existence of the Lord, (we reply) — that also is not so, because of the authority of the Śāstra, and also because we do not understand (as you the opponent of Vedānta do) that the Lord himself has the nature of the transmigratory Jīva-Self. We understand that the Scriptures do not propound that the Lord is the transmigratory Jīva-Self, but on the other hand we do understand that the Scriptures aim at propounding, by denying the transmigratory nature of the Jīva-Self itself, that it is the Lord. This being so, it is determined, that the non-dual Lord has the nature of being free from all sinfulness, and that the (supposed) contrary nature of the Jīva-Self, is illusory. With regard to the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that there would be the absence of any person competent (to study the Vedānta Śāstra) and that such means-of-proof as direct perception would be contradicted, (we reply) that, that also is not so, because it is understood by us, that prior to the realization of knowledge, the Jīva-Self by all means, does indeed have such transmigratory nature, and it is during such condition that the operation of such means-of-proof, as direct perception etc. takes place. While the Scriptures indicate by the passage “When all this becomes to him, the Self as such, by what will he see and see what”? (BrhU.2.4.14) that after the realization (of the Self) there is absence of such means-of-proof as direct perception etc. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that in the absence of the means-of-proof such as direct perception, there would be the predicament of even the Scriptures themselves ceasing to be the Scriptures (because they are the strongest means-of-proof), (we reply) — Not exactly, because, we on the other hand, do welcome such a predicament (i.e. it is for us a consummation devoutly to be wished). Besides, the Scriptures beginning with “In this condition (of realization), a father ceases to be a father” (BrhU.4.3.22), go on to say in the end, that “The Vedas cease to be the Vedas” (BrhU.4.3.22), and thus after the realization (of Brahman) we do welcome, even the Vedas ceasing to be the Vedas. If the opponent were to say — “Who in that case, is the one, that is in ignorance i.e. in need of such realization?”, we reply — It is you yourself, who are asking this question. If the opponent were to say — “Oh, but the Scriptures declare that I myself am the Lord”, (we retort) — If you have realized it to be so (i.e. that you are the Lord) then (in that case) there is none that happens to be without any such realization. Again the fault attributed, viz. that inasmuch as the Self along with Avidyā (i.e. Nescience) necessarily make a pair, it makes for duality, and hence ‘Advaita’ (non-duality or monism) is not reasonably sustainable, is also refuted by what has just gone before. Therefore, one should focus the mind on the Lord as being the Ātmā (the Self). — 3.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Na: not; Pratīke: in the symbol (such as Ākāśa, the sun, the mind, etc.); Na: not; Hi: because; Saḥ: he.🔗 The Symbol cannot be (understood to be the Self). He (i.e. the person meditating) does not (look upon it as the Self). — 4.1.4. Now a doubt arises, with regard to meditations on symbols in such (Scriptural passages) as “One should meditate on the mind as Brahman, the Adhyātma (aspect), and ‘the Ākāśa is Brahman’ the Adhidaivatā (aspect)” (ChanU.3.18.1), “The instruction is that Āditya is Brahman” (ChanU.3.19.1), “He who meditates on Nāman (i.e. the Vedas) as Brahman” (ChanU.7.1.5), as to whether the symbols should themselves be understood to be the Self (Ātmā) or not. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that it is logical that they also should themselves be understood to be the Self (Ātmā). Whence is it so? Because in the Scriptures, Brahman is well-known as being the Self (Ātmā), and inasmuch as these symbols, as the effects or modifications (Vikāra) of Brahman, are also of the nature of Brahman, it is reasonably sustainable that they also are of the nature of the Self. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — One should not fasten the notion of the Self on symbols. The person meditating does not understand these different symbols to be the Self. The argument that symbols being the effects of Brahman, are themselves of the nature of Brahman, and hence they are of the nature of the Self also, is not correct because (in that case) there would then be the predicament of the non-existence of the symbol itself thus resulting. It is only after the nature of the diverse effects such as Nāman etc. qua effects is destroyed, that it is possible to accept them as being of the nature of Brahman. When this nature of the effects i.e. Nāman etc. is destroyed, how could they then have the nature of a symbol or how could they then be accepted as being of the nature of the Self? Because Brahman has the nature of the Self, it cannot be supposed, that in the instruction about the contemplation. on Brahman, there is an instruction about the contemplation on the Self, because in the instruction about the contemplation on Brahman, the agentship (of the person meditating) is not dispensed with. The doing away of all the attributes of transmigratory nature such as agentship etc., is a sine qua non for the instruction that Brahman is the Self, while an injunction to meditate is given without doing away with such attributes as agents etc. (implicit in transmigratory existence). Hence, inasmuch as, both the persons meditating, and the symbol (the object of meditation) are similar (because neither are Brahman), that the symbol can be looked upon as the ‘Self’ is not reasonably sustainable. A Rucaka (a kind of golden utensil) and a Sv-astika (another kind of golden utensil) are not the self of each other (i.e. they are not identical). They are identical only as gold. We have said already, that if symbols are considered to be of the nature of Brahman, there would then be the predicament of the non-existence of the symbol resulting. Therefore, the symbol is not looked upon as being the Self. — 4.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Brahma-dṛṣṭiḥ: the view of Brahman, the view in the light of Brahman; Utkarṣāt: on account of superiority, because of super-eminence.🔗 (The Āditya i.e. the Sun etc.) are to be looked upon as Brahman, because, that way there is exaltation (Utkarṣa) (of them). — 4.1.5. As regards the instances given (above), this other doubt arises, viz., as to whether, therein, Āditya etc. are to be looked upon as Brahman, or Brahman is to be looked upon as Āditya etc. Whence is there any such doubt? Because we do not know of any reason for both these having the same case-ending (Sāmānādhikaraṇya). Here, it is seen that the word Brahman has the same case-ending as the words ‘Āditya etc.’ in the passages “Āditya (is) Brahman”, “Prāṇa (is) Brahman”, “Lightning (is) Brahman”. Here, the fact of their having the same case-ending is not clearly understood to be proper, because the words ‘Brahman’ and ‘Āditya’ etc. have different meanings. A sentence such as ‘The bull (is) a horse’ cannot be an instance of a proper coordination merely because of the fact that both have the same case-ending. But (it is argued by the opponent of Vedānta), as there is a relationship of cause and effect between Brahman and Āditya, just as there is for instance, between clay and a trough, there would be such coordination between them, by reason of their having the same case-ending. No, we reply. By such coordination resulting from their having the same case-ending, the effect qua an effect would be destroyed, and it has already been stated by us, that there would then be the predicament of the non-existence of the symbol itself resulting, and this passage would then be a passage relating to the Highest Self, and thus the competency (of a man) to meditate would be affected, and a particular mention here of only a few limited entities (such as Āditya, Prāṇa and lightning, when all entities are equally the effects of Brahman), would be useless. Therefore when there is a superimposition of one entity on another, as in the passage “The Brāhmaṇa (is) the Vaiśvā-nara Agni”, and there is a doubt as to what is to be superimposed on what, and the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that in the absence of any Śāstra laying down the raison d’etre of such a rule, there could be no rule as to that, or preferably, the conclusion is, that Brahman should be looked upon as being the Āditya etc., because it is only by looking upon Brahman as the Āditya etc. in this way that there would be a meditation on Brahman, and the Śāstra also lays down that it is only the meditation on Brahman that has a fruit, and that hence the Āditya should not be looked upon as Brahman. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — Āditya etc. should be looked upon as Brahman. Whence is it so? Because of the exaltation (Utkarṣa). It is in this way that Āditya etc. would really be looked upon as exalted, because the notion of their being exalted (viz., that they are Brahman) is superimposed on them. The same thing is held good in ordinary life, which expects that the idea of exaltation should always be properly superimposed on an inferior entity, as for instance when a king’s charioteer is looked upon as the king. The same rule aught also to be followed here, because to reverse the process would cause the predicament of a fault (Pratyavāya) being committed. If a king is looked upon as a charioteer, and is thus lowered in estimation, it would not be proper. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) such a doubt about the predicament of a fault thus resulting should not be entertained, because of the authority of the Scriptures, and it would not be logical to regulate the outlook of Śāstra by the canons of the ordinary world. To this our reply is — This would be so, provided the meaning of the Śāstra happens to be properly determined, but when the meaning of the Śāstra is doubtful, the application of the canons of ordinary life for clearing the ambiguity would not be wrong. So, it is but proper, that when the meaning of the Śāstra is duly ascertained to be in favour of the superimposition of the notion of an exalted status (on an inferior entity), any one who superimposes a low status (on a superior entity) would be going into an error. Besides, as the words ‘Āditya’ etc. come first (in the passage), in the absence of any reason to the contrary, they ought to be understood in their primary sense. When therefore, that these words should be understood in their primary sense is thus fixed in our mind first, and the word ‘Brahman’ which comes to our mind later cannot be properly coordinated with the earlier words ‘Āditya’ etc. in a Sāmānādhikaraṇya sense, if it is understood in its primary sense, the only remaining alternative available, is, that it (i.e. the passage) enjoins the looking upon the first entity as Brahman. Besides as the word ‘as’ (Iti) is used in conjunction with the word ‘Brahman’ the same meaning is logical. For the Scriptures everywhere mention the word ‘Brahman’ in conjunction with the word ‘Iti’, as for instance in “That it is as Brahman, is the instruction; That it is as Brahman, is how it should be meditated upon”, “That it is as Brahman, is how he meditates on it”, while they mention only the mere words ‘Āditya’ etc. Hence as in the sentence ‘He perceives the mother-of-pearl as silver’ while the word ‘mother-of-pearl’ means the mother-of-pearl, the word ‘silver’ means only the perception of silver (in the mother-of-pearl). A man merely perceives it as silver, when actually no silver is there. In the same way it is understood here also, that he should look upon ‘Āditya’ etc. as Brahman. The complementary passages “He who knows this to be so, meditates on the Āditya as Brahman” (ChanU.3.19.4), “Who meditates on ‘Speech’ as Brahman” (ChanU.7.22.1), “Who meditates on a mental resolution (Saṅkalpa) as Brahman” (ChanU.7.4.3) also, by using the words Āditya etc. in the accusative case, indicate that the Āditya etc. are the objects of the act of meditation, by superimposing the idea of Brahman on them. With regard to the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that it is Brahman that should be meditated upon for the purpose of the fruit (viz. Final Release), we say that it is not proper, because as demonstrated above, it is the Āditya etc. that have to be meditated upon (as Brahman). As regards the fruit of such meditation (viz. Final Release), Brahman itself, which presides over every thing, will of course vouchsafe the fruit of the meditation on Āditya etc., as in the case of the service (Upāsanā) of a guest (Atithi). This has been already described in the Sūtra — “The fruit (comes) from Him (the Lord) for it is reasonably sustainable” (Bra. Su. III. ii. 38). When it is said that Brahman is the object of meditation, it is in the sense of the superimposition of the idea of Brahman on symbols, just as there is the superimposition of Viṣṇu etc. on images etc. — 5.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Āditya-ādi-matayaḥ: the idea of the sun, etc.; Ca: and; Aṅge: in a subordinate member (of the sacrificial acts); Upapatteḥ: because of consistency, because of its reasonableness.🔗 Notions of Āditya etc. (are to be superimposed) on the subordinate parts (i.e. Aṅgas of sacrificial acts), because it is reasonably sustainable. — 4.1.6. As regards meditations which relate to the subordinate parts (i.e. Aṅgas of sacrificial acts) such as “He (the Sun) who shines, should be meditated upon as Udgītha” (ChanU.1.3.1), “The worlds should be meditated upon as five-fold Sāman” (ChanU.2.2.1), “‘Speech’ (Vāk) should be meditated upon as the seven-fold Sāman” (ChanU.2.8.1), “This (very Earth) (is) the Ṛk and the Agni (is) the Sāman” (ChanU.1.6.1), a doubt arises, as to whether it is enjoined, that the Āditya etc. should be looked upon as the Udgītha or that the Udgīṭha etc. should be looked upon as the Āditya etc. With regard to that, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that there is no rule as to that, on account of the absence of any reason for any such rule. Here, it is not understood that there is any special exaltation of anything in particular, as there is in the case of Brahman. It is possible to understand that Brahman is more exalted than the Āditya etc., by reason of its being the cause of the world and because of its being endowed with the nature of being free from sin, but there happens to be no reason to understand any reason for understanding that there is any special exaltation in the case of the Āditya and the Udgīṭha, inasmuch as, the nature of being but effects only, is common to them both. Or rather, (we think, that) the notions of Udgīṭha etc. should as a rule be superimposed on the Āditya etc. Whence is it so? Because Udgītha etc. are of the nature of sacrificial acts, and because it is well-known that it is through such acts that fruits are obtained. Āditya etc. when meditated upon with the notions of their being the Udgīṭha etc. may themselves acquire the nature of religious acts and may thus become the cause of the acquisition of fruits. For the Scriptures, by the passages “This (very Earth) (is) the Ṛk, this Agni (is) the Sāman” (ChanU.1.6.1), and by (the complementary passage) “That this Sāman is superimposed on this Ṛk” (ChanU.1.6.1), indicate the Earth by the word Ṛk, and Agni by the word Sāman, which is possible only when it is desired to look upon the Earth and the Agni as the Ṛk and Sāman respectively and not when it is desired to look upon the Ṛk and Sāman as the Earth and Agni. It is when the charioteer is looked upon as the king, that the word ‘King’ happens to be used metaphorically for the charioteer, but the word ‘charioteer’ is never so used metaphorically for the king. Besides, by the use of the locative case (Adhikaraṇa) in connection with the word ‘worlds’, in the passage “The worlds should be meditated upon by looking upon them as the five-fold Sāman”, it is understood, that it is the Sāman that is to be superimposed on the worlds. In the Scriptural passage “This Gāyatra (Sāman) (in which the five-fold Sāman is considered to be the five Prāṇas i.e. the sense-organs) is woven into the Prāṇas” (ChanU.2.11.1) also, it is indicated similarly. In the Scriptural passage “That Āditya is Brahman, is the instruction” (ChanU.3.19.1), Brahman, which is referred to after Āditya, is to be superimposed on Āditya etc. which are referred to first. In the Scriptural passage “The Earth is the Hiṅ-kāra” (ChanU.2.2.1) again, the Earth etc. are referred to first, and the Hiṅ-kāra etc. are referred to afterwards. Hence the notion of the subordinate parts (of a sacrificial act) are to be superimposed on Āditya etc. which are not such subordinate parts (of action i.e. Karma). This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) we reply — It is the notions of Āditya etc., that should of course be superimposed on such subordinate parts (of sacrificial acts) as the Udgītha etc. Whence is it so? Because, it is reasonably so sustainable. It is reasonably sustainable, that it is only when the Udgītha etc. undergo refinement by the superimposition of the notions of Āditya on them, that on account of the contact with the Apūrva (lit., the remote consequence of an act, here, the merit of such religious acts) the religious acts attain greater augmentation. The Scriptural passage “Whatever (religious act) he performs with knowledge, faith, and meditation (on the deities), that alone becomes more potent” (ChanU.1.1.10) indicates that knowledge (Vidyā) is the cause which makes a religious act more potent. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), this may be so, in the case of actions which are made more potent by such meditations, but what is the position (Katham) with regard to actions which have their own independent fruit, as is seen for instance, in the Scriptural passage “He who, knowing this, meditates on these worlds by looking upon them as the five-fold Sāman” (ChanU.2.2.3)? (We reply) — Even in that case, because it is only those who are competent that can engage themselves in such meditation, it is logical to hold, that the fruit is obtained as a result of the relation of the aforesaid Apūrva to the meditation, as it is for instance, in the case of the rule about the Go-dohana (Milk-pail). Besides, inasmuch as Āditya etc. have themselves the nature of (vouchsafing) a fruit, it is reasonably sustainable to understand that they are more exalted than the Udgītha etc. which are of the nature of a religious act. Moreover the Scriptures teach us that the fruit of religious acts is of the nature of the attainment of Āditya etc. Besides, the Scriptures by mentioning in the beginning that the Udgītha is something that should be meditated upon by the passage “The letter ‘Om’ is the Udgītha and it should be meditated upon. The following is the further explanation of Udgītha” (ChanU.1.1.1), later on enjoin this notion of looking upon them as Āditya. The statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that the Āditya etc. meditated upon as the Udgītha etc. would themselves acquire the nature of a religious act and yield a fruit, is not proper, because meditation itself being a religious act, it would be reasonably sustainable that meditation itself would yield a fruit, and also because Udgītha etc. even though looked upon as Āditya etc. would not thereby lose their nature of being religious acts. The use of the words ‘Ṛk and Sāman’ for the Earth and the Agni respectively, in the Scriptural passage “That Sāman is superimposed on the Ṛk” (ChanU.1.6.1), is by way of an indirect application (Lakṣaṇā). Indirect application (Lakṣaṇā) is promoted by its possible proximate or even distant relation as the case may be, to the primary meaning (of the word). Hence even though it is desired here that the Ṛk and Sāman are to be looked upon as the Earth and Agni, still, inasmuch as such well-known entities as Ṛk and Sāman have been separately mentioned, and again inasmuch as the entities, Earth and Agni are proximate to them, therefore, the Ṛk and Sāman thus being related to Earth and Agni, it is definitely ascertained that the words Ṛk and Sāman are used synonymously for the Earth and Agni respectively. Again, it is not possible to prevent the word ‘charioteer’ from proceeding to denote a king, for some reason or other (as for instance when the king chooses to take up the reins in his own hand, and do the work of a charioteer). The Scriptural passage “This (Earth) itself, is the Ṛk (Iyam eva Ṛk)” (ChanU.1.6.1), because of the order in which the words (earth and Ṛk) are mentioned, makes it understood that it is the Ṛk that is of the nature of the Earth. If the Scriptures had meant it to be understood that the earth was of the nature of the Ṛk, the order of the words would have been — This (i.e. the Earth) is but the Ṛk only (Iyam Ṛk Eva). Besides the Scriptural passage “He who knowing thus, sings Sāman” (ChanU.1.7.7) concludes that the meditation is upon the subordinate part (i.e. Aṅga of a religious act) and not upon the earth. Similarly, in the Scriptural passage “The worlds may be meditated upon as the five-fold Sāman”, even though the word ‘world’ is governed by the locative case (Lokeṣu), it is the worlds that are to be superimposed on the five-fold Sāman, because it is understood from the word Sāman which is governed by the accusative case, that it is the Sāman that is the object of meditation. When the worlds are superimposed on Sāman, it is that Sāman which is meditated upon as the worlds, or otherwise it would be the worlds that would happen to be meditated upon as Sāman. This discussion should be understood as explaining the Scriptural passage “This Gāyatra (Sāman) is woven into the Prāṇas” (ChanU.2.11.1), where also the Scriptures use the accusative case equally for both (the words), as in the passage “Now verily this seven-fold Sāman should be meditated upon as Āditya” (ChanU.2.9.1). As the introductory portion shows the Sāman as the entity to be meditated upon, thus — “Verily meditation on the whole Sāman is good” (ChanU.2.1.1), “Now about the five-fold” (ChanU.2.7.2), “And now about the seven-fold” (ChanU.2.8.1), it is the Āditya etc. that are to be superimposed on it (i.e. the Sāman). It is precisely because it is understood that it is the Sāman that is to be the object of meditation, that even when the Scriptural indication is the opposite way, such as “The Earth is the Hiṅ-kāra” (ChanU.2.2.1), it is Hiṅ-kāra etc. that are to be looked upon as the Earth etc. Therefore it is thus proved that the notions of Āditya etc., which do not rest on any subordinate part (of a religious act) are to be superimposed on the Udgīṭha etc. which are such subordinate parts of religious acts. — 6.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Āsīnaḥ: sitting; Sambhavāt: on account of the possibility.🔗 (The person meditating must be) in a sitting posture, because (it is only that way that meditation) is possible. — 4.1.7. There could be no question of the consideration about posture etc. in the case of meditations relating to the subordinate parts of religious actions, inasmuch as they are regulated by the religious actions themselves, nor can there be any such question in the case of the correct i.e. perfect intuitive knowledge (of an entity such as Brahman), as the knowledge of such an entity depends upon such intuitive knowledge of the entity itself. But with regard to other meditations, the Sūtra-kāra now proceeds to consider, whether they should as a rule be performed in a sitting posture or whether a man should set about to perform them, regardless of any such rule, whether he be standing, sitting, or lying down, just as he pleases. With regard to this, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that inasmuch as meditation is a mental act, there could be no rule with regard to the bodily posture. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) the Sūtra-kāra replies — A person should meditate in a sitting posture only. Whence is it so? Because it is possible (only in that posture). Meditation indeed is the setting up of a continuous stream of homogeneous mental apprehensions, which is not possible when a person is either walking or running, as motion etc. of any kind are prone to distract the mind. In the case of a man standing also, inasmuch as the mind is preoccupied in maintaining the body in an erect posture, it is not capable of realizing a supersensuous entity. A man in a recumbent posture is prone to be suddenly overpowered by sleep. But, in the case of a man in a sitting posture, many such faults are easily avoidable and meditation by him is thus possible. — 7.
[Go top]
Dhyānāt: on account of meditation; Ca: and.🔗 Also because (of meditation being) of the nature of steadfast concentration of thought. — 4.1.8. Besides, to concentrate on a thought steadfastly is but the setting up of a continuous stream of homogeneous mental apprehensions. The term ‘steadfast concentration of thought’ is seen to be used in a secondary sense, when bodily movements are perfectly relaxed, the vision is fixed (as in a brown-study), and the mind is absorbed in a single object, as for instance, when we speak of a crane watching intently (for a fish) or of a grass widow (a Proṣita-bandhu i.e. a woman whose husband is absent on a journey) watching intently with steadfast devotion (her traveller-husband’s return). This can be accomplished with ease in a sitting posture. Therefore, also, meditation is an act to be performed in a sitting posture. — 8.
[Go top]
A-calatvam: immobility, stability, steadiness; Ca: and, indeed; Apekṣya: referring to, aiming at, pointing to.🔗 It is with reference to the steadfastness (of the earth even while rotating, that the Scriptures have used that term in steadfast concentration in the case of the earth). — 4.1.9. In the Scriptural passage “The Earth is, as it were, in (a condition of) steady concentration (of thought)” (ChanU.7.6.1), the statement about such concentration of thought is used in reference to the Earth’s (apparent) want of movement. That is a Scriptural indicatory mark for holding, that meditation is an act to be performed in a sitting posture. — 9.
[Go top]
Smaranti: the Smṛti texts say, it is mentioned in the Smṛtis; Ca: also.🔗 The Smṛtis also say similarly. — 4.1.10. The learned Smṛti-kāras also speak of the sitting posture (Āsana) as a subordinate part of meditation, thus — “Having taken up a firm sitting posture for oneself in a hallowed place etc.” (BhG.6.11). Hence also, the Yoga-Śāstra gives instructions about such special postures as Padmaka (the lotus posture — i.e. sitting, right foreleg on left thigh and left foreleg on right thigh). — 10.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Yatra: where, wherever; Eka-agratā: concentration of mind; Tatra: there; A-viśeṣāt: for want of any specification, it not being specifically mentioned, as there is no special direction in Śruti.🔗 Because, no particular (rules are mentioned, meditation should he performed) wherever concentration of mind (can he attained). — 4.1.11. As regards the direction, environment or time (in which meditation should be performed), a doubt (arises), as to whether there is or is not any rule (governing it). The Sūtra-kāra answers the opponent of Vedānta, who considers, that there may be some sort of rule as to that, inasmuch as it is observed that usually in the case of Vedic actions there is a rule as to the direction etc., that a rule as to direction etc. in connection with the aim (of such meditation) does exist by implication, thus: — As there is no special Scriptural mention about any rule about meditation, as there is in Sacrifices etc., as regards the eastern direction, or forenoon, or a site sloping towards the east, one should perform meditation wherever and in whichever direction, and whenever, concentration of mind can be secured with ease, because such concentration of mind is possible anywhere. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) some do mention such special rules as for instance — “One should meditate in a level place which is clean and is free from pebbles, fire, sand etc. and also free from noise and ponds etc. and in a place which is agreeable to the mind, but not in a place where there are mosquitoes etc. which are troublesome to the eye, i.e. in a cave etc. where the air is still and calm” (SvetU.2.10). The reply given is — No doubt there is such a kind of rule but such a rule being there, the Ācārya as a friend hints that there is no special rule about the special things mentioned in that rule. The expression ‘agreeable to the mind’ indicates this very thing, viz. that meditation should be performed, in such places wherever there is concentration of mind. — 11.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Ā prāyaṇāt: till death, till Mukti; Tatra: there, then; Api: also, even; Hi: because; Dṛṣṭam: is seen (in the Śruti).🔗 There should he repetition of meditations, right up to the time of death, because it is observed to be so, even at that moment. — 4.1.12. In the first Adhikaraṇa it was concluded that there should be repetition of all meditations. So far as that is concerned, as such meditations for the purpose of correct i.e. perfect knowledge, should, as in the case of the pounding (of rice etc.), ultimately culminate in the achievement of the objective viz. correct i.e. perfect knowledge, the extent of their repetition has of course been understood already. When the effect of meditation viz. correct i.e. perfect knowledge, is achieved, it is not possible to enjoin any further effort (of meditation) because, as Brahman is the Self of all and is not something which can be enjoined (on a man), it cannot be the province of a Śāstra. With respect to meditations which have the fruit of the nature of secular prosperity, however, there is scope for consideration as to whether one should stop after repeating such meditations for some time, or whether they should be repeated as long as one continues to live. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that meditation having been performed for some time, should be given up, because the Scriptural requirement of ‘meditation’ in which such repetition is implicit, is thereby achieved. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) we reply: — Meditation should be repeated right up to the time of death, because the acquisition of the invisible fruit of meditation is dependent upon the final act of the acquisition of knowledge (Antya-pratyaya). Religious acts which begin to produce the fruit to be enjoyed during the next birth, require (Akṣipanti) the knowledge of the nature of i.e. the conception of, such fruit, at the time of death, according to Scriptural passages such as “He becomes endowed with special consciousness of desires, he follows the subtle body (Liṅga-Śarīra) which has such special consciousness of desires” (BrhU.4.4.20), “He approaches the Prāṇa with whatsoever he has in his mind. This Prāṇa conjointly with Tejas, takes him along with the Self, to the desired world” (PrasU.3.10). (This is so), also because of the illustration of the caterpillar on the grass. But so far as these meditations are concerned, what knowledge of desires other than that which accrues at the time of death, apart from the repetition of such meditations, can such meditations expect? Therefore, there ought to be a repetition of the meditations, which are of the nature or the conception of the knowledge of the desire of the fruit to be obtained at the time of death. For even so does the Scriptural passage “With whatever special desire he departs from this world” indicate the repetition of the act of meditation, even at the time of death. The Smṛti also says — “With whatever desire in mind he departs from the body at the end, to that object of desire, Oh son of Kuntī, obsessed as he is with that desire, he goes” (BhG.8.6), “With a steadfast mind, at the time of departure (from the body” (BhG.8.10). The Scriptures also declare, that even at the time of death, there is something still remaining to be done, thus — “He should at the time of death, call to his mind the three things” (The three Mantras addressed to the Sun, the Ādhidaivika aspect of Prāṇa thus — “There is no destruction of you, you are constant, you are the subtle element of Prāṇa”) (ChanU.3.17.6). — 12.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tad-adhigame: when that is realised; Uttara-pūrva-aghayoḥ: of the subsequent and the previous sins; A-śleṣa-vināśau: non-clinging and destruction; Tad-vyapadeśāt: because Śruti has declared so.🔗 On its (Brahman’s) realization, the possible future sins and the past ones, do not come into contact and are destroyed respectively, because it is so declared (by the Scriptures). — 4.1.13. The supplemental portion which remained (to be discussed) in the third Adhyāya is now finished. Now, the Sūtra-kāra starts on the consideration of the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman. The doubt is, as to whether, when realization of Brahman has taken place, sinful acts whose fruit is contrary to it (i.e. the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman) are destroyed or not. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that inasmuch as actions do have the result of producing their fruit, their destruction, prior to their producing such fruit, is not possible, because it is understood from the Scriptures, that actions do possess an inherent power of producing their fruit, and hence if sinful acts were to be so destroyed before their fruit is duly suffered, the Scriptures would thus happen to be ignored. The Scriptures also declare — Actions are never destroyed. But (says the Vedāntin) if it be so, then it would come to this, that the instruction of the Scriptures with respect to expiatory rites would be rendered meaningless. This is no fault (the opponent of Vedānta replies), because it is reasonably sustainable that expiatory rites are understood to depend upon particular occasions, as for instance, like the Iṣṭi which is to be performed, when a house is destroyed by fire. Besides as expiatory rites have been enjoined in connection with a man’s contact with sin, they may well have the purpose of neutralizing such sinful acts, but there is no such injunction (about expiatory rites) with respect to the Vidyā of the knowledge of Brahman (viz. that it should be attained for the purpose of neutralizing sinful acts). But (says the Vedāntin), if it is not understood that the sinful acts of a man who has attained the knowledge of Brahman are so destroyed, then inasmuch as the fruit of such actions has necessarily to be suffered, no Final Release would ever take place. (The opponent of Vedānta replies) — No, because, like fruits of actions, Final Release also may come about, depending upon a particular environment, time and special cause. Therefore, there never is any destruction of the sinful acts, on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply: — On its (i.e. Brahman’s) realization, the destruction and non-contact respectively of prior and subsequent sinful acts, come about, i.e. the prior sinful acts are destroyed and possible sinful acts in future do not come into contact with a person. Whence is it so? Because of the declaration to that effect (by the Scriptures). For the Scriptures, in the chapter dealing with Brahma-Vidyā, indicate that a learned man does not come into contact, with future sins, (even though such contact is possible in the case of future sinful acts), thus — “Just as water does not stick to a lotus-leaf, even so, sinful acts do not contaminate a man, who knows this in this way” (ChanU.4.14.3). The Scriptures similarly indicate the destruction of sinful acts committed already, thus — “Just as a fluff of cotton-wool sticking to an arrow is consumed when the arrow is put in the fire, even so are all his prior sins destroyed” (ChanU.5.24.3). The following again, is yet one more Scriptural declaration about the destruction of actions — “The knot of the Hṛdaya is cut under and all doubts are resolved and all actions destroyed on the realization of Him who is at once both the High (Para) and low (Avara)” (MunU.2.2.8). With regard to the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that the assumption of the destruction of acts before their fruits are experienced, would mean that the Śāstra is ignored or vitiated, we reply that this is no fault. We do not mean to deny the power of actions to generate their fruit, but we only wish to say, that such power which of course is always inherent in actions, is merely arrested by some such other cause as correct or perfect knowledge etc. The Śāstra is concerned merely in maintaining that such power does exist, but not in maintaining either its liability to be obstructed, or not to be obstructed, in any way. The Smṛti statement, viz., that action is never destroyed is a statement only of the nature of a general rule, that inasmuch as action has the result of producing a fruit, it is never destroyed unless its fruit is first experienced. On the authority of such Scriptural statements as “He escapes from all sins’, “He who performs the Aśva-medha sacrifice escapes from the sin of the killing of a Brāhmaṇa, and also every one who knows it to be so”, the destruction of actions by expriatory rites is of course to be desired. The statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that expiatory rites may well be for special occasions as and when they arise, (we reply) — It is not so, because as they are enjoined whenever there is a contact with sin, and as their fruit, viz. the destruction of such sins by them, is possible, the idea of their having some other fruit is not reasonably sustainable. With regard, again, to the statement (by the opponent of Vedānta) that there is no injunction as regards the acquisition of the knowledge (of Brahman) with the intention of the destruction of sin, as there is in the case of an expiatory rite, we reply — There of course is such an injunction in the case of Vidyās (Cognitions) with respect to qualified Brahman, because in the complementary passage with regard to them, the attainment of lordly power by, and the removal of sin of, him, who has attained such knowledge, is referred to, and as there is no reason for the Scriptures not desiring to state so, it is therefore definitely ascertained that the acquisition of lordly power, as preceded by the destruction i.e. incineration (Pradaha) of sin, is their fruit. As regards Vidyās (Cognitions) with respect to unqualified Brahman, even though there is no similar injunction, the destruction i.e. incineration of all actions is established as a necessary result of the knowledge that the Self is not an agent. The term ‘non-contact’ indicates, that, with regard to actions (which may occur) at some future time, any one who has realized Brahman does not ever actually become an agent of any action. With respect to actions in the past, though a person through false-knowledge understood himself to be such an agent as it were, still by reason of the removal of such false-knowledge through the power of the knowledge (of Brahman) even these past actions are dissolved, and that is why the Sūtra-kāra has referred to their destruction. The person who has realized Brahman understands, that he himself is Brahman, which has the nature of never being an agent or an experiencer during all the three divisions of time (viz. the past, present or future), contrary to the preconceived (wrong) notion of being such an agent or experiencer, and a person who has realized Brahman knows that he never was such agent or experiencer before, nor is he so at present, nor will he ever be so at some future time. Final Release is reasonably sustainable only in this way. Otherwise as there would never be any destruction of actions which have their origin in beginningless time, there would be no Final Release. Final Release does not, like fruits of actions, deserve to be dependent on environment, time and special causes, because (if it were to be so), there would be the predicament of its being transitory i.e. non-eternal, and also because it is not reasonably sustainable that the fruit of knowledge is not directly perceptible. Therefore, it is firmly established that on the realization of Brahman, sinful actions are liquidated. — 13.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Itarasya: of the other; Api: also; Evam: thus, in the same way; A-samśleṣaḥ: non-clinging; Pāte: at death; Tu: but, indeed.🔗 But there is a similar non-contact even of the other i.e. meritorious acts, in the same way (as in the case of sinful acts), and (Final Release takes place), as soon as the body falls (i.e. death takes place). — 4.1.14. In the former topic (Adhikaraṇa), non-contact and destruction of (future and past) sins which are natural and which are the cause of bondage, were as indicated by the Scriptures (Śāstra), explained as being caused by the knowledge (of Brahman). Now, a doubt having been raised, that meritorious acts being acts in accordance with the Śāstra, they could not be antagonistic to knowledge based on the Śāstra, in order to remove such doubt, an extended application (Atideśa) of the argument in the previous Adhikaraṇa is made here (in the Sūtra), viz. that in the case of a man who has attained knowledge, there is a similar non-contact and destruction of acts of the other kind i.e. meritorious acts, as in the case of sinful acts. Whence is it so? Because of the possibility of a predicament of such acts being an impediment to the fruit of knowledge (i.e. Final Release) occurring, as they also, are the cause of their own fruit. In Scriptural passages such as “He verily transcends both (i.e. meritorious as well as sinful acts)” (BrhU.4.4.22), there is a mention that like sinful acts meritorious acts also are annihilated, as is indicated by (the use of) the word ‘destruction’, because the destruction of actions, as a result of the knowledge that the Self is never an agent (i.e. the doer of such acts), is common, both to meritorious as well as sinful acts, and as in the Scriptural passage “His (i.e. of the man who has realized Brahman) actions are annihilated” (Mund, 2.2.8); no distinction is made (between meritorious and sinful acts). Besides where only the word ‘sin’ is seen (to be used in the Scriptures) it should be understood that it covers ‘merit’ also, because, as compared with the fruit of perfect knowledge (i.e. Final Release) the fruit of a meritorious act (which is only secular prosperity) is inferior. Besides the word ‘sin’ is used in the Scriptures also to indicate merit, because, in the Scriptural passage “Neither day nor night transcend this bund” (ChanU.8.4.1), good deeds are enumerated along with the bad deeds, and in the passage “All sins turn back from here”, for ‘merit’ which also is relevant here, the word ‘sin’ is used in a common way. The word ‘as soon as’ (Tu) in the Sūtra ‘as soon as the body falls’ is used for the purpose of indicating proper ascertainment. It being thus established, that there is non-contact and liquidation of good and bad deeds which are the cause of bondage, as a result of the power of the knowledge i.e. Vidyā (of Brahman), the Sūtra-kāra makes us understand that in the case of a man who has attained knowledge (of Brahman), Final Release is bound to take place the moment the body falls (i.e. death supervenes). — 14.
[Go top]
[Go top]
An-ārabdha-kārye: in the case of those works, the effects of which have not begun to operate, i.e., to yield fruits or results; Eva: only; Tu: but; Pūrve: former works; Tad-avadheḥ: that (death) being the limit, because of waiting till death.🔗 But it is only the past actions which have not started their effects i.e. fructification (that are annihilated by the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman), because (the Scriptures have declared death to be) the point of time, (for Final Release). — 4.1.15. From the foregoing Adhikaraṇas, the annihilation of meritorious and unmeritorious actions as brought about by the knowledge of Brahman, has been ascertained. It is now being considered whether, this (annihilation) takes place indiscriminately in the case of both, viz. actions which have started to fructify and those which have not yet started, to do so, or particularly in the case of those only, which have not yet started to fructify. With regard to that, as, by the passage “Verily he transcends both these” (BrhU.4.4.2), the Scriptures do not specify anything in particular, (the conclusion is that) there is annihilation of all acts generally. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — (the annihilation is) of only those acts which have not yet begun to fructify. It is the collective meritorious and unmeritorious actions of the previous birth, and those also of the present birth done prior to the generation of knowledge of Brahman and which have not yet started to fructify, that are annihilated by such acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman, but not those which have already started to fructify and which are only semi-enjoyed, and Which have constituted the cause of the generation of the present body (i.e. Janma) which is the repository of the knowledge of Brahman. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures have prescribed the fall of the body as the point of time at which Final Release takes place, by the passage “He is delayed in the acquisition of Final Release, only so long as he is not relieved of the body” (ChanU.6.14.2), as otherwise, in the absence of any raison d’etre for a man’s existence after all actions are annihilated as a result of the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman, he would secure Final Release immediately after such acquisition of knowledge, and (if such were to be the case) the Scriptures would not have spoken about a man’s having to await the fall of the body (for Final Release). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) when this knowledge, viz. that the Ātmā is not in fact an agent, annihilates actions as a result of its own natural power (Vastu-balena), how can it be (maintained) that it annihilates some actions only and neglects to annihilate some others? When the contact between the seed and the fire is common (to all seeds), it is not possible to accept that the power of some particular seeds (to germinate) is annihilated and the power of some others is not (so annihilated). We reply — It is not reasonably sustainable, that there can be any generation of the knowledge of Brahman without the acceptance of a reservoir of actions (which is the cause of the generation of a body), in which actions have started their effects i.e. fructification, and when once that is accepted, and when, as in the case of a potter’s wheel which has been set in motion, there is no possibility of any hindrance to the momentum which is generated, it is inevitable that such knowledge has to await the dissipation of that momentum. The knowledge that the Self (Ātmā) is not an agent also annihilates actions by removing false-knowledge, but even though it is so removed it does still persist for a while, as a result of past impressions, just as, for instance, the notion about there being two moons also persists for some time. Besides, it should not be discussed here (i.e. it is not debatable here) as to whether a man who has realized Brahman does continue to possess a body for some time after such realization, or whether he does not, because how can one man ever dispute another man’s experience of both the realization of Brahman and of his yet continuing to possess a body, as such experience of the other man, can belong to such other man alone? The Scriptures and the Smṛtis by way of indicating the characteristics of a man firmly ensconced in the knowledge of Brahman, have explained the same thing. Therefore the final conclusion is, that through the power of knowledge there is annihilation only of the meritorious and unmeritorious actions which have not yet started their effects i.e. fructification. — 15.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Agni-hotra-ādi: daily Agni-hotra, etc., daily offering of oblations to the perpetually maintained fire; Tu: but; Tat-kāryāya: tend towards the same result as that (knowledge); Eva: only; Tad-darśanāt: that being seen from the scriptures.🔗 Agni-hotra etc. also (Tu), lead to the same result (viz. the generation of the effect of knowledge), because it is seen to be so (from the Scriptures). — 4.1.16. Extended application (Atideśa) of the reasoning about sinful acts, was made in the case of the non-contact and destruction of meritorious actions also. The Sūtra-kāra now raises a doubt as to whether this holds good in the case of all meritorious acts, and says — “Agni-hotra etc. also”. The word ‘also (Tu)’ removes the doubt. Whatever is routine (Nitya) Vedic religious action, such as Agni-hotra etc. for instance, makes for precisely the same result. The meaning is that the result of such action is the same as the result of knowledge. Whence is it so? On account of the Scriptural indication, viz. “The Brāhmaṇas endeavour to know the Self by means of the reciting of the Vedas, and by means of sacrifice, and charity” (BrhU.4.4.22). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) inasmuch as the results of knowledge and actions are dissimilar, it is not reasonably sustainable that they can have the same result. We reply — This is no fault, because even though curds and poison have the effect of (causing) fever and death respectively, still, when they are used conjointly with brown sugar, and incantations (Mantras) respectively, they are observed to produce satisfaction, and physical well-being i.e. nourishment, respectively. Even so, religious actions when they are connected with knowledge, produce the result of Final Release. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) Final Release is not something which can be effected i.e. produced, and so how can it be said to be the result of action? We reply — This is no fault, because actions help to produce that effect indirectly from a distance. Action being something which promotes knowledge, it is metaphorically said to be the means of Final Release, through the medium of knowledge. Hence it is, that the statement about the result being the same, is with reference only to action already performed (before the generation of knowledge). In the case of a man who has realized Brahman, it is not possible that there can be any performance of Agni-hotra etc. after such realization, because the realization of Brahman as the Self (of a man), which cannot be something to which a man can be enjoined, cannot properly be the subject of a Śāstra. In the case of meditations connected with qualified Brahman, inasmuch as in that case, a man does not cease to be an agent, the performance of Agni-hotra etc. even afterwards (i.e. after attaining knowledge of qualified Brahman) is of course possible. And when such action is performed in a disinterested manner (without any motive), then in the absence of its having any relation to any other result, it is reasonably sustainable, that it has appropriateness for such a relation to meditation (Vidyā). — 16.
[Go top]
Now, with respect to what action (Karma), then, is this Scriptural statement, about the non-contact and destruction (of actions)? and with respect to what action (Karma), then, is this statement, about the appropriation (of merits and demerits), by the followers of one branch (of the Vedas), thus — “His sons inherit his property, his friends inherit his meritorious actions, and his enemies inherit his unmeritorious actions”? The Sūtra-kāra gives a reply: —Ataḥ: from this; Anyā: different; Api: also; Hi: because, indeed; Ekeṣām: of some (Śākhās); Ubhayoḥ: of both.🔗 There are good acts, other than those (i.e. Agni-hotra etc.). (This statement about the appropriation is about them.) Both (Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa) (agree about that). — 4.1.17. There are good acts, other than these compulsory routine acts, such as Agni-hotra etc., which are undertaken with a desire for a particular fruit, and it is about the appropriation of these that the followers of one branch have spoken thus — “His friends inherit the good deeds etc.”. It is with regard to these, that there is this statement about this non-contact and destruction, as in the case of sinful acts. Both the Ācāryas Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa agree in holding that such kind of acts, performed for some desired end, are not helpful towards (the acquisition of) knowledge. — 17.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Yad eva: whatever; Vidyayā: with knowledge; Iti: thus, this, so; Hi: because.🔗 (The Scriptural passage) “Also whatever (he does) equipped with Vidyā (knowledge of Brahman)” also (intimates similarly). — 4.1.18. It is understood from the preceding Adhikaraṇa, that a compulsory routine act (Nitya-Karma) such as Agni-hotra etc., which, if performed (by a man) with a desire for the fruit of Final Release, and which by way of being the cause of the destruction of the sinful acts committed (by him), becomes the means of the purification of the mind, thus becomes the means of producing in cooperation with Vidyā the same result as that produced by the knowledge of Brahman, which has Final Release as its fruit. Now religious acts such as Agni-hotra etc. are acts which are either connected with Vidyā which is dependent upon the subsidiary part of religious acts, or are mere unconnected acts as such. By reason of Scriptural statements such as “He who sacrifices, knowing thus”, “He who offers oblation, knowing thus”, “He who recites, knowing thus”, “He who sings, knowing thus”, “Therefore one should appoint him only, who knows thus, as the Brahma-priest, and not one who does not know it to be like this” (ChanU.4.17.10), “Both equally, i.e. he who knows this to be so, and he who does not, perform acts (by means of the letter ‘Om’)” (ChanU.1.1.10), it is understood that religious acts are of both kinds, viz. either those connected with Vidyā or not so connected. With regard to that it is being considered, whether, it is only acts such as Agni-hotra etc. connected with Vidyā, which, by way of being the means of knowledge, come to have the same result as the result of knowledge, and not the mere Agni-hotra which is not so connected (with Vidyā), or whether both these kinds of acts whether connected or not so connected with Vidyā, equally without any distinction come to have the same result. Whence is the doubt? Because the Scriptural passage “(They) endeavour to know this Self by sacrifice”, speaks of sacrifice etc. generally, as being subsidiary to the knowledge of the Self, while Agni-hotra etc. connected with Vidyās are understood to have a sort of special significance. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that it is only Agni-hotra etc. which are connected with Vidyās, which become complementary to the knowledge of the Self, and not those which are not so connected, because that which is equipped with Vidyā is understood to have a special significance over that which is not so connected. Also because of such Scriptural passages as “One who knows this to be so, conquers death, the very day on which he offers an oblation”, and because of the Smṛti passages “Equipped with which knowledge, Oh Pārtha, wilt thou' get rid of the bondage of acts?” (BhG.2.39), “Oh Dhanañjaya, (mere) action is vastly inferior to action equipped with the possession of knowledge” (BhG.2.49). This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), it is expounded (by the Sūtra-kāra), thus — Also whatever (he does) equipped with Vidyā — (in the above Sūtra). It is true that an act such as Agni-hotra etc. when it is connected with Vidyā is superior to a mere act of Agni-hotra which is not so connected (with Vidyā), just as a Brāhmaṇa who is equipped with Vidyā, is superior to one who is not so equipped. Still, it is not, that an act of Agni-hotra, not so connected with Vidyā, is not at all necessary. Whence is it so? Because, the Scriptural passage “They endeavour to know this Self by means of a sacrifice” speaks of Agni-hotra generally as being the means of the knowledge of Brahman. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) inasmuch as Agni-hotra etc. which is connected with Vidyā is understood (from the Scriptures) to be superior to one which is not so connected, it is logical, that Agni-hotra which is not so connected with Vidyā, is not considered necessary, as the means of the knowledge of the Self. (We reply) — No, it is not so. Rather, it is logical to imagine that as an Agni-hotra which is connected with Vidyā has very great power because of such Vidyā, it only happens to be a superior means as regards the knowledge of the Self, while it is not so in the case of a mere Agni-hotra which is not so connected with Vidyā. It is not proper to understand, that, Agni-hotra etc., which is mentioned by the Scriptures to be but a subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahman, in a general way only, thus — “Endeavour to know by means of a sacrifice”, is not such a subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahman. For the Scriptures which declare, thus — “Whatever he does with Vidyā, faith and esoteric meditation, becomes more potent” (ChanU.1.1.10), and speak of a certain sort of superiority of an Agni-hotra which is connected with Vidyā, towards its own effect, by thus speaking about its being more potent, also indicate thereby, that the same Agni-hotra, when it is not so connected with Vidyā, has ht least some potency as regards its fruit any way. Now what constitutes the potency of an act, is its ability to produce its own fruit. It is thus established, that the compulsory routine Agni-hotra, whether connected with Vidyā or not so connected, and performed by an aspirant for Final Release, with the desire for such Final Release as its fruit, prior to the generation of the knowledge (of Brahman), whether during the present or previous birth, and which in proportion to its power, becomes the cause of the realization of Brahman, by way of causing the annihilation of the aggregate of sins which constitute an impediment to such realization (of Brahman), and which is helpful to such internal causes as, hearing, contemplating, faith and steadfast devotion, thus becomes a collaborator of Brahma-Vidyā in the production of the same result, viz. Final Release. — 18.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Bhogena: by enjoyment; Tu: but; Itare: of the other two works (merit and demerit); Kṣapayitvā: having exhausted; Sampadyate: becomes united with Brahman, becomes one with Brahman, obtains, joins.🔗 By destroying other acts (i.e. these meritorious and unmeritorious acts which have started to fructify) by experiencing their fruit, however, he attains identification with the Supreme Spirit i.e. Kaivalya. — 4.1.19. Mention has already been made (by the Sūtra-kāra) of the destruction of the meritorious and sinful acts which have not yet started to fructify, through the power of knowledge. Having also annihilated the other meritorious and sinful acts which have already started fructifying, by the experiencing of their fruit, identification with the Supreme Spirit is attained, on the authority of the Scriptural passages “He is delayed only so long as he is not relieved of the body and then he becomes one with Brahman” (ChanU.6.14.2), and “Himself being Brahman, he merges into Brahman” etc. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) — Even though correct i.e. perfect knowledge is there, just as, according to the maxim (Nyāya) of ‘the vision of double moons’, a man still continues to see entities as different, prior to the fall of the body, he may well continue to do so i.e. see entities as different even after that. (We reply) — No, because of the absence of any cause for it. In the former case, the necessity of the destruction of the residue of actions of which the first has yet to be experienced, is the cause of the persistence of such notion of duality, while no such cause exists in the present case. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) another fresh aggregate of actions may start a fresh experience of the fruit of actions? (We reply) — No, because the seeds (of such actions) happen to have been burnt out. Any new action, which has to depend upon false-knowledge, may if at all, begin a fresh experience after the fall of the body, but such false-knowledge is completely destroyed by correct i.e. perfect knowledge, and hence, the proposition, that on the dissipation of the effects of actions which have started to fructify, a wise man experiences complete identity with the supreme spirit (Kaivalya), holds perfectly good. — 19.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
Now, (the Sūtra-kāra) wishing to lead a man to the path of the Gods (Devāyana) for the attainment by him of the fruit of the lower kind of Vidyā, to begin with, speaks about the order of the passage (of the Self, out of the body), according to the Śāstra. He will later on say how the passage (of the Self, out of the body) is common, both in the case of those who are equipped with knowledge and those who are ignorant of it.Vāk: speech; Manasi: in the mind; Darśanāt: because it is so seen or observed, because of the scriptural declaration; Śabdāt: because of the word of the Vedas, because of the statement of the Smrti; Ca: also, and.🔗 Vāk i.e. Speech (merges) into the Mind (Manas), because it is so seen and also because of the Scriptural statement. — 4.2.1. There is the following Scriptural statement with regard to the subject of death — “Oh gentle one, when a man is dying, Speech (Vāk) merges into the Manas, the Manas into Prāṇa, the Prāṇa into Tejas, and Tejas into the Highest deity” (ChanU.6.8.6). Here, the doubt is, whether the Scriptural passage speaks of the merger of speech (Vāk) itself along with its mode or function, into the mind (Manas), or whether it speaks of the merger of only the mode or function (of speech). With regard to that the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), is, that it is speech (Vāk) itself, that merges into the mind. It would be only thus that the proper meaning of the Scriptural passage will be brought out, otherwise a Lakṣaṇa (implication) would result. Whenever there is a doubt as between a Scriptural passage and a Lakṣaṇa, logically the Scriptural passage is acceptable and not a Lakṣaṇa. Hence, the merger into the mind, is of speech (Vāk) itself. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — It is the mode or the function of speech (Vāk) that merges into the mind. (Asks the opponent of Vedānta) — How do you interpret that it is only the function of speech (Vāk) that merges, when the Scriptural passage recites that speech (Vāk) merges into the mind (Manas)? (We reply) — What you say is right, but the Sūtra-kāra will mention hereafter (in Sūtra 16 of this Pāda) thus: “There is nonseparateness (Avibhāga), i.e. complete merger, because of the Scriptural statement”. Therefore, it is understood that what is intended to be spoken of here, is merely about the cessation of the mode or function of speech (Vāk). Assuming, the Sūtra-kāra intended to speak about the merger of the entity (Tattva) itself (i.e. speech), then, as nonseparateness i.e. complete merger would be common (between all entities) everywhere, why would he, only at a later stage, speak of nonseparateness or complete merger of it (into a person who has attained knowledge, in Sūtra 16)? Therefore the cessation of the mode or function alone is intended to be spoken of here, the meaning being, that the mode or function of speech is arrested first, while the mode or function of the mind still continues to function. Whence is it so? Because it is so seen. It is actually seen that the function of speech is arrested first, even when the function of the mind still exists. Nobody is able to observe the merger of speech itself along with its function, in the mind. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) it has been said, that on the authority of the Scriptures, it is logical that there is a merger of speech itself, into the mind. We reply — No, because speech has not the mind as its cause. It is logical (to hold) that, from whatever cause any entity is created, into that, it merges, as for instance, an earthenware trough, into (its cause) the earth. There is no means-of-proof i.e. authority (for saying) that speech results from the mind. The generation and the cessation of a function, however, are seen to depend even upon what is not their cause. For instance, the function of fire which is of the nature of Tejas, is generated from fuel which is of the nature of the earth, while it (i.e. fire) is extinguished in water. Supposing this view is correct (says the opponent of Vedānta), how is there a Scriptural statement, that “Speech merges into the Mind”? The Sūtra-kāra replies — On the authority of the Scriptures themselves. The meaning is that the Scriptural statement is reconcilable in favour of this view, by metaphorically treating the function of an entity and the entity itself as being non-different. — 1.
[Go top]
Ataḥ eva: hence; Ca: and, also; Sarvāṇi: all (organs); Anu (Anugacchanti): after (follow).🔗 Hence it is that all (sense-organs) follow the lead (of the mind). — 4.2.2. In the Scriptural passage “Therefore when (after leaving the body) the Jīva-Self, whose lustre i.e. bodily heat (Tejas) has cooled off, (goes) to a rebirth (through death which is then imminent) along with the sense-organs that have become one with the mind” (PrasU.3.9), the Scriptures have mentioned the absorption of all sense-organs generally, into the mind. Here it is to be seen from this Scriptural passage, that, for this very reason, viz., that just as speech by way of its mode or function becomes one with the mind, even so, the mode or functions of the eye etc. also merge into the mind which along with its mode or function is still in existence, and, as it is possible to construe the word ‘sense-organ’ occurring in the Scriptures as meaning its function, and as the complete absorption of the sense-organ as such (Tattva) is not possible, the Scriptures mean to say that it is only through the merger of their modes or functions that the sense-organs are understood to become one with the mind. Now, when the absorption of all the sense-organs generally (by way of their mode or function) into the mind, is being intended to be spoken of by the Scriptures, the special mention of speech (Vāk), the organ of speech (in the Sūtra) is in accordance with the particular instance from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad — “Speech becomes one with the Mind”. — 2.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tat: that; Manaḥ: mind; Prāṇe: in the Prāṇa; Uttarāt: from the subsequent clause (of the Śruti).🔗 It is understood from, the following (sentence) that, Mind (merges) into Prāṇa (by way of its function or mode). — 4.2.3. By the Scriptural passage “Speech merges into the Mind” (ChanU.6.8.6), it is meant to be spoken here, that it is the mode or function (of speech) that merges, is understood. As regards the next sentence — “Mind merges into Prāṇa”. (ChanU.6.8.6) — , when it is considered, as to whether it is intended to be told, that here also, there is merging of the mode or function only, or whether there is merging of that to which the mode or function belongs (i.e. the entity, the sense-organ mind) along with its mode or function, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that it is the merging of the mind along with its mode or function, that is meant to be spoken of here. Because the Scriptures favour the view, and it is reasonably sustainable, that the mind has Prāṇa as its material cause. For the Scriptural passage “Oh gentle one, mind has the structure of the earth, and the Prāṇa has the structure of water” (ChanU.6.5.4) declares, that the earth is the cause of the mind, and water is the cause of the Prāṇa, and that “the Āpas (i.e. waters) created the earth” (ChanU.6.2.4). Hence when the mind therefore merges into Prāṇa, it is in fact the earth that merges in water, for mind in fact is the earth and the Prāṇa is water, because, there is non-difference between the cause and the effect. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — It should be understood from the next sentence, that it is by way of its mode or function only, that the mind, after having absorbed into itself the modes or functions of the external organs-of-sense merges into Prāṇa, because it is seen, that in the case of a man in deep sleep or a man dying, there is a cessation of the function of the mind, while the respiratory function of the Prāṇa still continues. Again the merger of the mind (itself i.e. in its own nature) into Prāṇa is not possible, because mind has not Prāṇa as its material cause (Atat-prakṛtitvāt). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), it has been shown that the mind has Prāṇa as its material cause. (We reply) — This is not quite right. Mind does not deserve to merge into Prāṇa, by maintaining by way of such ratiocination (viz. that mind is earth, Prāṇa is water, and the earth originates from water) that mind has Prāṇa as its material cause. Even accepting this view, mind will be absorbed into the earth, and the earth into water, and Prāṇa also into water. Besides, even in this view there is no authority for the statement that mind has its origin in water which has modified itself into Prāṇa. Therefore, mind itself (with its own nature) is not absorbed into Prāṇa. It has been shown (already) that even the Scriptural statement as it is, holds good, even if only the mode or function (of the mind) is understood to be absorbed, by metaphorically holding a mode or function (of an entity) and the entity to which such function belongs, as being non-different. — 3.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Saḥ: that (Prāṇa); Adhyakṣe: in the ruler (the Jīva); Tad-upagama-ādibhyaḥ: on account of the (statements as to the Prāṇas) coming to it and so on.🔗 The Prāṇa (vital breath) merges into the presiding entity (Adhyakṣa i.e. the Jīva-Self) because of its reaching the Jīva-Self, the presiding entity (Adhyakṣa). — 4.2.4. It has thus been established, that there is merger of merely the mode or function of an entity and not of the entity itself into another entity, from which the former entity has not had its origin. Now, with regard to the Scriptural statement, “Prāṇa (merges) into Tejas”, it is being considered whether, as stated by the Scriptures, this merging of the mode or function of Prāṇa, is into the Tejas only, or it is into the Jīva-Self, the entity presiding over the bodily cage. With regard to that, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that, as the Scriptures are above being doubted (Anatiśaṅkyatvāt), the merging of Prāṇa must be into Tejas, because the assumption of anything that is not stated by the Scriptures is not logical. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), the Sūtra-kāra explains — The Prāṇa merges into the presiding entity (the Jīva-Self). The Prāṇa which is relevant (to the present discussion) subsists in the Jīva-Self i.e. the Cognitional Self, which is the presiding entity, having Nescience (Avidyā), action (Karma), and consciousness of the former birth (Pūrva-prajñā) as its limiting adjuncts. The meaning is that the function of Prāṇa has mainly that Jīva-Self as its basis (of operation). Whence is it so? Because it is understood, that they (i.e. the Prāṇas i.e. sense-organs which have merged in the Prāṇa, the vital breath) reach the Self. The Scriptural passage “Just in this way do all the Prāṇas gather round the Self at the time of death, when man reaches the final gasping stage” (BrhU.4.3.38), says so, commonly, of all Prāṇas in general, and a Scriptural passage elsewhere indicates, how all the Prāṇas approach the presiding entity, and the Scriptures indicate in particular by the passage “When the Self goes out of the body, all the Prāṇas (i.e. sense-organs) follow the Self”, as to how the Prāṇa of the five-fold modes or functions (i.e. of Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna, Samāna) follows the presiding entity (i.e. the Jīva-Self), and the Scriptural statement “When Prāṇa sets forth out of the body, all the Prāṇas, (i.e. sense-organs) follow that Prāṇa (i.e. vital breath)” (BrhU.4.4.2), indicates how the other Prāṇas follow in the wake of the Prāṇa of the five-fold modes or functions. And the Scriptural statement “He becomes equipped with special cognition (by way of being equipped with the sense-organs) demonstrates how the presiding entity becomes possessed of internal consciousness (Antar-vijñānatva), and makes it understood that the Prāṇa (i.e. vital breath) in whom the aggregate of all the other sense-organs has merged, subsists in it (i.e. in the presiding entity i.e. the Jīva-Self). But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the Scriptural passage declares that Prāṇa merges into Tejas. How then do you go further and accept in addition that the Prāṇa merges into the presiding entity? (We reply) — This is no fault, because, with regard to this business of the exodus from the body (Utkrānti), as the presiding entity (the Jīva-Self) is the main entity that is concerned in it, any special circumstances mentioned in other Scriptural passages, ought to be given due regard to. — 4.
[Go top]
The doubt here is as to how the Scriptural statement “The Prāṇa merges into Tejas” is to be explained. The Sūtra-kāra replies: —Bhūteṣu: in the elements; Tat-Śruteḥ: as that can be understood from Śruti, from the Śruti texts to that effect, there being a Vedic statement about that.🔗 (The presiding entity along with Prāṇa) resides in the (subtle) elements, because the Scriptures declare to that effect. — 4.2.5. It should be understood that the presiding entity which is in conjunction with Prāṇa, resides in the subtle elements, which are the associates of Tejas and which are the seeds of the body, because of the Scriptural statement — “Prāṇa (merges) into Tejas”. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) this Scriptural statement indicates the residing of Prāṇa in the Tejas, and it does not say that the presiding entity having Prāṇa in conjunction resides in the Tejas? (We reply) — This is no fault. Because, by the preceding Sūtra, which says — “Prāṇa (merges) into the presiding entity”, (it should be understood that) the presiding entity has been enumerated by the Scriptures as coming in between the Prāṇa and the Tejas. It is possible to say of a man, who, after going to Mathurā from Srughna proceeds from Mathurā to Pāṭali-putra, that he goes from Srughna to Pāṭali-putra. Therefore, by the Scriptural passage “Prāṇa (merges) into Tejas”, it is precisely the residing of the presiding entity in conjunction with Prāṇa, in the subtle elements which are the associates of Tejas, that is meant. — 5.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) how could it be said that the presiding entity resides in the elements which are the associates of Tejas, when the Scriptures speak only of one element viz. the Tejas, thus — “Prāṇa (merges) into Tejas”? The Sūtra-kāra replies: —Na: not; Ekasmin: in one; Darśayataḥ: (both the Śruti and Smṛti) declare so, both the Śruti and Smṛti show; Hi: as, for, because.🔗 But the Jīva-Self does not reside in one (element i.e. Tejas) only, because (the Scriptures and Smṛtis) both indicate this. — 4.2.6. The Jīva-Self, at the time of entering into another body, does not happen to reside in Tejas only, because the gross physical body, which is the effect (of the subtle body), is seen to be composed of many (elements). The same meaning is conveyed by the passage in the form of a question and answer, thus — “(Do you know) how Āpaḥ (during the fifth oblation) attain the name of a Puruṣa (man)?” (ChanU.5.3.3). This has been explained thus — “Because (Āpaḥ) has a triple composition (of elements), (but Āpaḥ is particularly mentioned) because of its preponderance” (Bra. Su. III. i. 2). Both the Scriptures and Smṛtis indicate the same thing. The Scriptures say thus — “(This Self) has the structure of Earth, Water, Vāyu, Ākāśa and Tejas” (BrhU.4.4.5). The Smṛti says thus — Along with the subtle and indestructible minute parts of the five (lit., half of ten) elements, all this world is born, as of yore. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) beginning with the Scriptural passage “Where, at that time, does the Puruṣa happen to be?”, the subsequent Scriptural passage “What these two (viz. Yājña-valkya and Ārta-bhāga) spoke about was but Karma (action), what they praised (as being the material cause of the world) was but Karma (action)” (BrhU.3.2.13), explains, how, when all the sense-organs such as speech etc. become merged, at the time of the Self’s going away to another body, it is but Karma on which the Self depends. The Sūtra-kāra says with regard to this — There, what is intended to be spoken of as (the Self’s) dependence on Karma (action), is the bringing about of the bondage (of the Self) by the tendency of sense-organs and sense-objects termed as Graha and Atigraha respectively, which is promoted by Karma (action). Here, on the other hand, what is spoken of as the dependence (of the Self) on the elements, is because of the desire to speak of the generation of another body, out of the elements, as its material cause. Besides by the use of the word “praise” (Praśaṃsā), what is indicated is, that action is of the chiefest importance, and not, that the dependence (of the Self) on another entity, is excluded. Therefore, there is no contradiction (in those two passages). — 6.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Samānā: common; Ca: and; Ā-sṛti-upakramāt: up to the beginning of their ways; A-mṛtatvam: immortality; Ca: and; An-upoṣya: without burning, without dissolution.🔗 (This going out of the body) is common (to both the learned and the ignorant), up to the beginning of the Path. (This) immortality is of those who have not completely destroyed their afflictions (such as Avidyā etc.). — 4.2.7. With regard to those who entertain a doubt, as to whether this going out (of the body) is common both to the learned and the ignorant, or whether, there is any distinctive peculiarity about it, (and that it applies only to the ignorant), the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that there is such distinctive peculiarity (i.e. it is applicable to only one of the two). It relates to the Jīva-Self which depends on the subtle elements. It is for rebirth that these subtle elements are resorted to (by the Jīva-Self). Rebirth is not possible in the case of the learned, because it is a firmly established conclusion that no rebirth is possible for a learned man and that he attains immortality. Therefore, this manner of going out (of the body) is only for the ignorant. But (says the Vedāntin) — As this going out is mentioned (in the Scriptures) in the chapter dealing with the knowledge of the Self i.e. Ātmā-Vidyā (in Chāndogya 6.8), this going out may be only in the case of the learned. (The opponent of Vedānta replies) — No, like sleep etc. it is only referred to as a thing already established (by other means-of-proof) elsewhere before. Similarly, just as elsewhere in Scriptural passages, such as “When a man indeed desires to sleep, or desires to eat or desires to drink” (ChanU.6.8.1.3.5), sleep etc., which are common to all beings generally, are referred to even in the chapter dealing with the knowledge of the Self, as being best calculated to explain the thing desired to be explained, and the Scriptures there, do not particularly purport to enjoin them on the learned, even so, this going out of the body which applies in the case of the people in general is here spoken of in a general way only, with a view to propound, thus — “That Highest Deity in which the Tejas of the man about to die, merges, is the Ātmā (i.e. the Highest Self), and, that Self thou art”. This manner of going out is denied in the case of the learned man, on the authority of the Scriptural passage “His Prāṇas do not depart” (BrhU.4.4.6). Therefore, this (going out of the body) is applicable only in the case of the ignorant. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — This going out of the body, beginning with the Scriptural statement, that “Speech (merges) into the Mind” etc., deserves to be common to both the learned as well as the ignorant up to the beginning of the Path, because nothing special in particular is mentioned 'by the Scriptures about it. The ignorant person (by which, his Self is meant) after resorting to the subtle elements which form the seeds of the body, and being impelled by (his) Karma, goes out for experiencing the acquisition of a body, and the learned man on the other hand resorts to the Nāḍī which is the way to Mokṣa (i.e. Final Release) and which is illuminated by knowledge. The same is expressed (in the Sūtra), by “Upto the beginning of the path”. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), it is immortality which a learned man aims to attain and that does not depend upon (a man’s going) from one place to another, (i.e. it does hot involve any movement), so how can there ever be any such resort to subtle elements or any such going up to the Path (in his case)? To that (we reply) — This is for those who have not had their afflictions (i.e. Avidyā) destroyed (Anupoṣya). Where a man desires to obtain only a relative immortality on the strength of the Vidyā of qualified Brahman, without having got rid of afflictions such as Nescience etc., there, in their case, the beginning Of the Path and a resort to subtle elements is possible, because, it is not reasonably sustainable, that any movement (towards Final Release) could be possible in the case of Prāṇas which have not resorted to any such subtle elements. Therefore, there is no fault (of any kind here). — 7.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tad: that, aggregate of the elements, the sum total of the subtle elements; Ā-apīteḥ: till the attainment of Brahman (through knowledge); Saṃsāra-vyapadeśāt: because (scriptures) declare the state of relative existence.🔗 That (i.e. Tejas) subsists upto the time of complete merging (Pralaya), because there is reference to transmigratory existence till that time (in the Scriptures). — 4.2.8. That the Scriptural passage “The Tejas (merges) into the transcendent deity (i.e. Brahman)” means that the Tejas of the person dying, which is the subject matter of the context here, along with the presiding entity, Prāṇa, the set of sense-organs, and other elements, merges completely into the transcendent deity, has been stated on the authority of the Scriptural chapter. Of what nature, however, can this merger (i.e. Sampatti into Brahman) be, is being considered now. With regard to this the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is, that this merging of the Tejas (i.e. of its own nature) is a total merging (into the transcendent deity), because, that it has that (i.e. the transcendent deity) as its own cause, is reasonably sustainable. It has been established, that the Highest deity (Brahman) is the material cause (Prakṛti i.e. Upādāna cause) of the entire set of entities liable to be created, and hence this attainment (by an entity) of this condition of non-separation (with its material cause), is therefore absolute and complete. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply – These subtle elements, Tejas etc., which form the substratum of all sense-organs, such as the sense-organ of hearing etc., subsist upto the time of merging i.e. upto the time of this Final Release from transmigratory existence resulting from correct i.e. perfect knowledge, because, the following Scriptural passage, viz. “Some enter into the species (Yoni) of beings which have a body, for the purpose of acquiring such a body, and others acquire existence as inanimate things, according to what their actions are, and what they know” (KathU.2.2.7), indicates such transmigratory existence (in the case of the ignorant), because otherwise, every one would attain absolute Brahman by the mere extinction of all limiting adjuncts, just at the moment of death. In that case both the Śāstra which gives injunctions, as also the Śāstra of correct i.e. perfect knowledge, would be rendered meaningless. Bondage, of which false-knowledge is the cause, does not deserve to be dissolved, except through correct i.e. perfect knowledge. Therefore, even though it (i.e. Brahman) is the cause (of all the subtle elements) this merging into Sat (i.e. supreme being) is — as in the case of deep sleep and the great absorption (Pralaya) — only in such a way that they (i.e. the Jīva-Self, Prāṇa, the set of sense-organs and the subtle elements) still continue to exist in a seed form. — 8.
[Go top]
Sūkṣmam: subtle; Pramāṇataḥ: as regards size; Ca: and; Tathā: thus, so; Upalabdheḥ: because it is experienced, it being observed.🔗 (This Tejas) is subtle in its nature and in its size, because it is seen to be so. — 4.2.9. This Tejas (of a person) which, along with the other subtle elements, is resorted to by the Jīva-Self as it goes out of the body, deserves to be subtle by itself (in its own nature and size). Its subtle nature is also understood from the Scriptural declaration about its passage through the Nāḍīs etc., and its rarefied fineness (Tanutva) makes its movement reasonably sustainable, and its freedom from obstruction is made reasonably sustainable by reason of its pristine purity, and hence it is, precisely, that it is not perceived by persons round about (a person dying) as it goes out of the body. — 9.
[Go top]
Na: not; Upamardena: by the destruction; Ataḥ: therefore, because of this reason.🔗 Hence it is that (the subtle body is not destroyed) on the destruction of the gross body. — 4.2.10. Hence it is that when the gross body is destroyed during cremation etc., this subtle body is not so destroyed. — 10.
[Go top]
Asya: of the subtle body; Eva: verily, certainly, alone; Ca: and, also; Upapatteḥ: it being possible, because of possibility; Eṣaḥ: this; Uṣmā: (bodily) heat.🔗 This warmth is of this (i.e. the subtle body), because, that it is so, is reasonably sustainable. — 4.2.11. It is precisely the warmth of this subtle body, which is experienced (by people) on touching the body, for when the body is in the defunct condition, even when the body still subsists and the attributes of the body, such as form etc., are still present, no warmth is perceivable, while it is so perceivable only when the body is in a living condition, and hence it is that it is reasonably sustainable that this warmth has its resort elsewhere than in this well-known body as such. Of a similar import is the Scriptural passage “He is warm while he is living and cold when he is dead”. — 11.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Pratiṣedhāt: on account of the denial; Iti: so; Cet: if (if it be argued); Na: not so, you cannot say so; Śārīrāt: from the individual soul.🔗 If it be said that because of the denial (by the Scriptures), (the Prāṇas i.e. sense-organs of him who has realized Brahman) do not go out of the body, (we, the Vedāntins say) — No, because the denial is meant to imply that they i.e. the Prāṇas do not leave the Jīva-Self. — 4.2.12. (The Vedāntin says) — By the qualification made by the Scriptural passage “Immortality without having destroyed the afflictions (such as Avidyā)” it is understood that in the case of absolute immortality there is absence of any movement and going out (of the Jīva-Self), still (the Sūtra-kāra) by raising a doubt that this ‘going out’ may still be there on account of some reason or other, ultimately denies it all the same by the Scriptural passage “Now about one who does not desire (Akāmayamānaḥ), who therefore is without desire (Akāma), who is free from (any) desire (Niṣkāma), when (his) desires have all been fulfilled (Āpta-kāma), he whose desire is all contained in the Self (Ātma-kāma), and who being Brahman himself, merges into Brahman” (BrhU.4.4.6). Hence, this denial, thus, having reference to the subject of the knowledge of the Highest Brahman, when it is said (by the Vedāntin) that in the case of those who have realized Brahman, his Prāṇas do not go out of the body, (the opponent of Vedānta says) — No, this denial about the going out of the Prāṇas has reference to the going out of the Prāṇas from the embodied Jīva-Self and not from the body. How is it understood (asks the Vedāntin)? Because in the Scriptural passage of the followers of another branch (of the Vedas), thus — “Prāṇas do not go away from him (Tasmāt)”, the ablative case (Tasmāt i.e. from him) is used, (and not the genitive, Tasya i.e. of him). The genitive case which refers only to a general relation is thus restricted in its ordinary application in a general way, and is made to govern a special relation by the ablative case used in the other branch of the Scriptures. The words “from him” are made to govern the Jīva-Self, which alone is competent as regards secular prosperity and Highest Bliss and which is the chief subject (of the chapter) and not the body. Therefore, the meaning is that the Prāṇas do not go away from the Jīva-Self as it leaves the body, but continue to be with it. — 12.
[Go top]
Thus, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) being, that the going away of the Jīva-Self from the body is along with the Prāṇas (i.e. sense-organs), the Sūtra-kāra refutes it, thus: —Spaṣṭaḥ: clear; Hi: for; Ekeṣām: of some Śākhās or schools; the statement of some Śrutis.🔗 (It is not as you say) because, in the case of the followers of one branch, there is a clear denial of the going out of the body (by the Jīva-Self). — 4.2.13. The statement (by the opponent of Vedānta), that there is such going out of the body of the Prāṇas (i.e. sense-organs), even in the case of one who knows the transcendent Brahman, because, the denial of such going out, thus — “from him the Prāṇas do not go out”, is with reference to the going out (Apādāna) of the Prāṇas from the embodied Jīva-Self, is not correct, because in the case of some reciters of the Scriptures, that the denial of such going out (Apādāna), is with reference to a body from which such going out takes place, is definitely observed. Even so, in the question (posed) by Ārta-bhāga, viz., “Whether, when such person dies, the Prāṇas go away from him, or they do not?” (BrhU.3.2.11), the view being taken, that there is no such going out, thus — “No, said Yājña-valkya” (BrhU.3.2.11), and when a doubt (under such circumstances) is (expressed), that inasmuch as the Prāṇas (of such a man) do not depart, he does not therefore in fact die, the Scriptures, having declared the dissolution of the Prāṇas by stating, “The Prāṇas get absorbed even here, (i.e. in the body)”, in order to establish that statement, mention the bloating and swelling of him (i.e. Jīva-Self) who is the relevant subject here, and who is thus referred to as ‘He’ in the Scriptural statement — “He becomes bloated, he swells and lies down dead, thus bloated” (BrhU.3.2.11). Now this can only happen to the body and never to the Jīva-Self. And in common with that, (in the Scriptural statement) “From him the Prāṇas do not depart but are dissolved even there (in the body)”, the denial is, thus, of the going out from the body, from which such going out takes place, the body and the Jīva-Self being metaphorically considered to be one and the same and non-different. Even though the Jīva-Self is to be explained as being the chief entity, in the case of those, in whose branch the Scriptures recite the ablative case, even in that case it should be explained that the denial is of the going out of the body, because of such metaphorical treatment of non-difference between the body and the Jīva-Self. In the case of those in whose Scriptural recital, the genitive case is used, the denial about the going out, which has reference to a man who has attained knowledge (of Brahman), is the denial of the going out from the body, inasmuch as the Scriptures here purport to deny the going out which is well-known, and as it is the going out from the body and not the going out from the Jīva-Self, that is well-known, the denial, therefore, is of the going out from the body. Besides having described this going out, and reverting into transmigratory existence, of those who are ignorant (of Brahman), in detail, by the Scriptural passage “That (this Jīva-Self) goes out by way of the eye or the head or by way of some other region of the body, and as it goes out, the Prāṇa follows in its wake, and as the Prāṇa goes out all the other Prāṇas (i.e. subtle sense-organs) follow suit” (BrhU.4.4.2), and having thus concluded this statement about those who are ignorant (of Brahman) by the passage “This is about one who still has desires (Iti nu Kāmayamānaḥ)” (BrhU.4.4.6) etc., and having thereafter indicated those who have realized Brahman, by the passage “Now about those who have no desires (Atha Akāmayamānaḥ)” (BrhU.4.4.6), if the Scriptures were to make one understand this going out, to be of one who has realized Brahman, then such indication by the Scriptures would necessarily be meaningless. Therefore, in order that such indication may have meaning, this movement and going away from the body arrived at in the case of those who are ignorant (of Brahman), should be explained as having been denied (by the Scriptures) in the case of those who have realized Brahman. In the case of one, who has realized Brahman, and to whom his Self is but the all-pervading Brahman itself, and whose desires and actions have come to an end, any such movement or going out (of the body) would not be reasonably sustainable, because of the absence of any proper cause for it. Besides Scriptural passages such as “Here (in this very body) he attains Brahma-hood” also indicate the absence of any such movement or going out (on the part of one who has realized Brahman). — 13.
[Go top]
Smaryate: the Smṛti says, it is mentioned in the Smṛtis; Ca: and.🔗 Smṛti also (has said similarly). — 4.2.14. Besides, the Mahā-bhārata also has mentioned that there is absence of any movement or going out (of the body), (in the case of one who has realized Brahman), thus — “In their search of the path of a man to whom all beings have but become his Self and who has understood all beings correctly by intuition (as being of the nature of the Ātmā) and who has no path (such as the Deva-yāna or Pitṛ-yāṇa) to traverse, even the Gods get perplexed”. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the Smṛti does speak of such movement even in the case of one who has realized himself to be the all-pervading Brahman, thus — “Śuka the son of Vyāsa, who with a desire for Final Release set forth towards the sphere of the Sun, when called by his father following him, responded with the words — ‘Yes, father?’”. (We reply) — No, it should be understood here, that he (i.e. Śuka) after first having reached a particular region physically by means of the powers of Yoga, thereafter discarded his body, because, the Smṛti has stated that he was seen by all beings and all those beings could not have actually seen him going, were he to go in a disembodied condition. The legend is then wound up with the remark — “Śuka, traversing the stellar region at a speed faster than that of the wind, and having thus displayed his prowess, entered into all beings”. Therefore, in the case of one who has realized Brahman, there is absence of any movement and going out (of the body). We shall explain the subject of those Scriptural passages which speak of movement, later (in Bra. Su. IV. iii. 7). — 14.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tāni: those; Pare: in the Supreme Brahman; Tathā: thus, so; Hi: because; Āha: (the Śruti) says.🔗 Those Prāṇas (i.e. sense-organs) get absorbed in the transcendent Brahman, because, the Scriptures have said so. — 4.2.15. Now, the sense-organs of the person who has realized Brahman, which are described by the term “Prāṇa”, and the subtle elements, get absorbed into the Highest Self. Whence is it so? Because the Scriptures say so, thus — “Even so, in the case of a man who is a seer his sixteen component parts (Kalās) dependent on the Puruṣa, as they approach and reach the Puruṣa merge into Him” (Prashna 6.5). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) another Scriptural passage with respect to a person who has realized Brahman, has spoken about the merger of these component parts, elsewhere than into the Highest Brahman, thus — “Gone are the fifteen parts into the earth etc. which are their cause i.e. substratum (Pratiṣṭhā)” (MunU.3.2.7). (We reply) — No, that passage is only with reference to the point of view of the phenomenal mundane existence, i.e. that such parts as are the effects of the earth etc., merge into the earth etc. which is their material cause, while the former passage is with respect to a person who has realized Brahman, viz. that this entire set of the component parts of a person who has realized Brahman, attains the Brahmic condition (i.e. merges into Brahman). Therefore it is all flawless. — 15.
[Go top]
[Go top]
A-vibhagaḥ: non-distinction; Vacanāt: on account of the statement (of the scriptures).🔗 (This absorption of the component parts into the Highest Brahman is a total merger, so that there is non-separateness (Avibhāga) (between them and Brahman) on the strength of Scriptural declarations. — 4.2.16. Now, is this absorption of the component parts (Kalā-pralaya), in the case of those who have realized Brahman, incomplete (Sāvaśeṣa) as in the case of the others (i.e. the ignorant) or is it absolute and total (Nir-avaśeṣa)? With regard to that (the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta being) that inasmuch as the merger is general i.e. common in its nature, a residue of the potential powers (Śakty-avaśeṣa) continues to subsist, (the Sūtra-kāra) says — The merger is necessarily total i.e. a condition of non-separateness is attained. Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statement. Because the Scriptures, after mentioning the merger of the component parts, declare — “Their names and forms (which constitute their power) are obliterated and it is said that he is the Puruṣa alone and he thus becomes one who is without any component parts, and immortal” (PrasU.6.5). The component parts being but the product of Nescience, that any such merger, having knowledge as its cause, could be incomplete (i.e. retaining a residue), is not reasonably sustainable, and hence there is non-separateness i.e. the merger is necessarily total. — 16.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Tad-okas-agra-jvalanam: the illumining of the top of its (soul’s) abode (the heart); Tat-prakāśita-dvāraḥ: with the passage illumined by this light; Vidyā-sāmarthyāt: by the power of his knowledge; Tat-śeṣa-gati-anusmṛti-yogāt: because of the application of meditation to the way which is part of that knowledge; Ca: and; Hārda-anugṛhītaḥ: being favoured by Him who dwells in the heart; Śata-adhikayā: by one that exceeds a hundred. (Tat: of that; Okas: abode, the heart; Agra-jvalanam: the forepart or the end of the heart being illumined; Tat: by the Lord dwelling in the heart; Prākaśita: illumined; Dvāraḥ: door, the root from which the hundred and first Anusmṛti-yogāt: because of the application of the remembrance or constant thought; Hārda: the Lord who dwells in the heart; Anugṛhītaḥ: being favoured by.)🔗 (Even though in the case of both i.e. in the case of the ignorant and in the case of one who has realized qualified Brahman), the apex of the nest of the Self (i.e. Hṛdaya) becomes (equally) floodlit and thereby the way-out of the Ātmā also is (equally) floodlit, still, as a result of the power of Vidyā, and on account of meditation on the subordinate part of Vidyā, being prescribed (by the Scriptures), (it is understood that the Self of one who has realized unqualified Brahman issues forth from the head). Therefore, it is established that blessed by the Grace of Him who belongs to the Hṛdaya (i.e. Brahman), the Self of him who has realized qualified Brahman issues forth by way of the hundred and first Nāḍī of the head (viz. Suṣumnā). — 4.2.17. The incidental discussion with regard to the Vidyā of the transcendent one (i.e. Nir-guṇa i.e. unqualified Brahman) is now finished. The Sūtra-kāra now reverts to the discussion about the lower kind of Vidyā. It has been stated that the going out, of one who has realized qualified Brahman and of one who is ignorant, is similar (in the case of both). Upto the beginning of the path. And the Sūtra-kāra now indicates the entering on that path. The nest or abode of the cognitional Jīva-Self which is desirous of going out, and which has absorbed into itself the powers (Tejo-mātras) of this group of (sense-organs such as) speech etc., is the Hṛdaya, on the authority of the Scriptural passage — “Receiving into itself the powers of the sense-organs, it proceeds towards the Hṛdaya”. And the Scriptures speak about the going out (of the Self) to be from the abode of the sight etc., after the apex of the Hṛdaya is flood-lit, thus — “The apex of the Hṛdaya of the man becomes flood-lit and his Self goes out by means of this light either by way of the eye or the head or by way of any other region of the body” (BrhU.4.4.2). Now when the question is whether this going out is the same in the case of both, viz. the one who has realized qualified Brahman and the one who is ignorant, the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), being, that it is the same, because the Scriptural statement (about it) is the same, the Sūtra-kāra says — Even though the flood-lit condition of the apex of the Hṛdaya and the flood-lighting of the way-out is common both to the ignorant and to one who has realized qualified Brahman, the Self of him who has realized qualified Brahman, alone, goes out by way of the head, and of the others by other regions (of the body). Whence is it so? Because of the power of the Vidyā. If, even the Self of one who has realized qualified Brahman, were, like the Self of the ignorant, to go out by any part i.e. by way of some one part of the body or another, (and not by way of the head), then he would not attain the best world (Loka) and such Vidyā would then be rendered useless. By reason of the circumstance, that meditation on the path subordinate to those Vidyās is prescribed, it is meant, that inasmuch as in these several different Vidyās, the path subordinate to those Vidyās and connected with the Nāḍī of the head, have been prescribed, it is logical to understand that the Self of him who meditates on that path should tend to go out by that way viz. by that Nāḍī (of the head). Therefore, the wise one, to whom the grace of Brahman, which has the Hṛdaya as its abode, has been vouchsafed, and on whom he has meditated well and has thus attained its (Brahman’s) condition, goes out by way of the hundred and first Nāḍī which is the one over and above the other hundred Nāḍīs, and the others (i.e. the ignorant) go out by way of the other hundred Nāḍīs. For even so, the Scriptures declare with reference to the Vidyā of the Hṛdaya thus — “There are a hundred and one Nāḍīs of the Hṛdaya, one of which courses up into the head. One who goes up by way of that, attains immortality. All other Nāḍīs are for the ordinary going out” (ChanU.8.6.6). — 17.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Raśmi: the rays; Anusārī: following.🔗 (Both i.e. the Self of the ignorant as well as the Self of one who has realized Brahman, ascend by) following the way of the ray (of the Sun). — 4.2.18. Mention is made by the Scriptures, of the Vidyā of the Hṛdaya (also called Dahara-Vidyā), beginning with “That small lotus-like mansion which is (situated) in Brahma-pura (the city of Brahman, i.e. the body)” (ChanU.8.8.1). In the chapter (Prakriyā) about the Vidyā, the Scriptures, after first mentioning the relation between the Nāḍī and the ray (of the Sun) in detail, thus — “Now these Nāḍīs of the Hṛdaya”, further mention, thus — “Now then, when this i.e. the Self issues forth from the body, it ascends, by following the way of the ray (of the Sun) only” (ChanU.8.6.5). And again, thus — “And ascending thus by following the ray, the Self attains immortality” (ChanU.8.6.6). Therefore, it is understood that issuing forth by way of the hundred and first Nāḍī, the Self goes out following the way of the ray (of the Sun). And when the doubt arises, as to whether the person dying (i.e. his Self) ascends by following the ray (of the Sun) irrespective of whether such person dies during the day or the night, it is declared (by the Sūtra-kāra) that inasmuch as the Scriptural statement is general, the Self (whether death occurs by day or by night) without any distinction, ascends by following the way of the ray (of the Sun). — 18.
[Go top]
Niśi: at night, in the night; Na: not; Iti: so; Cet: if (if it be objected); Na: not (the objection is not valid); Sambandhasya: of the relation; Yavad-deha-bhāvitvāt: as long as the body lasts; Darśayati: the Śruti shows or declares (this); Ca: and, also. (Yāvad: as long as; Bhāvitvāt: because of the existence.)🔗 (If it be said that the Self of those who die) during the night, does not go by following the way of the ray (of the Sun), we reply No, because the connection of the Nāḍī with the ray (of the Sun) subsists as long as the body (subsists). The Scriptures also indicate that. — 4.2.19. If the opponent were to say that inasmuch as the connection between the Nāḍī and the ray (of the Sun) exists during the day, the ascent of the Self of one who dies during the day, by following the way of the ray (of the Sun), may be possible, but it could not be so, in the case of one who dies during the night, because (then) the connection between the Nāḍī and the ray (of the Sun) is destroyed, (we reply) — No, because the connection between the Nāḍī and the ray subsists as long as the body subsists. The connection between the Śirā (i.e. Nāḍī) and the ray subsists as long as the body subsists. The same is indicated by the Scriptures, thus — “The rays spread out from the Sun and enter the Nāḍīs and again spreading out from the Nāḍīs they enter the Sun” (ChanU.8.6.2). During summer the existence of the rays is perceived even during nights, because, heat etc., the effects of the rays, are perceived. Just as during the cloudy days of the winter (Śiśira) season the rays are few, they are not perceivable, even so they are not perceivable during the nights of other seasons or on cloudy days. The Scriptural statement “The sun makes a day (of it) even during the night” indicates the same thing. Were a person dying during the night, to ascend without following the way of the ray (of the Sun), the Scriptural statement about its i.e. the Self’s following by way of the ray (of the Sun) would be contradicted, nor has it been particularly taught (by the Scriptures) that he who dies during the day, ascends, by following the way of the ray, while he who dies during the night (also ascends) in spite of the absence of rays. Now, if a person who has realized Brahman, were not to ascend, merely because of the offence of dying during the night, (then in that case) the fruit of the Vidyā would thus be uncertain (i.e. it would be available in some cases and not in others) and inasmuch as there is no rule about the time of death, no one would be attracted towards the Vidyā. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — May be, that one who dies during the night may await the advent of the day; but (we reply) — even if he were to await the advent of the day, may be, on account of the contact with the fire (during cremation) the body may not be in a condition fit for such contact with the ray (of the Sun). Besides the Scriptures indicate, how, there is no such awaiting (the advent of the day), thus — “As soon as his mind is thrown off (at the time of death) he reaches the Sun” (ChanU.8.6.5). Therefore, this ascent of the Self, by following the way of the ray (of the Sun) is uniform both during the day as well as during the night.) — 19.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Ataḥ: for this very reason, therefore, for the same reason; Ca: and; Ayane: during the sun’s course; Api: also, even; Dakṣiṇe: in the southern.🔗 And hence also (the Self of a man follows the way of the ray of the Sun) even during Dakṣiṇāyana (Southern journey of the Sun). — 4.2.20. And it is precisely because this awaiting (the advent of the Sun) by the Self, is not reasonably substainable, and also because of the fruit of the Vidyā being uncertain (in such case), and also because of there being no regulation of the time of death (of a person), that, when a man who has realized Brahman dies even during the Southern journey (of the Sun) he does by all means obtain the fruit of the Vidyā. This Sūtra removes the doubt that the Scriptures mean that one should await the Northern journey (of the Sun), as death during the Northern journey (of the Sun) is commendable, because, Bhīṣma’s awaiting the advent of the Northern journey (of the Sun) is also observed, and because of the Scriptural statement — “From the bright half of the month (they go) to the six months of the Sun’s Northern journey” (ChanU.4.15.5). This well-known thing (about the propriety of death during the Northern journey of the Sun) is with reference to those who are ignorant (of Brahman). Bhīṣma’s patient waiting, was for the purpose of observing appropriate conduct, and for demonstrating the gift obtained by him as a favour from his father, of being able to time his death at will (Sva-cchanda-mṛtyutā). The meaning of the Scriptural statement (referred to above) would be stated later on by the Sūtra “They (i.e. fire etc.) are the guides (of the person dying) because there is indicatory mark of that” (Bra. Su. IV. iii. 4). — 20.
[Go top]
The opponent of Vedānta says: — The Smṛti, beginning thus — “Oh the best amongst the Bhāratas, I shall now tell you the time, dying at which time, the Yogins return and do not return respectively (to this mundane phenomenal existence)” (BhG.8.23), has, specially with reference to time, determined the day etc. as the particular time, when those who die at that time do not return (to this mundane existence). How is it then said that those who die during the night or during Dakṣiṇāyana, also do not return? To this it is said –Yoginaḥ prati: with respect to the Yogi; Ca: and; Smaryate: the Smṛti declares; Smārte: belonging to the class of Smṛtis; Ca: and; Ete: these two.🔗 The Smṛtis prescribe a particular time etc. with regard to Yogins only. Sāṅkhya and Yoga are mentioned in the Smṛtis. — 4.2.21. This fixing of the proper time for dying etc. such as dying during day etc. in order that there should be no return (to transmigratory existence) are prescribed for the Yogins. Sāṅkhya and Yoga are mentioned in the Smṛtis and not in the Scriptures. Hence, as the subjects are different, and have a special kind of authority (in their own systems), the time (of death) fixed in those Smṛtis has no application in a Scriptural Vidyā. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), the Path of the Gods and the Path of the Manes (Deva-yāna and Pitṛ-yāṇa) such as — “Fire, light, the bright half of a month, and the six months of the Northern journey of the Sun” and “Smoke, night, the dark half of the month, and the six months of the Southern journey of the Sun”, known from the Scriptures, are known from the Smṛtis also. The reply is: It is by assuming a doubt about a contradiction supposed to occur by the mention of time by the Smṛti, thus — “I shall speak of the time”, that the refutation stated above is made. But no such contradiction would occur, if, even in the case of Smṛtis, deities such as fire etc. are understood to be the guides (of the person dying). — 21.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
That the going out (of the Jīva-Self, out of the body) upto the beginning of the path is common (to the ignorant as well as to one who has acquired the knowledge of Brahman) has been stated, so far. Other Scriptural passages have mentioned the path in various ways. One (path) is with reference to the connection between the Nāḍī and the ray (of the Sun), thus — “Now he ascends by means of the rays” (ChanU.8.6.5). Another with reference to Arci (light) etc., is thus — “They reach the Arci (light) and thence the day” (BrhU.6.2.15). Another one thus — “Having reached the Deva-yāna path, he thence reaches the world of Agni” (Kaush. 1.3). Still another one, thus — “Verily, when the Puruṣa departs from this world, he reaches Vāyu” (BrhU.5.10.1). Yet still another one, thus — “Divested of all contamination with sin, they proceed through the Sun-gate” (MunU.1.2.11). Now, with regard to these, a doubt arises, as to whether these' paths are all mutually different, or whether they all together form but one and the same path, particularized by different stages (for resting on the way). The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that these paths are all different from each other because the chapters (relating to these paths) are different and they are subordinate parts of different types of meditations. Besides, the final determination (Avadhāraṇa) — “Now just by these rays only” (ChanU.8.6.5) — would be contradicted, if the paths of light (Arci) etc. have also to be considered necessary, and the Scriptural statement about ‘speed’, viz., “As soon as his mind is thrown off (at the time of death), he reaches the Sun” (ChanU.8.6.5), also would be similarly contradicted. Therefore, the paths are of course mutually different. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply —Arcir-ādinā: by the path of the rays, etc., by the rays of light and so on, on the path connected with deities, beginning with that of light; Tat-prathiteḥ: that being well-known (from the Śruti).🔗 (One desirous of Final Release) goes along the path of light (Arci) etc. because that path is well-known. — 4.3.1. “Along the path of Arci (light) etc.”. We understand that all those who desire to attain Brahman, go only along the path of Arci (light) etc. Whence is it so? Because of its being so well-known. This path is well-known to all who have acquired knowledge (of Brahman). Even so in the Vidyā (Lore) of the Five Fires the Scriptures speak of the path of the Arci (light) even for those who study other Vidyās, thus — “Those also who meditate on the Truth by faith, in the forest” (BrhU.6.2.15). (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — It may well be this way. In the case of those Vidyās, wherein no path is mentioned, the path of the Arci (light) may be accepted, but where another path is specifically mentioned, why should there be the acceptance of the path of Arci (light)? To this, it is replied — This would be so, if these several paths were to be essentially different from each other. We maintain, however, that the Path is but the one and only one path leading up towards Brahma-Loka, which is marked by different characteristics of stages in different places, and as everywhere the same one path is clearly understood, that these different characteristics of stages only serve to indicate the relation of adjectives to the substantive (viz. the path of Arci), is reasonably sustainable. Even though the chapters are different, inasmuch as the Vidyā is identical, the paths having different characteristics of stages are to be combined into one single path, just as different attributes (Guṇas) are to be combined (in the case of different Vidyās i.e. Cognitions). Now, even though the Vidyās are different, inasmuch as the path (in each) is distinctly recognizable as being one and the same, and as the destination (in all cases) also is identical, there is no difference in the paths. For, in the Scriptural statements — “They have their sojourn in the Brahma-Loka for a period coextensive with the life-span of Brahman” (BrhU.6.2.15), and “He has his sojourn there (i.e. in Brahma-Loka) for eternal years” (BrhU.5.10.1), “He wins the same victory and attains the same comprehensive greatness, characteristic of Brahman” (Kaush. 1.4), “That those who through their vow of celibacy (meditate on Brahman) and attain the Brahma-Loka” (ChanU.8.4.3), the same one uniform nature of the result, viz. the acquisition of Brahma-Loka, is indicated everywhere. With regard to the argument (of the opponent of Vedānta) that the specific determination “By these very (rays) etc.” would not be available, if the path of Arci (light) etc. were to be accepted (as the path in all cases), (our reply is) — This is no fault, because this (statement) also has the purport of including the ray as one of the stages (to which the Self goes in its journey). The same one word “only” cannot at once establish the rays as a stage, as well as reject the path of Arci (light) etc. So it should be understood that it makes only the (Self’s) relation to the rays understood. The statement about ‘speed’ is not obstructed in its application, even in the case of the path of Arci (light) etc. also, as it merely indicates comparative swiftness, so far as having to reach another place is concerned, just as in (the sentence) — “I would be returning here in a moment”. Besides, the Scriptural statement “By neither of those two paths” (ChanU.5.10.8), which speaks of the miserable third path of those who have missed the other two paths (i.e. Deva-yāna and Pitṛ-yāṇa), also establishes the Deva-yāna path having Arci (light) etc. as its various stages as the only other path, as distinguished from the path of the manes (Pitṛ-yāṇa). Only, there are many stages in the path of the Arci (light) etc., and few in the other paths and it is logical to understand the fewer stages as included in the greater number (of stages), and that also is why the Sūtra-kāra has stated the Sūtra as above. — 1.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Vāyum: the deity of the air; Abdāt: from the deity of the year; A-viśeṣa-viśeṣābhyām: because of non-specification and specification, because it is stated in general in one Śruti and in detail in another.🔗 (That the Self in its journey goes) from the Saṃvatsara to Vāyu (is understood) from the non-specific and specific (statements). — 4.3.2. The Ācārya now, in the capacity of a friend, determines (for the pupil) the specific order of the arrangement of the particular stages in the path, which mutually have a relation of adjectives to the substantive (viz. the path of Arci). As regards the followers of the Kauṣītaki branch of the Scriptures, the Deva-yāna path is recited by them, thus — “He having reached the Deva-yāna path, thereafter (by that path) reaches the world of Agni, and then the world of Vāyu, thereafter the world of Varuṇa, and from there the worlds of Indra, Prajā-pati and Brahman” (Kaush. 1.3). Now, the words ‘Arci’ (in BrhU.6.2.15) and Agni-Loka (above) both express the same meaning as both of them mean the flaming fire (Jvalana) and hence it is unnecessary to look for any specific order of arrangement, in their case. Scriptures however have not mentioned the exact position of Vāyu in the path of Arci etc. and hence it has of course to be determined. We say that, in the Scriptural statement “They reach the Arci, from there the day, thereafter the bright half of the month, and from there the six months during which the Sun journeys towards the North, from thence to the Saṃvatsara and from the Saṃvatsara to the Āditya” (ChanU.5.10.1, 2), it has to be understood, that they accommodate Vāyu after the Saṃvatsara and before the Āditya. Whence is it so? Because of the non-specification and the specification. For, Vāyu, which is mentioned non-specifically (i.e. without reference to its particular position in the order) in the Scriptural passage “He (reaches) the world of Vāyu” (Kaush. 1.3), is seen to be specifically so mentioned in another Scriptural passage — “Verily when a person departs from this world, he reaches the world of Vāyu, where Vāyu affords him an exit, like the hole in a wheel, by which he ascends and reaches the Āditya” (BrhU.5.10.1). Now, as the coming of Vāyu earlier in the order than the Āditya, is a specific statement, Vāyu’s position has to be fixed in-between the Saṃvatsara and the Āditya. Why (again says the opponent of Vedānta), should not the position of Vāyu be fixed after Arci, because of the specific mention about Vāyu coming later on than Agni? We reply, that here there is no specific mention at all. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) there is the Scriptural statement — “Having arrived at the Deva-yāna path, he then reaches the world of Agni, the world of Vāyu, the world of Varuṇa” (Kaush. 1.3). We reply — Here the statements are merely made, one after another, but there is no word indicative of any specific order (as between them). Only an indication is made here of the objects reached, viz. that the Jīva-Self reaches these particular objects, but in the other passages a specific order is understood, viz. that the Self, ascending by way of the chariot wheel, arrives at the Āditya. Therefore, it is but very properly stated (by the Sūtra-kāra) in the Sūtra — “From the non-specific and specific (statements)”. As regards the Vāja-saneyins, they recite thus — “From the months (the Self) reaches the world of the Gods and from there the world of Āditya” (BrhU.6.2.15). There, so as to secure Āditya being reached after (Vāyu) it should be understood that the Self reaches Vāyu from the world of the Gods. The Sūtra-kāra has stated “From the Saṃvatsara (he) reaches the Āditya” with reference to the Chāndogya statement. As between the Chāndogya and the Vāja-saneyaka, the world of the Gods is not mentioned in one statement and the Saṃvatsara is not mentioned in the other. Both, however, being equally authoritative, both the world of the Gods and the Saṃvatsara have to be included in both. Besides, it should be properly discriminated here that the Saṃvatsara being (as an extension of the month) connected with the month, it comes first and the world of the Gods comes afterwards. — 2.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Taḍitaḥ adhi: after the deity of lightning; Varuṇaḥ: (comes) Varuṇaḥ (rain god); Sambandhāt: on account of connection.🔗 (In the order of the stages of the path) next after Lightning comes Varuṇa because of the relation (between them). — 4.3.3. There is the Scriptural passage — “From the Sun (the Self goes) to the Moon and from the Moon to the Lightning” (ChanU.4.15.5). Now after the Lightning, Varuṇa ought to be connected, because of the (Kauṣītaki) Scriptural statement — “He reaches the world of Varuṇa”, Lightning and Varuṇa of course have a mutual relation. Whenever large lightnings dance about within the bowels of the clouds, with sharp cracking noise, rain pours down. A Brāhmaṇa passage also says — “There is Lightning, it is making noise, and then, may be, it will rain” (ChanU.7.11.1). It is well-known from the Scriptures and Smṛtis, that Varuṇa is the Lord of Waters. After Varuṇa, Indra and Prajā-pati should be successively placed in the order, both because (in Kauṣītaki) the Scriptures recite that way and there is no other position (where they could possibly be placed). They should be relegated towards the end, after Varuṇa etc., inasmuch as, they are casually mentioned, and have no recognized position in the path, which begins with Arci and ends with Lightning. — 3.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Ātivāhikāḥ: conductors, deities conducting the departed soul; Tad-liṅgāt: on account of indicatory marks to that effect.🔗 (These stages of the path are) guides (Ātivāhikas), because there is an indicatory mark (about it being so). — 4.3.4. With regard to the path of Arci etc., there is a doubt as to whether these entities are the signs of the path, or places where the Self experiences the fruits (of action), or whether they are conductors of those who travel (by this path). The conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) is that Arci etc. are the signs i.e. land-marks on the road, because the trend of the Scriptural instruction is of that nature. Just as in the ordinary world, when a man starts to go to a village or a town, he is given instructions, thus — “Go thou from here to that hill, thence to that Udumbara tree, thence further on to the river, and from there thou shalt reach the village or town (as the case may be)”, even so, it is stated here by the Scriptures, thus — “From the Arci to the day, from the day to the bright half of a month, etc.”. Or else, may be, they are the places for experiencing (the fruits of actions) inasmuch as the Scriptures have connected Agni etc. with the word ‘Loka’ (world), as for instance, “He reaches the world (Loka) of Agni” (Kaush. 1.3), and the word ‘Loka’ is used for a place of enjoyment, as for instance, “The world of men, the world of the manes and the world of the Gods” (BrhU.1.5.16). Even so, says the Brāhmaṇa — “They become attached to the worlds characterized by days and nights” (Śata. Bra. 10.2.6.8). Hence these stages could not possibly be the guides, precisely because they are non-sentient and their being guides is not reasonably sustainable. In the ordinary world, it is the actually living intelligent men that are appointed by the King, to guide the people travelling along a difficult path. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), we reply — They of course deserve to be the guides. Whence is it so? Because, the Scriptural passage “From the moon to the lightning. There, a Puruṣa, who is non-human (Amānuṣa), leads them (the Selfs) up to Brahman” (ChanU.4.15.5) indicates that, that these are guides is spoken of as an established thing. (If the opponent of Vedānta says) — But, the use of that statement is exhausted in that particular subject it speaks about (and does not also mean that there is any man as a guide upto the stage of Lightning): (we reply) — No, because the special qualification ‘who is non-human’ has the purpose of excluding an earlier already established idea about these guides being men. It is only, if it is understood, that Arci etc. are men that serve as guides, that this use of the expression ‘who is non-human’ would be justified in its purpose of excluding, in the case of that particular guide, the previously established fact that the guides are human beings. — 4.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) mere indicatory mark, in the absence of any logical reason to support it, is not indicative (of such sentient guides). We reply: —Ubhaya: both (the path and the traveller); Vyāmohāt: because of unconsciousness; Tat-siddheḥ: that is established.🔗 Because, by reason of both the path and the Selfs who travel by that path being without any knowledge, it is established (that the Deities Arci etc. are guides). — 4.3.5. As regards those (Selfs) who traverse the path of Light, in as much as they are not independent, because, all their sense-organs happen to be bunched up together by their having been separated from their body, and in as much as Light (Arci) etc. also are equally incapable of any independent activity, because of their being nonsentient, it is understood that these sentient Deities who preside over Light etc., are appointed (to act as guides) on this special journey. In the ordinary world also (it is seen that) people who are either drunk or have fainted, and whose sense-organs happen to be similarly bunched up together (and have become incapable of action), are led along their path by others. Again as Light etc. are not permanently available, that they can be characteristic of the path, i.e. that they can be land-marks of the path, is not reasonably sustainable, nor can one, who has departed (this life) during the night, ever reach the day, while it has already been stated, that he cannot possibly await (the advent of) the day. But if it is understood that these Arci etc. have Deities etc. as their Selfs, then such Deities having eternal existence, this fault does not occur (in their case). It is reasonably sustainable that they (the Deities) are referred to here as Light etc., because they are supposed to identify themselves with Arci etc. The statement “From the Light to the day” (ChanU.4.15.5; ChanU.5.10.1) is not inconsistent even in the case of their being such guides, because it is possible, that by means of the instrumentality of the Light, the Self reaches the day and by means of the instrumentality of the day, it reaches the bright half of the month. It is seen that such instruction is seen to be given to the guides well-known in this ordinary world also, thus — Do thou go from this place to Jaya-varmā, thence to Jaya-siṃha and from thence to Kṛṣṇa-gupta. Besides, in the introductory portion, merely a general relation is stated, in the passage “They arrive at the Light” (BrhU.6.2.15), but no special relation (of any kind). But in the concluding passage a special relation as that between a guide and a person guided is mentioned, thus — “He conducts them to Brahman”, and from that it is definitely concluded that the same special relation exists in the introductory portion also. In as much as the sense-organs of those who traverse this path are all bunched up together, there is no possibility of any such experiencing (of the fruits of actions). Now, even with respect to those who traverse this path but do not experience the fruits of actions, it is possible to use the word Loka (world), because these Lokas (i.e. worlds met with in the path) can well be the places for the experiencing (of the fruit of actions) by those who are residents of these worlds. So, it should be construed like this — One who reaches the Agni-Loka (i.e. where Agni is the Lord) is conducted by Agni and one who reaches the place where Vāyu is the Lord, is conducted by Vāyu. — 5.
[Go top]
(The opponent of Vedānta raises a doubt.) If the view that these (stages of the path) are but such living sentient guides, how can that properly apply in the case of Varuṇa etc. inasmuch as, in the arrangement (of the order of the stages) Varuṇa etc. are placed after Lightning, while, from the stage of Lightning right up to Brahma-Loka, the Scriptures speak about the conductorship of the Puruṣa who does not belong to the human species (i.e. who is a nonhuman)? Hence, to this, the Sūtra-kāra replies, thus —Vaidyutena: by the (superhuman) guide connected with lightning, by the superhuman being who takes his charge from the god of lightning; Eva: alone, only, indeed; Tataḥ: from thence; Tat-sruteh: that being known from the Śruti, as Śruti states so, because of the Vedic text.🔗 From there, the Selfs are escorted by the Puruṣa in the Lightning, because the Scriptures have said so. — 4.3.6. It should be understood that having reached (the stage of) Lightning, (the Selfs) are escorted by a non-human Puruṣa upto the world of Brahman. Because, the Scriptures make you understand that way, thus — “From that stage of Lightning, a non-human Puruṣa comes along and leads the Selfs to the world of Brahman”. As regards (deities such as) Varuṇa and others, it should be understood that they favour him, either by not obstructing him or by actually helping him on in some way. Therefore, it is but properly stated (by the Sūtra-kāra) that these Light etc., who have the deities as their Selfs, are the guides (of the Jīva-Selfs on their way). — 6.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Kāryam: the relative Brahman or Hiraṇya-garbha; Bādariḥ: the sage Bādari (holds); Asya: his; Gati-upapatteḥ: on account of the possibility of being the goal.🔗 Bādari is of opinion that the Brahman (referred to above) is the qualified Brahman, an effect (Kārya) (of the unqualified transcendent Brahman), because an approach (Gati) towards such qualified Brahman is reasonably sustainable. — 4.3.7. With regard to the Scriptural passage “He leads them up to Brahman” (ChanU.4.15.5), it is now considered, as to whether he leads the Selfs to the lower Brahman (i.e. qualified Brahman), an effect of the unqualified transcendent Brahman, or whether he leads the Selfs to the principal transcendent unqualified Brahman which does not undergo any modification. Whence is there any such doubt? Because of the employment of the word Brahman and the mention of the act of going (implying movement). With regard to that, Ācārya Bādari is of opinion, that the nonhuman Puruṣa leads the Selfs only to the qualified Brahman, an effect (of the unqualified transcendent Brahman). Whence is it so? Because, an approach (i.e. movement) as such, towards such qualified Brahman is reasonably sustainable. It is only towards qualified Brahman, an effect (of the unqualified Brahman), that any such approach (involving motion) is possible, because it has a definite local habitation (Loka in Brahma-Loka), while it cannot be imagined, that there can be any approach towards the transcendent unqualified Brahman, or that it can ever be an object of any such approach, or that any such approach (involving movement) towards it, is possible, because the transcendent unqualified Brahman is omnipresent and is the universal Self of all those who are supposed so to approach. — 7.
[Go top]
Viśeṣitatvāt: because of being specified in Śruti, on account of the qualification; Ca: and.🔗 Also, because of the specification. — 4.3.8. In another Scriptural passage — “He leads them up to the worlds of Brahman, and having attained excellence, they sojourn there for a period coextensive with the life-span of Brahman” (BrhU.6.2.15), because of the specification, it is understood that this movement of approach (by the Selfs) is only towards Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahman). Any such specification by the plural number (viz. worlds) is not possible in the case of the Highest (unqualified) Brahman, while it is possible in the case of Brahma-the-effect, because, that it can have differences of conditions, is reasonably sustainable. Besides, the use of the word Lokas (worlds) by the Scriptures in its direct sense is appropriate in the case of such places as are comprised in the effects (of Brahman) and which have a specific design, and wherein fruits of actions are experienced. In other cases its use is in the metaphorical sense, as for ' instance, in the Scriptural passage (in which Yājña-valkya says to Janaka) — “Oh king, Brahman alone is this world” (BrhU.4.4.23). Besides, the Scriptural statement about one entity being a support (Ādhāra), and another entity as something which rests on such support (Ādheya), cannot be appropriate in the case of the Highest (transcendent) Brahman. Therefore, this movement of approach is of course towards Brahma-the-effect. — 8.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the use of the word Brahman is not reasonably sustainable even in the case of Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahman), because it has been established in the Samanvaya Adhyāya (i.e. Bra. Su. Adhyāya I), that Brahman is the cause of the creation etc. of this entire world. With regard to that, it is said: —Sāmīpyāt: because of the nearness or proximity; Tu: but; Tad: that; Vyapadeśaḥ: designation.🔗 The reference to it i.e. Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahman), as Brahman, however (Tu), is because of the nearness. — 4.3.9. The word ‘however’ (Tu) has the purpose of refuting the above objection. The use of the word Brahman for the lower qualified Brahman is not contradictory, by reason of its nearness to the Highest (transcendent) Brahman, because it is firmly established, that, in fact it is but the Highest Brahman itself, which, when it is in contact with pure limiting adjuncts such as intellect etc.), is described as having the qualities of an effect, such as having the mind as its structure etc., for the purpose of meditation, and is described as the Lower qualified Brahman. — 9.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the conclusion that it is the qualified Brahman, i.e. Brahma-the-effect, to which the Selfs reach, does not fit in properly with the Scriptural declaration about the non-return (to this transmigratory existence). It is not accepted (by Scriptures), that there can ever be any eternal existence (to the Jīva-Self) elsewhere than in the Highest transcendent Brahman. (If it be said) that it is indicated by the Scriptures that those who go along the Deva-yāna path do not again return (to this transmigratory existence), thus — “Those who traverse this path do not ever return to this recurring human existence” (ChanU.4.15.6), and that they do not return again because it is also said — “One who ascends by that path attains immortality” (ChanU.8.6.6; KathU.2.3.16), we reply: —Kārya-atyaye: on the dissolution of the Brahma-loka (Kārya: of the effect, i.e., the universe, the relative Sa-guṇa Brahman); Tad: of that; Adhyakṣeṇa: with the ruler-president, i.e., Hiraṇya-garbha or the four-faced Brahmā; Saha: with; Ataḥ param: higher than that, i.e., the Supreme Brahman; Abhidhānāt: on account of the declaration of the Śruti.🔗 When there is a dissolution of the worlds of Brahma-the-effect, (the Selfs) along with the presiding deity, attain the Highest Brahman, because the Scriptures have so declared. — 4.3.10. When the dissolution of the worlds of Brahma-the-effect, is imminent, the Selfs, in whom correct i.e. perfect knowledge is generated there, attain the highest place of Viṣṇu, which is pure, and is even higher than this world of Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahman), along with its presiding entity, the Hiraṇya-garbha. This should be understood to be so from the Scriptural statements about Final Release by stages (Krama-mukti), and non-return (to this transmigratory existence) etc. It has been expounded (already) that the attainment of the Highest Brahman, as preceded by a movement of approach (Gati-pūrvikā) towards it, is properly not possible. — 10.
[Go top]
Smṛteḥ: on account of the statement of the Smṛti, as Smṛti agrees with the view, according to the Smṛti; Ca: and.🔗 On account of the Smṛti, also. — 4.3.11. The Smṛti also is in agreement with this view, thus — “When the final dissolution (of this world) along with Hiraṇya-garbha, is imminent, all these (Jīva-Selfs), purified in mind, attain the Highest Brahman, along with Brahman, the Hiraṇya-garbha.” Therefore, the conclusion is that the Scriptural statement about the movement of approach, is with respect to the Brahman, i.e. Brahma-the-effect. — 11.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of.Vedānta), by raising what primo facie doubt, is this conclusion, viz. “Bādari is of opinion that the Brahman referred to, is Brahma-the-effect” (Bra. Su. IV.iii.7) arrived at? The Sūtra-kāra now sets forth the same i.e. the prima facie doubt by the following Sūtra:Param: the Supreme (Brahman); Jaiminiḥ: the sage Jaimini (opines or holds); Mukhyatvāt: on account of that being the primary meaning (of the word ‘Brahman’).🔗 Jaimini is of opinion that he (the Puruṣa) leads them to the Highest Brahman, because, that is the principal meaning (of the word, Brahman). — 4.3.12. Ācārya Jaimini is of opinion, that the Scriptural passage “He leads them on to Brahman” (ChanU.4.15.6) means that he leads them to the Highest transcendent Brahman. Whence is it so? Because, the principal meaning of the word ‘Brahman’ is the Highest transcendent Brahman, and Brahma-the-effect is its secondary meaning, and as between the principal and the secondary meanings the principal meaning is to be preferred. — 12.
[Go top]
Darśanāt: on account of the Śruti texts; Ca: and, also.🔗 Also, because of the Scriptures. — 4.3.13. The Scriptural passage “One ascending by that path, attains immortality” (ChanU.8.6.6 and KathU.2.3.16), indicates that this immortality (referred to therein) is preceded by a movement of approach (to it). Immortality is reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest transcendent Brahman, and not in the case of Brahma-the-effect, inasmuch as every effect, as such, is liable to destruction, because of the Scriptures, which declare — “Where one sees things different (from each other) that is insignificant and mortal” (ChanU.7.24.1). It is with respect to the Highest (Brahman) that in the Kaṭha-Valli, such movement of approach is mentioned. No other Vidyā is introduced there, because by the Scriptural passage “Different from meritorious action (Dharma), different from unmeritorious action (Adharma) etc.” (KathU.1.2.14), it is the Highest transcendent Brahman that is introduced there. — 13.
[Go top]
Na: not; Ca: and; Kārye: in the Sa-guṇa Brahman; Pratipatti: realisation of Brahman; Abhisandhiḥ: desire. (Pratipatti-abhisandhiḥ: the desire to attain or realise Brahman.)🔗 This determinate belief (Abhisandhi) about the attainment (of Brahman), is not with respect to Brahma-the-effect (i.e. qualified Brahman). — 4.3.14. Besides, this determinate belief about the attainment (of Brahman), thus — “May I reach the assembly hall of the mansion of Prajā-pati” (ChanU.8.14.1), is not with respect to Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahman), because, in the (preceding) Scriptural passage — “That which makes names and form manifest, and in whom they abide, that is Brahman” (ChanU.8.14.1), the Highest Brahman, which is dissimilar to Brahma-the-effect, is understood to be the relevant subject matter. Similarly, in the Scriptural passage — “I shall be the Self (Yaśas) of the Brāhmaṇas (and of the Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas)” (ChanU.8.14.1), it is understood to be the Self of all, inasmuch as in the Scriptural passage “That, whose name is the great Self (Yaśas), has no equal” (SvetU.4.19), that Highest Brahman alone is known to bear the name ‘Yaśas’ (the Self). Because of this attainment of the mansion which is preceded by a movement of approach towards it and which is mentioned in the Vidyā of the Hṛdaya (Daharā-vidyā) thus — “That city of Brahman, called Aparā-jitā, having a golden canopy built by the Lord, Brahman (to which, the one who knows the Daharā-vidyā, goes)” (ChanU.8.5.3), and also, because the root-verb ‘Pad’ also means movement, it is concluded, that there is an expectation of some path (along which such movement can take place). Therefore, the Scriptural statements about ‘movement’ are with respect to the Highest Brahman, is the other view (Pakṣāntaram, i.e. the opponent’s view i.e. Pūrva-Pakṣa). These are the two views which have been detailed by the Ācārya in the form of Sūtras. One view (in Sūtras 7 to 11) shows movement to be reasonably sustainable, and the other view (in Sūtras 12 to 14), shows that it is the principal meaning (of the word Brahman) that is feasible. Now, here, the view that ‘movement is reasonably sustainable’, is capable of rendering the view that ‘the principal meaning (of Brahman) is feasible’ fallacious, but not vice versa. The first view therefore is explained as being the final conclusion (Siddhānta) and the latter one as being the Pūrva-Pakṣa (i.e. the view of the opponent of Vedānta). When it is not so possible (to understand the word Brahman to be used in the principal sense here) we know of no one, who can dictate to us that it should be so understood. Besides, even in the chapter relating to the Vidyā of the Highest Brahman, it is reasonably sustainable to understand that, the reference to the movement implied in another Vidyā, such as — “Very many other Nāḍīs are for the purpose of the going up (of the Jīva-Selfs)” (ChanU.8.6.6), is for the glorification of the Vidyā of the Highest Brahman. By separating the passage “May I reach the hall of the mansion of Prajā-pati” (ChanU.8.14.1) (from the passage preceding it), it would even not be contradictory (to understand) that this determinate belief (in reaching) is with reference to Brahma-the-effect. Just as the qualified Brahman is spoken of as one to whom all actions and all desires belong, it is also possible to describe it, as being the Self of all. Therefore, the Scriptural statements about ‘movement’ are with reference to Apara-Vidyā i.e. the Vidyā of qualified Brahman (Kārya-Brahman i.e. Brahma-the-effect). Some others again adhering to the usual arrangement, viz., that the earlier Sūtras here (7 to 11) represent the Pūrva-Pakṣa view (i.e. the view of the opponent of Vedānta) and the later Sūtras here (12-13) represent the final conclusion (i.e. the Siddhānta view), maintain that the Scriptural statements about ‘movement’ are with reference to the Highest Brahman. That however is not proper, because, that Brahman could ever be the object of any such ‘movement’ is not reasonably sustainable. It can never be reasonably sustainable, that the Highest Brahman, which is ascertained to be all-pervading and which is immanent in all and is the Self of all, as particularized in the Scriptural passages “All-pervading and eternal, like the Ākāśa”, and “That which is Brahman, directly and immediately” (BrhU.3.4.1), “That Self which is inside all” (BrhU.3.4.1), “All this, verily, is the Self” (ChanU.7.25.1), “Brahman verily, is all this and is the best” (MunU.2.2.11), is something, towards which this movement of approach is possible. What has already been reached cannot again be sought to be reached. As is well-known in the ordinary world, it is one thing that goes towards some other thing, (i.e. there always are two different things involved in such a case). But (says the opponent of Vedānta) — It is seen in the ordinary world that something which has already been arrived at, can still be something towards which movement is possible, having regard to its relation with specific different environment, as for instance, one who already is on this earth can be described as going to this very same earth by way of going from one part of it to another. Similarly, a child being itself (i.e. without being different), can be seen to be progressing towards its own old age, which of course pertains to its own Self, but is characterized by a different period of time. Even so, inasmuch as, Brahman equipped as it is with all kinds of power, may still be something which can somehow admit of being approached. (We reply) — No, because in the case of Brahman all special characteristics are denied. It is not possible to imagine any special relation (to subsist) as between the Highest Self and any such special circumstance as a particular environment or time etc., because of such Scriptural passages as “(Brahman is) without parts, and without activity and it is tranquil, faultless and untainted” (SvetU.6.19), “Neither gross nor subtle, nor short nor long” (BrhU.3.8.8), “He who is without and within, and is not liable to be born” (MunU.2.1.2), “The great unborn Self, ageless, deathless, immortal, fearless, Brahman” (BrhU.4.4.25), “He that can only be described (negatively) as ‘not so, not so’” (BrhU.3.9.26), and also as well by Smṛtis and reasoning, so that, on the ground of any such relation to particular environment in space or condition, it (the Highest Self) could be said to be something towards which movement is possible. As regards the earth and a person’s age, because of their having a relation to special conditions of environment of space and time respectively, the possibility of their being approached by movement towards them as being related to some specific conditions of environment and time, is reasonably sustainable. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta), that because of the Scriptural declarations, about Brahman being the material cause of the creation, preservation and dissolution of the world, it (the Highest Brahman) possesses manifold powers, (we reply) — No, because those other Scriptural statements which purport to deny any special attributes to Brahman, cannot have any other interpretation. If it be said (by the opponent of Vedānta) that the Scriptural statements about creation etc. also, cannot have any other interpretation, (we reply) — No, because they have the purpose of propounding the oneness (i.e. unity) of Brahman. The Śāstra, which by means of the simile about clay etc. purports to propound the oneness of Brahman as the only existing reality, and the unreality of everything that is an effect (as from a cause), does not deserve to have the aim of propounding creation etc. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — But, why again (should it be), that the Scriptural statements about creation etc. should be in a subordinate position to those which aim at denying differences in Brahman, and why should not the latter be in a subordinate position to the former? It is replied — Because Scriptural statements which deny any special differences (in Brahman) have the purport of not leaving any further unsatisfied curiosity (Nirākaṅkṣatvāt). On the realization of the Self as being the only one, eternal and pure entity, no further curiosity ever again arises, because of the generation of a complete conviction (in a person), that the final aim of man is thus achieved, by reason of such Scriptural passages as — “How can there be any confusion or sorrow, in the case of a person, who realizes the unity (of Brahman)” (IsU.7), “Oh Janaka, thou hast attained fearlessness” (BrhU.4.2.4), “One who knows (the bliss of Brahman) is unafraid, and is not tormented (by the doubt) as to whether he has performed a good action or whether he has performed a sinful action” (TaitU.2.9.1). Similarly, because it is also observed that those who have realized Brahman experience contentment (of mind), and because the Scriptures have also censured the notion of considering the unreal effect, as being real, thus — “He who sees things as different goes from death to death”. Hence it is not possible to consider the Scriptural statements which deny differences, to be in a subordinate position to the other Scriptural statements. Scriptural statements about creation etc. (of the world) have no such power to propound a meaning which results in allaying any further curiosity, while it is directly understood that they have a different meaning. Even so, after stating the following passage, viz., “Oh mild one, know that this sprout which has thus sprung up, cannot be without its root” (ChanU.6.8.3), the Scriptures later on indicate, how the ‘Sat’ (being) is the one and the only one root of this world, which deserves to be known, thus — “That from which these beings are created, that by which they are preserved and that in which they are ultimately absorbed, that you should desire to know. That is Brahman” (TaitU.3.1.1). In this way, inasmuch as the Scriptural statements about creation etc. have the purpose of making the oneness (unity) of the Self understood, Brahman cannot possibly have a relation with many powers. Hence, that Brahman is something which can be approached, is not reasonably sustainable. The Scriptural passages — “His Prāṇas do not depart (from the body)”, “Being himself but Brahman, he merges into Brahman” (BrhU.4.4.6) repudiate the notion of any movement towards the Highest Brahman. That has been explained in the Sūtra — “For (the denial of the departure) is clearly made (in the texts) of some (schools)” (Bra. Su. IV. ii. 13). As regards the assumption of a movement (towards Brahman), the Jīva-Self which is supposed to be the one that so approaches, can either be a part of, or an effect of, that which is to be so approached, viz. Brahman, or it may be something absolutely different from it, because if (they were to be) totally identical, movement (of the Jīva-Self) would not be reasonably sustainable. (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — Supposing it is so, so what? The reply is — If, it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is a part (of Brahman) then inasmuch as a part is always in contact with the whole, of which it is such a part, that a part such as Jīva-Self can approach Brahman cannot be reasonably sustainable. Besides inasmuch as Brahman is well-known as being devoid of any parts, the assumption that anything (such as the Jīva-Self) can be a part of it, is not reasonably sustainable. As regards the view that it (the Jīva-Self) is an effect of Brahman, also, it would be equally so, because an effect is always in contact with or present in the cause. An earthen pot cannot subsist (as such pot) if it were to divest itself (of the nature) of its having the clay as its Self, and were it to give up (the nature of having such clay as its Self), there would be the predicament of its ceasing to exist altogether. As regards both the views about the Jīva-Self being either a part of or an effect of Brahman, Brahman, of which the Jīva-Self is supposed to be such a part or effect, being itself unchanging, its entering into a condition of transmigratory existence is not feasible. If a Jīva-Self is different from Brahman, it would deserve to be, either an atom (Aṇu) or all-pervading, or of a dimension in-between these two. If all-pervading, any movement on its part would not be reasonably sustainable and if of an intermediate dimension, there would be the predicament of its being non-eternal, and if it has the dimension of an atom, perception (Vedanā) over the whole body would not be reasonably sustainable. Besides, the view about its being either an atom or of an intermediate dimension, has been fully refuted earlier (in Bra. Su. II. iii. 29). If the Jīva-Self is supposed to be different from the transcendent Self, there would be the predicament of the Śāstra “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7) being contradicted. The same fault would be common to both the views about its being a part or an effect (of Brahman). If it be said, that inasmuch as such a part or an effect (of Brahman) being non-different from Brahman of which it is such a part or an effect, there would be no such fault, (we reply) — No, because, in that case, their being the same one entity in the principal sense of the term, is not reasonably sustainable. In the case of all these views, there is the predicament of there being no Final Release (for the Jīva-Self) because of the non-effacement of the notion of its being the Self in a transmigratory condition, and if there is such effacement, there would be the predicament of its own innate nature perishing, because it is not understood (by those who hold such a view) that Brahman is the Jīva-Self’s Self. With regard to what is maintained by some people foolishly, viz., that, inasmuch as. permanently obligatory actions and actions performed on special occasions are performed (by people) so that no sin (on their part) should result, and actions meant to be performed with some special desire, or actions which are prohibited, are avoided in order that they may neither attain heaven nor hell respectively, and actions whose results are to be experienced in the present existing body, are duly exhausted by the experiencing of their fruits, therefore, (in the case of persons so circumstanced), in the absence of there being any cause for their attaining another body after the present body has fallen, they may well attain complete identification with the Supreme Spirit (Kaivalya) having the characteristic of their Selfs abiding in their own innate nature, even without their having acquired the knowledge that Brahman is their Self, (we reply) — This is not correct (Asat), because of the absence of any means-of-proof (for such a view). No Śāstra has ever propounded, that a person desirous of Final Release should behave in this particular way. It has been inferred by such people as a result of their own wishful thinking, that inasmuch as transmigratory existence results from actions, it would not so result, in the absence of such a cause. Besides, as it is extremely difficult to understand that there is in fact an absence of any such cause, it is not possible even to infer so. It is possible that each living being has amassed a store of actions having desirable and undesirable fruits, in its previous birth (Jāty-antara), and because of the impossibility of experiencing the fruits of actions having such dissimilar fruits simultaneously, some of them which get an opportunity, cause one birth, while some others stand by, and await favourable environment, time and cause, and as there is no possibility of these remaining actions being exhausted, it is not possible to determine, even in the case of a person behaving in the manner described (above), that when his present body falls, there positively is an absence of any cause for the attainment of a new body. The existence of such residuary actions, is proved by Scriptural and Smṛti passages, such as — “Those whose conduct here has been good etc.” (ChanU.5.10.7) and “Thereafter, by means of the residuary actions”. (Says the opponent of Vedānta) — It may be that permanently obligatory actions and those which have to be performed because of some special cause, may exhaust such residuary actions. (We reply) — No, because of the absence of any incompatibility between them. It is only in the presence of such incompatibility, that there is reciprocity of destroying and being destroyed between them (i.e. one action can exhaust or neutralize another action, and the other action can get itself exhausted or neutralized by the first). Good actions thus stored up in a former birth are however not antagonistic to the permanently obligatory actions or actions performed because of some special cause, because ‘purity of such actions’ is a factor common to both (these sets of actions). Sinful actions, inasmuch as they are of an impure nature, when they thus are incompatible may well exhaust actions, but even so, they won’t be able to bring about the absence of a cause for the attainment of another body, because, that subsisting good actions do furnish such a cause, is reasonably sustainable. Also because it is not possible to determine, that the destruction of all bad actions without leaving any residue (un-destroyed) has taken place. There is no means-of-proof to determine that the performance of permanently obligatory actions, and actions which have to be performed because of some special cause, would merely prevent the accruing of sin, and would not generate some other ancillary fruit, because along with it (i.e. the prevention of the accrual of sin) such other fruit may possibly result side by side. For the Āpastamba Smṛti says — When a mango tree is planted for its fruit only, its shade and fragrance also become available along with the fruit, similarly, when religious duties are performed, other benefits also can accrue side by side. It is not possible for any body, who has not attained true i.e. perfect knowledge, to be able to assert confidently, that during his whole life between his birth and death, he would avoid performing acts performed with a desire (Kāmya-Karma) and avoid the performance of acts prohibited (Pratiṣiddha), because it is observed that even the most clever (persons) are guilty of performing some such venial acts. May be, all this can be justifiably doubted, still it certainly is difficult to be sure that no cause (for rebirth) exists. Without realizing the unity of the Jīva-Self and the Highest Brahman, which can only be realized by true knowledge, it is not possible to expect, that the Jīva-Self, whose nature is to be an agent and an experiencer, can wish for complete identification with the Supreme Spirit, because it is impossible (for one) to overcome one’s own nature as (for instance) it is impossible for Agni to overcome its own nature of heat. (The opponent of Vedānta says) — It may perhaps be like this. The actual effect of a Jīva-Self being in fact an agent and an experiencer (i.e. its being in a transmigratory condition) is something which is detrimental to it, but not its potential power of being such an agent or an experiencer, and hence, when the operation of such potential power is avoided by avoiding action, then, even if such potential power exists, Final Release may be reasonably sustainable. (We reply) — That cannot be so, because when such potentiality subsists, it is extremely difficult to avoid such potentiality producing its effect. (The opponent of Vedānta says again) — It may be this way: mere potential power, independently of other causes, does not begin to produce its effect, and so, even if such potential power subsists, being isolated, it would not offend in any way. (We reply) — Even that could not be so, because causes also are in relationship with the Jīva-Self by way of this permanent relation with such potential power. Hence when the Jīva-Self’s nature of being an agent and an experiencer subsists, and the identity of the Jīva-Self and Brahman which is to be understood through Vidyā, is not so understood, there is not even the least little hope of Final Release. The Scriptures which declare — “There is no other path (to salvation)” (SvetU.3.8), thus rule out any other path to Final Release than that of perfect knowledge. (If the opponent of Vedānta says) that, supposing the Jīva-Self to be non-different from the Highest Self, there would be the predicament of the cessation of all phenomenal activity i.e. practical existence, because there would be no scope for the operation of such means-of-proof as direct perception etc., (we reply) — No, because prior to the realization of Brahman, like the transactions in a dream prior to awakening, the continuance (i.e. the operation of the means-of-proof) would be reasonably sustainable. The Śāstra also, by the passage “For when there is duality as it were then one sees another” (BrhU.2.4.14; 4.5.15) etc., having spoken about the operation of such means-of-proof as direct perception etc. in the case of those who have not realized the truth (i.e. Brahman), again indicates the absence of it (i.e. the operation of such means-of-proof), in the case of those who have realized such truth (i.e. Brahman), by the passage “When every thing has, to him, become but the Self only, by what can he see and whom?” (BrhU.2.4.14; 4.5.15). Thus in the case of one who has realized the transcendent Brahman, inasmuch as the notion that Brahman is something which has to be approached is obliterated, it is not possible in any way to propound any movement (of approach towards Brahman). (The opponent of Vedānta says) — With respect to whom, then, are the Scriptural declarations about such a movement? It is replied — They may well be, with regard to the Vidyā of qualified Brahman, for even so, is such movement occasionally mentioned, in the Pañcāgni-Vidyā (the Vidyā of the Five Fires), and the Paryaṅka-Vidyā (Vidyā of the Couch of Brahman), and the Vaiśvā-nara-Vidyā (Vidyā of the Vaiśvā-nara Fire). Wherever such movement is spoken of even with respect to Brahman, as in the Scriptural passages “Prāṇa is Brahman, Joy is Brahman, Ākāśa is Brahman” (ChanU.4.10.5), “Now this lotus-like hall of the mansion in the city of Brahman (i.e. the body) which is there” (ChanU.8.1.1), even there, because of the attribute of being Vāmanī (carrier of blessings) and of having true desires, as it is only the qualified Brahman (Sa-guṇa Brahman) that has to be meditated upon, movement (of approach towards such qualified Brahman) is possible. The Scriptures, however, do not ever mention any such movement with respect to the transcendent Brahman, as they have specifically denied it by the passage “His Prāṇas do not depart” (BrhU.4.4.6). Even though, in the Scriptural passage “One who has realized Brahman, attains the Highest” (TaitU.2.1.1), the root “to attain” implies a movement, it should be understood, that, as described above, inasmuch as there is no possibility of reaching some other region, it should be looked upon as meaning, that the attainment (by the Jīva-Self) of its own nature, by way of the dissolution of the names and forms superimposed by Nescience, is spoken of, as in the Scriptural passage “Being but Brahman, he merges into Brahman” (BrhU.4.4.7) etc. Even if it is supposed that such movement is mentioned in connection with the transcendent Brahman, it ought to be understood as mentioned either for creating a taste, or for meditation. Now, in the case of one who has realized Brahman no such taste is possibly created by mentioning any such movement, because it happens to have been already brought about by the peace (of mind) which is vouchsafed to him by the knowledge (of Brahman), of which he is immediately and not distantly conscious in himself. Nor is it reasonably sustainable, that there can be any necessity of thinking about any such movement (on the part of the Jīva-Self) with respect to knowledge, which is not something capable of being acquired (as a fruit of some action) and which speaks of the Final Release which is always ready at hand. Therefore this ‘movement’ is only with respect to qualified Brahman (i.e. Sa-guṇa Brahman). Under these circumstances, because of the inability to grasp the distinction between the Highest Brahman and the qualified Lower Brahman, Scriptural statements about movement with respect to qualified Brahman, are superimposed on the transcendent Brahman. (Here, the opponent of Vedānta says) — What? Are there then two kinds of Brahman, the Highest or unqualified Brahman and the Lower or qualified Brahman? (We reply) — Well, of course there are these two kinds of Brahman, because there is this Scriptural passage, “Oh Satya-kāma, what this syllable ‘Om’ is, is the Highest and the Lower Brahman” (PrasU.5.2). What again is the Highest Brahman and what the lower Brahman (asks the opponent of Vedānta)? The reply is — Wherever there is instruction about Brahman by means of such words as “not gross etc.”, by denying the distinctions of names and forms brought about by Nescience, that is the Highest transcendent Brahman. Where, as in the Scriptural passage “Which has the structure of the mind, which has Prāṇa as the body, and which has the form (Rūpa) of brightness” (ChanU.3.14.2), instruction is given about Brahman as having the distinction of names and forms for the purpose of meditation, that is the Lower i.e. qualified Brahman. But (says the opponent of Vedānta), in this way, the Scriptural declarations about non-duality would be contradicted. (We reply) — No, because, it is refuted by the fact that it is affected by the limiting adjuncts such as names and forms which are brought about by Nescience. Of the meditation on the Lower Brahman, there is the fruit, as mentioned in the Scriptural passage “If he is desirous of the world of the manes” (ChanU.8.2.1), which is characterized by Lordship over the earth, and which is available in this transmigratory existence, because of the ignorance (of one who knows qualified Brahman only) not having been yet removed. As such fruit is confined to a particular environment, a movement for the attainment of it, is not contradictory. Even though the Self is all-pervading, that, like the movement of Ākāśa when a pot moves, it is well-known that the Jīva-Self is said to depart along with the movement of the limiting adjuncts of intelligence etc., has been stated by us in the Sūtra) — “On account of its having for its essence the qualities of that” (Bra. Su. II. iii. 29). Therefore it should be seen that the view of Bādari in Sūtra IV. iii. 7, is the final conclusion (Siddhānta view), and the view of Jaimini in Sūtra IV. iii. 12 is merely an indication of the Pūrva-Pakṣa view, for the purpose of the development of the intelligence (of the pupil). — 14.
[Go top]
[Go top]
A-pratīka-ālambanāt: those who do not have recourse to the symbols for the meditation of Brahman; Nayati: (the superhuman being) leads or takes; Iti Bādarāyaṇaḥ: so says Bādarāyaṇa; Ubhayathā: both ways; A-doṣāt: there being no defects; Tat-kratuh: as is the meditation on that, (so does one become); Ca: and.🔗 Bādarāyaṇa (is of opinion) that he (the non-human being) conducts these who do not take their resort upon the symbol (of Brahman). No fault arises either way, because, only he who wishes for it (reaches Brahman). — 4.3.15. It is firmly established so far, that (the Jīva-Self’s) movement is with respect to Brahma-the-effect (i.e. Sa-guṇa Brahman), and not with respect to the Highest Brahman. It is now doubted whether, the non-human being, leads all those who depend upon Brahma-the-effect, without any exception, to the world of Brahman, or some of them only. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that all those who have acquired the knowledge (of Brahman) move towards Brahma-the-effect, which is different from the Highest Brahman, because in Bra. Su. III. iii. 31, such movement (towards qualified Brahman) has been stated in the case of all other Vidyās generally. This being the condition (of the opponent of Vedānta) the Sūtra-kāra replies: — “Those who do not take their resort upon a symbol”. Bādarāyaṇa Ācārya is of opinion that the non-human being leads all those who take their resort upon Brahma-the-effect, except those who depend on a symbol, to the world of Brahman. No fault arises even if it is understood that there are both these ways. It is reasonably sustainable to say that the argument about there being no rule, holds good in all meditations, except those on symbols. It should be understood that the sentence ‘a man who entertains a desire for Brahman’ furnishes the reason which justifies there being those two ways. It is but proper (to say) that he who entertains a desire for Brahman reaches Brahmic Lordship, because of the Scriptural statement — “In whatever way he meditates, even so he becomes”. In the case of a symbol, no desire for Brahman is entertained, because in such meditations, the symbol is the principal thing. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the Scriptures declare that even those who do not entertain a desire for Brahman do also go towards Brahman, as in the passage in the Vidyā of the Five Fires, viz. “He leads them on to Brahman” (ChanU.4.15.5). (The reply is) — It may be, no such discussion is justified where it is so specifically mentioned, but where there is no mention of any such specific exception, it is possible to determine, according to the ordinary rule about those who entertain a desire for Brahman, that it is only those who entertain a desire for Brahman that reach it and no others. — 15.
[Go top]
Viseṣam: difference; Ca: and; Darśayati: the scripture declares.🔗 (The Scriptures) indicate that there is something special (about the fruit). — 4.3.16. With respect to meditations on symbols (of Brahman) such as Nāman (name) etc., the Scriptures indicate a specially greater and greater fruit of each succeeding meditation than the one in the case of an earlier meditation, by such passages as “He (who meditates on a Nāman as a symbol of Brahman) is free to go about at his pleasure, as far as the Nāman is capable of going” (ChanU.7.1.5), “Speech (Vāk), indeed is greater than a Nāman” (ChanU.7.2.1), “He is free to go about as far as speech (Vāk) can go” (ChanU.7.2.2), “Mind, indeed is greater than speech” (ChanU.7.3.1) etc. This specially greater and greater nature of the fruit is reasonably sustainable, because meditations depend upon the technique of the symbols. If they were to depend upon Brahman, in as much as Brahman is but one and one only, how could there be any speciality (of greater and greater) fruit? Therefore, it is, that meditations which depend upon symbols (of Brahman) have not the same fruit as the other meditations. — 16.
[Go top]
[Go top]
[Go top]
The Scriptures declare — “It is thus that the serene Jīva-Self (Samprasāda), having thus risen from this body and having attained unity with the Highest light (Jyotis) manifests itself in its own nature” (ChanU.8.12.3). With regard to this a doubt arises, as to whether it manifests itself in some particular adventitious (Āgantuka) form, as it does in a place where fruits of actions are experienced, such as the world of the Gods etc., or whether it manifests itself only in its own form as the Self. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that, may be, such manifestation is in an adventitious form, as in the other places, inasmuch as. Final Release also is known to be a sort of a fruit, and also because the word ‘to become manifest’ is an alternative (synonym) for the word ‘to be born’. Were such manifestation to be but in its own form, then it would manifest itself equally so in its earlier conditions also, because the form of an entity never perishes, and therefore this manifestation (of the Jīva-Self) must be in some particular adventitious manner. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta), 'we reply: —Sampadya: having attained; Āvir-bhāvaḥ: there is manifestation; Svena-śabdāt: from the word ‘own’. (Svena: by one’s own; Śabdāt: inferred from the word.)🔗 (When the Jīva-Self) has attained (unity with Brahman), there is manifestation of it (in its own form as Ātmā), because of the word ‘Sva’ (one’s own). — 4.4.1. It manifests itself in the pure form of its own Self, and not in some other adventitious form. Whence is it so? Because of the word ‘Sva’ (one’s own) in the Scriptural statement — “It manifests itself in its own Atmic form”, otherwise, the special qualifying adjective ‘Sva’ (one’s own) would not be appropriate. But (says the opponent of Vedānta) the word ‘Sva’ may merely convey the meaning of the form of the Self. (We reply) — No, because it is not necessary to say so in so many words, inasmuch as it is reasonably sustainable that whatever particular form any thing manifests itself in, it, all the same, is its own form and therefore (in that case) the qualifying word ‘Sva’ would be meaningless, but if the word is construed to mean the Self (Ātmā), the qualifying word has A meaning, in as much as the Jīva-Self manifests itself purely as its own Atmic Self and not in some other adventitious form. — 1.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) this non-liability of the form of a thing to perish both in the former and present condition being common, what is the difference (between the Jīva-Self’s earlier condition and its later condition) contemplated here? The Sūtra-kāra replies: —Muktaḥ: the liberated one, released, freed; Pratijñānāt: according to the promise.🔗 (The Jīva-Self now) attains Final Release, because the Scriptures have made a declaration (to that effect). — 4.4.2. That (Jīva-Self) which is here spoken of, as manifesting itself (in its own Atmic form), is one, that now is released from all bondage, and which subsists as its own pure Self, the special distinction being, that before, its Atmic Self was obscured by the three conditions, referred to in the Scriptural passage — “He happens to become blind, he weeps as it were, and is, as it were, destroyed” (ChanU.8.9.10–11, in which Indra points out these defects in the Self as taught him by Prajā-pati). (The opponent of Vedānta asks) — How again is it known, that it has now attained Final Release? (We reply) — Because the Scriptures have so declared. Because, the Scriptures having declared that the Self which is free from the defect of these three conditions, is the one that has to be explained (to the pupil), by the passage “I shall explain this same (Self) to you again” (ChanU.8.9.3; ChanU.8.10.4; ChanU.8.11.3), and having stated further on, that “Neither pleasure nor pain touch that Self which indeed has become disembodied” (ChanU.8.12.1), they ultimately conclude thus — “(It) manifests itself in its own Atmic form, that is the Highest Puruṣa” (ChanU.8.12.3). Similarly, in the introductory portion of the legend (of Indra and Prajā-pati) also, the declaration is with respect to the Self which has attained Final Release, thus — “That Self which is free from sin” (ChanU.8.7.1) etc. Besides, Final Release which is known to be the fruit, is dependent upon merely the cessation from bondage and not on the accrual of some extraordinary new condition altogether. As regards the argument (of the opponent of Vedānta) that ‘to be manifest’ is synonymous with ‘to be born’, that also, is with reference to the earlier condition (of the Jīva-Self), even as a person, who, after being cured of his malady, emerges from it (i.e. out of the illness), is a person who now is free from such malady. Therefore there is no fault. — 2.
[Go top]
Ātmā: the Supreme Self; Prakaraṇāt: on account of the subject matter of the discourse or context.🔗 Because of the chapter, (by the word Jyotis) the Self is understood here. — 4.4.3. (The opponent of Vedānta says) how is it said here (i.e. in Sūtra 2 above), ‘that (the Jīva-Self) attains Final Release’, even though, by the passage “Having attained the Highest Light” (ChanU.8.12.3), the Scriptures mention the Jīva-Self to have become that, which is perceived to be an effect (from the cause, Brahman), and inasmuch as the word Light (Jyotis) is by established usage positively understood to mean the physical light (the element created by Brahman)? Now, one who has not transcended the condition of being an effect, can never deserve to have attained Final Release, inasmuch as, an effect is well-known to be perishable. (We reply) — This is no fault, inasmuch as, the chapter makes it understood that by the word ‘Light’ (Jyotis), the Self (Ātmā) alone is meant, and when, in the Scriptural passage ‘This Self which is free from sin, and is ageless and deathless” (ChanU.8.7.1), the supreme transcendent Self is the relevant entity, it is not possible to understand the word Jyotis capriciously, as the physical light, as there would be the predicament of the abandonment of what is relevant (viz. the transcendent Self), and the acceptance of that which is irrelevant (viz. Tejas, an effect). Besides, the word ‘Light’ (Jyotis) is observed to be used for the Self, as in the Scriptural passage “That, the Gods (meditate upon) as the Light of Lights” (BrhU.4.4.16). This has also been fully elaborated (in Brahma-Sūtra I. iii. 40). — 3.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Avibhāgena: as inseparable; Dṛṣṭatvāt: for it is so seen from the scriptures.🔗 (The Jīva-Self in the condition of Final Release) subsists in a condition of non-separateness (from Brahman), because it is so seen (from the Scriptures). — 4.4.4. When the doubt is, as to whether, the Jīva-Self which attains the highest light, and manifests itself in its own Atmic form, is separate from the Supreme Self or subsists in a condition of non-separateness from it, and when the opponent of Vedānta, because of the Scriptural passage “He moves about in that condition” (ChanU.8.12.3), which indicates something in which something else subsists, and something which so subsists in such something, and “Having attained the light” (ChanU.8.12.3), which indicates an agent (Kartṛ) and an object (Karma) (of such agent’s activity), is of opinion that it continues to subsist separate (from Brahman), (the Sūtra-kāra) explains it (to the opponent of Vedānta) and declares that the Jīva-Self which has attained Final Release, subsists in a condition of non-separateness from the Supreme Self. Whence is it so? Because, it is so seen (from the Scriptures). For, the Scriptural passages “I am Brahman” (BrhU.1.4.10), “Where (he) sees nothing as separate” (ChanU.7.24.1), “There is nothing which makes itself a second to it, so that it may see something as separate” (BrhU.4.4.33) indicate the Supreme Self to be non-separate (from the Jīva-Self). Now following the reasoning (Nyāya) “Whatever his desire is etc.” (Bra. Su. IV. iii. 15), it is logical that, the fruit is, as is the knowledge. Also, Scriptural passages such as “Oh Gautama, just as pure water thrown into pure water, becomes one and the same and all-alike, even so, the Self of a sage who knows, becomes” (KathU.2.1.15), which purport to expound the nature of the Jīva-Self which has attained Final Release, indicate the non-separateness (of the Jīva-Self and the Supreme Self). Similarly, also the illustrations of the river and the sea etc. As to the reference to separateness, even when non-separateness is there, it can be described to be so in a figurative sense, as indicated in such Scriptural passages as “Oh Bhagavān, in what does it abide? It abides in its own glory” (ChanU.7.24.1). It is so seen also in “In love with itself”, “Sporting with one’s own Self” (ChanU.7.25.2). — 4.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Brāhmeṇa: as possessed of the attributes of Brahman; Jaiminiḥ: Jaimini (holds); Upanyāsa-ādibhyaḥ: on account of the reference etc.🔗 Jaimini (is of opinion) that, because of the statement (Upanyāsa) (in the Scriptures) etc., (the Jīva-Self) manifests itself in the Brahmic form. — 4.4.5. It is now settled that the Jīva-Self, according to the Scriptural statement “In its own Atmic nature” (ChanU.8.3.4), manifests itself only in the form of the Supreme Self and not in any other adventitious lower (Apara) form. Now, when the desire is to know the particular speciality of the form, it is stated (by the Sūtra-kāra) that Ācārya Jaimini is of opinion that it manifests itself in its own Brahmic form (comprising of the whole gamut of attributes) beginning with the nature of being free from all sin, and ending with the attribute of having true desires, as also (the attributes) of omniscience and lordship over all. Whence is it so? Because, it is so understood from the statements (Upanyāsa) etc. in the Scriptures. For the statements, beginning with “He who is free from all sin” (ChanU.8.7.1), and ending with “Having desires which are true and having true resolutions” (ChanU.8.7.1), inform us that the Self has the nature of its own Self. Again the passage “He moves about there, eating, sporting, and being completely engrossed in enjoying” (ChanU.8.12.3), intimates its attribute of lordly power, as also the passage “He has complete liberty of movement in all the worlds” (ChanU.7.25.2). And, it is only in this manner, that the references about it, as being omniscient and the Lord of all, become reasonably sustainable. — 5.
[Go top]
Citi-tad-mātreṇa: solely as pure consciousness (Tad-mātreṇa: solely); Tad-ātmakatvāt: that being its true nature or essence; Iti: thus, so; Auḍulomiḥ: Auḍulomi (thinks).🔗 Auḍulomi (is of opinion) that (the Jīva-Self manifests itself) only as pure sentiency, as that is its Self. — 4.4.6. Even though attributes such as those of being free from sin etc. are indicated (by the Scriptures) as being of separate forms, still they have their origin merely in the imaginary conceptions that arise (in the mind) by words, because, that they merely indicate the absence of sin etc., is understood (from the words), while, inasmuch as, ‘sentiency’ alone is the nature of this Self, it is but logical that the manifestation (of the Jīva-Self) should be, merely in its own nature of sentiency. For even so it is, that the Scriptural statements “Thus, oh (Maitreyī), this Self which has no inside or outside but which is wholly a solid mass of sentiency” (BrhU.4.5.13) happen to be in consonance with the Scriptures. Even though such attributes as “Having desires which are true etc.” are spoken of as being the attributes of an entity (dissolving the compound word ‘Satya-kāma’ as ‘he whose desires are true’), yet, inasmuch as they are dependent upon contact with limiting adjuncts they cannot possibly be, like Sentiency, the Selfs own nature, because in the case of Brahman, there is a denial of its having more than one i.e. several aspects. In the case of Brahman, this i.e. its having more than one aspect is denied in Bra. Su. III. ii. 11. Hence, the mention about it of eating etc. is meant merely to convey the absence of any misery, for the purpose of glorification, as it is, in the attribute of ‘loving its own Self’ (Ātma-ratiḥ) etc. It is not possible to describe Brahman (alone by itself) as having the attributes of love, sport and love-play, in the principal meaning of the terms, as they presuppose the existence of two entitles. Therefore, Ācārya Auḍulomi is of opinion that the Jīva-Self manifests itself in a way in which all phenomenal duality is effaced from it, and that it is serene, and as one having a nature of serene sentiency, which is not possible of being indicated (by any term). — 6.
[Go top]
Evam: thus; Api: even; Upanyāsāt: on account of reference; Pūrva-bhāvāt: owing to attribution of properties mentioned before; A-virodham: there is no contradiction; Bādarāyaṇaḥ: Bādarāyaṇa (thinks).🔗 Bādarāyaṇa (is of opinion) that even if it he so (i.e. even though the Jīva-Self attains Brahmic form of sentiency only), because of the Scriptural statement (Upanyāsa) (it is understood) that the Jīva-Self still retains its previous attributes also and there is thus no contradiction. — 4.4.7. Even if it is understood that the Jīva-Self has this transcendental attribute of pure sentiency only, still, inasmuch as, considering the phenomenal point of view, it is not denied that the Jīva-Self still retains its previous attribute of possessing Lordly powers also, as understood from the Scriptures, Ācārya Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that there is no contradiction. — 7.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Saṅkalpāt: by the exercise of will; Eva: only; Tu: but; Tat-śruteḥ: because Śruti says so.🔗 But, a person who has attained Final Release, (attains his desires) merely by his volition, because the Scriptures have stated so. — 4.4.8. The Scriptures have stated in the Vidyā of the Hṛdaya, thus — “If he is desirous of the world of the manes, then by his mere volition alone, his manes appear before him” (ChanU.8.2.1) etc. With regard to that the doubt is, whether mere volition itself is the only cause by which the manes etc. so appear (before him) or whether it has any other means combined with it. (The opponent of Vedānta says) even though the Scriptures mention mere volition alone (as the cause), still, as is observed in the ordinary world, it is logical, that there is need of other means also. Just as in the ordinary world, a man, like myself (for instance), meets his father etc. by a volition coupled with other means, such as approaching his father, even so, it may similarly be in the case of a person who has attained Final Release. It is only in this way that, nothing contrary to what is usually observed, will have been imagined. The expression ‘merely by his volition’ is used by taking it for granted, that as in the case of a king, the other equipment of means, by which the desired object is attained, is easy to obtain. Because, were the manes to appear (before the person who has attained Final Release) as a result of mere volition alone, because of their being of as unstable a nature as the display of mere volition, they would not be capable of affording much enjoyment. This being the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta) we reply: The manes would of course appear (before the person who has attained Final Release) merely as a result of his volition alone. Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statement about it. The Scriptural passage “His manes appear merely through his volition alone” (ChanU.8.2.1) etc. would be contradicted, if it is understood that other means also are necessary (for that purpose). If the other means also happen to be available by volition, may it well be so, but such means can never be understood to have been brought about by a separate effort of volition, as, otherwise before such other means become available, there would be the predicament of mere volition alone being rendered unfruitful. It is not possible to apply (the test of) what is ordinarily seen in the world, to things which can only be understood from the Scriptures. Inasmuch as the volition of a person who has attained Final Release, is different by nature, to the volition of the people in the ordinary world, it is through mere volition alone, that their (i.e. of manes etc.) being steady by nature till the attainment of the result desired, is understandable. — 8.
[Go top]
Ataḥ eva: for the very reason, therefore, so; Ca: and; An-anya-adhipatiḥ: without any other Lord.🔗 It is just because of this (i.e. that a person has attained Final Release) that he has no other Lord (to lord it over him). — 4.4.9. It is precisely because of this, i.e. because the volitions of a person who has attained Final Release are not unfructuous, that he has no other Lord to lord it over him. The meaning is, that there is no one else who is his Lord. Even an ordinary man, when he forms any resolution, does not, if he can help it, care to be dominated by another. The Scriptural passage “Now, those who depart (from this world), after having realized the Self, and having desires which are true i.e. sure of fulfilment, can move about the worlds with perfect freedom” (ChanU.8.1.6) also indicates the same thing. — 9.
[Go top]
[Go top]
A-bhāvam: absence (of body and organs); Bādariḥ: the sage Bādari (asserts); Āha: (the Śruti) says; Hi: because; Evam: thus.🔗 Bādari (is of opinion) that there is absence (of a body and sense-organs of a Jīva-Self, which has attained Final Release), the Scriptures also have declared similarly. — 4.4.10. Because of the Scriptural statement “By mere volition alone his manes appear (before him)” (ChanU.8.2.1) etc., the existence of the mind at least, as a means of volition, is proved. It is now being considered whether a person who has attained Final Release and has acquired lordly power, possesses a body and sense-organs. With regard to that Ācārya Bādari is of opinion, that in the case of a man who has attained such advancement, there is absence of a body and sense-organs. Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statement — “By visualising the desires of this world of Brahman with the mind alone, he becomes engrossed (in them)” (ChanU.8.12.5). Were he to be so engrossed while possessing a body and sense-organs also, in addition to a mind, there could not have been the specific particular mention (in the Scriptures) of the mind alone. Therefore, during the condition of Final Release there is absence of a body and sense-organs. — 10.
[Go top]
Bhāvam: existence; Jaiminiḥ: Jaimini (holds); Vikalpa-āmananāt: because the scripture declares (the capacity to assume) divine forms. (Vikalpa: option, diversity in manifestation; Āmananāt: from statement in Śruti.)🔗 Jaimini (is of opinion) that body and sense-organs do exist for him, because the Scriptures speak of an option (about them). — 4.4.11. — 11. Ācārya Jaimini is of opinion that a person who has attained Final Release does possess a body together with the sense-organs quite as surely as the mind, inasmuch as by the Scriptural passage “He becomes onefold, he becomes three-fold etc.” (ChanU.7.26.2) the option of being manifold is mentioned, and in the absence of different bodies, such manifoldness cannot be feasible. Even though, this option of becoming manifold is mentioned in the Vidyā of the Bhūmā (the great one) referring to the unqualified Brahman, still this lordly power which exists in the condition of qualified Brahman, is referred to for the purpose of the glorification of the Vidyā of the Bhūmā, and hence, there, it must be understood as being the fruit of the Vidyā of qualified Brahman. — 11.
[Go top]
It is said (here, by the Sūtra-kāra):Dvā-daśa-ahavat: like the twelve days’ sacrifice; Ubhaya-vidham: (is) of both kinds; Bādarāyaṇaḥ: Bādarāyaṇa (thinks); Ataḥ: so, therefore, from this, from this very reason.🔗 Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that (the finally released Jīva-Self) has both the characteristics. It is like (for instance) the “Dvā-daśa-aha” (Twelve-day Sacrifice). — 4.4.12. Ācārya Bādarāyaṇa again considers this two-fold condition to be proper, because, it is seen that there are indicatory marks of both the kinds, viz., that he becomes embodied or disembodied, just as he desires to have such a body or desires to be without such a body, because his determinate desires are true and because of the variety of his volition. This is like the Twelve-day Sacrifice (Dvā-daśa-aha) which is both a ‘Satra’ and an ‘Ahīna’, because the indicatory marks are of both the kinds (viz. the verbs ‘Upayanti’ (used in a Satra) and ‘Yajayet’ (used in an Ahīna) are used, which indicate it to be both a Satra and an Ahīna). It is so in this case also. — 12.
[Go top]
Tanu-a-bhāve: in the absence of a body; Sandhyavad: just as in dreams (which stand midway between waking and deep sleep); Upapatteḥ: this being reasonable.🔗 In the absence of a body, it becomes reasonably sustainable, as (it is) in a dream-condition. — 4.4.13. When there is absence of a body and sense-organs, then as in a dream-condition a body and sense-organs do not exist, and objects of desire, such as the manes etc., are only of the nature of a mere perception (and hence merely unsubstantial), even so, during the condition of Final Release also, it is reasonably sustainable, only in that way. — 13.
[Go top]
Bhāve: when the body exists; Jāgradvat: just as in the waking state.🔗 When the finally released Jīva-Self, is in an embodied condition, it is, as it is, in a waking condition. — 4.4.14. When a body does exist, as for instance in the waking condition, a father or such other entities are actually in existence (and are not mere perceptions only) even so it is during the condition of Final Release, when a body still exists. — 14.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Pradīpavat: like the flame of a lamp; Āveśaḥ: entering, animating; Tathā: thus, so; Hi: because; Darśayati: the scripture shows (or declares).🔗 The entering (Āveśa) (of the Jīva-Self that has attained Final Release, into several bodies) is like a lamp, because the Scriptures indicate it to be so. — 4.4.15. In Brahma-Sūtra IV. iv. 11 — “Jaimini (is of opinion) that body and sense-organs do exist, because the Scriptures mention an option (about them)” — it has been stated, that a person who has attained Final Release does possess a body. So, it has to be seen here, whether, with respect to his becoming three-fold etc., when many different bodies are created, the bodies so created are as if they are mere wooden figures devoid of the Self, or whether they are created like our bodies along with the Jīva-Self, (and when the conclusion of the opponent of Vedānta is) that, inasmuch as any division of the Self and the mind is not reasonably sustainable, and as they have already a connection with one body, the other bodies are (necessarily) without the Self, we reply — “The entering into (Āveśa), is like the lamp”, just as a lamp, one as it is, becomes many (lamps) on account of its possessing the power to modify itself into an effect. In this way, a man that has attained knowledge, single as he is, having attained the condition of being many, by means of his lordly power, enters into all the bodies. Whence is it so? Because the Śāstra indicates that one becomes many, by the Scriptural passage — “He becomes one-fold, three-fold, five-fold, seven-fold, and ninefold etc.” (ChanU.7.26.2). This cannot be imagined to be so, if the simile of the wooden figures is accepted, or if this entering into all the bodies, is by some other Jīva-Selfs. Nor is any movement on the part of bodies devoid of Selfs, possible. With regard to the objection (of the opponent of Vedānta) that, inasmuch as any division of the Self or the mind is not reasonably sustainable, there is no possibility of the Jīva-Self having several separate bodies, (we reply) — This is no fault, inasmuch as the desires of a man who has attained knowledge are true, and he can very well create bodies equipped with minds which would follow the lead of one mind. And when they are so created, because of the differences in the limiting adjuncts (in the form of bodies), the Selfs also will be different (from each other), and would be able to preside over the different bodies. The Yoga-Śāstra also speaks of the use of the same technique with regard to the Yogins having simultaneous connection with several bodies. — 15.
[Go top]
(The opponent of Vedānta says) — How again is it understood that a person that has attained Final Release, can have the lordly power of entering into several different bodies, when Scriptural passages, such as — “Whereby and whom would one see” (BrhU.4.5.15), “There is nothing, however, that is other than himself, so that he can know of something which is separate from him” (BrhU.4.3.30), “He then is (clear) like water, is the only one that is a seer and is without a second” (BrhU.4.3.32), deny any special knowledge? Hence the reply is given, thus:Sva-apyaya-sampattyoḥ: of deep sleep and absolute union (with Brahman); Anyatara-apekṣam: having in view either of these two; Āviṣ-kṛtam: this is made clear (by the Śruti); Hi: because. (Sv-apyaya: deep sleep (entering into oneself); Anyatara: either, any of the two; Apekṣam: with reference to, with regard to.)🔗 (That the Jīva-Self that has attained Final Release has no special cognition, is spoken of by the Scriptures) with reference to either complete merger or the attainment of unity, because it is so made clear. — 4.4.16. By complete merger, deep sleep is meant, because the Scriptural passage says — “He becomes merged into himself, therefore, it is said that he sleeps” (ChanU.6.8.1). Attainment (of unity) means a pure isolated condition (Kaivalya), because of the Scriptural passage — “Himself being Brahman in fact, he becomes merged in Brahman” (BrhU.4.4.6). It is with reference to one of these two conditions that the Scriptures speak of the condition of the absence of any special cognition. Sometimes it is spoken of with reference to the condition of deep sleep, and sometimes with reference to the pure isolated condition. Whence is it so understood? Because wherever this absence of special cognition is referred to, the chapter deals with either of these two conditions, as in the Scriptural passages — “Having emanated from the elements, it perishes after them, having departed (i.e. having died) there is no further cognition” (BrhU.2.4.14), “Where every thing has become but the Self only” (BrhU.2.4.14), “Where being in deep sleep he does not desire any thing and sees no dreams” (BrhU.4.3.19, Mandukya. 5). Where however this lordly power is spoken of, it is with reference to a different condition, similar to the condition of the heavenly world etc., where the Vidyā of the qualified Brahman ripens into fruition. Therefore, there is no fault. — 16.
[Go top]
[Go top]
Jagad-vyāpāra-varjam: except the power of creation, etc., Prakaraṇāt: (on account of the Lord being) the subject matter, because of the general topic of the chapter; A-sannihitattvāt: on account of (liberated souls) not being mentioned on account of non-proximity; Ca: and. (Jagat: world; Vyāpāra: creation etc.; Varjam: excepted.)🔗 (Those who have attained Final Release possess all the lordly powers) barring the operation of running this world, (is understood) from the chapter (having the Lord as the relevant subject) and also because of the absence of proximity (of the person finally released). — 4.4.17. Now, with regard to those, who, through meditation on qualified Brahman, attain unity with the Lord, along with the mind, the doubt arises, whether they have unlimited power or have only a limited power. What then is the conclusion (of the opponent of Vedānta)? It is, that because of the Scriptural passages “He attains the Self’s Lordship” (TaitU.1.6.2), “All deities carry offerings to him” (TaitU.1.5.3), “They move freely in all the worlds” (ChanU.7.25.2, ChanU.8.1.6), they deserve to have unlimited powers. This being the conclusion, the reply is — They have all the powers, barring that of the operation of running the world. Barring the creation etc. of the world, they deserve to possess all other powers, such as Aṇimā (the power to reduce one’s Self to the dimension of an atom) etc., the operation of running this world however being the exclusive power of the eternally perfect lord. Whence is it so? Because of the Lord being the relevant subject there and the others not being anywhere in proximity. It is the Highest Lord who has jurisdiction over the operation of running this world. It is with reference to him that the Scriptures speak of the creation etc., and also because the word ‘eternal’ is confined to him only. The Scriptures speak of the lordly power of the other Jīva-Selfs such as assuming the dimensions of an atom etc. as a result of the antecedent search for Him (the Lord) and a desire to know him. They are not in proximity with the operation of running this world. Besides, each of them (i.e. the Jīva-Selfs) precisely because of having a separate mind of its own, when they are not all of one mind, one of them may wish that the world should subsist, while another may desire its destruction, and thus there may perhaps be a conflict (as between them). If, however, it is sought to uphold that there would be no such conflict, on the assumption that the intention of one may follow the intention of the other, then that would just establish straight off, that all the Jīva-Selfs depend upon the will of the Highest Lord. — 17.
[Go top]
Pratyakṣa-upadeśāt: on account of direct teaching; Iti: so, thus; Cet: if; (Iti cet: if it be said); Na: not; Adhikārika-maṇḍala-stha-ukteḥ: because the scripture declares that the soul attains Him who entrusts the sun, etc., with their offices and abodes in those spheres. (Adhikārika: the master of a world, a world-ruler; Maṇḍala-stha: existing in spheres, i.e., those abiding in the spheres, of those entrusted with the special functions; Ukteḥ: as it is clearly stated in Śruti.)🔗 If it be said (that the lordly power of the Jīva-Selfs that have attained Final Release is unlimited) because of direct Scriptural statement, (we say) — No, because the Scriptures declare (that the Jīva-Selfs attain Him who holds command over the Sun etc. and who resides in their spheres). — 4.4.18. The argument (of the opponent of Vedānta) that because of the direct statement of the Scriptures, thus — “He attains unity with the Self” (TaitU.1.6.2), it is logical (to understand) that the lordly power of those who have attained Final Release is unlimited, has to be refuted. With regard to that, it is said — This is no fault. Because this attainment of unity with the Self depends upon the statement about him who holds command over the Sun etc. and who resides in those spheres. It is stated that the unity with the Self, attained (by the Jīva-Selfs), is dependent upon him who holds command over and resides in the particular abodes of the spheres of the Sun etc. (viz. the Highest Lord), because it is stated later on that “He attains the Lord of the mind” (TaitU.1.6.2). It means that the Jīva-Self attains the Lord of the mind i.e. the eternally existing Īśvara. And following the same lead, it is stated later on — “He becomes the Lord of the speech, the Lord of the eye, the Lord of the ear and the Lord of the knowledge” (TaitU.1.6.2). Thus in this context also, it should be construed as far as possible that the lordly power of the others is dependent upon the eternal perfect Lord. — 18.
[Go top]
Vikāra-avarti: which is beyond all effected things, becomes incapable of transformation by birth, decay, death, etc.; Ca: and; Tathā: so; Hi: because; Sthitim: status, condition, existence; Āha: (Śruti) declares.🔗 There is another form of the Highest Lord which does not abide in the effect (Vikārāvarti), for the Scriptures declare his existence in that manner. — 4.4.19. There is also a form of the Highest Lord which is eternally free and which does not abide in the effect, and it is not that it has only that one form which is perceptible in the effect and which resides in the sphere of the Sun etc. Thus is its existence in two forms spoken by the Scriptures in the passage — “Such is his greatness, and the Puruṣa is even greater than that. All beings collectively form but one foot (i.e. part) of Him, and the other three feet mean that which is immortal in the heaven” (ChanU.3.12.6) etc. It is not possible to say, that those who depend upon his other forms, attain that form of his which does not undergo any modification, because they have not entertained any desire about it. Hence it should be understood that even when there are these two forms of the Highest Lord, (the Jīva-Selfs) not having attained the unqualified form, they abide only in the qualified form and similarly not having attained unlimited powers in the qualified form, they possess the limited powers only. — 19.
[Go top]
Darśayataḥ: they both show; Ca: and; Evam: thus; Pratyakṣa-anumāne: direct perception (‘before the eyes’, directly revealed, Śruti) and inference (‘following thinking’, Smṛti).🔗 That this is so is also indicated by direct perception and inference (i.e.Śruti and Smṛti). — 4.4.20. The Scriptures and the Smṛti also indicate, that the Highest Light (Jyotis) does not abide in its modification, thus — “The Sun is unable to shine there, nor the Moon, nor the Stars nor also the Lightning, whence then can this Agni (shine there)?” (KathU.2.2.15, SvetU.6.14, MunU.2.2.10) and “The Sun does not illumine it, nor the Moon, nor the fire” (BhG.15.6). In this way, the Sūtra-kāra means, that it is well-known that the Highest Jyotis (Light, i.e. the Highest Lord, Brahman) does not abide in its modification. — 20.
[Go top]
Bhoga-mātra: with respect to enjoyment only; Sāmya: equality; Liṅgāt: from the indication of Śruti; Ca: also, and.🔗 Because of the indicatory mark (in the Scriptures) about equality only about experience (Bhoga) (between Jīva-Selfs that have attained Final Release, and the Highest Lord), and also because (it is understood that the former do not possess unlimited powers). — 4.4.21. This is again why those who depend upon Brahma-the-effect (Kārya-Brahman) only, do not possess unlimited powers, inasmuch as it is stated in the Scriptures, that it is only this experience (Bhoga), that they have in common with the Eternal Lord, because of the indicatory marks thus — “(Hiraṇya-garbha said to the meditator), the (Primeval) Waters verily indeed are my worlds and yours also” (Kaush. 1.7), “All beings honour that deity. So do all beings honour him, who knows that. He obtains through it, equality in body (Sāyujya) and sameness of abode (Sālokya) with the deity” (BrhU.1.5.23). — 21.
[Go top]
But (says the opponent of Vedānta) if it be so, then because of the lordly powers being either more or less, they are such, as are prone to come to an end and the Jīva-Selfs will be liable to revert (to the transmigratory existence). To this, Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa replies:An-āvṛttiḥ: no return; Śabdāt: on account of the scriptural statement.🔗 On the authority of the Scriptures, there is no more return, there is no more return (to transmigrational existence). — 4.4.22. Those who go by the path of the. Gods, which is connected with the Nāḍī and the ray (of the Sun) and have Arci etc. as its stages, towards the world of Brahman having special characteristics as stated by the Śāstra, thus — “That world of Brahman which is the third in the order of the heavens from here, and in which there are two seas (of nectar) by name Ara and Ṇya, a lake which consists of food which is intoxicating, an Aśvattha tree oozing Soma, a city of the Gods called Aparā-jitā in which there is a golden palace built by the Lord and which is often described at length in the Mantras and Artha-Vādas etc., arrive there, but do not return from there, as some do from the world of the Moon after completing their experience (Bhukta-bhogāḥ)”. Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptural statements — “Proceeding upwards they attain immortality” (ChanU.8.6.6, KathU.2.3.16), “In their case there is no return” (BrhU.6.2.15), “Those who arrive by the path do not again return to this transitory worldly whirlpool” (ChanU.4.15), “He attains the world of Brahman, and does not return” (ChanU.8.15.1) etc. Even though their powers are liable to come to an end, as to how they never return has been indicated in Brahma-Sūtra IV. iii. 10. That, in the case of those whose darkness of ignorance has been dispelled by perfect knowledge, and who have resorted to the eternal Nirvāṇa, there is no return, has been established. Hence it goes without saying that those also who resort to qualified Brahman and have their resort in that Nirvāṇa, do not return. The repetition of the words ‘do not return’ indicates the end of the Śāstra. — 22.
Go to Top ('Home' key on many Windows browsers)
| Abbreviation References | |
|---|---|
| Ait. | Aitareyopaniṣad |
| Ait. Bra. | Aitareya Brāhmaṇa |
| Ait. Ar. | Aitareya Āraṇyaka |
| Bh. G. | Bhagavadgītī |
| Bra. Su. | Brahma-Sūtras |
| Bra. Su. Bha. | Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya |
| Brih. | Brihad-āraṇyakopaniṣad |
| Chhan. | Chandogyopaniṣad |
| Dha. Su. | Dharma-Sūtra |
| Gaudapada Ka. | Gaudapāda Kārikā |
| Isha. | Īṣavāsyopaniṣad |
| Jābāla. | Jābālopaniṣad |
| Jai. Su. | Jaimini Sūtra |
| Katha. | Kaṭhopaniṣad |
| Kena. | Kenopanishad |
| Kaivalya | Kaivalyopaniṣad |
| Kaush. | Kauṣītakyopanishad |
| Kaush. Bra. | Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa |
| M. Bh. | Mahā-bhārata |
| Manu. Sam. | Manu-Saṃhitā |
| Muktik. | Muktikopaniṣad |
| Mund. | Muṇḍakopaniṣad |
| Nara. | Nārāyaniyopaniṣad |
| Nyāya-Su. | Nyāya-Sūtra |
| Prashna. | Praṣnopaniṣad |
| Pu.-Ml. | Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā |
| Ṛg.-Ved. Sam. | Ṛg-Veda-Saṃhitā |
| Sarvanu. | Sarvānukramaṇī |
| Śat. Brā. | Śata-patha-Brāhmaṇa |
| Shvet. | Śvetāśvatāropaniṣad |
| Tait. | Taittirīyopaniṣad |
| Tait. Ār. | Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka |
| Tait. Brā. | Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa |
| Tait. Sam. | Taittirīya-Saṃhitā |
| Tan. Bra. | Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa |
| Vai. Sū. | Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra |
॥इति ब्रह्मसूत्र-शानङ्कर-भाष्यम् Translation॥